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**FM 5-0  
(101-5)**

**Army  
Planning and Orders  
Production**

**FINAL DRAFT**

**15 JULY 2002**

**HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY**

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# Army Planning and Orders Production

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\*When approved, this publication will supersede FM 101-5.

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## Preface

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FM 5-0 is the Army's keystone manual for planning operations. It is the Army's doctrinal source for problem solving, the military decision making process (MDMP), and troop leading procedures (TLP).

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### PURPOSE

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FM 5-0 promotes a common understanding of the fundamentals of planning and provides the foundation for developing planning tactics, techniques, and procedures in all Army publications. It is the common reference for planning instruction in the Army education system.

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FM 5-0 cannot be read in isolation. To understand it, readers must understand the fundamentals of full spectrum operations described in FM 3-0, *Operations*, and the art of tactics described in FM 3-90, *Tactics*. They must also understand how the activities described in FM 3-07, *Stability Operations and Support Operations*, carry over and affect offensive and defensive operations, and vice versa. They must understand the operations process (plan, prepare, execute, and continuously assess) described in FM 6-0, *Command and Control*, and how mission command, commander's visualization, and exercising command and control influence planning. FM 5-0 also refers to joint publications. Reviewing them will help readers understand how Army planning supports and complements joint planning.

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### SCOPE

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FM 5-0 includes material on the MDMP and formats for plans, orders, and briefings formerly found in FM 101-5, *Staff Organization and Operations*. Staff duties and responsibilities, information management, and liaison formerly addressed in FM 101-5, are now covered in FM 6-0.

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Chapter 1 describes the Army's approach to planning and discusses the nature of plans and planning activities. Chapter 2 discusses problem solving in general terms and prescribes the steps of Army problem solving. Chapter 3 explains the MDMP. Chapter 4 discusses TLP. The appendixes serve as planning tools to assist commanders and staffs in planning, orders production, and military briefings.

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### APPLICABILITY

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FM 5-0 applies to all Army leaders. Chapters 1 and 2 contain tactics, techniques, and procedures that apply to solving problems at all echelons throughout the institutional and field Army. The primary audiences for Chapter 3 are battalion-through corps-level commanders, leaders, and staffs. Chapter 4 applies primarily at echelons below battalion. The appendixes support Chapters 3 and 4.

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The doctrine in FM 5-0 applies across the spectrum of conflict (peacetime military engagement, smaller-scale contingencies, and major theater war), and the range of operations (offense, defense, stability, and support). Army headquarters

41 serving as a joint force land component command or joint task force headquarters  
42 should refer to JP 5-0, *Planning*, and other joint planning publications.  
43 Additionally, Army service component commands, and headquarters serving as  
44 ARFOR headquarters should also refer to FM 3-93, *The Army In Theater*  
45 *Operations*, for Army-specific operational planning considerations.

## 46 ADMINISTRATIVE INFORMATION

47 The proponent for this manual is Headquarters, US Army Training and Doctrine  
48 Command (TRADOC). Send comments and recommendations on DA Form 2028  
49 (Recommended Changes to Publications and Blank Forms) to Commander, US  
50 Army Combined Arms Center and Fort Leavenworth, Combined Arms Doctrine  
51 Directorate, ATTN: ATZL-FD-CD, 1 Reynolds Road, Fort Leavenworth, KS  
52 66027-1352.

53 Unless stated otherwise, masculine nouns or pronouns do not refer exclusively to  
54 men.

55 This publication contains copyrighted material.

56 Cross-references use the new field manual numbering system. The bibliography  
57 lists field manuals by new number followed by old number.

58 The glossary lists most terms used in FM 5-0 that have joint or Army definitions.  
59 Terms for which FM 5-0 is the proponent manual (the authority) are indicated  
60 with an asterisk. The glossary does not list acronyms and abbreviations that are  
61 included for clarity only and appear one time, nor those that appear only in a  
62 figure and are listed in the legend for that figure. Some common abbreviations  
63 and acronyms—for example, the abbreviations for military ranks and  
64 publications—are not spelled out; refer to the glossary. Since *ARFOR* is a defined  
65 term as well as an acronym, it is not spelled out.

66 Definitions for which FM 5-0 is the proponent manual are printed in boldface in  
67 the text. Other definitions are not printed in boldface. The term being defined is  
68 italicized, and the proponent manual follows the definition.

# Introduction

As warfare has become more complex, military staff procedures and decision making have evolved in an effort to help commanders make good decisions faster than their opponents can react. Modern military staff procedures can be traced back to the formation of the Prussian *generalstab* (general staff) under General Helmuth von Moltke in the late nineteenth century. The *generalstab* was largely responsible for orchestrating Prussia's rapid defeat of Austria in 1866 and France in 1871. Detailed algorithms for mobilization, rail schedules, and troop movements became the business of Prussian, and later German, army staffs. These were the keys to success in a time when victory in European wars required rapid mobilization and movement of forces to the area of operations.<sup>1</sup>

The beginnings of a modern staff system in the US Army emerged between the American Civil War (1861–1865) and Spanish-American War (1898). However, doctrine for staff procedures and planning processes was limited until World War I. Not until the 1924 publication of *Field Service Regulations* does Army doctrine show formatted orders—both field and administrative—with annexes, maps, and tables. Even then, doctrine only alluded to the requirement for leaders to make an “estimate of the situation” and follow a deliberate process that culminated in a decision on a definite plan of action.<sup>2</sup>

In 1932, the first manual for staff officers was published under authority of then Army Chief of Staff, General Douglas MacArthur. The 1932 *Staff Officer's Field Manual* provided a comprehensive command and staff doctrine. Modern Army staff procedures are based on it. Not only were the formats for orders more detailed than in the 1924 *Field Service Regulations*; the manual also described staff functions and explained a five-step commander's estimate process.

In August 1940, more than a year before the United States' entry into World War II, the first FM 101-5—*Staff Officer's Field Manual, The Staff and Combat Orders*—was published. The doctrine it established was broader in scope and depth than that in the 1932 *Staff Officer's Field Manual*. It explained definitions and commander and staff responsibilities more precisely. The 1940 edition of FM 101-5 guided Army commanders and staffs throughout World War II and for almost five years afterwards.<sup>3</sup>

After World War II, a new method for prescribing and disseminating doctrine for staff organization and operations emerged; it continues today. At that time, the US Army Command and General Staff College (CGSC) began publishing staff doctrine in draft to update frequently changing terms and procedures. A 1949 CGSC student handbook, for example, added emphasis to the planning process while keeping orders formats established in FM 101-5 (1940). Later CGSC publications were published as numbered reference books and student texts under various titles and formats. In the last half of the twentieth century, the Army often used CGSC publications to keep staff and planning doctrine current between revisions of FM 101-5.

FM 101-5 was revised five times between 1940 and 1984. In May 1997, 13 years after its last revision, FM 101-5, then titled *Staff Organization and Operations*,

45 was republished. It focused on command and staff relationships, staff  
46 organizations and characteristics, responsibilities of staff officers, the military  
47 decision making process, and the mechanics of producing orders. Additionally, it  
48 included doctrine on information management and formally introduced two  
49 central concepts of Army command and control doctrine: the commander's intent  
50 and CCIR (commander's critical information requirements).

51 FM 5-0 marks the sixth revision of Army planning doctrine since FM 101-5 was  
52 first published in 1940. Together, FM 5-0 and FM 6-0, *Command and Control*,  
53 replace FM 101-5. FM 5-0 now addresses only planning. FM 6-0 addresses  
54 command and control, staff organization and operations, and the duties and  
55 relationship between the commander and staff. This organization mirrors a  
56 similar distinction made in joint doctrine.

57 The doctrine FM 5-0 prescribes is built on two central themes:

58 First, commanders are responsible for planning. Planning is part of the broader  
59 field of command and control. It is a fundamental responsibility of commanders.  
60 While the staff completes much of the detailed analysis and preparations of plans  
61 and orders, the commander plays a central role in planning through the  
62 commander's intent and planning guidance. These guide the activities of the staff  
63 and subordinate commanders. The staff assists the commander with the  
64 coordination and detailed analysis necessary to convert the commander's intent  
65 and planning guidance into a plan.

66 Second, planning supports mission command. *Mission command* is the conduct of  
67 military operations through decentralized execution based upon mission orders  
68 for effective mission accomplishment (FM 6-0, *Command and Control*). It is the  
69 Army's preferred method of command and control. Successful mission command  
70 results in subordinate leaders at all echelons exercising disciplined initiative  
71 within the commander's intent. Planning and its products (plans and orders)  
72 support mission command when they produce mission orders.

73 *Mission orders* are a technique for completing combat orders that allows  
74 subordinates maximum freedom of planning and action to accomplish missions  
75 and leaves the "how" of mission accomplishment to the subordinates (FM 6-0).  
76 They concentrate on the objective of the operation, not on every detail required to  
77 accomplish the mission. FM 5-0 incorporates the philosophy of mission command.  
78 It describes how to produce mission orders.

79 FM 5-0 expands Army planning doctrine. To plan effectively, planners and  
80 commanders must appreciate the nature of planning and plans. Planners must  
81 understand the purpose, environment, and characteristics of the planning  
82 process. Knowledge of FM 5-0 forms the basis for this understanding.

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<sup>1</sup>Christopher R. Paparone, COL, "US Army Decisionmaking: Past, Present, and Future", *Military Review* ( July-Aug 01 ), p.46

<sup>2</sup> Ibid., p.47.

<sup>3</sup> Ibid.

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# Chapter 1

## The Art of Planning

*Successful generals make plans to fit circumstances, but do not try to create circumstances to fit plans.<sup>1</sup>*

General George S. Patton Jr.

Chapter 1 provides an overview of the nature of planning. It includes planning fundamentals and describes the functions of planning and plans. It emphasizes mission command as the preferred command and control concept for planning operations in uncertain and fluid environments. It provides common planning concepts, to include how planning supports decision making and how time, uncertainty, and risk influence planning. Chapter 1 describes effective planning and discusses the pitfalls that commonly impede it. Finally, this chapter addresses how modern information systems enhance planning.

### THE NATURE OF PLANNING

- 1-1. Military operations are uncertain and unpredictable. They are complex endeavors—struggles between opposing human wills. Commanders face thinking and adaptive enemies. They can never predict with certainty how enemies will act and react, or how events will develop. Even friendly actions are difficult to predict because of friction, such as the effects of stress on individuals, and because of human mistakes. Leaders that understand the dynamic relationship that time and uncertainty have on enemy and friendly forces are better equipped to develop effective plans. Given the uncertain nature of operations, the object of planning is not to eliminate uncertainty but to develop a framework for action in the midst of it.
- 1-2. *Planning* is the means by which the commander envisions a desired outcome, lays out effective ways of achieving it, and communicates to his

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28 subordinates his vision, intent, and decisions, focusing on the results he  
 29 expects to achieve (FM 3-0, *Operations*). The outcome of planning is a plan or  
 30 an order that assigns tasks to subordinates, contains the minimum  
 31 coordinating measures necessary to synchronize the operation, directs  
 32 preparation activities, allocates or reallocates resources, and establishes  
 33 times or conditions for execution.

35 1-3. Plans forecast but do not  
 37 predict. A plan is a continu-  
 39 ous, evolving framework of  
 41 anticipated actions that maxi-  
 43 mize opportunities. It guides  
 45 subordinates as they progress

*Any plan is a framework from which to adapt, not a script to be followed to the letter.*

FM 3-0, *Operations*

46 through each phase of the operation. The measure of a good plan is not  
 47 whether execution transpires as planned but whether the plan facilitates  
 48 effective action in the face of unforeseen events. Good plans foster initiative.

49 1-4. Full spectrum operations demand a flexible approach to planning that  
 50 adapts planning methods to each situation. An effective planning process  
 51 structures the thinking of commanders and staffs while supporting their  
 52 insight, creativity, and initiative. The Army uses three different, but related  
 53 processes to guide planning activities:

- 54 • Army problem solving.
- 55 • The military decision making process (MDMP).
- 56 • Troop leading procedures (TLP).

57 1-5. Army problem solving is an administrative planning process that applies  
 58 to all echelons (see Chapter 2). The Army’s two tactical planning processes—  
 59 MDMP and TLP—follow the basic logic of Army problem solving. The MDMP  
 60 is more appropriate for headquarters with staffs. It provides a logical  
 61 sequence of decisions and interactions between the commander and staff for  
 62 developing estimates and effective plans (see Chapter 3). At lower tactical  
 63 echelons, commanders do not have staffs. Leaders at company level and  
 64 below usually use TLP to plan and prepare for an operation (see Chapter 4).  
 65 Army problem solving, the MDMP, and TLP are means to an end. Their value  
 66 lies in the result, not the process.

67 **THE SCIENCE AND ART OF PLANNING**

68 1-6. Planning is both science and art. Many aspects of military operations—  
 69 such as, movement rates, fuel consumption, and weapons effects—are  
 70 quantifiable. They are part of the science of planning. Other aspects—for  
 71 example, the combination of forces, choice of tactics, and arrangement of  
 72 activities—belong to the art of planning. Effective planners understand and  
 73 master both the science and the art of planning.

74 **The Science of Planning**

75 1-7. The science of planning encompasses aspects of operations—capabilities,  
 76 techniques, and procedures—that can be measured and codified. These  
 77 include the physical capabilities of friendly and enemy organizations and  
 78 systems. It includes a realistic appreciation for time-distance factors and  
 79 understanding how long it takes to initiate certain actions. The science of

80 planning includes the techniques and procedures used to accomplish planning  
 81 tasks and the tactical terms and control measures that compose the language  
 82 of tactics. While not easy, the science of planning is straightforward.

83 1-8. Planners master the science aspect of military operations to understand  
 84 the physical and procedural constraints under which units operate. However  
 85 —because military operations are an intensely human activity—planning  
 86 cannot be reduced to a formula. This fact necessitates understanding the art  
 87 of planning.

88 **The Art of Planning**

89 1-9. The art of planning requires understanding how the dynamic  
 90 relationships between friendly forces, adversaries, and the environment  
 91 create the complexity of operations. This understanding assists planners in  
 92 developing simple and flexible plans for a variety of circumstances. The art of  
 93 planning includes knowing the effects of operations on soldiers. It involves  
 94 the commander’s willingness to take calculated risks.

97 1-10. The art of  
 98 planning requires creative  
 99 application of doctrine,  
 101 tactics, techniques,  
 102 procedures, units, and resources. It  
 103 requires a thorough  
 104 knowledge and applica-  
 105 tion of the fundamen-  
 106 tals of full spectrum  
 107 operations (see Figure  
 108 1-1 and FM 3-0, *Opera-*  
 109 *tions*) and the art of  
 110 tactics (see FM 3-90,  
 111 *Tactics*).

127 1-11. The art of  
 128 planning involves devel-  
 129 oping plans within the  
 130 commander’s intent and  
 131 planning guidance. It  
 132 includes identifying the  
 133 decisive operation and  
 134 envisioning how shap-  
 135 ing and sustaining oper-  
 136 ations support it. Plan-  
 137 ning involves designing  
 138 plans by choosing from  
 139 interrelated options, including—

- 140 • Types and forms of operations, forms of maneuver, and tactical mission
- 141 tasks.
- 142 • Task organization of available forces.
- 143 • Resource allocation.




Figure 1-1. Fundamentals of Full Spectrum Operations

- 155 • Choice and arrangement of control measures.
- 156 • Tempo.
- 157 • Risk the commander is willing to take.

158 1-12. These options define a starting point from which planners create  
 159 distinct solutions to particular tactical problems. Each decision involves a  
 160 range of options. Each balances competing demands and requires judgment.  
 161 The factors of METT-TC (mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and  
 162 support available, time available, civil considerations) always combine to  
 163 form a different set of circumstances. Thus, there are no checklists that  
 164 adequately apply to every situation. Commanders and staffs combine the art  
 165 and science of planning to develop effective plans.

166 **THE FUNDAMENTALS OF PLANNING**

167 1-13. Commanders and staffs consider certain planning fundamentals  
 168 when developing plans. These fundamentals lend rigor and focus to the  
 169 purely creative aspect of planning and provide a crucial link between theory  
 170 and application. The degree of application of these fundamentals varies  
 171 with the situation.  
 172  
 173  
 174  
 175

**Fundamentals of Planning**

- Commanders focus planning
- Planning is continuous
- Planning is time sensitive
- Keep plans simple
- Build flexible plans
- Design bold plans

176 **Commanders Focus Planning**

177 1-14. The commander is the most important participant in effective planning.  
 178 Commanders discipline the planning process to meet the requirements of  
 179 time, planning horizons, simplicity, and level of detail. Commanders also  
 180 discipline the product to ensure it is relevant to the moment and suitable to  
 181 subordinates. Generally, the more involved the commander is in planning,  
 182 the faster the staff can plan. Through personal involvement, commanders  
 183 ensure their will is reflected in the plan.

185 1-15. The art of command includes visualizing, describing, and directing  
 187 operations (see FM 3-0, *Operations*; FM 6-0, *Command and Control*).  
 189 The commander's visualization is the core mental process that focuses  
 191 the planning effort (see Figure 1-2). Upon receipt of a mission, visualization  
 193 begins with situational understanding supported by a common operational  
 195 picture (COP). Based on this situational understanding, commanders determine  
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


Figure 1-2. Commander's Visualization

220 their end state in broad terms. They then develop a construct of how to get  
221 the organization from its current position to the desired end state (a concept  
222 of operations).

223 1-16. Commanders describe their visualization, in the form of their  
224 commander's intent, planning guidance, and commander's critical  
225 information requirements (CCIR). This visualization focuses the staff in  
226 developing, analyzing, and comparing courses of action (COAs). Commanders  
227 then direct by choosing a COA and ensuring the staff synchronizes all  
228 battlefield operating systems in the plan or order. They continue to direct by  
229 providing planning guidance to the staff throughout the operations process to  
230 ensure the plan remains relevant. Chapter 3 provides a detailed discussion of  
231 the commander's role in planning, including the commander's intent,  
232 planning guidance, and CCIR.

233 **Planning Is Continuous**

234 1-17. Planning is a continuous and adaptive process. It does not stop with the  
235 production of an order. Since situations (or the information available about  
236 them) continuously change, plans are revised as time allows. Accurately  
237 predicting an operation's outcome is difficult. Still more difficult is  
238 anticipating the many possible contingencies, especially those far in the  
239 future. As planners develop a solution to a problem, the problem changes.  
240 Continuous planning enables organizations to adjust from an existing concept  
241 of operations based on a common understanding of the situation and the  
242 expected result. Thus, a plan, even if not executed as designed, provides the  
243 point of departure for later unplanned actions.

245 1-18. Planning occurs  
247 throughout the operations  
249 process (see Figure 1-3).  
251 During preparation, plans are  
253 revised based on new  
255 information. Feedback from  
257 unit back-briefs and  
259 rehearsals may also initiate  
261 changes to plans. During  
263 execution, plans are revised  
265 based on the assessed  
267 progress of the operation and  
269 new information. Branch  
271 planning and sequel  
273 development often becomes  
275 the priority for planning  
277 staffs during execution.  
278 Continuous assessment, as reflected in running staff estimates, is key to  
279 ensuring plans are revised and remain relevant to the situation. (Appendix E  
280 discusses staff estimates.)




Figure 1-3. The Operations Process

281 **Planning Is Time Sensitive**

282 1-19. Time is a critical factor in planning. Whether done deliberately or  
283 rapidly, all planning requires an acute awareness and judicious use of time.

284 Time is a precious commodity during operations; both sides attempt to exploit  
 285 it. The result is a constant pressure to decide and act more quickly than the  
 286 enemy. Understanding the effects of time on conducting (planning, preparing,  
 287 executing, and continuously assessing) operations helps commanders  
 288 determine how fast and how far ahead to plan.

290 1-20. When allocating  
 292 planning time, commanders  
 294 consider subordinates'  
 296 planning requirements.  
 298 Commanders ensure that  
 299 plans are sent to subordinates in enough time to allow them to adequately  
 300 plan and prepare their own actions. When time is short, commanders accept  
 301 less than optimum products in the interest of timeliness.

*A good plan violently executed now is better than a perfect plan next week.*  
 General George S. Patton Jr.

302 **Keep Plans Simple**

303 1-21. Simplicity is a principle of war; it is key to effective planning. Plans and  
 304 orders should be simple and direct. Staffs prepare clear, concise orders to  
 305 ensure thorough understanding. They use doctrinally correct terms and  
 306 graphics and eliminate every opportunity to misunderstand the commander's  
 307 exact, intended meaning.

308 1-22. Simple plans require an easily understood concept of operations.  
 309 Planners prepare them by limiting the number of actions or tasks to the  
 310 minimum the situation requires. They minimize detail where possible,  
 311 allowing subordinates to develop specifics with the commander's intent. For  
 312 example, instead of assigning a direction of attack, planners can designate an  
 313 axis of advance.

314 1-23. Simple plans are not simplistic plans. Simplistic refers to something  
 315 made overly simple by ignoring the complexity of the situation. The factors of  
 316 METT-TC determine the degree of simplicity possible. Plans must simplify  
 317 complex situations; some situations require more complex plans than others.  
 318 Commanders at all levels weigh the apparent benefits of a complex concept of  
 319 operations against the risk that subordinates will not be able to understand  
 320 or follow it. Simple plans are preferred because they are easier to understand  
 321 and execute and, more important, execute well.

322 **Build Flexible Plans**

323 1-24. Flexible plans allow units to adapt quickly to a broad variety of  
 324 circumstances. Identifying decision points and designing branches and  
 325 sequels ahead of time—combined with a clear commander's intent—aid in  
 326 building flexible plans. Incorporating risk reduction measures into a plan also  
 327 builds flexibility (see paragraphs 1-60–1-63). For example, a commander may  
 328 plan a large mobile reserve to compensate for the lack of information  
 329 concerning the enemy's decisive operation.

330 1-25. Commanders stress the importance of mission orders as a way of  
 331 building flexible plans. Mission orders specify what to do and the purpose for  
 332 doing it, without prescribing how to do it. Control measures are established to  
 333 aid cooperation among forces without imposing needless restrictions on  
 334 freedom of action. This allows subordinates maximum freedom of planning

335 and action to accomplish the mission and leaves the “how” of mission  
336 accomplishment to subordinates. Mission orders build flexibility by allowing  
337 commanders freedom to seize opportunities or react effectively to unforeseen  
338 enemy actions and capabilities (see paragraph 1-28).

339 **Design Bold Plans**

340 1-26. Commanders design bold, inventive plans that produce decisive results.  
341 They understand when and where to take calculated risks. They do not let  
342 uncertainty or a lack of information keep them from designing a bold concept  
343 of operations. Through their commander’s intent and planning guidance,  
344 commanders build offensive action into all plans. Commanders design plans  
345 that initiate combat on their own terms to allow them to mass the effects of  
346 combat power against enemy weaknesses. They seek to design plans that  
347 seize, retain, and exploit the initiative. They build opportunities for initiative  
348 into plans by anticipating before hand events that allow them to operate  
349 inside of the enemy’s decision making cycle during execution.

350 **MISSION COMMAND**

351 1-27. FM 6-0, *Command and Control* describes two concepts of command and  
352 control—mission command and detailed command. Mission command is the  
353 preferred command and control concept for planning operations in high-  
354 tempo and uncertain environments. Mission command emphasizes timely  
355 decision making, subordinates understanding the commander’s intent, and  
356 the clear responsibility of subordinates to exercise initiative within that  
357 intent. With the commander’s intent to provide unity of effort, mission  
358 command relies on decentralized execution and subordinate initiative. The  
359 elements of mission command are—

- 360 • The commander’s intent.
- 361 • Subordinate initiative.
- 362 • Mission orders.
- 363 • Resource allocation.

364 1-28. Effective planning supports mission command by stressing the  
365 importance of *mission orders*—a technique for completing combat orders that  
366 allows subordinates maximum freedom of planning and action to accomplish  
367 missions and leaves the “how” of mission accomplishment to the subordinates  
368 (FM 6-0, *Command and Control*). Mission orders state the task organization,  
369 commander’s intent and concept of operations, unit mission, subordinates’  
370 missions, and the minimum essential coordinating instructions. Missions  
371 assigned to subordinates include all normal elements (who, what, when,  
372 where, and why). However, they place particular emphasis on the purpose  
373 (why) in order to guide, along with the commander’s intent, subordinate  
374 initiative.

375 1-29. Mission command requires plans with the proper level of detail—nei-  
376 ther so detailed that they stifle initiative nor so general that they provide  
377 insufficient direction. The proper level of detail depends on each situation  
378 and is not easy to determine. Some operations require tight control over  
379 subordinate elements. An air assault for example requires detailed synchroni-  
380 zation. As a rule, plans should contain only the detail required to provide the

381 guidance necessary to synchronize combat power while allowing subordinates  
382 as much freedom of action as possible.

### 383 THE FUNCTIONS OF PLANNING AND PLANS

384 1-30. Most military activities benefit from some kind planning. When the  
385 problem is simple, detailed planning may not be necessary. When the  
386 problem is complicated, planning is essential. The value of planning changes  
387 with every situation and type of activity.

388 1-31. Planning, however, is not valuable in itself. Using a prescribed  
389 planning process does not guarantee that an organization will improve its  
390 situation. Mastering the procedural aspects of planning is important;  
391 however, creative thinking and applying sound judgment to solve tactical  
392 problems is the true essence of effective planning. Planning takes on value  
393 when done properly using methods appropriate to the conditions and  
394 activities being planned. Done appropriately and well, planning greatly  
395 improves performance. Done poorly and inappropriately, planning can waste  
396 valuable time and energy.

397 1-32. Planning and plans accomplish several key functions. They help  
398 commander and staffs—

- 399 • Think critically.
- 400 • Develop a common understanding of the situation.
- 401 • Anticipate.
- 402 • Simplify complexity.
- 403 • Guide preparation activities.
- 404 • Direct and coordinate actions.
- 405 • Task organize forces and allocate resources.

### 406 Planning Shapes the Thinking of Army Leaders

407 1-33. The Army's doctrinal planning processes (problem solving, the MDMP,  
408 and TLP) are based on an analytical decision making model. They provide a  
409 way to think about solving problems. When faced with a problem or tactical  
410 mission, Army leaders define the problem; gather information relevant to it;  
411 develop, analyze, and compare courses of action; and select the optional  
412 solution. The MDMP, for example, provides a disciplined framework for  
413 commanders and staffs to approach and solve tactical problems. The use of a  
414 common process understood Armywide is helpful in that planning techniques  
415 are similar among individuals and between units. This facilitates effective  
416 planning between echelons and with cross-attached and adjacent units.

### 417 Planning Builds a Common Understanding of the Situation

418 1-34. Planning that analyzes the factors of METT-TC in detail helps  
419 commanders and staffs understand the current state of enemy and friendly  
420 forces in relation to the environment and each other. This analysis  
421 contributes to developing a common understanding of the situation and  
422 nature of the problem. In turn, commanders can better visualize and describe  
423 an operation to the staff and subordinate commanders. A common  
424 understanding of the situation supports communication and cooperation

425 among commanders, staffs, and subordinates during planning. It provides the  
426 basis for unity of effort and the exercise of disciplined initiative by  
427 subordinates during execution.

#### 428 **Planning Helps Leaders Anticipate**

429 1-35. Anticipatory planning is essential to seizing and retaining the  
430 initiative. It involves projecting thoughts forward in time and space to  
431 determine how to influence events before they occur, rather than responding  
432 to events dictated by others. To seize the initiative, commanders must be able  
433 to anticipate events and act purposefully and effectively before enemies do.  
434 Part of the value of planning is identifying possible actions in advance  
435 (decision points, branches, and sequels). Doing this speeds decision making  
436 and decreases friendly reaction time during execution.

437 1-36. Anticipatory planning speeds decision making during execution by  
438 allowing commanders and staffs to consider potential decisions and actions in  
439 advance. It also reduces the time between decisions and actions during  
440 execution, especially at higher echelons. While some actions are implemented  
441 immediately, others require forethought and preparation. For example,  
442 changing the direction of attack may be a relatively simple and immediate  
443 matter for a squad; however, changing the scheme of maneuver of a division,  
444 including its support, is complicated and time-consuming. Changing the  
445 priority of fires at division level may take considerable time if artillery units  
446 must reposition. If leaders wait until an event occurs to begin preparing for it,  
447 units may not be able to react quickly enough. Proper planning helps reduce  
448 crises by anticipating situations before they reach crisis proportions.

#### 449 **Planning Simplifies Complexity**

450 1-37. Planning provides a logical way to understand problems and develop  
451 solutions to them. Planning is critical when a problem is actually a complex  
452 set of interrelated problems, the solution to each affecting the others. The  
453 commander may not be able to visualize the various possibilities without the  
454 staff working through the problem systematically. If the situation is very  
455 complex, planning may offer the only opportunity to deal with the complete  
456 set of problems as a whole. Some situations require extensive planning, some  
457 very little. In general, the more complex a situation, the more important and  
458 involved the planning effort.

459 1-38. Whether a problem is complex or simple is largely based on the experi-  
460 ence of the problem solvers. Planning can serve, at least in part, as a substi-  
461 tute for experience. Leaders with enough experience in a situation know  
462 intuitively what to expect, which goals are feasible, and what actions to take.  
463 In situations where leaders lack firsthand experience, planning allows them  
464 to think through the problem systematically and devise a workable solution.

#### 465 **Plans Guide Preparation Activities**

466 1-39. Plans provide a common framework that guides subordinate planning  
467 and preparation activities. This framework, particularly the commander's  
468 intent and concept of operations, contributes to a shared understanding of  
469 what the commander wants done. Plans guide unit and staff rehearsals,

470 reconnaissance and surveillance, coordination, inspection, and movements.  
 471 Plans direct the positioning of forces before execution to ensure the unit is  
 472 postured for the operation.

473 **Plans Direct and Coordinate Actions**

474 1-40. Plans and orders tell those within the unit what to do and inform those  
 475 outside the unit of how to cooperate and provide support. Good plans direct  
 476 subordinates by stating “what” is required (the task) and “why” (the purpose);  
 477 they leave the “how” up to subordinates. They contain the minimum number  
 478 of control measures needed to coordinate actions and synchronize battlefield  
 479 operating systems to mass the effects of combat power. Over-emphasizing the  
 480 directing and coordinating function of planning can lead to detailed and rigid  
 481 plans that stifle initiative among subordinates. Mission command encourages  
 482 the use of mission orders to avoid creating overly restrictive instructions to  
 483 subordinates.

484 **Plans Task-Organize Forces and Allocate Resources**

485 1-41. When assigning missions, commanders ensure subordinates have the  
 486 means to accomplish them. They do this by task organizing and allocating  
 487 resources. *Task organizing* is the process of allocating available assets to  
 488 subordinate commanders and establishing their command and support  
 489 relationships (FM 3-0, *Operations*) (see Appendix F). Plans designate the task  
 490 organization, allocate resources, and establish priorities of support to ensure  
 491 subordinates have the means to accomplish their missions.

492 **Summary of Planning Functions**

493 1-42. Planning is not only a way of directing and coordinating actions; it also  
 494 generates a common understanding of the situation and expectations,  
 495 supports the exercise of initiative, and structures the thinking of commanders  
 496 and staffs. In some situations, commanders may emphasize different  
 497 functions. For example, under time-constrained conditions, commanders may  
 498 focus planning on directing and coordinating actions at the expense of  
 499 developing a common understanding of the situation. It is important for  
 500 commanders to understand the planning functions and determine which ones  
 501 are most important in a given situation.

502 **KEY PLANNING CONCEPTS**

503 1-43. Effective planning requires dedication, study, and practice. Planners  
 504 must be technically and tactically competent and understand basic planning  
 505 concepts. The section discusses some key planning concepts that aid in  
 506 effective planning. These include—

- 507 • Operational and tactical planning.
- 508 • Planning and decision making.
- 509 • Risk reduction.
- 510 • Hasty and deliberate operations.
- 511 • Intelligence, reconnaissance and surveillance (ISR).
- 512 • Planning horizons.
- 513 • Parallel and collaborative planning.

- 514 • Forward and reverse planning.
- 515 • The one-third/two-thirds rule.
- 516 • Planning pitfalls.

## 517 OPERATIONAL AND TACTICAL PLANNING

518 1-44. It is important to understand planning within the context of the levels  
519 of war. The levels of war are doctrinal perspectives that clarify the links  
520 between strategic objectives and tactical actions (see FM 3-0, *Operations*).  
521 The three levels are strategic, operational, and tactical, although there are no  
522 distinct limits or boundaries between them. The strategic and operational  
523 levels provide the context for tactical planning and operations.

524 1-45. Operational and tactical planning complement each other but have  
525 different aims. Operational-level planning focuses on developing plans for  
526 campaigns and major operations. In broad terms, operational planners and  
527 commanders begin with a clean sheet of paper. They often define an area of  
528 operations (AO), estimate forces required, and evaluate the requirements for  
529 the operation. In contrast, tactical planning proceeds from an existing  
530 operational design. Normally AOs are prescribed, objectives and available  
531 forces identified, and sequences of activities specified for tactical-level  
532 commanders. Operational and tactical planning, however, are not limited to  
533 particular echelons. Major Army command (MACOM) headquarters may  
534 engage in tactical planning, and echelons normally associated with tactical  
535 missions increasingly find themselves undertaking operational-level design.

536 1-46. Joint operation planning (deliberate, crisis action, and campaign) is  
537 beyond the scope of this manual. However, Army forces operate in a joint  
538 environment, and Army leaders must understand joint operation planning.  
539 Army service component commands (ASCCs) routinely participate in joint  
540 operation planning. Corps and divisions perform or participate in joint  
541 operation planning when serving as joint task force (JTF) or ARFOR  
542 headquarters. JP 5-0, *Doctrine for Joint Operation Planning*, covers joint  
543 operation planning and the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System  
544 (JOPES). JOPES provides the uniform policies, procedures, and reporting  
545 structures that guide joint operation planning.

546 1-47. Tactical-level planning revolves around battles and engagements  
547 conducted to accomplish military objectives assigned to tactical units or task  
548 forces (see FM 3-90, *Tactics*). Activities at this level focus on the ordered  
549 arrangement and maneuver of combat elements in relation to each other and  
550 the enemy to achieve combat objectives. Tactical planning emphasizes  
551 flexibility and options. Planning horizons for tactical actions are relatively  
552 short. At the tactical level, comprehensive planning may be feasible only for  
553 the first engagement or phase of a battle; succeeding actions could depend on  
554 enemy responses and circumstances. A key to effective tactical planning lies  
555 in anticipating and developing sound branches and sequels.

556 1-48. Tactical planning for stability operations and support operations is  
557 performed in a similar manner as for offensive and defensive operations.  
558 However, applying combat power in offensive and defensive operations is  
559 considerably different than in stability operations and support operations.  
560 Planning horizons may be longer and the emphasis on civil considerations

561 greater. The nature of the environment in which forces conduct stability  
 562 operations and support operations requires commanders and staffs to view  
 563 the factors of METT-TC from a different perspective (see FM 3-07, *Stability*  
 564 *Operations and Support Operations*).

565 **PLANNING AND DECISION MAKING**

566 1-49. *Decision making* is selecting a course of action (COA) as the one most  
 567 favorable to accomplish the mission (FM 6-0, *Command and Control*).  
 568 Deciding involves knowing *if* to decide, then *when* and *what* to decide, and  
 569 understanding the consequences. Planning supports and is a form of decision  
 570 making. However, not all decisions require the same level of planning. In  
 571 fact, some decisions require no planning.

572 1-50. Commanders make hundreds of decisions during operations in an  
 573 environment of great uncertainty, unpredictability, and constant change.  
 574 Some decisions are deliberate—as with using the MDMP to analyze the  
 575 situation in detail, arrive at an optimal solution, and create a complete,  
 576 written order. Other decisions are made without the benefit of time-intensive,  
 577 deliberate analysis. Often, situations require commanders to proceed through  
 578 a decision making process alone and issue oral orders based on their own  
 579 knowledge of the situation, without taking the time to formally include the  
 580 staff in the process.

581 1-51. Commanders use two decision making techniques to solve tactical  
 582 problems: analytical and intuitive. They decide which one to use based on the  
 583 factors of METT-TC.

584 **Analytical Decision Making**

585 1-52. Analytical decision making approaches a problem systematically. Com-  
 586 manders review available information, generate several possible solutions,  
 587 compare them to a set of criteria, and select the best solution. Analytical  
 588 decision making breaks down tasks into recognizable elements and  
 589 emphasizes analytic reasoning guided by experience.

590 1-53. This methodical approach serves well for decision making in complex or  
 591 unfamiliar situations and when time is available to analyze all the facets that  
 592 affect the solution. However, analytical decision making consumes time and  
 593 is not appropriate to all situations—especially during execution, where  
 594 circumstances often require immediate decisions. The MDMP is an analytical  
 595 decision making tool (see Chapter 3).

596 **Intuitive Decision Making**

597 1-54. Intuitive decision making is a technique for making decisions based on  
 598 the intuitive knowledge or experience of the decision maker. It is faster than  
 599 analytical decision making in that it involves making decisions based on an  
 600 assessment of the situation rather than a comparison of multiple COAs. It  
 601 relies on the experienced leader’s ability to recognize the key elements and  
 602 implications of a particular problem or situation, reject the impractical, and  
 603 select an adequate COA (see FM 6-0, *Command and Control*). Intuitive  
 604 decision making is especially appropriate in time-constrained conditions (see  
 605 Chapter 3).

606 1-55. Intuitive decision making depends on situational understanding and an  
607 accurate assessment of variances in the current plan. The commander plays a  
608 major role in determining the COA, while the staff focuses its efforts on  
609 implementing the decision. Rather than conducting a thorough analysis of  
610 several COAs to choose the single best solution, commanders use their  
611 knowledge of the situation and the latest reports to rapidly select one COA.  
612 The commander chooses this COA based on assessing the situation,  
613 recognizing the patterns involved, and by applying his intuition and tactical  
614 judgment. Troop leading procedures are based largely on intuitive decision  
615 making. They are designed to help leaders apply judgment to quickly arrive  
616 at a COA, complete the plan, and prepare for operations.

617 1-56. Intuitive decision making may involve the commander alone, or the  
618 commander may involve the staff. After a decision is made, the commander  
619 issues directives to subordinate commanders and the staff coordinates what  
620 must be done to support it. Fragmentary orders (verbal or written) are the  
621 primary means of doing this.

622 1-57. Intuitive decision making replaces methodical analysis with  
623 assessment; it obtains a satisfactory solution rather than an optimal one. It is  
624 faster than analytical decision making. However, substituting assessment for  
625 detailed analysis means that some implications may be overlooked.  
626 Commanders use intuitive decision making when time is short and problems  
627 straightforward. It is usually appropriate during execution.

## 628 **Combining Analytical and Intuitive Decision Making**

629 1-58. In practice, commanders combine analytical and intuitive decision  
630 making. For example, if commanders use the MDMP to plan an operation,  
631 the plan and associated products provide the basis for decision making during  
632 execution. As operations commence and decision making time shortened,  
633 commanders may use intuitive decision making to exercise command and  
634 control. Circumstances requiring an immediate decision could involve the  
635 commander alone deciding on a COA and issuing verbal directives. In other  
636 situations, the commander may quickly eliminate friendly and enemy options  
637 and focus the staff's planning effort on synchronizing a single friendly COA.  
638 The staff then develops a fragmentary order for execution.

639 1-59. Each decision making technique has advantageous and disadvantages  
640 (see Figure 1-4, page 1-14). Selecting one depends primarily on the experience  
641 of the commander and staff, and how much time and information are  
642 available. Taking more time to plan often results in greater synchronization;  
643 however, it also means less time for subordinates to plan and prepare, and  
644 more time for the enemy to prepare and act.

## 645 **RISK REDUCTION**

646 1-60. Uncertainty and risk are inherent in tactical operations. Planning seeks  
647 not to eliminate uncertainty and risk, but to provide a framework that  
648 facilitates effective and focused action in the face of them. A commander can-  
649 not be successful without the capability of acting under conditions of uncer-  
650 tainty while balancing various risks and taking advantage of opportunities.




Figure 1-4. The Decision Making Continuum

651 1-61. While planning focuses on arranging activities and allocating resources  
 652 to accomplish the mission, it is also a risk reduction tool. During planning,  
 653 commanders and staffs perform risk management (see FM 5-19, *Risk*  
 654 *Management*). They identify potential hazards to mission accomplishment  
 655 and assess the probability and severity of each hazard. Commanders  
 656 determine the acceptable level of risk and express this determination in their  
 657 planning guidance. The staff uses the commander's risk guidance to guide  
 658 them in developing control measures to reduce identified hazards. Com-  
 659 mander's risk guidance is also incorporated into each COA developed, and in  
 660 turn, each COA considered is evaluated by its acceptability. (The tactical  
 661 advantage gained by executing the COA must justify the cost in resources,  
 662 especially casualties.)

665 1-62. Because uncertainty exists in all military operations,  
 666 every military decision incurs some risk. In designing plans, the com-  
 667 mander decides how much risk to accept. Figure 1-5,  
 669 shows several techniques available to reduce the risk  
 671 associated in a specific operation. Incorporating risk  
 673 reduction measures adds to the plan's flexibility  
 675 during execution.




Figure 1-5. Risk Reduction Adjustments

692 1-63. Risk reduction does not always mean increasing knowledge of the  
693 enemy at the expense of time. A flexible plan can partially compensate for a  
694 lack of intelligence. Unclear situations may require increasing in the depth of  
695 the security area, size and number of security units, or size of the reserve.  
696 Combat and movement formations that provide for initial enemy contact with  
697 the smallest possible friendly force may also be appropriate. Another way to  
698 compensate for increased risk is to allocate time and resources to subordinate  
699 elements for developing the situation.

## 700 HASTY AND DELIBERATE OPERATIONS

701 1-64. One of the first decisions commanders make when they receive a new  
702 mission or encounter a significant change to the situation is how much time  
703 and effort to devote to planning. The uncertain environment of military  
704 operations means this decision always entails some risk. Appreciating how  
705 time relates to planning requires understanding the differences and the  
706 tradeoffs between hasty and deliberate operations. The primary differences  
707 are the enemy and amount of time available for planning and preparation.

708 1-65. A *hasty operation* is an operation in which a commander directs his  
709 immediately available forces, using fragmentary orders, to perform activities  
710 with minimal preparation, trading planning and preparation time for speed  
711 of execution (FM 3-90, *Tactics*). Hasty operations usually occur when a force  
712 encounters an unexpected situation during execution.

713 1-66. A *deliberate operation* is an operation in which a commander's detailed  
714 intelligence concerning the situation allows him to develop and coordinate  
715 detailed plans, including multiple branches and sequels. He task-organizes  
716 his forces specifically for the operation to provide a fully synchronized  
717 combined arms team. He conducts extensive rehearsals while conducting  
718 shaping operations to set the conditions for the conduct of his decisive  
719 operation (FM 3-90, *Tactics*).

720 1-67. A decision to plan an operation as hasty or deliberate is based on  
721 several competing factors. These include the commander's current knowledge  
722 of the situation and his assessment of whether the assets available (including  
723 time) and means to coordinate and synchronize them can accomplish the  
724 mission. If they cannot, the commander takes additional time to plan,  
725 prepare, or bring additional forces to bear on the problem. This decision  
726 determines the extent to which the operation will be hasty or deliberate.

727 1-68. Deliberate operations are normally supported by analytical decision  
728 making. However, when planning and preparing a deliberate operation,  
729 commanders take only the minimum time necessary to assure a reasonable  
730 chance of success. For example, commanders may be able to reduce the time  
731 devoted to planning and preparation when conducting operations against a  
732 less-capable and less-prepared enemy. It is better to err on the side of speed,  
733 audacity, and momentum than on the side of caution, all else being equal.  
734 Such decisions incur calculated risks. Commanders exercise military  
735 judgment when determining whether the possible advantages merit the risk  
736 involved.

737 **INTELLIGENCE, SURVEILLANCE AND RECONNAISSANCE**

738 1-69. The quality of available information and intelligence significantly  
 739 influences the ability to produce a viable plan or order. The more intelligence  
 740 available, the better the commander and staff can plan. Less information  
 741 means that the commander has a greater chance of making a poor decision.

742 1-70. Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) operations  
 743 contribute significantly to the commander’s visualization and decision  
 744 making. Commanders aggressively seek information linked to decision  
 745 making (CCIR) by employing ISR assets early in the planning process—  
 746 usually well before publishing the operation order. Employing ISR assets  
 747 early improves planning quality by providing the commander and staff with  
 748 current information and by confirming or denying assumptions. Early  
 749 employment of ISR assets requires commanders to emphasize ISR planning  
 750 early in the planning process (see Chapter 3).

751 1-71. ISR cuts across the battlefield operating systems. It demands an inte-  
 752 grated combined arms approach to planning, preparation, execution and  
 753 assessment. Commanders make judicious yet aggressive use of their ISR  
 754 assets because there are never enough of them to accomplish all tasks. They  
 755 do this by setting priorities, primarily through their planning guidance and  
 756 CCIR. Effective ISR planning ensures that available ISR assets produce the  
 757 greatest results to support the commander’s decision making during planning  
 758 and execution.

759 **PLANNING HORIZONS**

760 1-72. A tension exists between  
 761 how far ahead commanders  
 762 can plan effectively without  
 763 preparation and coordination  
 764 becoming irrelevant. Planning  
 765 too far into the future may  
 766 overwhelm the capabilities of  
 767 planning staffs, especially  
 768 subordinate staffs. Converse-  
 769 ly, not planning far enough  
 770 ahead may result in losing the  
 771 initiative and the unit being  
 772 unprepared. Understanding  
 773 this tension is key to effective  
 774 planning and to ensuring the  
 775 command is focused on the  
 776 right planning horizon.

777 **1-73. Planning horizons**  
 778 **are points in time the**  
 779 **commander uses to focus**  
 780 **the organization’s plan-**  
 781 **ning efforts to shape fu-**  
 782 **ture events.** Planning hori-  
 783 zons are measured from weeks




Figure 1-6. Planning Horizons

784 or months for operational commanders to hours and days for tactical  
785 commanders. Organizations often plan within several different horizons  
786 simultaneously. To guide their planning efforts, commanders use three  
787 planning horizons—commitment (short-range), contingency (mid-range), and  
788 orientation (long-range)—(see Figure 1-6). Commanders focus the staff on the  
789 appropriate planning horizon.

#### 790 **Commitment Planning**

791 1-74. Ideally, planning to the commitment horizon (commitment planning)  
792 occurs when commanders believe they can reasonably forecast events and  
793 commit to a particular plan. Units and resources are physically prepared  
794 under conditions of greater certainty with a shorter time horizon. However,  
795 circumstances may require commanders to execute an operation under  
796 uncertain conditions. In such cases, commanders use ISR assets to develop  
797 the situation to the greatest extent possible before execution.

#### 798 **Contingency Planning**

799 1-75. Within the contingency horizon, commanders plan for several different  
800 contingencies without committing to any one (contingency planning). Units  
801 and resources are programmed—but not physically committed—for several  
802 projected circumstances under conditions of moderate uncertainty with an  
803 increased time horizon.

#### 804 **Orientation Planning**

805 1-76. Beyond the contingency horizon, the situation is too uncertain to plan  
806 for specific contingencies. Commanders develop broad concepts addressing a  
807 number of different circumstances over a longer time period. This orientation  
808 planning allows them to respond quickly and flexibly to a broad variety of  
809 circumstances.

### 810 **PARALLEL AND COLLABORATIVE PLANNING**

811 1-77. Echelons planning for an operation plan in parallel as much as possible.  
812 New information systems allow different headquarters, particularly at higher  
813 echelons, to plan collaboratively as well.

#### 814 **Parallel Planning**

815 1-78. **Parallel planning is two or more echelons planning for an**  
816 **operation nearly simultaneously.** It occurs when the higher headquarters  
817 alerts subordinates of their planning activities and shares planning  
818 information with them as it becomes available. This information sharing  
819 enables subordinates to begin planning concurrently with their higher  
820 headquarters instead of waiting until the higher headquarters completes its  
821 planning. Parallel planning requires timely warning orders (WARNOs) and  
822 frequent communication over staff channels. It allows each echelon to make  
823 maximum use of time available.

824 1-79. To facilitate parallel planning, the intelligence officer of the higher  
825 headquarters provides all intelligence products to subordinate units as soon  
826 as they are usable, even if only partially complete. The higher headquarters

827 intelligence officer should have most intelligence products near completion  
 828 before the orders briefing. Intelligence officers should not wait until after the  
 829 orders briefing to release these products. If parallel planning is to occur, and  
 830 the planning process is to be IPB-driven, this is the only way it can be  
 831 conducted in a timely fashion. Liaison officers can contribute significantly by  
 832 passing all intelligence products as soon as they become available.

833 **Collaborative Planning**

834 **1-80. Collaborative planning is the real-time interaction among**  
 835 **commanders and staffs at two or more echelons developing plans for**  
 836 **a particular operation.** Collaborative planning greatly speeds decision  
 837 making by providing the higher commander with real-time information about  
 838 what subordinates can and cannot do. Collaborative planning enables  
 839 subordinates to provide the higher commander with their current assessment  
 840 and status, and how they are postured for various operations. This  
 841 information helps the higher commander determine what is possible with  
 842 subordinate units. In addition, collaborative planning allows sharing ideas  
 843 and concepts for COA development. Often, subordinates have insights into  
 844 how an operation might unfold, based on their intimate knowledge of the  
 845 enemy and terrain.

846 1-81. Collaborative planning is enabled by information systems that allow  
 847 real-time exchange of data, voice, and video. This capability allows  
 848 commanders and staffs to collaborate throughout planning. Collaborative  
 849 planning enhances understanding of the commander’s intent and planning  
 850 guidance throughout the force and decreases the time required for all  
 851 echelons to complete a plan or order.

852 1-82. Collaborate planning is not appropriate when extended planning  
 853 sessions take subordinate commanders and staffs away from directing  
 854 current operations. As a rule, if the commander is directly involved in time-  
 855 sensitive planning, collaborative planning is probably called for.

856 **FORWARD AND REVERSE PLANNING**

857 1-83. Commanders and planners use two planning techniques: forward  
 858 planning and reverse planning.

859 1-84. Forward planning involves starting with the present conditions and  
 860 laying out potential decisions and actions forward in time, identifying the  
 861 next feasible step, the next after that, and so on. Forward planning focuses on  
 862 what is feasible in the relatively short term. In forward planning, the  
 863 envisioned end state serves as a distant and general aiming point rather than  
 864 as a specific objective. Forward planning answers the question, Where can we  
 865 get to next?

866 1-85. Reverse planning involves starting with the envisioned end state and  
 867 working backward in time toward the present (see Figure 1-6). Planners  
 868 begin by identifying the last step, the next-to-last step, and so on. They  
 869 continue until they reach the step that begins the operation. Reverse  
 870 planning focuses on the long-term goal. It answers the question, Where do we  
 871 eventually want to get?

873 1-86. To plan effectively in  
 875 reverse, commanders re-  
 877 quire a clear and relatively  
 879 permanent goal; alterna-  
 881 tively, they may define the  
 883 goal broadly enough to  
 885 provide a valid point of re-  
 887 ference, regardless of how  
 889 the situation may develop.  
 891 Consequently, effective re-  
 893 verse planning is possible  
 895 only in relatively predict-  
 897 able situations. For exam-  
 899 ple, given a fixed dead-  
 901 line, commanders often use  
 903 reverse planning to allocate  
 904 preparation time. Reverse planning is common at lower tactical echelons and  
 905 is an important aspect of TLP (see Chapter 4).




Figure 1-7. Reverse Planning

906 1-87. Of the two methods, forward planning is the more natural because it is  
 907 consistent with the direction time moves and the way humans act. Reverse  
 908 planning is more difficult because it proceeds opposite to the way humans  
 909 naturally think and act and because goals in military operations change over  
 910 the long term. In practice, planning effectively often means combining the  
 911 two methods, using forward planning to provide an idea of what is feasible in  
 912 the short term and reverse planning to provide a point of aim over the long  
 913 term.

#### 914 THE ONE-THIRD/TWO-THIRDS RULE

915 1-88. Timely plans are those issued soon enough to allow subordinates  
 916 enough time to plan, issue their orders, and prepare for the operations. Few  
 917 factors are more important than giving subordinates enough time to prepare.  
 918 Effective planning demands issuing timely plans to subordinates.  
 919 Commanders follow the “one-third/two-thirds rule”: they use one-third of the  
 920 time available for planning and preparation for their planning and allocate  
 921 the remaining two-thirds to their subordinates.

922 1-89. Commanders and staffs often underestimate the time required for  
 923 directives to permeate the echelons of an organization. Brevity during  
 924 planning is essential; so is speed. Effective staffs avoid consuming too much  
 925 time developing lengthy plans that contain irrelevant details. When plans  
 926 arrive late, subordinates can only react. Subordinate commanders are forced  
 927 to forego the advantages of analytical decision making and make recognition  
 928 decisions. To save time and shorten plans, commanders and staffs anticipate  
 929 support requirements and forecast options. Headquarters at each level plan  
 930 in parallel with higher and lower headquarters. Parallel planning expedites  
 931 the exchange of information among headquarters through WARNOs and  
 932 should be used as much as possible. Commanders also exploit technology to  
 933 increase situational understanding and the speed of planning.

934 **PLANNING PITFALLS**

935 1-90. Planners must guard against several common mistakes. These pitfalls  
 936 generally stem from a common cause: the failure, or more often the willful  
 937 refusal, to appreciate the unpredictability and uncertainty of military  
 938 operations. Pointing these out is not a criticism of planning but of improper  
 939 planning. Commanders recognize both the benefits and the potential pitfalls  
 940 of planning. They ensure that planning is conducted properly to avoid them.  
 941 Commanders discipline the planning process and teach staffs the relevance of  
 942 product content. Common pitfalls include—

- 943 • Planning too far ahead.
- 944 • Planning in too much detail.
- 945 • Using planning as a scripting process.
- 946 • Applying planning techniques inflexibly.

947 **Planning Too Far Ahead**

949 1-91. Planners often err by  
 951 attempting to forecast and dictate  
 953 events too far in the future. It is a  
 955 natural tendency to plan based on  
 957 the assumption that the future will  
 959 be a continuation of present  
 961 conditions. Doing this may result in  
 963 underestimating the scope of changes  
 964 or the direction in which they may occur. Moltke’s well-known dictum does  
 965 not demean the value of planning; it reminds commanders and staffs of the  
 966 relationship between planning and executing.

*...no plan...extends with any  
 degree of certainty beyond the  
 first encounter with the main  
 force.*

German Field Marshal Helmuth  
 von Moltke

967 1-92. While it is imperative to plan, planning too far ahead can consume  
 968 valuable time and effort on events that have little or no chance of occurring.  
 969 This may result in plans being executed, even if they bear no relation to  
 970 reality. Planning too far ahead can also create a false sense of the ability to  
 971 predict the future. All of these are fatal.

972 1-93. The purpose of any plan is to establish the conceptual basis for action.  
 973 A plan provides a reasonably accurate forecast of execution. Because it is  
 974 difficult to anticipate the unexpected, it is common to believe the unexpected  
 975 will not occur. Often plans are overcome by events much sooner than  
 976 anticipated. Therefore, effective planners do not try to plan too far into the  
 977 future.

978 **Planning in Too Much Detail**

980 1-94. Planners also tend to plan in too  
 982 much detail as opposed to developing  
 984 simple and flexible plans. This is not a  
 986 criticism of detailed planning but of  
 988 planning in more detail than  
 990 conditions warrant. This pitfall often  
 992 stems from the desire to leave as little  
 994 as possible to chance. In general, the

*Plans must be simple and  
 flexible. Actually, they only  
 form a datum plane from  
 which you build as necessity  
 directs or opportunity offers.*

General George S. Patton Jr.

995 less certain the situation, the less detail in which one can plan. However, the  
996 natural response to the anxiety of uncertainty is to plan in greater detail—to  
997 try to cover every possibility. This effort can generate even more anxiety,  
998 which in turn leads to planning in even more detail. The result can be an  
999 extremely detailed plan that does not survive the friction of the situation,  
1000 constricts effective action, and arrives too late for subordinates to effectively  
1001 execute.

1002 1-95. Military operations are complicated endeavors that require a good deal  
1003 of detailed planning. Combat service support planning, air movement tables,  
1004 and intelligence collection plans are all examples of portions of plans that  
1005 require close synchronization and attention to detail. Those parts of a plan  
1006 most affected by potential enemy action should have least detail, those least  
1007 affected the most detail. The underlying principle is conveying an easily  
1008 understood concept of operations, putting the fewest restrictions on  
1009 subordinates, and allowing them the greatest flexibility in execution. Mission  
1010 orders offer a technique for developing simple and flexible plans.

#### 1011 **Using Planning As A Scripting Process**

1012 1-96. The tendency to use planning as a scripting process is another planning  
1013 pitfall. When planners fail to recognize the limits of foresight and control, the  
1014 plan can become a coercive and overly regulatory mechanism that restricts  
1015 initiative and flexibility. Subordinates then focus on the requirements of the  
1016 plan rather than on making decisions and acting effectively. During  
1017 execution, successful commanders fight the enemy, not the plan. Plans must  
1018 facilitate initiative, not constrain it.

#### 1019 **Applying Planning Techniques Inflexibly**

1020 1-97. There is a tendency for institutionalized planning methods to lead to  
1021 inflexible or lockstep thinking and for planning and plans to become rigid and  
1022 overly emphasize procedures. While planning is a disciplined framework for  
1023 approaching problems, the danger is in taking that discipline to the extreme.  
1024 Using a prescribed planning process does not guarantee that an organization  
1025 will improve its situation. Mastering the procedural aspects of planning is  
1026 important; however, creative thinking and applying sound judgment to solve  
1027 tactical problems is the true essence of effective planning. Planning takes on  
1028 value when done properly with methods appropriate to the conditions and  
1029 activities being planned. Done appropriately and well, planning greatly  
1030 improves performance. Done poorly and inappropriately, planning can waste  
1031 valuable time and energy.

1032 1-98. It is natural to develop routines to streamline planning efforts. In fact,  
1033 effective standing procedures provide economy of effort and coordination  
1034 among those working on the same problem. They are essential to effective  
1035 planning. In situations where planning activities must be performed repeat-  
1036 edly with little variation, it helps to have well-rehearsed procedures in place.  
1037 However, even with well-rehearsed procedures, two dangers still exist.

1038 1-99. The first danger is in trying to reduce those aspects of planning that  
1039 require intuition and creativity to simple procedures; for example, basing a  
1040 COA solely on the mathematical correlation of enemy and friendly forces.

1041 Many planning skills cannot be captured in procedures. Attempts to do so  
 1042 restrict intuition and creativity.

1043 1-100. The second danger is that, even where procedures are appropriate,  
 1044 they tend to become rigid over time. Always conducting a detailed war game  
 1045 of multiple COAs without considering the planning time available, is an  
 1046 example of following procedure at the expense of the product. Inflexibility  
 1047 directly undermines the objective of planning—enabling the organization to  
 1048 adapt in the fluid combat environment.

## 1049 INFORMATION SYSTEMS ENHANCEMENTS TO PLANNING

1050 1-101. The Army is currently transitioning to a digitally-based command and  
 1051 control system. The Army Battle Command System (ABCS) is the  
 1052 information system currently being fielded. It is designed to provide  
 1053 commanders and staffs with timely, accurate, mission-critical information to  
 1054 support effective command and control. The range of digital devices the Army  
 1055 is fielding greatly enhances both analytical and intuitive decision making.  
 1056 Modern information systems enhance planning in several ways.

1057 1-102. First, modern information systems, coupled with information manage-  
 1058 ment, give commanders the capability of developing and disseminating a  
 1059 common operational picture (COP). The COP leads to commanders achieving  
 1060 situational understanding that in turn, speeds planning and decision making  
 1061 (see FM 6-0, *Command and Control*). Modern information systems—

- 1062 • Collect information more effectively than analog systems.
- 1063 • Process information faster and more accurately than legacy systems.
- 1064 • Allow information to be stored in a manner that provides instant access  
 1065 through distributed databases.
- 1066 • Display information in useable, tailorable, and current formats.
- 1067 • Disseminate information to the right place faster, with fewer errors,  
 1068 and less lag time than analog systems.
- 1069 • Allow leaders access to expertise and databases through reachback to  
 1070 service, national, and civilian institutions.

1071 1-103. Second, modern information systems enhance planning between eche-  
 1072 lons. This capability includes echelons planning in parallel, planning collabor-  
 1073 atively, or both. Information systems make sharing information easier  
 1074 through distributed databases and a COP. Modern information systems im-  
 1075 prove the speed and accuracy in which information is exchanged. They allow  
 1076 commanders and staffs to effectively collaborate without being co-located.

1077 1-104. The most significant challenge to planning is overcoming uncertainty.  
 1078 Traditionally, commanders have devoted a significant amount of planning  
 1079 time to developing situational understanding. A large effort by staffs is de-  
 1080 voted to gathering information to produce or update products that help com-  
 1081 manders understand the current state of the enemy, friendly forces, and the  
 1082 environment. Now, distributed databases and modern information systems  
 1083 enable commanders at all echelons to share information immediately. This  
 1084 capability allows all commanders throughout the force to share a COP. This  
 1085 capability significantly speeds developing situational understanding that  
 1086 enables commanders and staffs to develop feasible COAs faster.

1087 **CONCLUSION**

1088 1-105. Effective planning is both art and science. It can involve a detailed,  
1089 systematic analysis to provide insight into what might occur in order to  
1090 produce an optimum COA. Alternatively, planning may be a rapid process  
1091 that reaches an acceptable COA quickly by considering only critical aspects of  
1092 the problem. When planning under time-constrained conditions, the staff is  
1093 usually responding to existing conditions and needs a quick plan for  
1094 immediate or near future execution. All planning takes time and must  
1095 facilitate generating or maintaining the tempo the commander desires.

1096 1-106. Planning is a dynamic process of several interrelated activities. It  
1097 starts when the commander receives or perceives a new mission. It supports  
1098 decision making by analyzing the factors of METT-TC and by providing a  
1099 context for developing situational understanding. The outcome of planning is  
1100 the commander's decision about how to conduct the operation. After this  
1101 decision, the staff continues planning by creating an order or plan. Planning  
1102 continues during preparing and executing, whether by refining the plan or by  
1103 creating or refining branches and sequels.

1104 1-107. Effective planning requires a sensitive awareness and judicious use of  
1105 time. Plans should always be completed as soon as possible to maximize  
1106 subordinate planning time. Staffs use frequent WARNOs and judicious  
1107 collaborative planning to facilitate parallel planning with subordinates. In  
1108 addition, just because time is available does not mean that orders or plans  
1109 need to be detailed or long; mission orders should be as simple as possible,  
1110 providing the maximum latitude for subordinates.

1111 1-108. Although planning attempts to project the commander's thoughts and  
1112 designs forward in time, it involves an appreciation for planning horizons.  
1113 Because the future is always uncertain, plans should not specify future  
1114 actions with precision. Rather, plans must remain flexible and adaptable,  
1115 allowing the opportunity to pursue a variety of options

1116 1-109. Mission command requires plans that allow commanders flexibility to  
1117 exploit opportunities and respond to threats. Commanders should also  
1118 decentralize planning to the lowest possible level so subordinates have  
1119 maximum freedom of action. In general, a plan should not be a script that  
1120 establishes specific actions and timetables. Such scripting severely limits  
1121 possibilities to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative when unexpected  
1122 threats or opportunities arise. Rather, a good mission order creates  
1123 opportunities for subordinates to exercise their disciplined initiative based on  
1124 the commander's intent and the particulars of each situation.

1125 1-110. Automated systems assist the commander and staff with many of the  
1126 science aspects of planning. They do not relieve commanders and staffs of the  
1127 requirement to look at each situation as a unique tactical problem requiring  
1128 creativity and judgment to solve.

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<sup>1</sup> Robert Debs Heinl, Jr., Col, USMC, *Retired, Dictionary of Military And Naval Quotations* (Annapolis, MD: United States Naval Institute, 1978) p. 239.

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**Chapter 2**

**Army Problem Solving**

*The acid test of an officer who aspires to high command is his ability to be able to grasp quickly the essentials of a military problem.*

Montgomery

This chapter provides a standard, systematic approach to Army problem solving. Army problem solving is applicable to all Army activities, not just operations. It establishes the base logic for the Army’s two tactical planning processes: troop leading procedures and the military decision making process. Chapter 2 assumes more than one person is working on the problem; however, the techniques apply to individual Army leaders as well. Formats for staff studies and decision papers, products of Army problem solving, are located at Appendix A. Decision briefings are discussed in Appendix B.

**PROBLEM SOLVING AND DECISION MAKING**

2-1. The ability to recognize and effectively solve problems is an essential skill for Army leaders (see FM 6-22, *Army Leadership*). Army problem solving is a form of decision making. It is a systematic approach to defining a problem, developing courses of action (COAs) to solve the problem, arriving at the best solution, and implementing it. The object of problem solving is not just to solve near-term problems, but to do so in a way that forms the basis for long-term success.

2-2. Not all problems require lengthy analysis to solve. For simple problems, Army leaders often make decisions quickly—sometimes on the spot. However, for complicated problems involving a variety of factors, a systematic problem solving approach is essential. The amount of analysis required to effectively solve a problem depends on the problem’s complexity, the Army leader’s experience, and amount of time available.

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29 2-3. Army problem solving supports a single leader working alone or a group  
 30 of Army leaders working together. Commanders normally direct their staff or  
 31 subordinate leaders to recommend solutions to problems. These leaders follow  
 32 the steps of Army problem solving to do this. In formal situations, they  
 33 present their recommendations as staff studies, decision papers, and decision  
 34 briefings (see Appendixes A and B). Often, particularly at lower echelons,  
 35 they present recommendations orally.

36 2-4. Army leaders are faced with a variety of problems, each requiring its  
 37 own solution. A problem may be broad and conceptual, such as how to  
 38 improve unit readiness; or it may be more refined, such as determining the  
 39 best allocation of a critical resource. In general, a problem is simply a  
 40 question raised for inquiry, consideration, or solution. More specifically, a  
 41 problem can be the difference between “what is” happening and “what is  
 42 desired” to happen. The gap between the current situation and the desired  
 43 result is the situation or condition—the problem—to resolve.

44 2-5. In some cases, problems take the form of obstacles to achieving a goal.  
 45 The presence of a goal or desired outcome allows Army leaders to start the  
 46 information-gathering step of Army problem solving. When a desired end  
 47 state exists, Army leaders examine information in terms of how it relates to  
 48 that end state. The action required may be as simple as determining the an-  
 49 swer to a question or as complex as identifying a new problem, determining  
 50 COAs, identifying the best solution, and implementing it.

51 **SOLVING PROBLEMS IN A GROUP SETTING**

52 2-6. Creativity by Army leaders is key to developing effective solutions to  
 53 problems. Often, groups can be far more creative than individuals. While  
 54 working in a group is advantages, group problem solving has potential  
 55 pitfalls. One of these pitfalls is “groupthink.”

56 2-7. Groupthink is a common failing of people or groups who work together to  
 57 make decisions or solve problems. It is a barrier to creativity that combines  
 58 habit, fear, and prejudice:

- 59 • Habit—the reluctance to change from accepted ways of doing things.
- 60 • Fear—both fear of discarding the old to adopt the new and fear of being  
 61 thought a fool for recommending the new.
- 62 • Prejudice—preconceived opinion formed without a rational basis or  
 63 with insufficient knowledge.

64 2-8. Groupthink refers to a mode of thinking that people engage in when  
 65 they are deeply involved in a cohesive group. It occurs when members’  
 66 striving for unanimity overrides their motivation to realistically evaluate  
 67 alternative COAs.<sup>1</sup> The group makes a collective decision and feels good about  
 68 it because all members favor the same decision. In the interest of unity and  
 69 harmony, there is no debate or challenge to the selected COA. Being aware of  
 70 the existence of groupthink is the most important factor in avoiding it.  
 71 Following these practices helps avoid groupthink:

- 72 • The leader should encourage members to express objections or doubts.
- 73 • The presenter of a problem should refrain from expressing preferences  
 74 about potential solutions.

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- The leader should assign two independent subgroups to work on the problem.
  - The leader should ask people outside the group for input.
  - The leader should assign at least one member of the group the role of devil’s advocate.
  - After reaching a preliminary consensus, the group should reconsider previously considered COAs.<sup>2</sup>

82 **TYPES OF PROBLEMS**

83 2-9. There are three types of problems: well-structured, ill-structured, and  
84 medium-structured. Understanding the structure of a problem helps  
85 determine the time and resources required to develop a solution. A problem’s  
86 structure depends, in part, on the knowledge, skills, and ability of the Army  
87 leader who must solve it.

88 **WELL-STRUCTURED PROBLEMS**

89 2-10. Well-structured problems are the easiest to deal with. They have the  
90 following characteristics:

- 91 • All required information is available.
- 92 • The problem is clearly defined.
- 93 • A solution technique that makes analysis easy is available.
- 94 • There is a correct, verifiable answer.

95 **ILL-STRUCTURED PROBLEMS**

96 2-11. Ill-structured problems are at the opposite end of the spectrum. They  
97 have the following characteristics:

- 98 • No clear formulation of the problem is possible.
- 99 • Not all required information is available.
- 100 • They are more difficult to analyze.
- 101 • They are normally problems of prediction with no verifiable answer.
- 102 • They may require multiple solutions applied concurrently or  
103 sequentially.

104 Army leaders sometimes divide complex ill-structured problems into smaller  
105 problems.

106 **MEDIUM-STRUCTURED PROBLEMS**

107 2-12. Most problems Army leaders face are medium-structured. They fall  
108 between the extremes of well- and ill-structured problems. In a medium-  
109 structured problem, Army leaders may find—

- 110 • Some information is available.
- 111 • The problem is partially defined.
- 112 • The problem may or may not lend itself to routine solutions.
- 113 • The problem requires some creative skills to solve.
- 114 • The problem normally requires making assumptions about future  
115 conditions or the impact of current actions on the future.

## SOLVING PROBLEMS

2-13. Problem solving is a daily activity for Army leaders. Army problem solving is a systematic way to arrive at the best solution to a problem. It applies at all echelons and includes the steps needed to develop well-structured, well-coordinated solutions. It incorporates risk management techniques appropriate to the situation (see FM 5-19, *Risk Management*). Army leaders remain as objective as possible when solving problems. The goal is to prepare an unbiased solution or recommendation for the decision maker, based on the facts. Problem solving is an important Army leadership action (see FM 6-22, *Army Leadership*). It is essential to good staff work.

### Steps of Problem Solving

1. Problem Definition
2. Information gathering
3. COA development
4. COA analysis
5. COA comparison
6. Decision
7. Execution and assessment

## PROBLEM DEFINITION

2-14. The first step of Army problem solving is recognizing and defining the problem. This step is crucial, as the actual problem may not be obvious at first. Therefore, Army leaders determine exactly what the problem is by precisely and clearly defining its scope and limitations.

2-15. Army leaders identify problems from a variety of sources. These include—

- Higher headquarters directives or guidance.
- Decision maker guidance.
- Subordinates.
- Personal observations.

2-16. When identifying the problem, Army leaders actively seek to identify its root cause, not merely the symptoms on the surface. Symptoms may be the reason that the problem became visible. They are often the first things noticed and frequently require attention. However, focusing on a problem's symptoms may lead to false conclusions or inappropriate solutions. Using a systematic approach to identifying problems helps avoid the "solving symptoms" pitfall.

2-17. To identify the root cause of a problem, Army leaders do the following:

- Compare the current situation to the desired end state.
- Define the problem's scope or boundaries. Answer the following questions:
  - Who does the problem affect?
  - What is affected?
  - When did the problem occur?
  - Where is the problem?
  - Why did the problem occur?
- Determine how to eliminate or overcome the cause of obstacles between here (the current situation) and there (the desired end state).

- Write a draft problem statement.
- Redefine the problem as necessary as new information is acquired and assessed.

2-18. After analyzing the problem, Army leaders develop a problem statement. A problem statement is written as an infinitive phrase: such as, “To determine the best location for constructing a multipurpose vehicle wash rack facility during this fiscal year.” When the problem takes the form of a question or direction for a study, Army leaders submit their problem statement to the decision maker for approval. This ensures the Army leader has understood with the decision maker’s guidance before continuing.

2-19. Once they have developed the problem statement, Army leaders make a plan to solve the problem. This plan may be formal or informal. For example: a squad leader notified of a short-notice inspection will probably assess the situation, form a plan mentally, issue instructions, and supervise; a staff officer assigned a complex problem may develop a written plan with formal milestones. Army leaders fit the plan to the problem and the situation.

2-20. Army leaders make the best possible use of available time and allocate time for each problem solving step. Doing this provides a series of deadlines to meet in solving the problem. Army leaders use reverse planning to prepare their problem solving time line. Once they have implemented it, Army leaders periodically assess their progress. They do not let real or perceived pressure cause them to abandon solving the problem systematically. They change time allocations as necessary, but they do not ignore them.

## INFORMATION GATHERING

2-21. After completing the problem statement, Army leaders continue to gather information relevant to the problem. Gathering information begins with problem definition and continues throughout Army problem solving. Army leaders never stop acquiring and assessing the impact of new or additional information.

2-22. When gathering information, Army leaders obtain the definitions of unfamiliar words or terminology. Doing this is particularly important when dealing with technical information. Army leaders consider the intended audience in deciding what to define. For example: a product for an audience that includes civilians may require definitions of all Army terms; a technical report prepared for a decision maker unfamiliar with the subject should include definitions the reader needs to know to understand the report.

2-23. Army leaders gather information from primary sources. These vary based on the problem. For example: sources of information regarding a unit training problem may be subject matter experts and personnel who have first-hand knowledge of the problem; information sources addressing a policy question could be official documents and technical reports. Methods of collecting original data include interviews, letters of request for specific information, and questionnaires.

2-24. Two types of information are required to solve problems: facts and assumptions. Fully understanding these terms is critical to understanding

205 problem solving. In addition, Army leaders need to know how to handle  
206 opinions and how to manage information when working in a group.

207 **Facts**

208 2-25. *Facts* are verifiable pieces of information. They form the foundation on  
209 which the solution to a problem is based. A fact is an observed and reported  
210 event, past or present. Army leaders are concerned only with facts bearing on  
211 the problem. They do not use raw data or information that has not been anal-  
212 yzed for completeness and accuracy. Facts apply to all possible solutions; in-  
213 formation that applies to some but not all solutions does not help solve the  
214 problem. Regulations, policies, and doctrinal publications are sources of facts.

215 **Assumptions**

216 2-26. An *assumption* is information accepted as true in the absence of facts.  
217 This information is probably correct, but cannot be verified. If it could be  
218 verified, it would be a fact. Valid assumptions have two characteristics:

- They are likely to be true.
- They are essential to generating COAs.

221 Army leaders use assumptions as substitutes for facts they need to solve a  
222 problem. If the information assumed is not needed to solve the problem, an  
223 assumption is unnecessary. Army leaders base assumptions on facts. Sources  
224 can be personal experiences, members of the organization, subject matter  
225 experts, and written observations. (For military decision making process  
226 purposes, the Army uses the joint definition of assumptions. See Chapter 3.)

227 **Opinions**

228 2-27. When gathering information, Army leaders evaluate opinions carefully.  
229 An opinion is a personal judgment that the Army leader or another individual  
230 makes. These are generally of limited value in solving problems because  
231 solutions are based on verifiable information. However, opinions cannot be  
232 totally discounted. They are often the result of years of experience. Army  
233 leaders objectively evaluate opinions to determine whether to accept them as  
234 facts, include them opinions, or reject them. Army leaders neither routinely  
235 accept opinions as facts nor reject them as irrelevant—regardless of their  
236 source.

237 **Information Management**

238 2-28. Army leaders check each piece of information to verify its accuracy. If  
239 possible, two individuals should check and confirm the accuracy of facts and  
240 the validity of assumptions.

241 2-29. Being able to establish whether a piece of information is a fact or an  
242 assumption is of little value if those working on the problem do not know the  
243 information exists. Army leaders share information with the decision maker,  
244 subordinates, and peers, as appropriate. A proposed solution to a problem is  
245 only as good as the information that forms the basis of the solution. Sharing  
246 information among members of a problem solving team increases the  
247 likelihood that a team member will uncover the information that leads to the  
248 best solution.

249 2-30. Information management includes coordination with units and agencies  
250 that may be affected by the problem or its solution. Army leaders determine  
251 these as they gather information. They coordinate with other leaders as they  
252 solve problems, both to obtain assistance and to keep others informed of  
253 situations that may affect them. Such coordination may be informal and  
254 routine: for example, a squad leader checking with the squad on his right to  
255 make sure their fields of fire overlap; or it may be formal, as when a division  
256 action officer staffs a decision paper with the major subordinate commands.  
257 At minimum, Army leaders always coordinate with units or agencies that  
258 might be affected by a solution they propose before they present it to the  
259 decision maker.

## 260 COURSE OF ACTION DEVELOPMENT

261 2-31. After gathering information relevant to the problem, Army leaders  
262 develop COAs for solving it. They carefully consider the guidance provided by  
263 the commander or their superior, and develop several alternatives to solve  
264 the problem. The greater the number of alternatives considered, the more  
265 likelihood of developing a high-quality solution. Experience and time  
266 available determine how many COAs to consider. Army leaders always  
267 consider at least two possible COAs. Doing this forces them to develop criteria  
268 to judge which one provides the best solution. Developing only one COA to  
269 “save time” may produce a faster solution, but risks creating more problems  
270 from factors not considered.

271 2-32. Army leaders follow three steps when developing COAs:

- 272 • Develop screening criteria.
- 273 • Generate options.
- 274 • Write a COA statement.

### 275 Screening Criteria

276 2-33. Army leaders use screening criteria to ensure COAs being considered  
277 can solve the problem. Screening criteria define the minimum and maximum  
278 characteristics the solution must have. They include the absolute standards  
279 that solutions must meet to solve the problem. Army leaders base screening  
280 criteria on facts. They may accept or reject a COA based solely on them. Five  
281 screening criteria are commonly applied to determine whether to consider a  
282 COA:

- 283 • **Suitability**—solves the problem or accomplishes the mission. The COA  
284 must also comply with any guidance from the decision maker and be  
285 consistent with Army values.
- 286 • **Feasibility**—fits within available resources.
- 287 • **Acceptability**—worth the cost or risk.
- 288 • **Distinguishability**—differs significantly from other COAs.
- 289 • **Completeness**—contains the critical aspects of solving the problem  
290 from start to finish.

### 291 Generate Options

292 2-34. After developing the screening criteria, Army leaders generate several  
293 options to solve the problem. Creativity by Army leaders is key to developing

294 effective COAs. Often, groups can be far more creative than individuals.  
 295 However, those working on COAs should have some knowledge of or back-  
 296 ground in the problem area.

297 2-35. An effective technique for developing new ideas in a group setting is  
 298 brainstorming. Brainstorming is characterized by unrestrained participation  
 299 in discussion. Its rules include—

- 300 • State the problem and make sure all participants understand it.
- 301 • Appoint someone to record all ideas.
- 302 • Withhold judgment of ideas.
- 303 • Encourage freewheeling thoughts.
- 304 • Aim for quantity, not quality
- 305 • “Hitchhike” ideas—combine one’s thoughts with those of others.

306 **Write a Course of Action Statement**

307 2-36. After generating options, Army leaders accurately record each COA.  
 308 The COA statement clearly portrays how the action or actions solve the  
 309 problem. In some circumstances, the COA statement may be a single  
 310 sentence: for example, “Purchase Model XYZ computers.” In other  
 311 circumstance the COA statement may require more detail, including sketches  
 312 or concept diagrams. For example, if the problem is to develop a multipurpose  
 313 small-arms range, Army leaders may choose to portray each COA with a  
 314 separate sketch or blueprint of each proposed range.

315 **COURSE OF ACTION ANALYSIS**

316 2-37. Having identified possible COAs, Army leaders analyze each one to  
 317 determine the best alternative. Without a systematic approach, comparing  
 318 alternatives may be overwhelming.

319 2-38. Army leaders use evaluation criteria to analyze COAs and compare  
 320 them with respect to each other and the desired outcome. Evaluation criteria  
 321 may be developed by the Army leader, the decision maker, or both.

322 2-39. Army leaders base evaluation criteria on facts or assumptions.  
 323 Evaluation criteria have five required elements:

- 324 • **Short Title**—the criterion name.
- 325 • **Definition**—a clear and precise definition of the criterion.
- 326 • **Unit of Measure**—a standard element used to quantify the criterion.  
 327 Examples of units of measure are US dollars, miles per gallon, and feet.
- 328 • **Benchmark**—the ideal standard of an acceptable COA in terms of the  
 329 criterion. Generally, the benchmark is the point at which the  
 330 evaluation criterion becomes an advantage. Army leaders avoid  
 331 benchmarks that result in a neutral payoff.
- 332 • **Formula**—an expression of whether more or less of the criterion is an  
 333 advantage. State the formula either objectively (for example, more is  
 334 better) or subjectively (for example, a night movement is better than a  
 335 day movement).

336 Figure 2-1 shows an example of an evaluation criterion.

337 2-40. A well-thought-  
 338 out benchmark is  
 339 critical for precise  
 340 analysis. Benchmarks  
 341 may be prescribed by  
 342 regulations or guidance  
 343 from the decision  
 344 maker. This guidance  
 345 may be verbal or  
 346 written. Sometimes, the  
 347 benchmark can be  
 348 inferred by the tangible  
 349 return expected from  
 350 the problem's solution. Often, however, Army leaders establish benchmarks  
 351 themselves. Four common methods for doing this are—

<p><b>Short Title:</b> Cost</p> <p><b>Definition:</b> The maximum total cost of each truck.</p> <p><b>Unit of Measure:</b> Dollars</p> <p><b>Benchmark:</b> \$38,600</p> <p><b>Formula:</b> <math>\leq</math> \$38,600 is an advantage; <math>&gt;</math> \$38,600 is a disadvantage; less is better</p>
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Figure 2-1. Sample Evaluation Criterion

- 352 • **Reasoning**—the Army leader establishes the benchmark based on  
 353 personal experience, with little or no outside information.
- 354 • **Historical data**—the Army leader establishes the benchmark based  
 355 on what has happened before.
- 356 • **Current allocation**—the Army leader establishes the benchmark  
 357 based on an existing condition.
- 358 • **Averaging**—the Army leader establishes the benchmark based on the  
 359 mathematical average of the remaining solutions. Averaging is the  
 360 least preferred of all methods.

361 2-41. Army leaders may assign weights to each evaluation criterion.  
 362 Weighting criteria establishes the relative importance of each one with re-  
 363 spect to the others. Army leaders state the rationale for the weight assigned  
 364 to each criterion when recommending a solution to the decision maker. When  
 365 the solution is recorded in writing, the report includes this rationale.

366 2-42. Army leaders evaluate each COA in terms of all evaluation criteria. For  
 367 quantitative criteria, they compute the payoff value for each COA. They are  
 368 careful not to compare COAs with each other during the analysis; they do  
 369 that during the next step. They examine each COA independently to identify  
 370 its strengths and weaknesses. They are also careful not to introduce new  
 371 criteria.

372 2-43. After applying the evaluation criteria to all COAs, Army leaders list the  
 373 advantages and disadvantages of each. Criteria that favor the COA are  
 374 termed *advantages*. Criteria that do not favor the COA are termed *disadvant-*  
 375 *ages*. Criteria that neither favor nor disfavor the COA are termed *neutral*. If  
 376 there are many neutral payoffs associated with a criterion, Army leaders ex-  
 377 amine it to ensure it is required, specific, and applied logically and objective-  
 378 ly. Neutral should rarely be used. The number of advantages, disadvantages,  
 379 and neutrals for each COA must equal the number of evaluation criteria.

380 **COURSE OF ACTION COMPARISON**

381 2-44. During COA comparison, Army leaders compare each COA against the  
 382 others to determine the best solution.

383 2-45. COA comparison identifies which COA best solves the problem based  
384 the evaluation criteria. Army leaders use any comparison technique that  
385 helps reach the best recommendation. The most common technique is a  
386 decision matrix (see Figures 3-18 [page 3-46], 3-19 [page 3-47], and 3-20 [page  
387 3-47]).

388 2-46. Quantitative techniques (such as decision matrixes, select weights, and  
389 sensitivity analyses) may be used to support comparisons. However, they are  
390 tools to support the analysis and comparison. They are not the analysis and  
391 comparison themselves. Summarize the results of any quantitative  
392 techniques clearly so the reader need not refer to an annex. Do not explain  
393 the quantitative technique; state the results it produces.

## 394 DECISION

395 2-47. After completing their analysis and comparison, Army leaders identify  
396 the preferred COA. For simple problems, Army leaders may proceed straight  
397 to executing the solution. For more complex problems, a leader plan of action  
398 or formal plan may be necessary (see FM 6-22, *Army Leadership*). If the  
399 problem was assigned by a superior, Army leaders prepare the necessary  
400 products (verbal, written, or both) needed to present the recommendation to  
401 the decision maker. Before presenting findings and a recommendation, Army  
402 leaders coordinate their recommendation with those affected by the problem  
403 or the solutions. In formal situations, Army leaders present their findings and  
404 recommendations to the decision maker as staff studies, decision papers, or  
405 decision briefings (see Annex A and Annex B).

406 2-48. A good solution can be lost if the Army leader cannot persuade the  
407 audience that it is correct. Every problem requires both a solution and the  
408 ability to communicate it. The writing and briefing skills an Army leader  
409 possesses may ultimately be as important as good problem solving skills.

## 410 EXECUTION AND ASSESSMENT

411 2-49. Based on the decision maker's decision and final guidance, Army  
412 leaders refine the COA and prepare necessary implementing instructions.  
413 Formal implementing instructions can be issued as a memorandum of  
414 instruction, policy letter, or command directive. A feedback system that  
415 provides timely and accurate information, periodic review, and the flexibility  
416 to adjust must also be built into the implementation plan. Army leaders stay  
417 involved, and are careful not to create new problems because of  
418 uncoordinated implementation of the solution.

419 2-50. Army problem solving does not end with identifying the best solution or  
420 obtaining approval of a recommendation. It ends when the problem is solved.  
421 Once they have given instructions, Army leaders monitor their implementa-  
422 tion and compare results to the criteria of success and the desired end state  
423 established in the approved COA. When necessary, they issue additional  
424 instructions.

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<sup>1</sup> Irving L. Janis, *Victims of Groupthink* (Houghton Mifflin Company Boston, 1972), p 9.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 209-218.

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### Chapter 3

## The Military Decision Making Process

*A good plan violently executed NOW is better than a perfect plan next week.<sup>1</sup>*

General George S. Patton Jr.,

The military decision making process (MDMP) is an established and proven analytical planning process. It applies across the spectrum of conflict and range of military operations. This chapter describes the steps of the MDMP and explains how commanders, staffs, and subordinate headquarters interact during planning. Additionally, this chapter offers ways to abbreviate the MDMP when planning in a time-constrained environment. Formats for staff estimates are located at Appendix E. Formats for plans and orders are located at Appendix G.

### BACKGROUND

3-1. **The military decision making process is a planning tool that establishes techniques for analyzing a mission, developing, analyzing, and comparing courses of action against criteria of success and each other, selecting the optimum course of action, and producing a plan or order.**

3-2. The military decision making process (MDMP) is an adaptation of Army problem solving (see Chapter 2). Commanders with an assigned staff use it to organize their planning activities, share a common understanding of the mission and commander’s intent, and develop effective plans and orders. The MDMP helps organize the thought process of commanders and staffs. It helps them apply thoroughness, clarity, sound judgment, logic, and professional knowledge to reach decisions.

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3-3. The shaded boxes in Figure 3-1 depict the seven steps of the MDMP. Each begins with inputs that build on previous steps. Each step, in turn, has outputs that drive subsequent steps. Errors committed early affect later steps. While the formal process begins with the receipt of a mission and has as its goal the production of an order, planning continues throughout the operations process.




Figure 3-1. The Military Decision Making Process

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3-4. Preparation and execution, while not part of the MDMP, are shown in the lower portion of Figure 3-1 to highlight the importance of continuous planning. Once a plan or order is produced, it is transmitted to those who will execute it quickly enough for them produce their own plans and prepare for the operation. Back-briefs and rehearsals occur during preparation. They are

38 essential to ensure those responsible for execution have a clear under-  
39 standing of the mission, commander's intent, and concept of operations (see  
40 FM 6-0, *Command and Control*). During execution, plans are refined or  
41 planning for a new operation begins, as the situation requires. Assessment is  
42 continuous and occurs during planning, preparation, and execution. At any  
43 time during the operations process, the situation may require the commander  
44 to restart the MDMP. Examples of these circumstances include—

- 45 • The commander receives a new mission.
- 46 • The commander receives or perceives a possible follow-on mission.
- 47 • The commander receives or perceives a contingency based on a  
48 variance in the current operation.

49 3-5. The MDMP can be as detailed as time, resources, experience, and the  
50 situation permit. The full MDMP is detailed, deliberate, sequential, and time-  
51 consuming. It is used when enough planning time and staff support are  
52 available to thoroughly examine two or more friendly and enemy courses of  
53 action (COAs). This typically occurs when developing operation plans  
54 (OPLANs), when planning for an entirely new mission, or during training  
55 designed to teach the MDMP.

56 3-6. There are situations when the MDMP requires abbreviation, especially  
57 when time available to plan is short. The commander decides whether to use  
58 the full MDMP, or provides guidance on how to abbreviate it, based on the  
59 situation (see paragraphs 3-185–3-228). The full MDMP provides the  
60 foundation on which planning in a time-constrained environment is based.  
61 Before a staff can effectively abbreviate the MDMP, it must master the steps  
62 of the full MDMP.

63 3-7. The advantages of using the full MDMP are that—

- 64 • It analyzes and compares multiple friendly and enemy COAs to  
65 identify the best possible friendly COA.
- 66 • It produces the greatest coordination and synchronization in plans and  
67 orders.
- 68 • It minimizes the chance of overlooking critical aspects of the operation.
- 69 • It helps identify contingencies for branch and sequel development.

70 3-8. The disadvantage of using the full MDMP is that it is time-consuming.  
71 The longer the higher headquarters spends planning, the less time for  
72 subordinates to plan and prepare. Additionally, more time devoted to  
73 planning versus preparation and execution can allow enemies to improve  
74 their posture. This may lead to ceding the initiative, resulting in a loss of  
75 momentum or lost opportunities of the friendly force.

## 76 **ROLE OF THE COMMANDER**

77 3-9. Commanders are in charge of the planning process. From start to finish,  
78 their personal role is central. They discipline the staff to meet the  
79 requirements of time, planning horizons, simplicity, and level of detail. They  
80 also discipline the product to ensure it is relevant to the moment and suitable  
81 to subordinates. Commanders do this by visualizing, describing, and directing  
82 operations (see FM 6-0, *Command and Control*).

83 **Visualize**

84 3-10. *Commander’s visualization* is the process of developing a clear under-  
 85 standing of the current state with relation to the enemy and environment,  
 86 envisioning a desired end state which represents mission accomplishment,  
 87 and then subsequently visualizing the sequence of activity that moves the  
 88 force from its current state to the end state (FM 6-0, *Command and Control*).  
 89 Visualization is the core mental process that supports planning. To visualize  
 90 the desired end state, commanders must clearly understand the situation in  
 91 the battlespace: What is the mission? What are the enemy’s capabilities and  
 92 likely actions? What are the characteristics of the area of operations (AO)  
 93 What role do civil considerations play?

94 3-11. Commanders frame their battlespace during mission analysis. (Battle-  
 95 space is not the same as AO. See FM 3-0, *Operations*.) They consider the  
 96 factors of METT-TC, staff estimates, input from other commanders,  
 97 experience, and judgment to develop situational understanding (see FM 6-0,  
 98 *Command and Control*). Based on their situational understanding,  
 99 commanders determine a desired end state. They then develop a construct of  
 100 how to get the organization from its current position to the desired end state  
 101 (a concept of operations).

102 3-12. Commanders use the operational framework and the elements of  
 103 operational design to assist them  
 104 in visualizing operations. They  
 105 visualize an operational  
 106 framework by defining and  
 107 arranging its three  
 108 components—AO, battlespace,  
 109 and battlefield organization (see  
 110 FM 3-0, *Operations*). The  
 111 operational framework helps  
 112 commanders visualize the  
 113 arrangement of friendly forces  
 114 and resources in time, space, and  
 115 purpose with respect to each  
 116 other and the enemy or situation.

<p><b>Elements of Operational Design</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• End state and military conditions</li> <li>• Center of gravity</li> <li>• Decisive points and objectives</li> <li>• Lines of operation</li> <li>• Culminating point</li> <li>• Operational reach, approach, and pauses</li> <li>• Simultaneous and sequential operations</li> <li>• Linear and nonlinear operations</li> <li>• Tempo</li> </ul>
---

117 3-13. The elements of operation-  
 118 al design are tools that help commanders visualize operations and shape  
 119 their intent. They provide commanders a means to conceptually link ends,  
 120 ways, and means. While the elements of operational design give commanders  
 121 a framework to think about operations, their usefulness and applicability  
 122 diminishes at each lower echelon. For example, a corps commander may  
 123 consider all the elements of operational design, while a brigade commander  
 124 may focus his visualization on decisive points, objectives, and tempo.

125 **Describe**

126 3-14. Commanders describe their visualization in the form of their  
 127 commander’s intent and planning guidance. They use an operational  
 128 framework and the elements of operational design to describe the relation-  
 129 ship of decisive, shaping, and sustaining operations to time and space. They

emphasize how the combination of decisive, shaping, and sustaining operations relates to accomplishing the purpose of the overall operation.

3-15. **Commander’s Intent.** The *commander’s intent* is a clear, concise statement of what the force must do and the conditions the force must meet to succeed with respect to the enemy, terrain, and the desired end state (FM 3-0, *Operations*). It consists of the end state, key tasks that the force as a whole must accomplish, and if desired, an expanded purpose of the operation.

- *End state*, at the operational and tactical levels, is the conditions that, when achieved, accomplish the mission. At the operational level, these conditions attain the aims set for the campaign or major operation. (FM 3-0, *Operations*).
- *Key tasks* are tasks that the force must perform or conditions the force must meet to achieve the stated purpose of the operation (FM 6-0, *Command and Control*).

3-16. Key tasks are not tied to a specific COA; they identify requirements fundamental to success of the force as a whole. When significant opportunities present themselves or the concept of operations no longer applies, subordinates use key tasks to keep their efforts supporting the commander’s intent. The tempo and duration of an operation, and their effect on adversaries or terrain that must be controlled, are examples of key tasks.

3-17. The commander’s intent does not state the method for the force to achieve the end state. The method is the concept of operations. Nor does the commander’s intent include acceptable risk. Risk is stated in the commander’s planning guidance and is addressed in all COAs. If the commander’s intent addresses purpose, it does not restate the “why” of the mission statement. Rather, it addresses the broader operational context of the mission. Figure 3-2 depicts how the commander’s intent focuses planning. Planners incorporate key tasks into all COAs and ensure all COAs achieve the end state.




Figure 3-2. Commander’s Intent and COA Development

3-18. **Planning Guidance.**

Commanders develop planning guidance from their visualization (see Appendix D). Planning guidance may be broad or detailed, as circumstances require. Either way, it conveys the essence of the commander’s visualization. Commanders use their experience and judgment to add depth and clarity to their planning guidance. Effective planning guidance gives the staff a broad outline of the commander’s visualization, while still allowing them latitude to explore different options.

3-19. The planning guidance initially focuses on COA development and on intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) operations. Commanders issue detailed ISR guidance early (during mission analysis or immediately

193 afterwards) and begin ISR operations as soon as possible. Commanders  
 194 identify an expected decisive operation and convey how they see shaping and  
 195 sustaining operations contributing to it. This initial battlefield framework  
 196 enables the staff to fully develop several COAs. The planning guidance states  
 197 in broad terms when, where, and how the commander intends to mass the  
 198 effects of combat power to accomplish the mission within the higher  
 199 commander’s intent.

200 3-20. The amount of detail in  
 201 the planning guidance depends  
 202 on the time available, staff  
 203 proficiency, and the latitude  
 204 the next higher commander al-  
 205 lows. Broad, general guidance  
 206 allows a proficient staff to  
 207 develop flexible and effective  
 208 options. Time-constrained  
 209 conditions require more speci-  
 210 fic and directive guidance. The  
 211 more detailed the planning  
 212 guidance, the more quickly the  
 213 staff can complete the plan.  
 214 However, detailed guidance  
 215 incurs the risk of overlooking  
 216 or insufficiently examining  
 217 things that might affect  
 218 mission execution.

**Decisive operations** are those that directly accomplish the task assigned by the higher headquarters. Decisive operations conclusively determine the outcome of major operations, battles, and engagements.

**Shaping operations** at any echelon create and preserve conditions for the success of the decisive operations.

**Sustaining operations** are operations at any echelon that enable shaping and decisive operations by providing combat service support, rear area and base security, movement control, terrain management, and infrastructure development.

FM 3-0, *Operations*

219 **Direct**

220 3-21. Commanders direct throughout the operations process by issuing plans  
 221 and orders, and establishing control measures. They direct when they decide  
 222 on a COA and communicate that decision to subordinates in a plan or order.  
 223 To select COAs for further analysis, the commander or staff analyzes each  
 224 COA for suitability, feasibility, and acceptability. After COA analysis and  
 225 COA comparison, the commander selects or approves the COA, using criteria  
 226 of success derived before starting the war game.

227 **3-22. Orders and Plans.** Under mission command, commanders direct with  
 228 mission orders (see Chapter 1). Mission orders stress not only the actions  
 229 required of subordinates but also understanding their context and purpose.  
 230 Mission orders enable subordinates to understand the situation, their  
 231 commander’s mission and intent, and their own mission. Subordinate  
 232 commanders decide how to accomplish their missions. Mission orders allow  
 233 unity of effort while allowing subordinate commanders to exercise initiative  
 234 in conducting their missions.

235 3-23. While clear direction is essential to the success of an operation,  
 236 commanders must strike a balance between necessary but minimum  
 237 direction and overly detailed direction. A subordinate who takes action first,  
 238 within the commander’s intent, and reports later may often achieve far more  
 239 than one who delays action to wait for the commander’s confirmation.

240 3-24. **Control Measures.** Control measures help commanders direct action  
241 by establishing responsibilities and limits to prevent units from impeding one  
242 another and to impose necessary coordination. They may be permissive or  
243 restrictive. A commander should impose only the minimum control measures  
244 needed to provide essential coordination and deconfliction among units.  
245 Commanders remove restrictive control measures as soon as possible. Control  
246 measures may be graphical, written, or procedural. (See FM 3-90, *Tactics*, for  
247 a discussion of control measures associated with each type of operations and  
248 FM 1-02, *Operational Terms and Graphics*, for a listing of doctrinal control  
249 measures and rules for drawing control measures on overlays and maps.)

## 250 **ROLE OF THE STAFF**

251 3-25. The staff's effort during planning focuses on helping the commander  
252 make decisions and developing effective plans and orders. It does this by  
253 integrating information with sound doctrine and technical competence. The  
254 chief of staff/executive officer manages, coordinates, and disciplines the staff's  
255 work, and provides quality control. Chiefs of staff must understand the  
256 commander's guidance and intent because they supervise the entire process.  
257 They provide time lines to the staff, establish brief-back times and locations,  
258 and provide any instructions necessary to complete the plan.

259 3-26. Staff activities during planning initially focus on mission analysis. Mis-  
260 sion analysis develops information to help the commander understand the  
261 situation and mission. During COA development and COA comparison, the  
262 staff provides tactically sound recommendations to support the commander in  
263 selecting a COA. After the commander makes a decision, the staff prepares  
264 the plan or order, coordinating all necessary details. The staff performs the  
265 following critical tasks during planning:

- 266 • Identifying specified and implied tasks.
- 267 • Identifying constraints.
- 268 • Identifying key facts and assumptions.
- 269 • Performing intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB).
- 270 • Formulating the concepts of operations and support in line with the
- 271 commander's intent.
- 272 • Developing the scheme of maneuver to support the COA.
- 273 • Preparing, authenticating, and distributing their portion of the plan or
- 274 order, annexes, estimates, appendixes, and supporting plans.

275 3-27. Throughout planning, staff officers prepare recommendations within  
276 their functional areas, such as—

- 277 • Unit, system, weapons, and munitions capabilities, limitations, and
- 278 employment.
- 279 • Risk identification and mitigation.
- 280 • Organization for combat, allocations to subordinate units, and com-
- 281 mand and support relationships among subordinate units.
- 282 • Resource allocation and employment synchronization of organic and
- 283 supporting assets (including those of other services).
- 284 • General locations and movements of units.

285 3-28. Staff sections prepare and continuously update estimates to help the  
286 commander make decisions. ***A staff estimate is an assessment of a***  
287 ***course of action by a staff element that assists the commander in***  
288 ***visualization and decision making. It is an evaluation of how factors***  
289 ***in a staff section's functional area will influence the course of action***  
290 ***the commander is considering.***

291 3-29. The staff estimate format parallels the steps of the MDMP and serves  
292 as the primary tool for recording a staff section's assessments, analyses, and  
293 recommendations (see Annex E). Staff estimates contain a compilation of  
294 critical factors the staff tracks, plus an analysis of other sections' actions that  
295 impact their functional area. Adequate plans hinge on early, accurate, and  
296 continuous staff estimates. The commander uses recommendations from  
297 them to select feasible COAs for analysis and decide which COA to execute.  
298 Failure to make or update staff estimates may lead to mistakes throughout  
299 an operation.

300 3-30. Staff estimates are continuous. They are maintained throughout the  
301 operations process—not just during planning. Often referred to as “running  
302 estimates,” staff sections revise them as new information becomes available.  
303 Revisions may or may not affect the assessments. When significant  
304 information or the situation changes, the estimate is revised to reflect new  
305 constraints, impacts, and possibly new recommendations. Any time new  
306 information is obtained, the staff section determines if it will change the  
307 analysis of the estimate, any impacts these changes have on the plan, and if a  
308 new recommendation is required.

## 309 **COMMANDER, STAFF, AND SUBORDINATE INTERACTION**

310 3-31. The MDMP is designed to facilitate interaction among commanders,  
311 staffs, and subordinate headquarters throughout planning (see Figure 3-3).  
312 This interaction allows for a concurrent, coordinated effort that maintains  
313 flexibility, efficiently uses time, and facilitates continuous information  
314 sharing. Internally, this interaction allows the staff to receive guidance from  
315 the commander and resolve issues as they arise. Additionally, it provides a  
316 structure within which the staff can work collectively to produce a  
317 coordinated plan.

318 3-32. Commander's actions are listed under the commander's visualization  
319 column in Figure 3-3. The right column lists a series of briefings the staff  
320 gives to the commander. (The operation order [OPORD] briefing is presented  
321 to subordinate commanders.) These briefings allow the staff to present their  
322 analysis and recommendations in a coordinated manner and receive guidance  
323 throughout the planning process.

324 3-33. The MDMP is also designed to allow the staff to interact and share  
325 information with subordinate headquarters during planning. (See Chapter 1  
326 for a discussion on parallel and collaborative planning.) As decisions,  
327 information, and staff products become available, the higher headquarters  
328 sends them to subordinates in warning orders (WARNOs). Timely WARNOs  
329 facilitate parallel planning, allow subordinates to start necessary movements,  
330 and direct ISR operations. While Figure 3-3 depicts three WARNOs, the  
331 situation dictates the number of WARNOs required.




Figure 3-3. The Role of the Commander and Staff in the MDMP

### PERFORMING THE MILITARY DECISION MAKING PROCESS

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3-34. The MDMP consists of the seven steps shown in Figure 3-1 (page 3-2). The commander and staff perform these steps sequentially; however, there may not be distinct points at which one step ends and another begins. For example, IPB (a mission analysis task) continues throughout the MDMP. It is convenient to describe the MDMP in terms of steps; nonetheless, planners compare the process to current requirements, set priorities, and perform the necessary tasks in an order that produces the required product on time.

3-35. The MDMP synchronizes several processes. Among these are—

- IPB (see FM 2-01.3, *Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield*).
- The operations security process (see FM 3-13, *Information Operations*).
- The military deception process (see FM 3-13, *Information Operations*).
- The targeting process (see FM 3-60, *The Targeting Process*).
- Risk management (see FM 5-19, *Risk Management*).

The following discussion shows where these processes provide input to the overall MDMP. All of them proceed concurrently.

### RECEIPT OF MISSION

3-36. The MDMP begins with receiving or anticipating a new mission. This can come from an order issued by higher headquarters or be derived from an

351 ongoing operation. For example, the commander may determine—based  
 352 change in enemy dispositions, friendly force dispositions, or other battlefield  
 353 factors—that there is an opportunity to accomplish the higher commander’s  
 354 intent by a means different from the original concept of operations. When a  
 355 new mission is identified, commanders and staffs perform the process actions  
 356 and produce the outputs shown in Figure 3-4.




Figure 3-4. Receipt of Mission

357 **Alert the Staff**

358 3-37. As soon as a unit receives a new mission, the operations section alerts  
 359 the staff of the pending planning requirement. Unit SOPs identify who  
 360 participates in mission analysis, who the alternates are, and where they  
 361 should assemble. Supporting and attached units obtain and review the unit  
 362 standing operating procedures (SOP) to ensure they understand their  
 363 responsibilities. If the commander wants to use collaborative planning,  
 364 participants from subordinate units are also notified.  
 365

366 **Gather the Tools**

367 3-38. The staff prepares for mission analysis by gathering the tools needed to  
 368 perform it. These tools include, but are not limited to—

- 369 • The higher headquarters order or plan and operational graphics.  
 370 (When possible, each staff section receives a copy of the higher  
 371 headquarters base order or plan, task organization, their functional  
 372 annexes, and a copy of the operational graphics.)
- 373 • Maps of the AO.
- 374 • Both their own and the higher headquarters’ SOPs.
- 375 • Appropriate field manuals (especially FM 1-02, *Operational Terms and*  
 376 *Graphics*).
- 377 • Current staff estimates.
- 378 • Other materials and products required.

379 Staff sections should develop a list of requirements for each type of mission.

380 **Update Staff Estimates**

381 3-39. While gathering the necessary tools for planning, each staff section  
 382 begins updating its estimate—especially the status of friendly units and  
 383 resources. While this task is listed at the beginning of the MDMP, developing  
 384 and updating staff estimates is continuous throughout the operations process.  
 385 During planning, staff members monitor, track, and aggressively seek

386 information important to their functional area. They assess how this  
387 information affects COA development and any recommendations they make.  
388 After the plan is approved, staff officers continue to monitor the situation and  
389 update their estimates. They pay particular attention to how new  
390 information or events affect recommendations and evaluations made during  
391 their initial estimate.

## 392 **Perform an Initial Assessment**

393 3-40. The commander and staff perform a quick initial assessment. This  
394 assessment includes determining the—

- 395 • Time available from mission receipt to mission execution.
- 396 • Time needed to plan and prepare for the mission, for both the head-  
397 quarters and subordinate units.
- 398 • Current IPB products available.
- 399 • Staff estimates already current and those that need updating.
- 400 • Time required to position critical elements—to include command and  
401 control (C2) nodes—for the upcoming operation.
- 402 • The staff's experience, cohesiveness, and level of rest or stress.

403 This assessment is designed to optimize the command's use of time while  
404 preserving time for subordinate commanders to plan and prepare for  
405 operations.

406 3-41. A critical product of this assessment is the initial operational time line.  
407 This time line includes allocation of available time for planning, preparing,  
408 and executing the operation. The commander and staff balance the desire for  
409 detailed planning against the time available to plan and prepare.  
410 Commanders generally allocate a minimum of two-thirds of the available  
411 time to subordinate units for planning and preparation. This leaves one-third  
412 of the time for the commander and staff to do their own planning (see  
413 Chapter 1). The operational time line is refined during mission analysis and  
414 continuously updated.

415 3-42. An important component of the operational time line is the staff  
416 planning time line. The chief of staff/executive officer or a representative  
417 outlines how long the staff can spend on each MDMP step. The planning time  
418 line indicates when certain products are due and to whom. It includes times  
419 and locations for meetings and briefings. It serves as a benchmark for the  
420 commander and staff.

421 3-43. Table 3-1 (page 3-12) depicts a generic planning time line for a division.  
422 It shows how much time can be devoted to each MDMP step, based on the  
423 time between receipt of mission and execution. This sample time line is based  
424 on the one-third/two-thirds rule, and uses the following percentages to  
425 determine the amount of time allocated to each step:

- 426 • Mission analysis 30%
- 427 • COA development 20%
- 428 • COA analysis/comparison/decision 30%
- 429 • Orders production 20%

430

**Table 3-1. Generic Planning Time Line for a Division**

	Time Available before Execution									
	8 hrs		24 hrs		48 hrs		72 hrs		96 hrs	
	Time For	R +	Time For	R +	Time For	R +	Time For	R +	Time For	R +
<b>Mission Analysis</b>	0:45	0:45	2:24	2:24	4:48	4:48	7:12	7:12	9:36	9:36
<b>COA Development</b>	0:30	1:15	1:36	4:00	3:12	8:00	4:48	12:00	6:24	16:00
<b>COA Analysis/ Comparison/ Decision</b>	0:45	2:00	2:24	6:24	4:48	12:48	7:12	19:12	9:36	25:36
<b>Orders Production</b>	0:30	2:30	1:36	8:00	3:12	16:00	4:48	24:00	6:24	32:00
<b>Total Time Used</b>	2:30		8:00		16:00		24:00		32:00	

431 3-44. The “R” in Table 3-1 represents receipt of mission time. All R + times  
 432 represent the time that the action should be completed. For example, given  
 433 48 hours to plan and prepare for a mission, mission analysis should be  
 434 complete by 4 hours, 48 minutes after the mission is received. Unit SOPs  
 435 should contain generic planning time lines to help decision makers develop  
 436 the staff planning time line. Generic time lines serve as guides and are  
 437 adjusted based on METT-TC.

438 **Issue the Initial Guidance**

439 3-45. Once time is allocated, the commander determines whether to use the  
 440 full or an abbreviated MDMP. Time, more than any other factor, determines  
 441 the detail to which the staff can plan. The commander then issues the initial  
 442 guidance (not to be confused with mission analysis task 15—Issue the  
 443 Commander’s Planning Guidance). Although brief, the initial guidance  
 444 includes—

- 445 • The initial operational time line.
- 446 • How to abbreviate the MDMP, if required (see paragraphs 3-201–3-  
 447 205).
- 448 • Necessary coordination to perform, including liaison officers to  
 449 dispatch.
- 450 • Initial surveillance and or reconnaissance to start.
- 451 • Authorized movement (to include positioning of C2 system nodes).
- 452 • Additional staff tasks.
- 453 • Collaborative planning times and locations (if desired).


454 **Issue the Initial Warning Order**

455 3-46. The last task in receipt of mission is to issue a WARNO to subordinate  
 456 and supporting units. This order includes, as a minimum—

- 457 • The type of operation.
- 458 • The general location of the operation.
- 459 • The initial operational time line.
- 460 • Any reconnaissance or surveillance to begin.
- 461 • Any movements to initiate.
- 462 • Any collaborative planning sessions directed by the commander.

463 **MISSION ANALYSIS**

464 3-47. A thorough mission analysis is crucial to planning. Both the process  
 465 and products of mission analysis help commanders refine their situational  
 466 understanding. Accurate situational understanding enables them to better  
 467 visualize the operation. Mission analysis consists of 17 tasks, not necessarily  
 468 sequential (see Figure 3-5). In addition to the staff's mission analysis, com-  
 469 manders perform their own mission analysis. This gives them a frame of  
 470 reference to assess the staff's work and develop their visualization. The staff  
 471 uses running estimates to record assessments and other information.  
 472 Anticipation, prior preparation, and a trained staff are the keys to a timely  
 473 mission analysis.



**Figure 3-5. Mission Analysis**

474 **Task 1. Analyze the Higher Headquarters Order**

475 3-48. Commanders and staffs thoroughly analyze the higher headquarters  
 476 order to establish where the unit mission fits into the missions of higher and  
 477 adjacent headquarters. Their goal is to determine how their unit, by task and  
 478 purpose, contributes to the mission, commander's intent, and concept of  
 479 operations of the higher headquarters. They also determine how their  
 480 mission and those of adjacent units contribute to achieving the commander's  
 481 intent. The commander and staff seek to completely understand—

- 482 • The higher headquarters—
  - 483 ▪ Commander's intent.
  - 484 ▪ Mission.


- 485                   ▪ Available assets.
- 486                   ▪ Area of operations.
- 487                   ▪ Concept of operations.
- 488                   ▪ Operational time line.
- 489                   • The missions of adjacent (including front and rear), supporting, and
- 490                   supported units, and their relation to higher headquarters plan.
- 491                   • The unit AO.
- 492                   • Their mission in the context of and in relation to the higher head-
- 493                   quarters mission and commander’s intent.

494 Parallel and collaborative planning with the higher headquarters facilitates  
495 this task.

496 3-49. When staffs misinterpret the higher headquarters mission, command-  
497 er’s intent, or guidance, time is wasted. If confused by the higher headquart-  
498 ers order or guidance, the staff seeks clarification immediately. Liaison of-  
499 ficers familiar with the higher headquarters plan can assist by attending and  
500 participating in planning. Staffs may also use requests for information to  
501 clarify or obtain additional information from a unit over which they do not  
502 have tasking authority, such as adjacent units.

504 **Task 2. Perform Initial Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield**

506 3-50. IPB is a systematic, continuous  
508 process of analyzing the weather,  
510 terrain, and threats as they relate to  
512 the mission and friendly forces in a  
514 specific geographic area (see FM 2-01.3,  
516 *Intelligence Preparation of the  
518 Battlefield*). It is essential to staff  
520 estimates, targeting, reconnaissance,  
521 surveillance, and decision making. IPB provides the basis for intelligence  
522 collection and friendly COA development and analysis. IBP starts during  
523 mission analysis, is refined during the rest of the MDMP, and continues  
524 during preparation and execution of operations. IBP consists of the four steps  
525 shown in Figure 3-6.



**Figure 3-6. Steps of IPB**

526 3-51. **Define the Battlefield Environment.** Defining the battlefield  
527 environment includes identifying characteristics that influence friendly and  
528 threat operations. It helps determine the area of interest and identifies gaps  
529 in intelligence.

530 3-52. **Describe the Battlefield’s Effects.** Describing the battlefield’s effects  
531 involves evaluating all aspects of the environment. These include the effects  
532 of terrain, weather, and civil considerations in the AO. Describing the  
533 battlefield’s effects identifies constraints on potential friendly COAs and may  
534 reveal implied tasks. It also identifies opportunities the battlefield environ-  
535 ment presents, such as avenues of approach and engagement areas. The staff  
536 integrates these into their staff estimates and potential friendly COAs.

537 3-53. **Evaluate the Threat.** Evaluating the threat involves analyzing  
538 current intelligence to determine how adversaries normally organize for

539 combat and conduct operations under similar circumstances. This step re-  
540 sults in a doctrinal template that depicts how the threat operates when  
541 unconstrained by effects of the environment. Knowing enemy capabilities and  
542 vulnerabilities allows the commander and staff to make assumptions about  
543 the relative capabilities of friendly forces.

544 **3-54. Determine Threat Courses of Action.** Using the results of the  
545 previous steps and the effects of the operational environment, the intelligence  
546 officer determines possible threat COAs and arranges them in probable order  
547 of adoption. They are expressed as situation templates (SITEMPs). SITEMPs  
548 include all combat multipliers the enemy could use. They are done before the  
549 mission analysis briefing (when the commander is briefed on likely enemy  
550 COAs). The intelligence officer develops and war-games these threats COAs  
551 during COA analysis.

552 **3-55. Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield Products.** During  
553 mission analysis IPB is started, but not completed. Initial IPB products  
554 include the modified combined obstacle overlay (MCOO) and enemy  
555 SITEMPs. Additionally, the initial IPB identifies gaps in intelligence that the  
556 commander uses to establish initial priority intelligence requirements (PIR).  
557 These are incorporated into the initial ISR plan (see mission analysis task  
558 9—Determine the Initial ISR Plan).

559 **3-56.** The intelligence officer, with staff assistance, develops event templates  
560 from the SITEMPs. Event templates are not required for the mission analysis  
561 briefing; however, they should be done before COA development. Event  
562 templates help identify where specific enemy activities may occur, the most  
563 likely enemy COA, and the most dangerous enemy COA. Additionally, IPB  
564 starts to identify high-value targets (HVTs) as a part of the targeting process.  
565 The targeting process proceeds concurrently with the MDMP (see Appendix  
566 H; FM 3-60, *Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for the Targeting Process*).

### 567 **Tasks 3. Determine Specified, Implied, and Essential Tasks**

568 **3-57.** The staff analyzes the higher headquarters order and the higher com-  
569 mander's guidance to determine specified and implied tasks. (A *task* is a  
570 clearly defined and measurable activity accomplished by individuals and  
571 organizations. Tasks are specific activities that contribute to the accomplish-  
572 ment of encompassing missions or other requirements [FM 7-0, *Training the*  
573 *Force*].) From the list of specified and implied tasks, the staff determines  
574 essential tasks.

575 **3-58. Specified tasks are tasks specifically assigned to a unit by its**  
576 **higher headquarters.** Paragraphs 2 and 3 of the higher headquarters order  
577 or plan state specified tasks. Combat support (CS) and combat service  
578 support (CSS) tasks may be in paragraphs 4 and 5. Specified tasks may be  
579 listed in annexes and overlays. They may also be assigned orally during  
580 collaborative planning sessions or in directives from the higher commander.

581 **3-59. Implied tasks are tasks that must be performed to accomplish**  
582 **the mission, but are not stated in the higher headquarters order.**  
583 Implied tasks are derived from a detailed analysis of the higher headquarters  
584 order, the enemy situation and COAs, and the terrain. Analysis of the unit's

585 current location in relation to its future AO may also reveal implied tasks  
586 that must be performed to accomplish specified tasks. Additionally, analysis  
587 of doctrinal requirements for each specified task may disclose implied tasks.  
588 Only implied tasks that require allocating resources should be retained.

589 3-60. **Essential tasks are tasks that must be executed to accomplish**  
590 **the mission.** Once staff members have identified specified and implied  
591 tasks, they ensure they understand each task's requirements. Then they  
592 determine the task or tasks that must be successfully executed to accomplish  
593 the mission. They present these essential tasks to the commander for  
594 approval. Essential tasks are incorporated into the unit mission statement.

#### 595 Task 4. Review Available Assets

596 3-61. The commander and staff examine additions to and deletions from the  
597 current task organization, support relationships, and status (current capa-  
598 bilities and limitations) of all units. They consider relationships among  
599 essential, specified, and implied tasks, and between them and available  
600 assets. From this analysis, they determine if they have the assets needed to  
601 accomplish all tasks. If there are shortages, they identify additional resources  
602 needed for mission success. The staff also identifies any deviations from the  
603 normal task organization and provides them to the commander to consider  
604 when developing the planning guidance. A more detailed analysis of available  
605 assets occurs during COA development.

#### 606 Task 5. Determine Constraints

607 3-62. A higher commander normally places some constraints on subordinate  
608 commanders. **Constraints are restrictions placed on the command by a**  
609 **higher command. They dictate an action or inaction, thus restricting**  
610 **the freedom of action a subordinate commander has for planning.**  
611 Constraints can take the form of a requirement to do something (for example,  
612 Maintain a reserve of one company) or a prohibition of action (for example,  
613 No reconnaissance forward of Phase Line Bravo before H-hour). The com-  
614 mander and staff must identify and understand these constraints. They are  
615 normally contained in the scheme of maneuver, concept of operations, or  
616 coordinating instructions. Annexes to the order may also include constraints.  
617 The operations overlay, for example, may contain a restrictive fire line or no  
618 fire area. Constraints may also be issued orally or in WARNOs.

#### 619 Task 6. Identify Critical Facts and Assumptions

620 3-63. The staff gathers two categories of information concerning assigned  
621 tasks—facts and assumptions. *Facts* are statements of known data  
622 concerning the situation, including enemy and friendly dispositions, available  
623 troops, unit strengths, and materiel readiness.

624 3-64. An *assumption* is a supposition on the current situation or a  
625 presupposition on the future course of events, either or both assumed to be  
626 true in the absence of positive proof, necessary to enable the commander in  
627 the process of planning to complete an estimate of the situation and make a  
628 decision on the course of action (JP 1-02). (The Army uses *commander's*  
629 *visualization* in place of *estimate of the situation*.) To determine assumptions,  
630 planners—

- 631 • List all assumptions received from higher headquarters.
- 632 • State expected conditions over which the commander has no control
- 633 but which are relevant to the plan.
- 634 • List conditions that would invalidate the plan or its concept of
- 635 operations.

636 3-65. An assumption is appropriate if it meets the tests of validity and  
 637 necessity. *Validity* means the assumption is likely to be true. “Assuming  
 638 away” potential problems, such as weather or likely enemy COAs, produces  
 639 an invalid assumption. *Necessity* is whether the assumption is essential for  
 640 planning. If planning can continue without the assumption, it is not  
 641 necessary and should be discarded.

642 3-66. Assumptions should be replaced with facts as soon as possible. The  
 643 staff identifies the information needed to convert assumptions into facts and  
 644 submits them to the appropriate agency as information requirements (IRs;  
 645 see FM 6-0, *Command and Control*). If the commander needs the information  
 646 to make a decision, he may designate the information requirement as one of  
 647 the commander’s critical information requirements (CCIR). Requirements for  
 648 information about threats and the environment are submitted to the  
 649 intelligence officer. The intelligence officer incorporates them into the input  
 650 to the initial ISR plan (see paragraph 3-75).

651 **Task 7. Perform Risk Assessment**

652 3-67. *Risk management* is the process of identifying, assessing, and  
 653 controlling risks arising from operational factors, and making decisions that  
 654 balance risk cost with mission benefits (FM 5-19, *Risk Management*). Risk  
 655 management consists of five steps that are performed throughout the  
 656 operations process (see Figure 3-7).

	Step 1 – Identify Hazards	Step 2 – Assess Hazards	Step 3 – Develop Controls & Make Risk Decisions	Step 4 – Implement Controls	Step 5 – Supervise & Evaluate
Receipt of Mission	X				
Mission Analysis	X	X			
COA Development	X	X	X		
COA Analysis	X	X	X		
COA Comparison			X		
COA Approval			X		
Orders Production				X	
* Preparation				X	X
* Execution				X	X
* Not part of the MDMP					

657 **Figure 3-7. Risk Management and the MDMP**

658 3-68. Risk is characterized by both the probability and severity of a potential  
 659 loss that may result from the presence of an adversary or a hazardous condi-  
 660 tion. During operations, the commander and staff assess two kinds of risk:

- 661 • *Tactical risk* is risk concerned with hazards that exist because of the
- 662 presence of either the enemy or an adversary (FM 5-19, *Risk*
- 663 *Management*).

664                   • *Accidental risk* includes all operational risk considerations other than  
 665                   tactical risk. It includes risks to the friendly force. It also includes risks  
 666                   posed to civilians by an operation, as well as an operation’s impact on  
 667                   the environment (FM 5-19, *Risk Management*).

668                   3-69. Steps 1 and 2 of the risk management process make up risk  
 669                   assessment. In step 1, the commander and staff identify the hazards that  
 670                   may be encountered during a mission. In step 2, they determine the direct  
 671                   impact of each hazard on the operation. Risk assessment enhances  
 672                   situational understanding and contributes to complete planning guidance.

673                   3-70. Commanders and staffs assess risk whenever they identify hazards,  
 674                   regardless of type; they do not wait until a set point in a cycle. The operations  
 675                   officer exercises overall staff responsibility for risk assessment. Other staff  
 676                   sections oversee risk management for hazards within their functional areas.

677                   **Task 8. Determine Information Requirements and Initial PIR, FFIR, and CCIR**

678                   3-71. A critical aspect of mission analysis is determining what information is  
 679                   required to successfully conduct (plan, prepare, execute, and assess) the  
 680                   operation. *Information requirements* are all of the information elements  
 681                   required by the commander and his staff for the successful execution of  
 682                   operations, that is, all elements necessary to address the factors of METT-TC  
 683                   (FM 6-0, *Command and Control*).

684                   3-72. The staff develops IR throughout mission analysis. Some IR are of such  
 685                   importance to the commander or staff that they are designated priority  
 686                   intelligence requirements (PIR) or friendly force information requirements  
 687                   (FFIR).

- 688                   • *Priority intelligence requirements* are those intelligence requirements  
 689                   for which a commander has an anticipated and stated priority in his  
 690                   task of planning and decision making (JP 1-02).
- 691                   • *Friendly force information requirements* are information that the  
 692                   commander and staff need about the forces available for the operation  
 693                   (FM 6-0, *Command and Control*). FFIR consist of information on the  
 694                   mission, troops available, and time available (for friendly forces).

695                   3-73. Commanders channel information processing by clearly expressing  
 696                   which information is most important—the commander’s critical information  
 697                   requirements (CCIR). The *commander’s critical information requirements* are  
 698                   elements of information required by commanders that directly affect decision  
 699                   making and dictate the successful execution of military operations (FM 3-0).  
 700                   Commanders use CCIR to focus the collection of information to support their  
 701                   visualization and make decisions. Commanders may choose their CCIR from  
 702                   those PIR and FFIR recommended by staff, or they may derive their own  
 703                   CCIR based on their visualization.

704                   3-74. CCIR concern information that commanders need to make decisions.  
 705                   Therefore, they are both limited in number and change as an operation pro-  
 706                   gresses. The initial CCIR developed during mission analysis normally focus  
 707                   on decisions the commander makes to focus planning and select the optimum  
 708                   COA. Once the commander selects a COA, the CCIR shift to information the  
 709                   commander needs to make decisions during execution. Commanders desig

710 nate CCIR to let the staff and subordinates know what information they  
711 deem essential for making decisions. The fewer the CCIR, the better the staff  
712 can focus its efforts and allocate scarce resources for collecting it.

713 **Task 9. Determine the Initial Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Plan**

714 3-75. Based on the initial IPB, PIR, and CCIR, the staff, primarily the  
715 intelligence officer, identifies intelligence gaps. Based on available  
716 surveillance and reconnaissance assets and input from the intelligence  
717 officer, the operations officer prepares the initial ISR plan. This initial ISR  
718 plan should contain, as a minimum—

- 719 • The AOs for surveillance and reconnaissance assets.
- 720 • A mission statement.
- 721 • Provisions for communications, logistics, and fire support.
- 722 • Task organization.
- 723 • The reconnaissance objective (see FM 3-90).
- 724 • CCIR, PIR and IR.
- 725 • Line of departure (LD) or line of contact (LC) time.
- 726 • Initial named areas of interest (NAIs).
- 727 • Routes to the AO, and passage of lines instructions.
- 728 • Fire support coordinating measures and airspace control measures.
- 729 • Provisions for medical evacuation.

730 3-76. Surveillance and reconnaissance assets are tasked or dispatched as  
731 soon as possible. The initial ISR plan sets surveillance and reconnaissance in  
732 motion. It may be issued as part of a WARNO or may take the form of a  
733 separate OPORD (see Appendix G for WARNO, OPORD, and ISR annex  
734 formats). As more information becomes available, it is incorporated into a  
735 complete ISR annex to the force OPORD. As ISR sources fill in gaps or the  
736 CCIR change, ISR taskings are updated. The operations officer does this with  
737 fragmentary orders (FRAGOs).

738 **Task 10. Update the Operational Time Line**

739 3-77. As more information becomes available, the commander and staff refine  
740 their initial plan for the use of available time. They compare the time needed  
741 to accomplish essential tasks to the higher headquarters operational time  
742 line to ensure mission accomplishment is possible in the allotted time. They  
743 also compare the operational time line to the enemy time line developed  
744 during IPB. From this, they determine windows of opportunity for  
745 exploitation or times when the unit will be at risk from enemy activity.

746 3-78. The commander and chief of staff/executive officer also refine the staff  
747 planning time line. The refined time line includes the—

- 748 • Subject, time, and location of briefings the commander requires.
- 749 • Times of collaborative planning sessions and the medium over which  
750 they will take place.
- 751 • Times, locations, and forms of rehearsals.

752 Commanders maximize planning time available to subordinate units by  
753 sending WARNOs as detailed planning develops. Commanders also use  
754 liaison officers to monitor changes at higher and adjacent headquarters.

#### 755 **Task 11. Write the Restated Mission**

756 3-79. The chief of staff/executive officer or operations officer prepares a  
757 mission statement for the unit based on the mission analysis. The mission  
758 statement contains the five elements associated with every operation—

- 759 • *Who* will execute the operation.
- 760 • *What* the essential tasks are.
- 761 • *When* the operation will begin.
- 762 • *Where* the operation will occur (AO, objectives, grid coordinates).
- 763 • *Why* (for what purpose) the force will conduct the operation.

764 3-80. The *what* and *why* of a mission statement are not the same thing. Both  
765 are needed. The *what* is an effect (for example, contain, destroy, isolate) that  
766 is normally measurable and expressed as a tactical mission task (see FM 3-  
767 90, *Tactics*). The *why* of a mission statement states the mission's purpose or  
768 reason. The mission statement includes any on-order missions. Be-prepared  
769 missions are placed in the concept of operations (see Appendix G).

770 3-81. Many of the words and terms used to describe the *what* and *why* of a  
771 mission statement do not have special connotations beyond their common  
772 English language meaning. However, both commanders and subordinates  
773 must have a common understanding of the what and why of the operation.  
774 FM 3-90, *Tactics*, provides a list of types of missions and tactical mission  
775 tasks normally used to develop mission statements. Additional tasks are in  
776 the FM 7-15, *The Army Universal Task List* (AUTL) and mission training  
777 plans (MTPs). However, commanders are not limited to the missions/tasks  
778 listed in FM 3-90, FM 7-15, or the unit's MTP. Commanders describe the  
779 what and why of a mission using words that all concerned understand.

#### 780 **Task 12. Deliver a Mission Analysis Briefing**

781 3-82. Time permitting, the staff briefs the commander on its mission analysis  
782 using the following outline:

- 783 • Mission and commander's intent of the higher and next higher  
784 headquarters.
- 785 • Mission, commander's intent, concept of operations, and military  
786 deception plan or deception objectives of the headquarters one level up.
- 787 • Review of the commander's initial guidance.
- 788 • Initial IPB products, including the MCOO and SITEmps.
- 789 • Pertinent facts and assumptions.
- 790 • Specified, implied, and essential tasks.
- 791 • Constraints.
- 792 • Forces available.
- 793 • Initial risk assessment.
- 794 • Recommended initial CCIR.
- 795 • Recommended time lines.

- 796 • Recommended restated mission.
- 797 • Recommended collaborative planning sessions.

798 3-83. The mission analysis briefing is given to both the commander and the  
799 staff. If appropriate, subordinate commanders may attend, either in person or  
800 by video teleconference (VTC). This is often the only time the entire staff is  
801 present and the only opportunity to ensure that all staff members are  
802 starting from a common reference point.

803 3-84. The briefing focuses on relevant conclusions reached as a result of the  
804 mission analysis. It is neither a readiness briefing nor a briefing of compiled  
805 data. It is a decision briefing that results in an approved restated mission,  
806 commander's intent, and commander's planning guidance (see mission  
807 analysis tasks 13, 14, and 15). Staff members present only relevant  
808 information the commander needs to develop situational understanding and  
809 formulate planning guidance. A comprehensive mission analysis briefing  
810 helps the commander, staff, and subordinates develop a shared  
811 understanding of the requirements of the upcoming operation.

#### 812 **Task 13. Approve the Restated Mission**

813 3-85. Immediately after the mission analysis briefing, the commander  
814 approves a restated mission. This can be the staff's recommended mission  
815 statement, a modified version of the staff's recommendation, or one that the  
816 commander has developed personally. Once approved, the restated mission  
817 becomes the unit mission.

#### 818 **Task 14. Develop the Initial Commander's Intent**

819 3-86. The commander's intent focuses planning and gives the commander a  
820 means of indirect control of subordinate elements during execution (see FM  
821 6-0, *Command and Control*). It must be understood and remembered by  
822 subordinates two echelons down. In the absence of orders, the commander's  
823 intent, coupled with the mission statement, directs subordinates toward  
824 mission accomplishment. When opportunities appear, subordinates use the  
825 commander's intent to decide whether and how to exploit them. Therefore,  
826 brevity and clarity in writing it intent is key. The commander's intent can be  
827 in narrative or bullet form; it does not exceed five sentences.

#### 828 **Task 15. Issue the Commander's Planning Guidance**

829 3-87. Commanders develop planning guidance from their visualization.  
830 Planning guidance may be broad or detailed, as circumstances require. How-  
831 ever, it must convey to the staff the essence of the commander's visualization.  
832 After approving the unit mission statement and issuing their intent, com-  
833 manders provide the staff (and subordinates in a collaborative environment)  
834 with enough additional guidance (including preliminary decisions) to focus  
835 staff and subordinate planning activities, and initiate preparation actions,  
836 such as movement.

837 3-88. The commander's planning guidance focuses on COA development, an-  
838 alysis, and comparison. Commanders identify the decisive operation and how  
839 they see shaping and sustaining operations supporting it, although these are  
840 not fully developed. Commanders explain how they visualize the array of

841 forces for the decisive operation, what effects they see the decisive operation  
842 producing, and how these effects will lead to mission accomplishment. The  
843 elements of operational design—such as the desired tempo or whether the  
844 operation will consist of simultaneous or sequential actions—help convey the  
845 commander’s visualization.

846 3-89. Specific planning guidance is essential for timely COA development  
847 and analysis. Commanders focus the staff’s time and concentration by stating  
848 the planning options they do or do not want considered. The commander’s  
849 planning guidance focuses on the essential tasks. It emphasizes in broad  
850 terms when, where, and how the commander intends to mass combat power  
851 to accomplish the mission within the higher commander’s intent.

852 3-90. Commander’s planning guidance includes priorities for all battlefield  
853 operating systems (BOS) (see Appendix D). It states how commanders  
854 visualize their actions within the battlefield organization. The amount of  
855 detail in the planning guidance depends on the time available, the staff’s  
856 level of proficiency, and the flexibility the higher commander allows. Broad  
857 and general guidance provides maximum latitude; it allows a proficient staff  
858 to develop flexible and effective options. Under time-constrained conditions,  
859 the planning guidance is more specific and directive. The more detailed the  
860 planning guidance, the more quickly the staff can complete a plan. However,  
861 the focus that results increases the risk of overlooking or insufficiently  
862 examining things that might affect execution.

863 3-91. The commander’s planning guidance may be written or oral. It is  
864 distributed throughout the command to ensure a common understanding. At  
865 minimum, the commander’s guidance addresses—

- 866 • The decisive operation.
- 867 • Specific COAs to consider or not, both friendly and enemy, and the  
868 priority for addressing them.
- 869 • Initial CCIR.
- 870 • Surveillance and reconnaissance guidance.
- 871 • Risk.
- 872 • Military deception.
- 873 • Fires.
- 874 • Mobility and countermobility.
- 875 • Security measures.
- 876 • The time plan.
- 877 • The type of order to issue.
- 878 • Collaborative planning sessions to be conducted.
- 879 • Movements to initiate (including command and control nodes).
- 880 • The type of rehearsal to conduct.
- 881 • Additional priorities for CS and CSS elements.
- 882 • Any other information the commander wants the staff to consider.

883 **Task 16. Issue a Warning Order**

884 3-92. Immediately after the commander gives the planning guidance, the  
885 staff sends subordinate and supporting units a WARNO that contains, at  
886 minimum—

- 887 • The approved unit mission statement.
- 888 • Task organization changes.
- 889 • Attachments/detachments.
- 890 • The commander's intent.
- 891 • The unit AO (sketch, overlay, or some other description).
- 892 • The CCIR, PIR, and FFIR.
- 893 • Risk guidance.
- 894 • Surveillance and reconnaissance instructions.
- 895 • Initial movement instructions
- 896 • Security measures.
- 897 • Military deception guidance.
- 898 • Mobility and countermobility guidance.
- 899 • Specific priorities.
- 900 • The updated operational time line.
- 901 • Guidance on collaborative events and rehearsals.

902 **Task 17. Review Facts and Assumptions**

903 3-93. During the rest of the MDMP, the commander and staff periodically  
904 review all facts and assumptions. New facts may alter requirements and  
905 requires a reanalysis of the mission. Assumptions may have become facts or  
906 may have become invalid. Whenever the facts or assumptions change, the  
907 commander and staff assesses the impact of these changes on the plan and  
908 make the necessary adjustments, including changing the CCIR, if necessary.

909 **COURSE OF ACTION DEVELOPMENT**

910 3-94. After receiving the restated mission, commander's intent, and com-  
911 mander's planning guidance, the staff develops COAs for the commander's  
912 approval. The commander's direct involvement in COA development can  
913 greatly aid in producing comprehensive and flexible COAs within the  
914 available time.

915 3-95. Staffs developing COAs ensure each one meets these screening criteria:

- 916 • **Suitable.** A COA must accomplish the mission and comply with the  
917 commander's planning guidance. However, commanders may modify  
918 their planning guidance at any time. When this happens, the staff  
919 records and coordinates the new guidance, and reevaluates each COA  
920 to ensure it complies with the change.
- 921 • **Feasible.** The unit must be able to accomplish the mission within the  
922 available time, space, and resources.
- 923 • **Acceptable.** The tactical or operational advantage gained by executing  
924 the COA must justify the cost in resources, especially casualties. This  
925 assessment is largely subjective.

- 926 • **Distinguishable.** Each COA must differ significantly from the others.
- 927 This criterion is also largely subjective. Significant differences include
- 928 differences in the—
- 929     ▪ Use of reserves.
- 930     ▪ Task organization.
- 931     ▪ Timing (day or night).
- 932     ▪ Scheme of maneuver.
- 933 • **Complete.** A COA must show how—
- 934     ▪ The decisive operation accomplishes the mission
- 935     ▪ Shaping operations create and preserve conditions for success of
- 936 the decisive operation.
- 937     ▪ Sustaining operations enable shaping and decisive operations.

938 3-96. A good COA positions the force for future operations and provides  
 939 flexibility to meet unforeseen events during execution. It also gives subord-  
 940 inates the maximum latitude for initiative. The six steps of COA development  
 941 are shown in the process column of Figure 3-8. During COA development, the  
 942 commander and staff continue risk assessment, focusing on identifying and  
 943 assessing hazards to mission accomplishment; they incorporate controls to  
 944 reduce them into COAs. The staff also continues to revise IPB products,  
 945 emphasizing event templates.




Figure 3-8. COA Development

946 **Step 1. Analyze Relative Combat Power**

947 3-97. *Combat power* is the total means of destructive and/or disruptive force  
 948 that a military unit/formation can apply against the opponent at a given time  
 949 (JP 1-02). It is a command's ability to fight. Commanders combine the  
 950 elements of combat power—maneuver, firepower, leadership, protection, and  
 951 information—to meet constantly changing requirements and defeat the  
 952 enemy. Commanders integrate and apply the effects of these elements, along  
 953 with CSS, against the enemy. Their goal is to generate overwhelming combat  
 954 power at the decisive point to accomplish the mission at least cost.

955 3-98. Analyzing combat power is difficult; it requires applying both military  
 956 art and science. Relative combat power analysis involves assessing tangible

957 factors (such as, equipment, weapon systems, and units) and intangible  
958 factors (such as, morale and training levels). It also considers the factors of  
959 METT-TC that directly or indirectly affect the potential outcome of an  
960 operation. Although some numerical relationships are used, analyzing  
961 relative combat power is not the mathematical correlation of forces  
962 computations called for by former Soviet doctrine; rather, it is an estimate  
963 that incorporates both objective and subjective factors. Comparing the most  
964 significant strengths and weakness of each force in terms of combat power  
965 gives planners insight into—

- 966 • Friendly capabilities that pertain to the operation.
- 967 • The types of operations possible from both friendly and enemy  
968 perspectives.
- 969 • How and where the enemy may be vulnerable.
- 970 • How and where friendly forces are vulnerable.
- 971 • Additional resources that may be required to execute the mission.
- 972 • How to allocate existing resources.

973 3-99. Analyzing relative combat power includes determining force ratios and  
974 comparing friendly and enemy strengths and weakness. The purpose of this  
975 analysis is to gain insight into the type of operations possible for both  
976 friendly and enemy forces. During this step, the staff looks at these factors as  
977 they affect the friendly and enemy force as a whole. In step 3, they perform a  
978 similar analysis for each major task or event in a given COA.

979 3-100. Planners begin analyzing relative combat power by making a rough  
980 estimate of force ratios. At corps and division levels, planners compute force  
981 ratios between combat units two levels down. For example, division planners  
982 compare all types of combat battalions; corps planners compare friendly  
983 brigades with enemy regiments. At brigade and battalion levels, planners  
984 may study, in detail, the personnel and weapons on each side. Depending on  
985 staff resources, available time, and known data on the enemy, planners can  
986 perform a detailed computation of force ratios. FM 2-01.3 (*Intelligence*  
987 *Preparation of the Battlefield*) and FM 2-33.4 (*Intelligence Analysis*) contains  
988 detailed planning factors and data for estimating force ratios.

989 3-101. Planners do not develop and recommend COAs based solely on  
990 mathematical force ratios. While numerical relationships are useful, force  
991 ratios do not include the environmental and human factors of warfare. Many  
992 times, human factors are more important than the number of tanks or tubes  
993 of artillery. Therefore, determining relative combat power includes evalu-  
994 ating intangible factors, such as friction or enemy will and intentions.

995 3-102. After computing force ratios, the staff analyzes the intangible aspects  
996 of combat power. A technique for this analysis is comparing friendly  
997 strengths against enemy weaknesses, and vice versa, for each element of  
998 combat power (see Figure 3-9, page 3-26). By comparing friendly strengths  
999 against enemy weaknesses, planners deduce vulnerabilities of each force that  
1000 may be exploitable or may need to be protected. These deductions may lead  
1001 planners to insights on potential decision points and effective force  
1002 employment.

Elements of Combat Power	Enemy strengths/ weaknesses	Friendly strengths/ weaknesses	Advantage	
			Friendly	Enemy
Maneuver				
Firepower				
Protection				
Leadership				
Information				

**Figure 3-9. Sample Elements of Combat Power Analysis**

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3-103. Planners combine the numerical force ratio with the results of their analysis of intangibles to determine the relative combat power of friendly and enemy forces. They determine what types of operations are feasible by comparing the force ratio with the historical minimum planning ratios for the contemplated combat missions (see Figure 3-10) and estimating the extent to which intangible factors affect the relative combat power. If, in the staff's judgment, the relative combat power of the force produces the effects of the historical minimum planning ratio for a contemplated mission, that mission is feasible.

<i>Friendly mission</i>	<i>Position</i>	<i>Friendly : enemy</i>
Delay		1 : 6
Defend	Prepared or fortified	1 : 3
Defend	Hasty	1 : 2.5
Attack	Prepared or fortified	3 : 1
Attack	Hasty	2.5 : 1
Counterattack	Flank	1 : 1

**Figure 3-10. Historical Minimum Planning Ratios**

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3-104. In missions characterized by stability operations or support operations, staffs often determine relative "combat" power by comparing available resources to the tasks assigned. This provides insight as to what options are available and if more resources are required. In such operations, the elements of maneuver, nonlethal firepower, leadership, and information may predominate.

**Step 2. Generate Options**

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3-105. Based on the commander's guidance and the results of step 1, the staff generates options for COAs. A good COA can defeat all feasible enemy COAs. In a totally unconstrained environment, the goal is to develop several possible COAs. Since there is rarely enough time to do this, commanders usually limit the options in the commander's guidance. Options focus on enemy COAs arranged in order of their probable adoption.

3-106. Brainstorming is the preferred technique for generating options. It requires time, imagination, and creativity, but it produces the widest range of choices. The staff remains unbiased and open-minded in evaluating proposed options. Staff members quickly identify COAs that are not feasible due to factors in their functional areas. They also quickly decide if a COA can be

1032 modified to accomplish the requirement or should be eliminated immediately.  
1033 Staff members who identify information that might affect other functional  
1034 areas share it immediately. This eliminates wasted time and effort.

1035 3-107. In developing COAs, staff members determine the doctrinal  
1036 requirements for each type of operation being considered, including doctrinal  
1037 tasks for subordinate units. For example, a deliberate breach requires a  
1038 breach force, a support force, and an assault force. In addition, the staff  
1039 considers possibilities created by attachments. For example, a light infantry  
1040 brigade attached to an armored division might allow an air assault.

1041 3-108. To develop options, the staff starts with the decisive operation  
1042 identified in the commander's planning guidance. The decisive operation  
1043 must be nested within the higher headquarters concept of operations. The  
1044 staff determines the decisive operation's purpose (if not stated by the  
1045 commander) and considers ways to mass the effects of overwhelming combat  
1046 power to achieve it. The decisive operation's purpose directly relates to  
1047 accomplishing the unit mission. When executed, the decisive operation  
1048 becomes the main effort.

1050 3-109. Next, the staff considers  
1052 shaping operations. The staff  
1054 establishes a purpose for each  
1056 shaping operation that is tied to  
1058 creating or preserving a condition  
1060 for the decisive operation's success.  
1062 Shaping operations may occur  
1064 before, concurrently with, or after  
1066 the decisive operation. A shaping  
1068 operation may be designated the  
1070 main effort if executed before or  
1072 after the decisive operation.

#### Sample Shaping Operations

- Economy of force actions
- Security operations
- Actions designed to limit enemy freedom of action
- Actions to deny the enemy the ability to concentrate
- Attacks designed to fix enemy forces
- Destruction of enemy capabilities
- Information operations (including military deception)
- Covering force actions

1074 3-110. The staff then determines  
1076 sustaining operations necessary to  
1078 create and maintain the combat  
1080 power required for the decisive  
1081 operation and shaping operations. After developing the basic battlefield  
1082 organization for a given COA, the staff then determines the essential tasks  
1083 for each decisive, shaping, and sustaining operation.

1084 3-111. Once staff members have explored each COA's possibilities, they  
1085 examine each to determine if it satisfies the COA screening criteria stated in  
1086 paragraph 3-95. They change, add, or eliminate COAs as appropriate. Staffs  
1087 avoid the common pitfall of presenting one good COA among several  
1088 "throwaway" COAs. Often commanders combine COAs or move desirable  
1089 elements from one to another.

### 1090 Step 3. Array Initial Forces

1091 3-112. To determine the forces necessary to accomplish the mission and to  
1092 provide a basis for the scheme of maneuver, planners consider—

- 1093
- The higher commander's intent and concept of operations.

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- The unit mission statement and the commander's intent and planning guidance.
  - The air and ground avenues of approach.
  - As many possible enemy COAs as time permits, starting with the most likely and including the most dangerous.

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3-113. Planners then determine the relative combat power required to accomplish each task, starting with the decisive operation and continuing through all shaping operations. They follow a procedure similar to that in step 1. Using the minimum historical planning ratios shown in Figure 3-10 as a starting point, planners determine the combination of tangible and intangible assets required to accomplish each task.

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3-114. For example, historically defenders have a 50 percent probability of defeating an attacking force approximately three times their equivalent strength. Therefore, as a starting point, commanders may defend on each avenue of approach with roughly a 1:3 force ratio. However, defenders have many advantages: for example, full use of cover and concealment, selection of the ground on which to fight, weapons sighted for maximum effectiveness, choice of firing first, and use of obstacles. Planners determine whether these and other intangibles increase the relative combat power of the unit assigned the task to the point that it exceeds the historical planning ratio for that task. If it does not, planners determine how to reinforce the unit. Relative combat power is only a planning tool for developing COAs. It cannot predict the results of actual combat

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3-115. Planners next determine a proposed forward edge of the battle area (FEBA) (in the defense) or a line of departure (in the offense). In the case of a noncontiguous AO, planners consider AOs for subordinate units. The intelligence officer's initial terrain analysis should validate the selection or help determine a recommended change. Planners resolve any changes with higher headquarters as necessary.

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3-116. Planners then consider military deception operations (see FM 3-13, *Information Operations*). Because aspects of the military deception operation may influence unit positioning, planners consider the military deception operation's major elements before developing any COAs.

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3-117. Planners next make the initial array of friendly forces, starting with the decisive operation and continuing through all shaping and sustaining operations. Planners normally array ground forces two levels down. The initial array focuses on generic ground maneuver units without regard to specific type or task organization, and then considers all appropriate intangible factors. For example, at corps level, planners array generic brigades consisting of three battalions. During this step, planners do not assign missions to arrayed units; they only consider what forces are necessary to accomplish the mission.

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3-118. The initial array identifies the total number of units needed and identifies possible methods of dealing with the enemy. If the number arrayed is less than the number available, the additional units are placed in a pool for use during concept of operations development (step 4). If the number of units arrayed is greater than the number available and the difference cannot be

1141 compensated for with intangible factors, the staff determines whether the  
1142 COA is feasible. Ways to make up the shortfall include requesting additional  
1143 resources, accepting risk in that portion of the AO, or executing tasks  
1144 required for the COA sequentially rather than simultaneously.

#### 1145 **Step 4. Develop the Concept of Operations**

1146 3-119. The concept of operations describes how arrayed forces will accomplish  
1147 the mission within the commander's intent. It concisely expresses the "how"  
1148 of the commander's visualization and governs the design of supporting plans  
1149 or annexes. The concept of operations summarizes the contributions of all  
1150 BOS and information operations (IO). The staff develops a concept of  
1151 operations for each COA.

1152 3-120. Ideally, decisive, shaping, and sustaining operations occur at the same  
1153 time. Simultaneous operations allow commanders to seize and retain the  
1154 initiative. However, they require overwhelming combat power across the AO.  
1155 If the initial array of forces shows a combat power shortfall, planners  
1156 recommend phasing the operation. When recommending if the operations  
1157 should be simultaneous or sequential, planners consider—

- 1158 • The skill and size of the opponent.
- 1159 • The size of the AO.
- 1160 • Operational reach.
- 1161 • Available joint support.
- 1162 • The scope of the mission.

1163 The crucial consideration is the success of the decisive operation, which must  
1164 have enough combat power to win decisively. If that combat power is not  
1165 available, planners develop the COA based on achieving the maximum  
1166 possible simultaneous action within each phase.

1167 3-121. Planners develop a concept of operations by refining the initial array  
1168 of forces. To do this, they use graphical control measures to coordinate the  
1169 operation and show the relationship of friendly forces to one another, the  
1170 enemy, and the terrain. During this step, unit types are converted from  
1171 generic to specific, such as, armor, light infantry, and mechanized infantry.  
1172 The concept of operations includes—

- 1173 • The purpose of the operation.
- 1174 • A statement of where the commander will accept tactical risk.
- 1175 • Identification of critical friendly events and transitions between phases  
1176 (if the operation is phased).
- 1177 • Designation of the decisive operation, along with its task and purpose.
- 1178 • Designation of shaping operations, along with their tasks and  
1179 purposes, linked to how they support the decisive operation.
- 1180 • Designation of sustaining operations, along with their tasks and  
1181 purposes, linked to how they support the decisive operation and  
1182 shaping operations.
- 1183 • Designation of reserve, including its location, composition, task, and  
1184 purpose.
- 1185 • ISR operations.
- 1186 • Security operations.

- 1187 • Identification of maneuver options that may develop during an
- 1188 operation.
- 1189 • Location of engagement areas, or attack objectives and counterattack
- 1190 objectives.
- 1191 • Assignment of subordinate AOs.
- 1192 • Concept of fires.
- 1193 • IO concept of support including military deception.
- 1194 • Prescribed formations or dispositions, when necessary.
- 1195 • Priorities for each battlefield operating system.
- 1196 • Integration of obstacle effects with maneuver and fires.
- 1197 • Considerations of the effects of enemy weapons of mass destruction
- 1198 (WMD) on the force.

1199 3-122. Planners select control measures (graphics) to control subordinate  
 1200 units during the operation (see FM 1-02). They base control measures on the  
 1201 array of forces and concept of operations. Control measures clarify  
 1202 responsibilities and help commanders synchronize combat power at decisive  
 1203 points while minimizing the risk of fratricide. All control measures impose  
 1204 some constraints on subordinate commanders. The staff recommends the  
 1205 minimum control measures needed to control the operation. Doing this allows  
 1206 as much freedom of action as possible to subordinates.

1207 3-123. Control measures should not split avenues of approach or key terrain.  
 1208 Planners leave space on the flanks of each avenue of approach to allow for  
 1209 maneuver and fires. To mass the effects of combat power, the AO designated  
 1210 for the decisive operation may be narrower than other AOs. Planners may  
 1211 establish phase lines to trigger execution of branches and sequels. When  
 1212 developing the concept of operations, planners use any forces remaining from  
 1213 the initial array to weight the decisive operation, strengthen the reserve, or  
 1214 increase ISR operations.

1215 **Step 5. Assign Headquarters**

1216 3-124. After determining the concept of operations, planners create a task  
 1217 organization by assigning headquarters to groupings of forces (see Appendix  
 1218 F). They consider the types of units to be assigned to a headquarters and its  
 1219 span of control. Generally, a headquarters controls at least two subordinate  
 1220 maneuver units, but not more than five. If planners need additional  
 1221 headquarters, they note the shortage and resolve it later. Task organization  
 1222 takes into account the entire battlefield organization. It also accounts for the  
 1223 special command and control requirements for operations such as a passage  
 1224 of lines, river crossing, or air assault.

1225 **Step 6. Prepare COA Statements and Sketches**

1226 3-125. The operations officer prepares a COA statement and supporting  
 1227 sketch for each COA. The COA statement clearly portrays how the unit will  
 1228 accomplish the mission and explains the concept of operations. It is written in  
 1229 terms of the battlefield organization and includes the mission and end state.  
 1230 The sketch provides a picture of the maneuver aspects of the concept of  
 1231 operations. Together, the statement and sketch cover the who (generic task  
 1232 organization), what (tasks), when, where, how, and why (purpose) for each

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subordinate unit. It states any significant hazards to the force as a whole and where they occur. The commander makes risk decisions regarding them during COA approval. Figure 3-11 provides a sample COA statement for a mechanized division conducting a linear, contiguous operation.




Figure 3-11. Course of Action Sketch and Statement

**DECISIVE OPERATION:** An armor-heavy brigade passes through the southern mechanized brigade east of PL AMBER and attacks to seize the terrain vicinity of OBJ SLAM to protect the northern flank of the 55th AD.

**SHAPING OPERATIONS:** A mechanized-heavy brigade in the south, the initial main effort, attacks to penetrate enemy forces vicinity PL AMBER to create enough maneuver space for the armor-heavy brigade to pass to the east without interference from the defending enemy infantry regiment. The armor-heavy brigade becomes the main effort after conducting a forward oassage of lines with the southern mechanized-heavy brigade. The southern mechanized heavy brigade than follows and supports the main effort by attacking east to clear remaining elements of the enemy southern infantry regiment from PL AMBER to PL GREEN, protecting the rear of the main effort.

The division reserve, an armor-heavy task force, initially follows the southern mechanized brigade with priority for planning/commitment to contain enemy forces capable of threatening the main effort's passage through the southern mechanized heavy brigade. If not committed west of PL GREEN, the division reserve follows the main effort and is prepared to block enemy forces capable of threatening the main effort's movement east, ensuring the seizure of OBJ SLAM.

In the north, a mechanized heavy brigade attacks east to fix an enemy infantry regiment, denying them the ability to interfere with the division's decisive operations in the south. The division cavalry squadron screens the division's northern flank to provide early warning of any enemy forces capable of threatening the northern mechanized heavy brigade.

The division attack helicopter battalion attacks along air axis SID to destroy the enemy tank battalion vicinity WEST TOWN to protect the main effort's northern flank. On order, attacks along air axis GIZMO to defeat the enemy tank regiment east of the NORTHERN MOUNTAINS providing the main effort time to seize OBJ SLAM.

IO focus is on deception and specific C2 nodes during the decisive operation. The deception story is that the division's decisive operation is in the north. Indicators are the initial positioning of the armor-heavy brigade in the northern portion of the rear area in AA MIKE, simultaneous attacks of two brigades abreast in the north and south, and the division cavalry squadron operating on the northern flank of the division's AO.

Division fires will: (1) conduct counterfire to neutralize enemy artillery to prevent it from massing fires against the southern two brigades; (2) provide suppressive fires to allow the southern lead brigade penetration vicinity PL AMBER; (3) Conduct SEAD along axes SIDNEY and GIZMO to provide unimpeded passage of the attack helicopter battalion attacks.

Division ISR operations focus on: (1) identifying the location and disposition of the southern enemy infantry regiment's main defense to determine optimal breach points; (2): location and intentions of the enemy tank battalion vicinity WEST TOWN; (3): location and intention of the enemy tank regiment vicinity the NORTHERN MTNS.

**SUSTAINING OPERATION.** The division support area will establish vicinity METRO CITY with MSRs SEAN and NICK the primary routes used to sustain combat power during the attack. A mechanized company team is the division TCF with priority of responding to any LEVEL III threat to the division class III supply point.

Tactical risk is assumed by not having a dedicated security force on the division's southern flank.

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**Figure 3-11. Course of Action Sketch and Statement (continued)**

- 1239  
1240 3-126. At minimum, the COA sketch includes the array of generic forces and  
1241 control measures, such as—  
1242     • The unit and subordinate unit boundaries.  
1243     • Unit movement formations (but not subordinate unit formations).  
1244     • The FEBA, LD, or LC, and phase lines, if used.  
1245     • Reconnaissance and security graphics.  
1246     • Ground and air axes of advance.  
1247     • Assembly areas, battle positions, strong points, engagement areas, and  
1248 objectives.  
1249     • Obstacle control measures and tactical mission graphics.  
1250     • Fire support coordinating measures.  
1251     • Designation of the decisive operation and shaping operations.  
1252     • Location of command posts and critical information systems  
1253 (INFOSYS) nodes.  
1254     • Enemy known or templated locations.

1255 3-127. Planners can include identifying features (such as, cities, rivers, and  
1256 roads) to help orient users. The sketch may be on any medium. What it  
1257 portrays is more important than its form.

### 1258 **Course of Action Briefing**

- 1259 3-128. After developing COAs, the staff briefs them to the commander. A  
1260 collaborative session may facilitate subordinate planning. The COA briefing  
1261 includes—  
1262     • An updated IPB.  
1263     • Possible enemy COAs (event templates).  
1264     • The unit mission statement.  
1265     • The commander's and higher commanders' intent.  
1266     • COA statements and sketches.  
1267     • The rationale for each COA, including—  
1268         ▪ Considerations that might affect enemy COAs.  
1269         ▪ Deductions resulting from the relative combat power analysis.  
1270         ▪ The reason units are arrayed as shown on the sketch.  
1271         ▪ The reason the staff used the selected control measures.  
1272         ▪ Updated facts and assumptions.

1273 3-129. After the briefing, the commander gives additional guidance. If all  
1274 COAs are rejected, the staff begins again. If one or more of the COAs are  
1275 accepted, staff members begin COA analysis. The commander may create a  
1276 new COA by incorporating elements of one or more COAs developed by the  
1277 staff. The staff then prepares to war-game this new COA.

### 1278 **COURSE OF ACTION ANALYSIS (WAR-GAMING)**

1279 3-130. COA analysis allows the staff to synchronize the BOS for each COA  
1280 and identify which COA best accomplishes the mission. It helps the  
1281 commander and staff to—

- 1282 • Determine how to maximize the effects of combat power while
  - 1283 protecting friendly forces and minimizing collateral damage.
  - 1284 • Develop as near an identical a visualization of the battle as possible.
  - 1285 • Anticipate battlefield events.
  - 1286 • Determine conditions and resources required for success.
  - 1287 • Determine when and where to apply force capabilities.
  - 1288 • Focus IPB on enemy strengths and weaknesses, and the desired end
  - 1289 state.
  - 1290 • Identify coordination needed to produce synchronized results.
  - 1291 • Determine the most flexible COA.
- 1292 3-131. COA analysis (war-gaming) is a disciplined process. It includes rules
- 1293 and steps that help commanders and staffs visualize the flow of a battle (see
- 1294 Figure 3-12). The process considers friendly dispositions, strengths, and
- 1295 weaknesses; enemy assets and probable COAs; and characteristics of the AO.
- 1296 It relies heavily on an understanding of doctrine, tactical judgment, and
- 1297 experience. War-gaming focuses the staff's attention on each phase of the
- 1298 operation in a logical sequence. It is an iterative process of action, reaction,
- 1299 and counteraction.
- 1300 3-132. War-gaming stimulates ideas, highlights critical tasks, and provides
- 1301 insights that might not otherwise be discovered. It is a critical step in the
- 1302 MDMP and should be allocated more time than any other step. The
- 1303 commander or chief of staff/executive officer determines how much time is
- 1304 available for war gaming and ensures this time line is followed.
- 1305 3-133. During the war game, the staff takes each COA and begins to develop
- 1306 a detailed plan, while determining its strengths or weaknesses. War-gaming
- 1307 tests and improves COAs. The commander and staff (and subordinate
- 1308 commanders and staffs if the war game is conducted collaboratively) may
- 1309 change an existing COA or develop a new COA after identifying unforeseen
- 1310 events, tasks, requirements, or problems.




Figure 3-12. Course of Action Analysis (War Game)

1311 **General War-gaming Rules**

1312 3-134. War gamers need to—

- 1313 • Remain objective, not allowing personality or their sensing of “what the
- 1314 commander wants” to influence them. They avoid defending a COA just
- 1315 because they personally developed it.
- 1316 • Accurately record advantages and disadvantages of each COA as they
- 1317 emerge.
- 1318 • Continually assess feasibility, acceptability, and suitability of each
- 1319 COA. If a COA fails any of these tests, they reject it.
- 1320 • Avoid drawing premature conclusions and gathering facts to support
- 1321 such conclusions.
- 1322 • Avoid comparing one COA with another during the war game. This
- 1323 occurs during COA comparison.

1324 **War-gaming Responsibilities**

1325 3-135. The chief of staff/executive officer is responsible for coordinating

1326 actions of the staff during the war game. He is the unbiased controller of the

1327 process, ensuring the staff stays on a time line and accomplishes the goals of

1328 the war gaming session. In a time-constrained environment, he ensures that,

1329 at minimum, the decisive operation is war-gamed. Staff members have the

1330 following responsibilities during the war game.

1331 3-136. **Personnel Officer.** The personnel officer (G1/S1) projects potential

1332 personnel battle losses and determines how CSS provides personnel support

1333 during the operation.

1334 3-137. **Intelligence Officer.** The intelligence officer (G2/S2) role-plays the

1335 enemy commander. He develops critical enemy decision points in relation to

1336 the friendly COAs, projects enemy reactions to friendly actions, and projects

1337 enemy losses. When additional intelligence staff members are available, the

1338 intelligence officer assigns different responsibilities to individual staff

1339 members within the section for war-gaming (such as, the enemy commander,

1340 friendly intelligence officer, and enemy recorder). The intelligence officer

1341 captures the results of each enemy action and counteraction, and the

1342 corresponding friendly and enemy strengths and vulnerabilities. By trying to

1343 win the war game for the enemy, the intelligence officer ensures that the staff

1344 fully addresses friendly responses for each enemy COA. For the friendly

1345 force, the intelligence officer—

- 1346 • Identifies IRs.
- 1347 • Refines the event template, including named areas of interest (NAIs),
- 1348 that support decision points.
- 1349 • Refines the event matrix with corresponding decision points, targeted
- 1350 areas of interest (TAIs), and HVTs.
- 1351 • Refines situation templates.
- 1352 • Participates in targeting meetings and selects high-payoff targets
- 1353 (HPTs) from HVTs identified during IPB.

1354 3-138. **Operations Officer.** The operations officer (G3/S3) normally selects

1355 the technique for the war game and role-plays the friendly commander. The

1356 operations staff ensures that the war game of each COA covers every

1357 operational aspect of the mission. They record each event's strengths and  
1358 weaknesses, and the rationale for each action. When staff members are  
1359 available, the operations officer assigns different responsibilities for war-  
1360 gaming. The rationale for actions during the war game are annotated and  
1361 used later, with the commander's guidance, to compare COAs.

1362 3-139. **Logistics Officer.** The logistics officer (G4/S4) assesses the  
1363 sustainment feasibility of each COA. He determines critical requirements for  
1364 each sustainment function and identifies potential problems and deficiencies.  
1365 He assesses the status of all sustainment functions required to support the  
1366 COA and compares it to available assets. He identifies potential shortfalls  
1367 and recommends actions to eliminate or reduce their effects. While  
1368 improvising can contribute to responsiveness, only accurate prediction of  
1369 requirements for each sustainment function can ensure continuous  
1370 sustainment. The logistics officer ensures that available movement times and  
1371 assets support each COA.

1372 3-140. **Civil Affairs Officer.** The civil affairs officer (G5/S5) ensures each  
1373 COA effectively integrates civil considerations (the "C" of METT-TC). The  
1374 civil affairs officer considers not only tactical issues, but also CS and CSS  
1375 issues. Host-nation support and care of displaced civilians are of particular  
1376 concern. The civil affairs officer's analysis considers the impact of operations  
1377 on public order and safety, the potential for disaster relief requirements,  
1378 noncombatant evacuation operations, emergency services, and protection of  
1379 culturally significant sites. If the unit does not have an assigned civil affairs  
1380 officer, the commander assigns these responsibilities to another staff  
1381 member.

1382 3-141. **Communications Officer.** The communications officer (G6/S6)  
1383 assesses the communications feasibility of each COA. He determines  
1384 command, control, communication, and computer requirements and compares  
1385 them to available assets. He identifies potential shortfalls and recommends  
1386 actions to eliminate or reduce their effect.

1387 3-142. **Information Operations Officer.** The information operations officer  
1388 (G7/S7) synchronizes IO and assists the staff in integrating IO into each  
1389 COA. The IO officer addresses how each IO element/related activity supports  
1390 each COA and its associated time lines, critical events, and decision points.  
1391 The IO officer revises IO concepts of support as needed during war-gaming.

1392 3-143. **Special Staff Officers.** Special staff officers support the coordinating  
1393 staff by analyzing the COAs from the perspective of their functional areas,  
1394 indicating how they can best support them. Every staff member determines  
1395 the requirements for external support, the risks, and each COA's strengths  
1396 and weaknesses. Collaborative war-gaming can greatly facilitate and refine  
1397 these actions. In addition, when conducted collaboratively, war-gaming  
1398 allows subordinates to see refinements to the concept of operations that  
1399 emerge immediately. Subordinates can then alter their own COAs without  
1400 waiting for a WARNO outlining the change.

1401 3-144. **Recorders.** The use of recorders is particularly important. Recorders  
1402 are trained to capture coordinating instructions, subunit tasks and purposes,  
1403 and information required to synchronize the operation. Doing this allows part  
1404 of the order to be written before planning is complete. Automated INFOSYS

1405 simplify this process: they allow entering information into preformatted  
1406 forms that represent either briefing charts or appendixes to orders. Each staff  
1407 section should have formats available to facilitate networked orders  
1408 production.

1409 3-145. **Location.** The location used for the war game must be prepared and  
1410 configured by the time the staff is ready to execute the war game. Charts and  
1411 boards must be cleaned and prepared for use. The blown-up terrain sketch  
1412 and enemy situation templates must be prepared and present. Automated  
1413 briefing products must be updated and digital terrain maps for the AO loaded  
1414 in the appropriate INFOSYS. Automated tools for war-gaming must have  
1415 correct data entered.

### 1416 War-gaming Steps

1417 3-146. The staff follows eight steps during war-gaming:

- 1418 • Gather the tools.
- 1419 • List friendly forces.
- 1420 • List assumptions.
- 1421 • List known critical events and decision points.
- 1422 • Determine evaluation criteria.
- 1423 • Select the war-game method.
- 1424 • Select a method to record and display results.
- 1425 • War-game the battle and assess the results.

1426 3-147. **Step 1. Gather the Tools.** The chief of staff/executive officer directs  
1427 the staff to gather the necessary tools, materials, and data for the war game.  
1428 Units war-game with maps, sand tables, computer simulations, or other tools  
1429 that accurately reflect the nature of the terrain. The staff posts the COA on a  
1430 map displaying the AO. Tools required include, but are not limited to—

- 1431 • Current staff estimates.
- 1432 • Event templates.
- 1433 • A recording method.
- 1434 • Completed COAs, including maneuver, reconnaissance and surveil-  
1435 lance, and security graphics.
- 1436 • Means to post enemy and friendly unit symbols.
- 1437 • A map of the AO.

1438 3-148. **Step 2. List All Friendly Forces.** The commander and staff consider  
1439 all units that can be committed to the operation, paying special attention to  
1440 support relationships and constraints. The friendly force list remains con-  
1441 stant for all COAs.

1442 3-149. **Step 3. List Assumptions.** The commander and staff review previous  
1443 assumptions for continued validity and necessity.

1444 3-150. **Step 4. List Known Critical Events and Decision Points.** Critical  
1445 events are those that directly influence mission accomplishment. They in-  
1446 clude events that trigger significant actions or decisions (such as commitment  
1447 of an enemy reserve), complicated actions requiring detailed study (such as a  
1448 passage of lines), and the essential tasks. The list of critical events includes

1449 major events from the unit's current position through mission  
1450 accomplishment.

1451 3-151. A *decision point* is the point in space and time where the commander  
1452 or staff anticipates making a decision concerning a specific friendly course of  
1453 action. A decision point is usually associated with a specific targeted area of  
1454 interest, and is located in time and space to permit the commander sufficient  
1455 lead time to engage the adversary in the targeted area of interest. Decision  
1456 points may also be associated with the friendly force and the status of  
1457 ongoing operations (JP 1-02). A decision point requires a decision by the  
1458 commander. It does not dictate what the decision is, only that the commander  
1459 must make one, and when and where it should be made to have the  
1460 maximum impact on friendly or enemy COAs. Decision points relate to  
1461 identified critical events and are linked to NAIs or TAIs. The staff keeps the  
1462 list of critical events and decision points as small as possible. More time  
1463 available for planning allows a longer list. In a time-constrained  
1464 environment, the staff limits the list to essential events and decision points.

1465 3-152. **Step 5. Determine Evaluation Criteria.** Evaluation criteria are  
1466 factors the staff uses to measure the relative effectiveness and efficiency of  
1467 one COA relative to other COAs after the war game. They address factors  
1468 that affect success and those that can cause failure. Evaluation criteria  
1469 change from mission to mission. They must be clearly defined and understood  
1470 by all staff members before starting the war game. Examples of evaluation  
1471 criteria for offensive and defensive operations include—

- 1472 • Mission accomplishment at an acceptable cost.
- 1473 • The principles of war.
- 1474 • Doctrinal fundamentals for the type and form of operation being  
1475 conducted (see FM 3-90, *Tactics*).
- 1476 • The commander's guidance and intent.
- 1477 • The level of tactical risk.
- 1478 • Measures of performance listed in FM 7-15 (*The Army Universal Task*  
1479 *List*).

1480 3-153. **Step 6. Select the War-game Method.** There are three  
1481 recommended war-game methods: belt, avenue-in-depth, and box. Each  
1482 considers the area of interest and all enemy forces that can affect the  
1483 outcome of the operation. The methods can be used separately or in  
1484 combination. The staff may devise a method of its own.

1485 3-154. The *belt method* divides the AO into belts (areas) running the width of  
1486 the AO (see Figure 3-13). The shape of each belt is based on the factors of  
1487 METT-TC. The belt method is most effective when terrain is divided into well  
1488 defined cross-compartments, during phased operations (such as, river  
1489 crossings, air assaults, or airborne operations), or when the enemy is  
1490 deployed in clearly defined belts or echelons. Belts can be adjacent to or  
1491 overlap each other. At minimum, belts should include the area of—

- 1492 • Initial contact either along the forward line of own troops, LD, or LC,  
1493 or in the covering force area.
- 1494 • Initial penetration or initial contact along the FEBA.
- 1495 • Passage of the reserve or commitment of a counterattack.

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- The objective (offense) or defeat of the enemy (defense).

3-155. This method is based on a sequential analysis of events in each belt. It is preferred because it focuses simultaneously on all forces affecting a particular event. A belt might include more than one critical event. Under time-constrained conditions, the commander can use a modified belt method. The modified belt method divides the AO into not more than three sequential belts. These belts are not necessarily adjacent or overlapping, but focus on the critical actions throughout the depth of the AO.




Figure 3-13. Belt Method

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3-156. The *avenue-in-depth method* focuses on one avenue of approach at a time, beginning with the decisive operation (see Figure 3-14, page 3-40). This method is good for offensive COAs or in the defense when canalizing terrain inhibits mutual support.

3-157. The *box method* is a detailed analysis of a critical area, such as an engagement area, a river-crossing site, or a landing zone. It is appropriate when time is constrained, as in a hasty attack. It is particularly useful when planning operations in noncontiguous AOs. When using this method, the staff isolates the area and focuses on critical events in it. Staff members assume that friendly units can handle most of the situations on the battlefield and focus their attention on essential tasks.

3-158. **Step 7. Select a Method to Record and Display Results.** The war game's results provide a record from which to build task organizations, synchronize activities, develop decision support templates, confirm and refine event templates, prepare plans or orders, and compare COAs. Two methods are used to record and display results: the synchronization matrix (see Figure 3-15, page 3-41) and the sketch note (see Figure 3-16, page 3-42). In both, staff members record any remarks regarding the strengths and weaknesses

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they discover. The amount of detail depends on the time available. Unit SOPs address details and methods of recording and displaying war-game results.




Figure 3-14. Avenue in Dept Method

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3-159. The *synchronization matrix* method allows the staff to synchronize the COA across time and space in relation to an enemy COA (see Figure 3-15). The first entry is time or phases of the operation. The second entry is the most likely enemy action. The third entry is the decision points for the friendly COA. The remainder of the matrix is developed around selected functional areas and the unit's major subordinate commands. Other operations, functions, and units that are to be integrated, or the use of which the staff wants to highlight, can be incorporated into the matrix.

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3-160. The *sketch note* method uses brief notes concerning critical locations or tasks and purposes. These notes refer to specific locations or relate to general considerations covering broad areas. The commander and staff note locations on the map and on a separate war-game work sheet (see Figure 3-16, page 3-42). Staff members use sequence numbers to link the notes to the corresponding locations on the map or overlay. Staff members also identify actions by placing them in sequential action groups, giving each subtask a separate number. They use the war-game work sheet to identify all pertinent data for a critical event. They assign each event a number and title, and use the columns on the work sheet to identify and list in sequence—

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- Units and assigned tasks.
- Expected enemy actions and reactions.
- Friendly counteractions and assets.
- Total assets needed for the task.
- Estimated time to accomplish the task.
- The decision point tied to executing the task.
- CCIR.
- Control measures.

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Time/Event		H - 8	H-hour	H + 8
Enemy Action				
Decision Points				
Maneuver	1st Bde			
	2d Bde			
	3d Bde			
	Avn Bde			
	Div Cav			
Air Defense				
Fire Support				
Information Operations				
Engineer				
CSS				
C2				
Note: The first column is representative only and can be modified to fit unit needs.				

Figure 3-15. Sample Synchronization Matrix

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3-161. **Step 8. War-Game the Battle and Assess the Results.** During the war game, the commander and staff try to foresee the battle’s action, reaction, and counteraction dynamics. The staff analyzes each selected event. They identify tasks the force must accomplish one echelon down, using assets two echelons down. Identifying each COA’s strengths and weaknesses allows the staff to adjust them as necessary.

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3-162. The war game follows an action-reaction-counteraction cycle. *Actions* are those events initiated by the side with the initiative (normally the force on the offensive). *Reactions* are the other side’s actions in response. *Counteractions* are the first side’s responses to reactions. This sequence of action-reaction-counteraction is continued until the critical event is completed or until the commander determines that he must use another COA to accomplish the mission.

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3-163. The staff considers all possible forces, including templated enemy forces outside the AO that can influence the operation. The staff evaluates each friendly move to determine the assets and actions required to defeat the enemy at that point. The staff continually considers branches to the plan that promote success against likely enemy counteractions. The staff lists assets used in the appropriate columns of the worksheet and lists the totals in the assets column (not considering any assets lower than two command levels down).

<b>Critical Event:</b> _____	
<b>Sequence #</b>	
<b>Action</b>	
<b>Reaction</b>	
<b>Counteraction</b>	
<b>Assets</b>	
<b>Time</b>	
<b>Decision Point</b>	
<b>CCIR</b>	
<b>Control Measures</b>	
<b>Remarks</b>	

**Figure 3-16. War Game Work Sheet**

1572 3-164. The commander and staff examine many areas in detail during the  
 1573 war game. These include—  
 1574       • All enemy capabilities.  
 1575       • Movement considerations.  
 1576       • Closure rates.  
 1577       • Lengths of columns.  
 1578       • Formation depths.  
 1579       • Ranges and capabilities of weapon systems.  
 1580       • Desired effects of fires.

1581 They consider how to create conditions for success, protect the force, and  
 1582 shape the battlefield. Experience, historical data, SOPs, and doctrinal  
 1583 literature provide much of the necessary information. During the war game,  
 1584 staff officers perform a risk assessment for their functional area for each COA  
 1585 and propose appropriate controls.

1586 3-165. The staff continually assesses the risk to friendly forces from  
 1587 catastrophic threat, seeking a balance between mass and dispersion. When  
 1588 assessing WMD risk to friendly forces, planners view the target that the force  
 1589 presents through the eyes of an enemy target analyst. They consider ways to  
 1590 reduce vulnerability and determine the appropriate MOPP (mission-oriented  
 1591 protective posture) level consistent with mission accomplishment. They also  
 1592 consider deployment of nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC)  
 1593 decontamination units.

1594 3-166. The staff identifies the BOS assets required to support the concept of  
 1595 operations, including those needed to synchronize sustaining operations. If  
 1596 requirements exceed available assets, the staff recommends priorities based

1597 on the situation, commander's intent, and planning guidance. To maintain  
1598 flexibility, the commander may decide to withhold some assets for unforeseen  
1599 tasks or opportunities (a reserve).

1600 3-167. The commander can modify any COA based on how things develop  
1601 during the war game. When doing this, the commander validates the  
1602 composition and location of the decisive operation, shaping operations, and  
1603 reserve forces. Control measures are adjusted as necessary. The commander  
1604 may also identify situations, opportunities, or additional critical events that  
1605 require more analysis. The staff performs this analysis quickly and  
1606 incorporates the results into the war game record.

1607 3-168. An effective war game results in the commander and staff—

- 1608 • Refining or modifying each COA, including identifying branches and  
1609 sequels that become on-order or be-prepared missions.
- 1610 • Refining the locations and times of decisive points.
- 1611 • Identifying key or decisive terrain and determining how to use it.
- 1612 • Refining the enemy event template and matrix.
- 1613 • Refining the task organization, including forces retained in general  
1614 support.
- 1615 • Identifying tasks the unit retains and tasks assigned to subordinates.
- 1616 • Allocating assets to subordinate commanders to accomplish their  
1617 missions.
- 1618 • Developing decision points.
- 1619 • Developing a synchronization matrix.
- 1620 • Developing decision support template.
- 1621 • Estimating the duration of the entire operation and each critical event.
- 1622 • Projecting the percentage of enemy forces defeated in each critical  
1623 event, and overall.
- 1624 • Identifying likely times and areas for enemy use of WMD and friendly  
1625 NBC defense requirements.
- 1626 • Identifying the potential times or locations for committing the reserve.
- 1627 • Identifying the most dangerous enemy COA.
- 1628 • Identifying locations for the commander, command posts, and  
1629 INFOSYS nodes.
- 1630 • Identifying critical events.
- 1631 • Identifying requirements for BOS support.
- 1632 • Determining requirements for military deception and surprise.
- 1633 • Refining C2 requirements, including control measures and updated  
1634 operational graphics.
- 1635 • Refining CCIR and IR—including the last time information is of value  
1636 (LTIOV)—and incorporating them into the ISR plan.
- 1637 • Developing the ISR plan and graphics.
- 1638 • Developing IO objectives and tasks (see FM 3-13, *Information Opera-*  
1639 *tions*).
- 1640 • Developing fire support, engineer, air defense, IO, and CSS plans and  
1641 graphics.

- 1642 • Identifying the effects of friendly and enemy action on the civilian
- 1643 population and infrastructure, and how these will affect military
- 1644 operations.
- 1645 • Identifying or confirming the locations of NAIs, TAIs, decision points,
- 1646 and IR needed to support them.
- 1647 • Determining the timing for concentrating forces and starting the
- 1648 attack or counterattack.
- 1649 • Determining movement times and tables for critical assets, including
- 1650 INFOSYS nodes.
- 1651 • Identifying, analyzing, and evaluating strengths and weaknesses of
- 1652 each COA.
- 1653 • Integrating targeting into the operation, to include identifying or
- 1654 confirming high-payoff targets and establishing attack guidance.
- 1655 • Identifying hazards, assessing their risk, developing controls for them,
- 1656 and determining residual risk.

1657 **War-game Briefing (Optional)**

1658 3-169. Time permitting, the staff delivers a briefing to ensure all fully  
 1659 understand the results of the war game. This briefing is not given to the  
 1660 commander: the staff uses it to review the war game and ensure the decision  
 1661 briefing to the commander covers all relevant points. It is normally given to  
 1662 the chief of staff/executive officer, or to the deputy or assistant commander.  
 1663 In a collaborative environment, it may include selected subordinate staffs. A  
 1664 format is—

- 1665 • Higher headquarters mission, commander’s intent, and military
- 1666 deception plan.
- 1667 • Updated IPB.
- 1668 • Enemy COAs that were war-gamed.
- 1669 • Friendly COAs that were war-gamed.
- 1670 • Assumptions.
- 1671 • War gaming technique used.
- 1672 • For each COA war-gamed—
  - 1673 ▪ Critical events.
  - 1674 ▪ Possible enemy actions and reactions.
  - 1675 ▪ Modifications to the COA.
  - 1676 ▪ Strengths and weaknesses.
  - 1677 ▪ Results of the war game.

1678 **COURSE OF ACTION COMPARISON**

1679 3-170. The COA comparison starts with all staff members analyzing and  
 1680 evaluating the advantages and disadvantages of each COA from their  
 1681 perspectives (see Figure 3-17). Staff members each present their findings for  
 1682 the others’ consideration. Using the evaluation criteria developed before the  
 1683 war game, the staff outlines each COA, highlighting its advantages and  
 1684 disadvantages. Comparing the strengths and weaknesses of the COAs  
 1685 identifies their advantages and disadvantages with respect to each other.

1686 3-171. The staff compares feasible COAs to identify the one with the highest  
 1687 probability of success against the most likely enemy COA and the most  
 1688 dangerous enemy COA. The selected COA should also—  
 1689 

- Pose the minimum risk to the force and mission accomplishment.

  
 1690 

- Place the force in the best posture for future operations.

  
 1691 

- Provide maximum latitude for initiative by subordinates.

  
 1692 

- Provide the most flexibility to meet unexpected threats and

  
 1693 opportunities.




Figure 3-17. COA Comparison

1694 3-172. Actual comparison of COAs is critical. The staff may use any  
 1695 technique that facilitates reaching the best recommendation and the  
 1696 commander making the best decision. The most common technique is the  
 1697 decision matrix, which uses evaluation criteria to assess the effectiveness and  
 1698 efficiency of each COA (see Figure 3-18, page 3-46).

1699 3-173. Staff officers may each use their own matrix to compare COAs with  
 1700 respect to their functional areas. Matrices use the evaluation criteria  
 1701 developed before the war game. Decision matrices alone cannot provide  
 1702 decision solutions. Their greatest value is providing a method to compare  
 1703 COAs against criteria that, when met, produce battlefield success. They are  
 1704 analytical tools that staff officers use to prepare recommendations.  
 1705 Commanders provide the solution by applying their judgment to staff  
 1706 recommendations and making a decision.

1707 3-174. The chief of staff/executive officer normally determines the weight of  
 1708 each criterion based on its relative importance and the commander's guidance.  
 1709 The commander may give guidance that results in weighting certain  
 1710 criteria. The staff member responsible for a functional area scores each COA  
 1711 using those criteria. Multiplying the score by the weight yields the criterion's  
 1712 value. The staff member then totals all values. However, he must be careful  
 1713 not portray subjective conclusions as the results of quantifiable analysis.  
 1714 Comparing COAs by category is more accurate than comparing total scores.

1715 **COURSE OF ACTION APPROVAL**

1716 3-175. COA approval has three components:  
 1717 

- The staff recommends a COA, usually in a decision briefing.

  
 1718 

- The commander decides which COA to approve.

  
 1719 

- The commander issues the final planning guidance.

1720

<b>CRITERIA</b> (note 1)	<b>WEIGHT</b> (note 2)	<b>COA 1</b> (note 3)	<b>COA 2</b> (note 3)	<b>COA 3</b> (note 3)
<b>Maneuver</b>	3	2 (6)	3 (9)	1 (3)
<b>Simplicity</b>	3	3 (9)	1 (3)	2 (6)
<b>Fires</b>	4	2 (8)	1 (4)	3 (12)
<b>Intelligence</b>	1	3 (3)	2 (2)	1 (1)
<b>ADA</b>	1	1 (1)	3 (3)	2 (2)
<b>Mobility/ Survivability</b>	1	3 (3)	2 (2)	1 (1)
<b>CSS</b>	1	2 (2)	1 (1)	3 (3)
<b>C2</b>	1	1 (1)	2 (2)	3 (3)
<b>Residual Risk</b>	2	1 (2)	2 (4)	3 (6)
<b>IO</b>	1	2 (2)	1 (1)	3 (3)
<b>TOTAL Weighted TOTAL</b>		20 (27)	18 (31)	22 (40)

NOTES:

1. Criteria are those assigned in step 5 of COA analysis.
2. The chief of staff/executive officer may emphasize one or more criteria by assigning weights to them based on their relative importance.
3. COAs are those selected for war-gaming.

Procedure: The staff assigns numerical values for each criterion after war-gaming the COA. Values reflect the relative advantages or disadvantages of each criterion for each COA action. The lowest number is best. The initially assigned score in each column is multiplied by the weight and the product put in parenthesis in the column. When using weighted value, the lower value assigned indicates the best option. The numbers are totaled to provide a subjective evaluation of the best COA without weighting one criterion over another. The scores are then totaled to provide a "best" (lowest number value) COA based on weights the commander assigns. Although the lowest value denotes the best solution, the best solution may be more subjective than the objective numbers indicate. The matrix must be examined for sensitivity. Although COA 2 is the "best" COA, it may not be supportable from a CSS standpoint. The decision maker must either determine if he can acquire additional support or if he must alter or delete the COA.

**Figure 3-18. Sample Decision Matrix—Numerical Analysis**

1721 **Course of Action Decision Briefing**

1722 3-176. After completing its analysis and comparison, the staff identifies its  
 1723 preferred COA and makes a recommendation. If the staff cannot reach a  
 1724 decision, the chief of staff/executive officer decides which COA to recommend.  
 1725 The staff then delivers a decision briefing to the commander. The chief of  
 1726 staff/executive officer highlights any changes to each COA resulting from the  
 1727 war game. The decision briefing includes—

- The intent of the higher and next higher commanders.
- The status of the force and its components.
- The current IPB.

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- The COAs considered, including—
  - Assumptions used.
  - Results of staff estimates.
  - Advantages and disadvantages (including risk) of each COA. These may be discussed in terms of a numerical analysis (see Figure 3-18, page 3-46), subjective analysis, (see Figure 3-19) or broad categories (see Figure 3-20).
- The recommended COA.

Course of Action	Advantages	Disadvantages
COA 1	Decisive operation avoids major terrain obstacles. Adequate maneuver room for decisive operation and reserve.	Decisive operation faces stronger resistance at beginning.
COA 2	Decisive operation gains good observation early. Shaping operation provides flank protection to the decisive operation.	Initially, reserve may have to be employed in AO of shaping operation. Needs detailed and rehearsed procedural and positive controls.
DISCUSSION:		

1740

Figure 3-19. Sample Decision Matrix—Subjective Analysis

Factors	Course of Action	
	1	2
Casualty estimate	+	-
Medical evacuation routes	-	+
Suitable location for medical facilities	0	0
Available EPW facilities	-	+
Suitable command post locations	-	+
Courier and distribution routes	-	+
Effects of attachments and detachments on force cohesion, casualty reporting, and replacement operations	-	+
Residual Risk	+	-
NOTE: The factors in the above example are neither all-inclusive nor always applicable.		

1741

Figure 3-20. Sample Decision Matrix—Broad Categories

1742

**Commander’s Decision**

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3-177. After the decision briefing, the commander selects the COA he believes will best accomplish the mission. If the commander rejects all COAs, the staff starts COA development again. If the commander modifies a proposed COA or gives the staff an entirely different one, the staff war-games it and presents the results to the commander with a recommendation.

1748

**Final Planning Guidance**

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3-178. After selecting a COA, the commander issues the final planning guidance. The final planning guidance includes a refined commander’s intent (if necessary) and new CCIR to support execution It also includes any additional guidance on priorities for BOS activities, orders preparation,

1753 rehearsal, and preparation. This guidance includes priorities for resources  
1754 needed to preserve freedom of action and assure continuous CSS.

1755 3-179. Commanders include risk they are willing to accept in the final  
1756 planning guidance. If there is time, commanders discuss acceptable risk with  
1757 adjacent, subordinate, and senior commanders, often by VTC. However, a  
1758 commander must obtain the higher commander's approval to accept any risk  
1759 that might imperil accomplishing the higher commander's mission.

1760 3-180. Based on the commander's decision and final planning guidance, the  
1761 staff issues a WARNO. This WARNO contains the information subordinate  
1762 units need to refine their plans. It confirms guidance issued in person or by  
1763 VTC and expands on details not covered by the commander personally.

## 1764 **ORDERS PRODUCTION**

1765 3-181. The staff prepares the order or plan by turning the selected COA into  
1766 a clear, concise concept of operations and required supporting information.  
1767 The concept of operations for the approved COA becomes the concept of  
1768 operations for the plan. The COA sketch becomes the basis for the operation  
1769 overlay. Orders and plans provide all information subordinates need for  
1770 execution. Mission orders avoid unnecessary constraints that inhibit  
1771 subordinate initiative. The staff assists subordinate staffs with their  
1772 planning and coordination.

1773 3-182. The concept of operations is a concise statement of where, when, and  
1774 how the commander intends to mass the effects of combat power to  
1775 accomplish the mission within to the higher commander's intent. It  
1776 designates the decisive operation and key shaping operations, and includes  
1777 command and support relationships. These relationships are mirrored in the  
1778 task organization.

1779 3-183. During orders production, the staff implements risk controls by  
1780 coordinating and integrating them into the appropriate paragraphs and  
1781 graphics of the order. The order communicates how to put controls into effect,  
1782 which implements them, and how they fit into the overall operation.

1783 3-184. Commanders review and approve orders before the staff reproduces  
1784 and disseminates them unless they have delegated that authority.  
1785 Traditionally, the chief of staff/executive officer or operations officer receives  
1786 it. If possible, the order is briefed to subordinate commanders face to face by  
1787 the higher commander and staff. The commander and staff conduct  
1788 confirmation briefings with subordinates immediately afterwards.  
1789 Confirmation briefings can be done collaboratively with several commanders  
1790 at the same time, or with single commanders. They may be performed face to  
1791 face or by VTC.

## 1792 **PLANNING IN A TIME-CONSTRAINED ENVIRONMENT**


1793 3-185. Staffs must be able to produce simple, flexible, tactically sound plans  
1794 in a time-constrained environment. Any METT-TC factor, but especially  
1795 limited time, may make it difficult to complete every MDMP step in detail  
1796 (see Figure 3-21). Applying an inflexible process to all situations will not

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work. Anticipation, organization, and prior preparation are the keys successful planning under time-constrained conditions.

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3-186. Planning in a time-constrained environment is based on the MDMP. The MDMP is a sound and proven process that can be modified with slightly different techniques to be effective when time is limited. The rest of this chapter discusses how to abbreviate the MDMP for use under time-constrained conditions. In these situations, commanders abbreviate the MDMP for simplicity only. An “abbreviated MDMP” is not a different process; it is a version same MDMP, shortened to meet the commander’s needs in circumstances where there is not enough time to complete all MDMP tasks in detail.



**Figure 3-21. Planning Continuum**

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3-187. The steps of an abbreviated MDMP are the same as those for the full process; however, the commander performs many of them mentally or with less staff involvement. The products developed during an abbreviated MDMP may be the same as those developed for the full process; however, they are usually less detailed. Some may be omitted altogether. Unit SOPs state how to abbreviate the MDMP based on the commander’s preferences.

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3-188. Staffs maintain the products created during the full MDMP—especially running estimates—to support decisions throughout preparation and execution. When significant parts of existing information and analysis have not changed substantially, products from the current operation may support planning for a future operation.

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3-189. In some situations, staffs may initially use the full MDMP to develop an order, and develop branches and sequels during execution using an abbreviated process. Alternatively, a higher headquarters may use the complete MDMP to develop an order, while subordinate headquarters use an abbreviated process to produce their own orders.

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3-190. The advantages of abbreviating the MDMP are—

- It maximizes the use of available time.
- It allows subordinates more planning time.
- It focuses staff efforts on the commander’s guidance.

- 1869                           • It facilitates adapting to a rapidly changing situation.  
1870                           • It allows commanders to compensate for the lack of a staff or for an  
1871                           inexperienced staff.
- 1872                   3-191. The disadvantages of abbreviating the MDMP are—  
1873                           • It is much more directive and limits staff flexibility and initiative.  
1874                           • It does not explore all available options when developing friendly  
1875                           COAs.  
1876                           • It may result in only an oral order or a FRAGO.  
1877                           • It increases the risk of overlooking a key factor or uncovering a  
1878                           significantly better option.  
1879                           • It may decrease coordination and synchronization of the plan.
- 1880                   3-192. The time saved on any MDMP step can be used to—  
1881                           • Refine the plan more thoroughly.  
1882                           • Conduct a more deliberate and detailed war game.  
1883                           • Consider potential branches and sequels in detail.  
1884                           • Focus more on rehearsing and preparing the plan.
- 1885                   3-193. The commander decides how to shorten the MDMP. Some possible  
1886                   techniques and procedures for saving time follow. They are neither  
1887                   exhaustive nor the only ways to save time, but they have proven useful.  
1888                   These techniques are not necessarily followed sequentially, nor are all of  
1889                   them useful in all situations. Whether a technique works depends on the  
1890                   unit, its training, and the factors of METT-TC. Commanders may use these,  
1891                   or techniques of their own choosing.

## 1892   **THE COMMANDER'S ROLE**

- 1893                   3-194. The commander decides how to adjust the MDMP, giving specific  
1894                   guidance to the staff to focus the process and save time. Commanders who  
1895                   have access to only a small portion of the staff, or none at all, rely even more  
1896                   than normal on their own expertise, intuition, and creativity, and on their  
1897                   understanding of the environment and of the art and science of warfare. They  
1898                   may have to select a COA, mentally war-game it, and confirm their decision  
1899                   to the staff in a relatively short time. If so, the decision is based more on  
1900                   experience than on a formal integrated staff process.
- 1901                   3-195. Commanders avoid changing their guidance unless a significantly  
1902                   changed situation requires major revisions. Frequent minor changes to the  
1903                   guidance can easily result in lost time as the staff makes constant minor  
1904                   adjustments to the plan.
- 1905                   3-196. Commanders consult with subordinate commanders before making a  
1906                   decision, if possible. Subordinate commanders are closer to the fight and can  
1907                   more accurately describe the enemy and friendly situations. Additionally,  
1908                   consulting with subordinates gives commanders insight into the upcoming  
1909                   operation and allows parallel planning. White boards and collaborative  
1910                   digital means of communicating greatly enhance parallel planning.
- 1911                   3-197. In situations where commanders must decide quickly, they advise  
1912                   their higher headquarters of the selected COA, if time is available. However,

1913 commanders do not let an opportunity pass because they cannot report their  
1914 actions.

1915 **THE STAFF'S ROLE**

1916 3-198. The importance of staff estimates increases as time decreases.  
1917 Decision making in a time-constrained environment almost always takes  
1918 place after a unit has entered the AO and begun operations. This means that  
1919 the IPB, an updated common operational picture, and some portion of staff  
1920 estimates should already exist. Detailed planning provides the basis for  
1921 information the commander and staff need to make decisions during  
1922 execution. Staff members keep their running estimates current so, when  
1923 planning time is limited, they can provide accurate, up-to-date assessments  
1924 quickly and move directly into COA development. Under time-constrained  
1925 conditions, commanders and staffs use as much of the previously analyzed  
1926 information and products from earlier decisions as possible.

1927 3-199. The staff uses every opportunity to perform parallel planning with the  
1928 higher headquarters. Parallel planning can save a lot of time, but if not  
1929 carefully managed, may waste time. Generally, the staff should not get ahead  
1930 of the higher headquarters during planning. Most of the effort should be  
1931 spent on mission analysis, which develops the foundation of the plan. The  
1932 staff should not develop and analyze COAs without specific guidance and  
1933 approval from higher headquarters.

1934 3-200. Collaborative planning may be used to further speed up decision  
1935 making. Collaborative planning facilitates parallel planning by subordinates  
1936 and takes advantage their knowledge of their AOs and associated threats and  
1937 opportunities. However, there is often a tension between taking commanders  
1938 away from an ongoing fight and the need to involve them in collaborative  
1939 planning. Only the higher commander can determine which takes  
1940 precedence.

1941 **TIME-SAVING TECHNIQUES**

1942 3-201. Commanders abbreviate the MDMP when there is not enough time to  
1943 perform each step in detail. The most significant factor to consider is time. It  
1944 is the only nonrenewable, and often the most critical, resource. There are four  
1945 primary timesaving techniques. There are also techniques specific to each  
1946 MDMP step.

1947 **General Techniques**

1948 3-202. The first is timesaving technique is to increase the commander's  
1949 involvement. This technique allows commanders to make decisions during  
1950 the MDMP without waiting for detailed briefings after each step.

1951 3-203. The second technique is for the commander to limit options by issuing  
1952 more prescriptive guidance. This technique focuses the staff on things the  
1953 commander feels are most important. This type of detailed guidance limits  
1954 the staff's flexibility and initiative, but it allows the staff more time to  
1955 synchronize the COA during the war game.

1956 3-204. The third technique is limiting the number of COAs developed and  
1957 war-gamed. In extreme cases, commanders direct development of only one

1958 COA. The goal is an acceptable COA that meets mission requirements in the  
 1959 time available, even if the COA is not optimal. This technique saves the most  
 1960 time.

1961 3-205. The fourth technique is maximizing parallel planning. Although  
 1962 parallel planning is the norm, maximizing its use in time-constrained  
 1963 environments is critical. In a time-constrained environment, the importance  
 1964 of WARNOs increases as available time decreases. A verbal WARNO now  
 1965 followed by a written order later saves more time than a written order one  
 1966 hour from now. The same WARNOs used in the full MDMP should be issued  
 1967 when abbreviating the process. In addition to WARNOs, units must share all  
 1968 available information with subordinates, especially IPB products, as early as  
 1969 possible. Digitization and a COP shared electronically allow collaboration  
 1970 with subordinates that can increase information sharing and improve the  
 1971 commander's visualization.

1972 **Receipt of Mission**

1973 3-206. The tasks performed during mission receipt do not change in a time-  
 1974 constrained environment. In all situations, commanders decide whether or  
 1975 not to abbreviate the process and, if so, specifies how they want to do it.

1976 **Mission Analysis**

1977 3-207. The commander's involvement is the key to saving time during  
 1978 mission analysis. If there is not enough time for a detailed mission analysis,  
 1979 the commander, staff, and subordinate commanders (if collaborative tools are  
 1980 available) perform a rapid mission analysis. They determine the restated  
 1981 mission based on intuitive decisions and whatever information is available.  
 1982 In extreme circumstances, mission analysis may be performed mentally by  
 1983 the commander and key staff. This should be the exception rather than the  
 1984 norm.

1985 3-208. IPB requires constant attention. Many delays during mission analysis  
 1986 can be traced to it. In a time-constrained environment, the intelligence officer  
 1987 quickly updates the IPB based on the new mission and changed situation. A  
 1988 current intelligence estimate allows ISR assets to deploy early to collect  
 1989 information to confirm adjustments to the initial plan. Enemy event  
 1990 templates must be as complete as possible before the mission analysis  
 1991 briefing. Because they are the basis for war-gaming, they must be constantly  
 1992 updated as new information becomes available.

1993 3-209. The staff performs as formal a mission analysis briefing as time  
 1994 allows. However, staff members may have to brief their estimates orally,  
 1995 without the use of charts or other tools, covering only information that has  
 1996 changed from the last staff estimate. When severely time-constrained, they  
 1997 brief only vital information that directly affects the new mission.  
 1998 Commanders who have been directly involved in mission analysis may decide  
 1999 to skip the mission analysis briefing.

2000 3-210. Issuing detailed commander's guidance is one way to save time during  
 2001 mission analysis. The elements of the commander's guidance may be the  
 2002 same as the full MDMP, but the guidance is much more directive. Detailed  
 2003 guidance may include outlining what the commander expects in each COA. It

2004 may include a tentative task organization and concept of operations.  
2005 Commanders may also determine which enemy COAs they want friendly  
2006 COAs war-gamed against as well as the branches or sequels to incorporate  
2007 into each COA. Detailed guidance keeps the staff focused by establishing  
2008 parameters within which to work.

2009 3-211. Commander's guidance must be constantly reviewed and analyzed. As  
2010 the situation changes and information becomes available, commanders may  
2011 need to update or alter their guidance. Once the guidance is issued, the staff  
2012 immediately sends a WARNO to subordinate units. If subordinate  
2013 commanders and staffs are part of a collaborative process, they receive this  
2014 updated guidance during the collaborative session. Even so, the staff captures  
2015 this guidance and disseminates it in a WARNO.

### 2016 **Course of Action Development**

2017 3-212. Increased commander involvement in COA development saves a  
2018 significant amount of time. It results in detailed and directive commander's  
2019 guidance. The greatest saving comes when the commander directs  
2020 development of only a few COAs instead of many.

2021 3-213. Time can be saved by performing a hasty war game at the end of COA  
2022 development. A hasty war game allows commanders to determine if they  
2023 favor one or more of the proposed COAs. It develops and matures one or more  
2024 COAs prior to the formal war game. If the commander cannot be present  
2025 during the hasty war game, the staff delivers a COA back-brief to the  
2026 commander afterwards. From the hasty war game, the commander refines  
2027 one or more COAs before the detailed war game. In extreme situations, this  
2028 may be the only opportunity to conduct a war game.

2029 3-214. Commanders may also use a hasty war game to select a single COA  
2030 for further development. Such a decision allows the staff and subordinates to  
2031 focus on one COA rather than several. It also lets the staff concentrate on  
2032 synchronizing the COA earlier.

2033 3-215. The fastest way to develop a plan is for the commander to direct  
2034 development of one COA with branches against the most likely enemy COA.  
2035 The technique should be used only when time is severely limited. This choice  
2036 of COA is often intuitive, relying on the commander's experience and  
2037 judgment. The commander determines which staff officers are essential to  
2038 assist him depending on the type of operation being planned. The minimum  
2039 is normally the intelligence officer, operations officer, fire support  
2040 coordinator, engineer coordinator, and chief of staff/executive officer. The  
2041 commander may also include subordinate commanders, if available, either in  
2042 person or by VTC. This team quickly develops a flexible COA that it feels will  
2043 accomplish the mission. The commander mentally war-games it and gives it  
2044 to the staff to refine.

2045 3-216. Limiting the number of COAs incurs the risk of overlooking a  
2046 significantly better COA. Developing only one COA is the most risky  
2047 approach. It provides the staff with the least flexibility to apply its creativity  
2048 and explore options. However, it gives staff and subordinates more time to  
2049 synchronize the plan.

2050 3-217. Saving time by not using the enemy event templates to develop COAs  
 2051 is a poor technique. Without them, commanders and staffs cannot perform  
 2052 the analysis of relative combat power and the initial arraying of forces.

2053 **Course of Action Analysis**

2054 3-218. The commander and staff war-game as many COAs as possible to  
 2055 ensure all elements are fully integrated and synchronized. An early decision  
 2056 to limit the number of COAs war-gamed, or to develop only one COA, saves  
 2057 the greatest amount of time. It is best to war-game friendly COAs against all  
 2058 feasible enemy COAs. However, war-gaming against a smaller number of  
 2059 enemy COAs can save additional time. At a minimum, the decisive operation  
 2060 is war-gamed against the most likely enemy COA.

2061 3-219. The commander's involvement can save significant time in COA  
 2062 analysis by focusing the staff on the essential aspects of the war game. The  
 2063 commander can supervise the war game and make decisions, provide  
 2064 guidance, and delete unsatisfactory concepts. If time is available to war-game  
 2065 multiple COAs, the commander may identify the COA he favors. Unwanted  
 2066 COAs are then discarded and the time allocated to refining the selected COA.  
 2067

2068 3-220. The commander always assesses risk during COA analysis. Limiting  
 2069 the number of COAs increases risk to the command. Commanders evaluate  
 2070 all COAs to ensure they will not render the force incapable of anticipated  
 2071 operations or lower the unit's combat effectiveness beyond acceptable levels.

2072 3-221. The box technique is best for an abbreviated MDMP. It addresses on  
 2073 the decisive operation first. If time permits, the staff war-games other critical  
 2074 events or boxes. Commanders identify and prioritiz the events they want  
 2075 analyzed. Analyzing essential tasks can identify critical events.

2076 3-222. Staff officers save time if they specifically define and limit the  
 2077 evaluation criteria before they begin the war game. The commander can  
 2078 greatly increase effectiveness here by specifying the critical factors and their  
 2079 weight. Significant factors are quantified, if possible, and limited to the four  
 2080 or five most important, based on the mission statement, commander's intent,  
 2081 and the initial planning guidance.

2082 3-223. The staff supports the commander's plan. However, as the staff refines  
 2083 the plan, it cannot become so biased that it develops a plan that is infeasible  
 2084 and unsupportable. If the staff determines that the COA the commander  
 2085 selected cannot be supported, they develop a new COA.

2086 3-224. When only one COA is developed, the purpose of COA analysis is to  
 2087 verify, refine, and synchronize the COA, and integrate recommended modifi-  
 2088 cations into it as necessary. However, the analysis should follow the formal  
 2089 war game process as much as time allows to help the commander visualize  
 2090 the outcome and identify potential branches and sequels. As time allows, the  
 2091 staff can further war-game and develop these branches and sequels.

2092 3-225. In a severely time-constrained environment and if automated tools  
 2093 allow, units may combine the war game with the rehearsal in a virtual  
 2094 environment that includes subordinate commanders and staffs. A significant

2095 benefit of this technique is that it allows subordinate commanders to control  
2096 their units during the war game.

2097 **Course of Action Comparison**

2098 3-226. If the commander decides to war-game only one COA, or if he chooses  
2099 one COA during the war game, no COA comparison is needed. If multiple  
2100 COAs have been war-gamed and the commander has not made a decision, the  
2101 staff must perform a COA comparison (see paragraphs 3-170–3-174).  
2102 Limiting the evaluation criteria and weighting factors is the only significant  
2103 shortcut in this step.

2104 **Course of Action Approval**

2105 3-227. If the commander has observed and participated in the planning  
2106 process the commander can make an immediate decision at the end of COA  
2107 comparison. If the commander has not participated in the process or has not  
2108 made a decision, a decision briefing is required. Good COA comparison charts  
2109 and sketches help the commander visualize and distinguish among the COAs.  
2110 The staff ensures all COAs are complete, with tentative task organizations,  
2111 concepts of operations, and tasks and purposes for each subordinate unit.  
2112 Time can also be saved by limiting the COA briefing to only the decisive  
2113 operation or critical points. If only one COA was developed, no decision is  
2114 required, unless the developed COA becomes unsuitable, infeasible, or  
2115 unacceptable. If this occurs, the staff develops another COA.

2116 **Orders Production**

2117 3-228. In a time-constrained environment, time is important and a verbal  
2118 FRAGO may be issued immediately after the commander makes a COA  
2119 decision. The staff follows the verbal FRAGO with a written order as soon as  
2120 possible. If a verbal order is not issued, the staff immediately sends out a  
2121 WARNO, followed as quickly as possible by a written order. In all cases, the  
2122 staff captures all the information in any verbal orders and WARNOs, and  
2123 produces a written order to follow up on any previously issued orders.

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<sup>1</sup> Patton, p. 399.

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## Chapter 4

# Troop Leading Procedures

*In every operation there must run from the highest to the lowest unit the sturdy life form of a guiding idea; from this will be spun the intricate web that binds an army into an invincible unit embodying a single thought and a single goal.<sup>1</sup>*

*Infantry in Battle, 1939*

Troop leading procedures (TLP) provide small unit leaders a framework for planning and preparing for operations. This chapter describes the relationship of TLP to the military decision making process. It includes a discussion of parallel planning. The remainder of this chapter describes the eight TLP steps.

### TROOP LEADING PROCEDURES AND THE MILITARY DECISION MAKING PROCESS

4-1. As a rule, company-level and smaller units do not have formal staffs. Nonetheless, leaders of companies, platoons, squads, and sections all plan for missions. They use key members of their organization to help them plan. For example, an infantry company commander may use his executive officer, first sergeant, fire support officer, supply sergeant, and communications sergeant to develop portions of a plan. To assist them in planning and preparing for operations, small unit leaders use troop leading procedures (TLP). **Troop leading procedures are a sequence of activities used by small unit leaders to plan and prepare for operations.** They enable small unit leaders to maximize available planning time while developing effective plans and adequately preparing their unit for an operation.

4-2. TLP extend the military decision making process (MDMP) to small unit level. Where the MDMP provides a structure for interaction between a commander and staff, TLP prescribe a sequence of activities for planning and preparing for operations. While the two processes are similar, they are not identical. TLP and the MDMP are linked by information flow. The type,

CONTENTS	
<b>Troop Leading Procedures and the Military Decision Making Process</b> .....	<b>4-1</b>
<b>Performing Troop Leading Procedures</b> .....	<b>4-4</b>
<b>Receive the Mission</b> .....	<b>4-4</b>
<b>Issue a Warning Order</b> .....	<b>4-5</b>
<b>Make a Tentative Plan</b> .....	<b>4-5</b>
<b>Initiate Movement</b> .....	<b>4-12</b>
<b>Conduct Reconnaissance</b> .....	<b>4-12</b>
<b>Complete the Plan</b> .....	<b>4-12</b>
<b>Issue the Order</b> .....	<b>4-12</b>
<b>Supervise and Assess</b> .....	<b>4-13</b>

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amount, and timeliness of the information passed from higher to lower headquarters directly impact the lower unit leader's TLP.

4-3. Figure 4-1 illustrates the parallel sequences of the MDMP and TLP. However, events do not always occur in the order shown. For example, TLP may start with receipt of an operation order (OPORD). Warning orders (WARNOs) may arrive at any time. Army leaders remain flexible. They adapt TLP to fit the situation rather than try to alter the situation to fit a preconceived idea of how events should flow.




Figure 4-1. Parallel Sequences of the MDMP and TLP

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4-4. Army leaders adapt the TLP steps to the situation, based on their experience and the experience of their subordinates. Normally the first three steps (receive the mission, issue a WARNO, and make a tentative plan) occur in order. However, the sequence of subsequent steps is based on the situation. The tasks involved in some steps (for example, initiate movement and conduct reconnaissance) may occur several times. The last step, supervise, occurs throughout. In some situations, time constraints or other factors may prevent Army leaders from performing each step as thoroughly as they would like.

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4-5. As a headquarters performs the MDMP, it normally issues at least three WARNOs: upon receipt of mission, upon completion of mission analysis, and when the commander approves a course of action (COA). However, the number of WARNOs is not fixed. WARNOs serve a function in planning similar to that of fragmentary orders (FRAGOs) during execution. Commanders may issue a WARNO whenever they need to disseminate

54 additional planning information or initiate necessary preparatory action,  
55 such as movement or reconnaissance.

56 4-6. The first WARNO normally contains minimal information. It alerts  
57 leaders that a new mission is pending. This WARNO normally contains the  
58 following information:

- 59 • Type of operation.
- 60 • General location of the operation.
- 61 • Reconnaissance to initiate.
- 62 • Movement to initiate.
- 63 • Initial time line.

64 4-7. The WARNO issued at the end of mission analysis contains essential  
65 information for planning, and directives to initiate movements and  
66 reconnaissance. Typically it includes—

- 67 • Terrain analysis and associated products.
- 68 • Enemy composition, disposition, and strength.
- 69 • Higher headquarters restated mission.
- 70 • Commander's intent.
- 71 • Area of operations (AO) and area of interest.
- 72 • Commander's critical information requirements (CCIR).
- 73 • Essential elements of enemy information (EEFI).
- 74 • Risk guidance.
- 75 • Reconnaissance to initiate.
- 76 • Security measures.
- 77 • Mobility/countermobility guidance.
- 78 • Priorities.
- 79 • Revised time line.
- 80 • Guidance on rehearsals.

81 4-8. The WARNO issued after COA approval normally contains—

- 82 • The higher headquarters mission.
- 83 • Concept of operations.
- 84 • AO.
- 85 • Principal tasks assigned to subordinate units.
- 86 • Preparation and rehearsal instructions not included in standing  
87 operating procedures (SOP).
- 88 • Final time line for the operation.

89 4-9. Army leaders begin TLP when they receive the initial WARNO or  
90 perceive a new mission. As each subsequent order arrives, leaders modify  
91 their assessments, update tentative plans, and continue to supervise and  
92 assess preparations. In some situations, the higher headquarters may not  
93 issue the full sequence of WARNOs; security considerations or tempo may  
94 make it impractical. Commanders carefully consider decisions to eliminate  
95 WARNOs. Subordinate units must always have enough information to plan  
96 and prepare for the operation. In other cases, Army leaders may initiate TLP

97 before receiving a WARNO based on existing plans and orders (contingency  
 98 plans or be-prepared missions), and an understanding of the situation.

99 4-10. Parallel planning hinges on distributing information as it is received or  
 100 developed (see Chapter 1). Army leaders cannot complete their plans until  
 101 they receive their unit mission. If each successive WARNO contains enough  
 102 information, the higher headquarters' final order will confirm what subord-  
 103 inate leaders have already analyzed and put into their tentative plan. In  
 104 other cases, the higher headquarters order may change or modify the subord-  
 105 inate's tasks enough that additional planning and reconnaissance is required.

106 **PERFORMING TROOP LEADING PROCEDURES**

107 4-11. TLP provide small unit leaders a  
 108 framework for planning and preparing for  
 109 operations. This section discusses each  
 110 TLP step.

<p><b>Troop Leading                  Procedure Steps</b></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Receive the mission</li> <li>2. Issue a warning order</li> <li>3. Make a tentative plan</li> <li>4. Initiate movement</li> <li>5. Conduct reconnaissance</li> <li>6. Complete the plan</li> <li>7. Issue the order</li> <li>8. Supervise and assess</li> </ol>
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111 **RECEIVE THE MISSION**

112 4-12. Receipt of a mission may occur in  
 113 several ways. It may begin with the initial  
 114 WARNO or when an Army leader receives  
 115 an OPORD. Frequently, leaders receive a  
 116 mission in a FRAGO over the radio.  
 117 Ideally, they receive a series of WARNOs,  
 118 the OPORD, and a briefing from their commander.

119 4-13. Upon receipt of mission, Army leaders perform an initial assessment of  
 120 the situation and allocate the time available for planning and preparation.  
 121 (Preparation includes rehearsals and movement.) This initial assessment and  
 122 time allocation form the basis of their initial WARNO. Army leaders issue the  
 123 initial WARNO quickly to give subordinates as much time as possible to plan  
 124 and prepare.

125 **Perform an Initial Assessment**

126 4-14. The initial assessment addresses the factors of METT-TC (mission,  
 127 enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available,  
 128 and civil considerations). The order and detail in which Army leaders analyze  
 129 the factors of METT-TC is flexible. It depends on the amount of information  
 130 available and the relative importance of each factor. For example, they may  
 131 concentrate on the mission, enemy, and terrain, leaving weather and civil  
 132 considerations until they receive more detailed information.

133 4-15. Often, Army leaders will not receive their final unit mission until the  
 134 WARNO disseminated after COA approval or the OPORD. Effective leaders  
 135 do not wait until their higher headquarters completes planning to begin their  
 136 planning. Using all information available, Army leaders develop their unit  
 137 mission as completely as they can. They focus on the mission, commander's  
 138 intent, and concept of operations of their higher and next higher head-  
 139 quarters. They pick out the major tasks their unit will probably be assigned  
 140 and develop a mission statement based on information they have received. At  
 141 this stage, the mission may be incomplete. For example, an initial mission

142 statement could be, “First platoon conducts an ambush in the next 24 hours.”  
143 While not complete, this information allows subordinates to start prepara-  
144 tions. During TLP steps three and six leaders complete a formal mission  
145 statement.

#### 146 **Allocate the Available Time**

147 4-16. Based on what they know, Army leaders estimate the time available to  
148 plan and prepare for the mission. They begin by identifying the times at  
149 which major planning and preparation events, including rehearsals, must be  
150 complete. Reverse planning helps them do this. Army leaders identify the  
151 critical times specified by higher headquarters and work back from them,  
152 estimating how much time each event will consume. Critical times might  
153 include aircraft loading times, the LD (line of departure) time, or the SP  
154 (start point) time for movement. By working backwards, Army leaders arrive  
155 at the time available to plan and prepare for the operation. They limit the  
156 amount of this time that they use to one-third. They allocate the remaining  
157 two-thirds of it to subordinates.

#### 158 **ISSUE A WARNING ORDER**

159 4-17. As soon as Army leaders finish their initial assessment of the situation  
160 and available time, they issue a WARNO. The WARNO contains as much  
161 detail as possible. It informs subordinates of the unit mission and gives them  
162 the leader’s time line. Army leaders may also pass on any other instructions  
163 or information they think will help subordinates prepare for the new mission.  
164 This includes information on the enemy, the nature of the higher headquart-  
165 ers plan, and any specific instructions for preparing their units. The most im-  
166 portant thing is that leaders not delay in issuing the initial WARNO. As more  
167 information becomes available, leaders can—and should—issue additional  
168 WARNOs. By issuing the initial WARNO as quickly as possible, Army lead-  
169 ers enable their subordinates to begin their own planning and preparation.

170 4-18. WARNOs follow the five-paragraph OPORD format (see Figure G-7  
171 [page G-36). Normally an initial WARNO issued below battalion level  
172 includes—

- 173 • Mission or nature of the operation.
- 174 • Time and place for issuing the OPORD.
- 175 • Units or elements participating in the operation.
- 176 • Specific tasks not addressed by unit SOP.
- 177 • Time line for the operation.

#### 178 **MAKE A TENTATIVE PLAN**

179 4-19. Once they have issued the initial WARNO, Army leaders develop a  
180 tentative plan. This step combines MDMP steps 2 thorough 6: mission analy-  
181 sis, COA development, COA analysis, COA comparison, and COA approval.  
182 At levels below battalion, these steps are less structured than for units with  
183 staffs. Often, leaders perform them mentally. They may include their  
184 principal subordinates—especially during COA development, analysis, and  
185 comparison. However, Army leaders, not their subordinates, select the COA  
186 on which to base the tentative plan.

187 **Mission Analysis**

188 4-20. To frame the tentative plan, Army leaders perform a mission analysis.  
189 This mission analysis follows the METT-TC format, continuing the initial  
190 assessment performed in TLP step one. (FM 6-0, *Command and Control*  
191 discusses the factors of METT-TC.)

192 4-21. **Mission.** Army leaders analyze the WARNO to determine how their  
193 unit contributes to the higher headquarters mission. They examine the  
194 following information that affects their mission:

- 195 • **Higher headquarters mission and commander's intent.** Army  
196 leaders determine the mission and commander's intent of their higher  
197 and next higher headquarters. When these are unavailable, Army  
198 leaders infer them based on the information they have. When they  
199 receive the actual mission and commander's intent, they revise their  
200 plan, if necessary.
- 201 • **Higher headquarters concept of operations.** Army leaders  
202 examine the concept of operations to determine how their unit's  
203 mission and tasks contribute to the higher mission's success. They  
204 determine details that will affect their operations, such as control  
205 measures and execution times.
- 206 • **Specified, implied, and essential tasks.** From WARNOs and the  
207 OPOD, Army leaders extract the specified and implied tasks assigned  
208 to their unit. They determine why each task was assigned to their unit  
209 to understand how it fits within the commander's intent and concept of  
210 operations. From the specified and implied tasks, Army leaders  
211 identify essential tasks. These tasks must be completed to accomplish  
212 the mission. Failure to complete an essential task results in mission  
213 failure.
- 214 • **Constraints.** Army leaders also identify any constraints placed on  
215 their unit. Constraints can take the form of a requirement to do  
216 something (for example, Maintain a reserve of one company) or a  
217 prohibition on action (for example, No reconnaissance forward of Line  
218 Bravo before H-hour).

219 4-22. The product of this part of the mission analysis is the restated mission.  
220 The restated mission is a simple, concise expression of the essential tasks the  
221 unit must accomplish and the purpose to be achieved. The mission statement  
222 states who (the unit), what (the task), when (either the critical time or on  
223 order), where (location), and why (the purpose of the operation).

224 4-23. **Enemy.** With the restated mission as the focus, Army leaders continue  
225 the analysis with the enemy. For small unit operations, Army leaders need to  
226 know about the enemy's composition, disposition, strength, recent activities,  
227 ability to reinforce, and possible COAs. Much of this information comes from  
228 higher headquarters. Additional information comes from adjacent units and  
229 other Army leaders. Some information comes from the leader's experience.  
230 Army leaders determine how available information applies to their operation.  
231 They also determine what they do not know about the enemy, but should.  
232 They identify these intelligence gaps to their higher headquarters or take  
233 action (such as sending out reconnaissance patrols) to obtain the necessary  
234 information.

235 4-24. **Terrain and Weather.** This aspect of mission analysis addresses the  
236 military aspects of terrain (known by the memory aid, OAKOC):

- 237 • **Observation and fields of fire.** *Observation* is the condition of  
238 weather and terrain that permits a force to see the friendly, enemy,  
239 and neutral personnel and systems, and key aspects of the environ-  
240 ment (FM 6-0, *Command and Control*). A *field of fire* is the area that a  
241 weapon or group of weapons may cover effectively from a given position  
242 (FM 6-0). Observation and fields of fire apply to both enemy and  
243 friendly weapons. Army leaders consider direct-fire weapons and the  
244 ability of observers to mass and adjust indirect fire.
- 245 • **Avenues of approach.** An *avenue of approach* is the air or ground  
246 route leading to an objective (or key terrain in its path) that an  
247 attacking force can use (FM 6-0). Avenues of approach include  
248 overland, air, and underground avenues. Underground avenues are  
249 particularly important in urban operations.
- 250 • **Key terrain.** *Key terrain* is any locality or area, the seizure or  
251 retention of which affords a marked advantage to either combatant in a  
252 given course of action (FM 6-0). Terrain adjacent to the AO may be key  
253 if its control is necessary to accomplish the mission.
- 254 • **Obstacles.** *Obstacles* are any physical characteristics of the terrain  
255 that impede the mobility of a force (FM 6-0). Obstacles include natural  
256 features, man-made structures, and military reinforcing obstacles, such  
257 as minefields.
- 258 • **Cover and concealment.** *Cover* is protection from the effects of fires  
259 (FM 6-0). *Concealment* is protection from observation and surveillance  
260 (FM 6-0). Terrain that offers cover and concealment limits fields of fire.  
261 Army leaders consider friendly and enemy perspectives.

262 Although remembered as separate elements, in practice Army leaders  
263 consider the military aspects of terrain together.

264 4-25. There are five military aspects of weather: visibility, winds, precipita-  
265 tion, cloud cover, and temperature/humidity (see FM 2-01.3 *Intelligence*  
266 *Preparation of the Battlefield*). The consideration of their effects is an impor-  
267 tant part of the mission analysis. Army leaders review the forecasts and con-  
268 clusions available from higher headquarters and develop their own conclu-  
269 sions on the effects of weather on the mission. The analysis considers the  
270 effects on soldiers, equipment, and supporting forces, such as air and artillery  
271 support. Army leaders identify the aspects of weather that can affect the  
272 mission. They focus on factors whose effects they can mitigate. For example,  
273 Army leaders may modify SOP uniform and carrying loads based on the  
274 temperature. Small unit leaders include instructions on mitigating weather  
275 effects in their tentative plan. They check for compliance during preparation,  
276 especially during rehearsals.

277 4-26. **Troops and Support Available.** Perhaps the most important aspect  
278 of mission analysis is determining the combat potential of one's own force.  
279 Army leaders know the status of their soldiers' morale, their experience and  
280 training, and the strengths and weaknesses of subordinate leaders. They  
281 realistically and unemotionally determine all available resources. This  
282 includes troops attached to or in direct support of the unit. The assessment  
283 includes knowing the strength and status of soldiers and their equipment. It

284 also includes understanding the full array of assets in support of the unit.  
 285 Army leaders know, for example, how much indirect fire, by type, is available  
 286 and when it will become available. They consider any new limitations based  
 287 on level of training or recent fighting.

288 **4-27. Time Available.** Army leaders not only appreciate how much time is  
 289 available; they understand the time-space aspects of preparing, moving,  
 290 fighting, and sustaining. They view their own tasks and enemy actions in  
 291 relation to time. They know how long it takes under such conditions to  
 292 prepare for certain tasks (such as, orders production, rehearsals, and  
 293 subordinate element preparations). Most important, Army leaders monitor  
 294 the time available. As events occur, they assess their impact on the unit time  
 295 line and update previous time lines for their subordinates. Time lines list all  
 296 events that affect the unit and its subordinate elements.

297 **4-28. Civil Considerations.** *Civil considerations* are how the man-made  
 298 infrastructure, civilian institutions, and attitudes and activities of the  
 299 civilian leaders, populations, and organizations within an area of operations  
 300 influence the conduct of military operations (FM 6-0, *Command and Control*).  
 301 Only rarely are military operations conducted in uninhabited areas. Most of  
 302 the time, units are surrounded by noncombatants. These noncombatants  
 303 include residents of the AO, local officials, and governmental and  
 304 nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). Based on information from higher  
 305 headquarters and their own knowledge and judgment, Army leaders identify  
 306 civil considerations that affect their mission. Civil considerations are  
 307 analyzed in terms of six factors (known by the memory aid ASCOPE):

- 308 • Areas.
- 309 • Structures.
- 310 • Capabilities.
- 311 • Organizations.
- 312 • People.
- 313 • Events.

314 FM 6-0 discusses these factors in detail.

### 315 **Course of Action Development**

317 4-29. Mission analysis pro-  
 318 vides information needed to  
 319 develop COAs. The purpose of  
 320 COA development is simple: to  
 321 determine one or more ways to  
 322 accomplish the mission. At low-  
 323 er echelons, the mission may  
 324 be a single task. Most missions  
 325 and tasks can be accomplished  
 326 in more than one way. How-  
 327 ever, in a time-constrained environment, Army leaders may develop only one  
 328 COA. Normally, they develop two or more. Army leaders do not wait for a  
 329 complete order before beginning COA development. They develop COAs as  
 330 soon as they have enough information to do so.

**COA Development**

1. Analyze relative combat power
2. Generate options
3. Array forces
4. Develop the scheme of maneuver
5. Assign responsibilities
6. Prepare COA statement and sketch

340 4-30. Usable COAs are suitable, feasible, acceptable, distinguishable, and  
341 complete. *Suitable* means the COA will accomplish the mission consistent  
342 with the higher commander's intent and concept of operations. *Feasible*  
343 means the unit has the technical and tactical skills and resources to suc-  
344 cessfully conduct (plan, prepare, execute and assess) the COA. *Acceptable*  
345 means the COA minimizes friendly casualties and positions the unit for  
346 future operations. *Distinguishable* means the COA is different enough from  
347 the others to justify separate consideration. *Complete* means the COA shows  
348 how the decisive operation accomplishes the mission and how shaping  
349 operations create and preserve conditions for the success of the decisive  
350 operation. A complete COA also includes how sustaining operations enable  
351 the shaping and decisive operations. Army leaders make each COA detailed  
352 enough to describe clearly how they plan to accomplish the mission. To  
353 develop a COA, leaders focus on the actions the unit must take at the  
354 objective and reverse plan to the starting point.

355 4-31. **Analyze Relative Combat Power.** During this step, Army leaders  
356 determine whether the unit has enough combat power to defeat the force  
357 against which it is arrayed by comparing the combat power of friendly and  
358 enemy forces. Army leaders seek to determine where, when, and how friendly  
359 combat power (the effects of maneuver, firepower, protection, leadership, and  
360 information) can overwhelm the enemy. It is a particularly difficult process if  
361 the unit is fighting a dissimilar unit (for example, if the unit is attacking or  
362 defending against an enemy mechanized force as opposed to a similarly  
363 equipped light infantry force). Below battalion level, relative combat power  
364 comparisons are very rough and generally rely on professional judgment  
365 instead of numerical analysis.

366 4-32. **Generate Options.** Army leaders first identify where and when the  
367 unit can mass overwhelming combat power to achieve specific results (with  
368 respect to terrain, enemy, or time) that accomplish the mission. Then they  
369 determine the doctrinal requirements for the operation. These normally  
370 include the tactical tasks to assign to subordinate units. Doctrinal  
371 requirements give Army leaders a framework from which to develop COAs.

372 4-33. Army leaders begin with the specified, implied, and essential tasks  
373 identified during mission analysis. They identify their decisive operation  
374 based on their essential and specified tasks. *Decisive operations* are those  
375 that directly accomplish the task assigned by the higher headquarters (FM 3-  
376 0, *Operations*). Then they examine tasks that make the decisive operation  
377 possible. These become shaping operations. *Shaping operations* at any  
378 echelon create and preserve conditions for the success of the decisive  
379 operation (FM 3-0). Army leaders then determine the resupply, maintenance,  
380 and medical support each operation requires. The operations that provide  
381 this support become *sustaining operations*.

382 4-34. Here is an example of generating options: A platoon receives the  
383 mission to secure and search a suspected terrorist hideout located in a house  
384 in a residential area. The platoon leader determines that entering and  
385 clearing the structure is the decisive operation. In order to do that, the  
386 platoon must accomplish the following tasks:

- 387 • Cordon off the residence.

- 388 • Establish blocking positions with antiarmor weapons on the likely
- 389 high-speed avenues of approach to the house.
- 390 • Provide a sniper element in overwatch.
- 391 • Prepare to secure and evacuate prisoners.

392 These tasks are shaping operations for the platoon. They create and preserve  
393 the conditions needed for the assault elements to enter and search the house.  
394 The platoon leader also considers casualty evacuation and resupply of water,  
395 ammunition, batteries and fuel, in case the operation takes longer than  
396 expected. These tasks become sustaining operations.

397 4-35. Below platoon level, Army leaders do not consider decisive, shaping, or  
398 sustaining operations. At these levels Army leaders are assigned tasks. In the  
399 example above, the platoon leader determines decisive, shaping, and  
400 sustaining operations. Squad leaders, however, do not. They consider the  
401 tasks that their element must accomplish, and in what sequence. These  
402 leaders do determine what their unit must do to create conditions necessary  
403 to accomplish the task and what support they require. They identify support  
404 requirements to their leader and incorporate actions that create the  
405 necessary conditions into their plan.

406 4-36. **Array Forces.** The unit leader then determines what combinations of  
407 soldiers, weapons, and other systems must be at each location to accomplish  
408 each task. Returning to the previous example, the platoon leader might  
409 determine that the entry and search task required two teams, each with an  
410 assault and support element. The security element at each roadblock requires  
411 either a light antitank weapon or a 40mm grenade launcher with dual-  
412 purpose ammunition. The prisoner element requires at least four soldiers:  
413 two to search and secure, two to guard. The sniper element, if used, needs  
414 two soldiers and requires a clear field of fire to the upper stories. Often  
415 arraying forces indicates that the leader does not have enough forces to  
416 accomplish the mission without risk. Army leaders assess the degree of risk  
417 for each COA. They consider the risk associated with each COA when they  
418 compare them. Occasionally, the analysis indicates such a mismatch of forces  
419 and tasks that the force cannot accomplish the mission. In those cases, higher  
420 headquarters must provide additional forces or change the tasks assigned to  
421 the unit.

422 4-37. **Develop a Concept of Operations.** The concept of operations  
423 describes how the leader envisions the operation unfolding, from its start to  
424 its conclusion or end state. They determine how accomplishing each task  
425 leads to executing the next. They identify the best ways to use available  
426 terrain and how best to employ unit strengths against enemy weaknesses.  
427 Fire support considerations make up an important part of the concept of  
428 operations. Even if fires are only executed in case of emergency, Army leaders  
429 keep in mind the relationship between maneuver and fires. Army leaders  
430 develop the graphic control measures necessary to convey and enhance the  
431 understanding of the concept of operations, prevent fratricide, and clarify the  
432 tasks and purposes of the decisive and shaping operations.

433 4-38. **Assign Responsibilities.** Army leaders assign responsibility for each  
434 task to a subordinate. Whenever possible, they depend on the existing chain  
435 of command. They avoid fracturing unit integrity unless the number of

436 simultaneous tasks exceeds the number of available elements. The platoon  
437 leader in the example has a problem. He knows he needs a sniper team to  
438 overwatch the entry. However, all three squads are committed to other tasks:  
439 entry, prisoners, and roadblocks. He considers two COAs: co-locate the sniper  
440 with the platoon leader, or take another junior leader from a squad and as-  
441 sign the sniper to the leader as a temporary element. METT-TC and the pla-  
442 toon leader's knowledge of his soldiers guide the choice. Different command  
443 and control arrangements may be the distinguishing feature among COAs.

444 **4-39. Prepare a COA Statement and Sketch.** Army leaders base the COA  
445 statement on the concept of operations for that COA. The COA statement  
446 focuses on all significant actions, from the start of the COA to its finish.  
447 Whenever possible, Army leaders prepare a sketch showing each COA.  
448 Another useful technique is to show the time it takes to achieve each  
449 movement and task in the COA sketch. Doing this helps gain an appreciation  
450 for how much time will pass as each task of the COA is executed. The COA  
451 statement states the—

- 452 • Decisive operation and why it is decisive.
- 453 • Form of maneuver or defensive technique to be used.
- 454 • Tasks and purposes of the decisive and shaping operations.
- 455 • Task and purpose of critical battlefield operating system elements.
- 456 • Necessary sustaining operations.
- 457 • End state.

458 A sample COA statement and sketch is located in Figure 3-11 (page 3-31).

#### 459 **Analyze Courses of Action (War Game)**

460 4-40. For each COA, Army leaders think through the operation from start to  
461 finish. They compare each COA with the enemy's most probable COA. At  
462 small unit level, the enemy's most probable COA is what the enemy is most  
463 likely to do, given what friendly forces are doing at that instant. The leader  
464 visualizes a set of actions and reactions. The object is to determine what can  
465 go wrong and what decision the leader will likely have to make as a result. To  
466 return to the example: The platoon leader considers not only the likely  
467 immediate threat (two or three terrorists in the house), but also likely enemy  
468 reactions to the platoon's operations. The platoon may be attacked by  
469 machine gun fire from lightly armored vehicles in firing positions up or down  
470 the road. The objective house may contain more enemy and equipment than  
471 intelligence has indicated. Both these cases constitute "what if?" factors that  
472 the platoon leader considers when war-gaming the different COAs.

#### 473 **Compare COAs and Make a Decision**

474 4-41. Army leaders compare COAs by weighing the advantages, disadvan-  
475 tages, strengths, and weaknesses of each, as noted during the war game.  
476 They take into account the—

- 477 • Time of the operation.
- 478 • AO.
- 479 • Concept of operations.
- 480 • Subordinate unit tasks and purposes.

- 481                   • Results from unit reconnaissance.
- 482                   • Reconnaissance and security operations by higher headquarters.
- 483           They decide which COA to execute based on this comparison and on their
- 484           professional judgment.

485   **INITIATE MOVEMENT**

486           4-42. Army leaders initiate any movement necessary to continue mission  
487           preparation or position the unit for execution, sometimes before making a  
488           tentative plan. They do this as soon as they have enough information to do so,  
489           especially when the unit must move to position itself for a task or time is  
490           short. Movements may be to an assembly area, a battle position, a new AO, or  
491           an attack position. They may include movement of reconnaissance elements,  
492           guides, or quartering parties. Army leaders often initiate movement based on  
493           their tentative plan and issue the order to subordinates in the new location.

494   **CONDUCT RECONNAISSANCE**

495           4-43. Whenever time and circumstances allow, Army leaders personally  
496           reconnoiter the AO for the mission. No amount of intelligence preparation of  
497           the battlefield (IPB) can substitute for firsthand assessment of METT-TC  
498           from within the AO. Unfortunately, many factors can keep leaders from  
499           performing a personal reconnaissance. The minimum action necessary is a  
500           thorough map reconnaissance, supplemented by imagery and intelligence  
501           products. In some cases, subordinates or other elements (such as scouts) may  
502           perform the reconnaissance for the leader while the leader completes other  
503           TLP steps.

504           4-44. Army leaders use the results of the war game to identify information  
505           requirements. Reconnaissance operations seek to confirm or deny information  
506           that supports the tentative plan. They focus first on information gaps  
507           identified during mission analysis. Army leaders ensure their leader's  
508           reconnaissance complements the higher headquarters reconnaissance plan.  
509           The unit may conduct additional reconnaissance operations as the situation  
510           allows. This step may also precede making a tentative plan if there is not  
511           enough information available to begin planning. Reconnaissance may be the  
512           only way to develop the information required for planning.

513   **COMPLETE THE PLAN**

514           4-45. During this step, Army leaders incorporate the result of reconnaissance  
515           into their selected COA to complete the order. This includes preparing  
516           overlays, refining the indirect fire target list, coordinating combat service  
517           support and command and control requirements, and updating the tentative  
518           plan as a result of the reconnaissance. At lower levels, this step may entail  
519           only confirming or updating information contained in the tentative plan. If  
520           time allows, Army leaders make final coordination with adjacent units and  
521           higher headquarters before issuing the order.

522   **ISSUE THE ORDER**

523           4-46. Small unit orders are normally issued orally and supplemented by  
524           graphics and other control measures. The order follows the standard five-

525 paragraph format OPORD format (see Figure G-2 [page G-20]). Typically,  
526 Army leaders below company level do not issue a commander's intent. They  
527 reiterate the intent of their higher and next higher commander.

528 4-47. The ideal location for issuing the order is a point in the AO with a view  
529 of the objective and other aspects of the terrain. The leader may perform a  
530 leader's reconnaissance, complete the order, and then summon subordinates  
531 to a specified location to receive it. Sometimes security or other constraints  
532 make it infeasible to issue the order on the terrain; then Army leaders use a  
533 sand table, detailed sketch, maps, and other products to depict the AO and  
534 situation.

### 535 SUPERVISE AND ASSESS

536 4-48. Throughout TLP, Army leaders monitor mission preparations, refine  
537 the plan, perform coordination with adjacent units, and supervise and assess  
538 preparations. Normally unit SOPs state individual responsibilities and the  
539 sequence of preparation activities. Army leaders supervise subordinates and  
540 inspect their personnel and equipment to ensure the unit is ready for the  
541 mission.

542 4-49. A crucial component of preparation is the rehearsal. Rehearsals allow  
543 Army leaders to assess their subordinates' preparations. They may identify  
544 areas that require more supervision. Army leaders conduct rehearsals to—

- 545 • Practice essential tasks.
- 546 • Identify weaknesses or problems in the plan.
- 547 • Coordinate subordinate element actions.
- 548 • Improve soldier understanding of the concept of operations.
- 549 • Foster confidence among soldiers.

550 4-50. Company and smaller sized units use five types of rehearsals:

- 551 • Confirmation brief.
- 552 • Back-brief.
- 553 • Combined arms rehearsal.
- 554 • Support rehearsal.
- 555 • Battle drill or SOP rehearsal.

556 See FM 6-0 for more information on rehearsals.

### 557 Confirmation Brief

558 4-51. Immediately after receiving the order, subordinate leaders brief their  
559 superior on the order they just received. They brief their understanding of the  
560 commander's intent, the specific tasks they have been assigned and their  
561 purposes, and the relationship of their tasks to those of other elements  
562 conducting the operation. They repeat any important coordinating measures  
563 specified in the order. The confirmation brief is normally used with other  
564 types of rehearsal.

### 565 Back-brief

566 4-52. The back-brief differs from the confirmation brief in that subordinate  
567 leaders are given time to complete their plan. Back-briefs require the fewest

568 resources and are often the only option under time-constrained conditions.  
569 Subordinate leaders explain their actions from start to finish of the mission.  
570 Back-briefs are performed sequentially, with all leaders going over their  
571 tasks. When time is available, back-briefs can be combined with other types  
572 of rehearsals. Doing this lets all element leaders coordinate their plans before  
573 performing more elaborate drills. If possible, back-briefs are performed  
574 overlooking subordinates' AOs, after they have developed their own plans.

### 575 **Combined Arms Rehearsal**

576 4-53. A combined arms rehearsal requires considerable resources, but  
577 provides the most planning and training benefit. Depending on  
578 circumstances, units may conduct a reduced force or full dress rehearsal.

579 4-54. **Reduced Force.** Circumstances may prohibit a rehearsal with all  
580 members of the unit. Unit leaders and other key individuals may perform a  
581 rehearsal, while most of their subordinates continue to prepare for the opera-  
582 tion. Often, smaller scale replicas of terrain or buildings substitute for the  
583 actual AO. Army leaders not only explain their plans, but also walk through  
584 their actions or move replicas across the rehearsal area or sand table. This is  
585 called a "rock drill." It reinforces the back-brief given by subordinates, since  
586 everyone can see the concept of operations and sequence of tasks.

587 4-55. **Full Dress.** The preferred rehearsal technique is a full dress rehearsal.  
588 Army leaders rehearse their subordinates on terrain similar to the AO,  
589 initially under good light conditions, and then in limited visibility. Small unit  
590 actions are repeated until executed to standard. Full dress rehearsals help  
591 soldiers to clearly understand what is expected of them. It helps them gain  
592 confidence in their ability to accomplish the mission. Supporting elements,  
593 such as aviation crews, meet soldiers and rehearse with them. An important  
594 benefit is the opportunity to synchronize the operation. Full dress rehearsals  
595 may be conducted by the unit. They also may be conducted and supported by  
596 the higher headquarters.

### 597 **Support Rehearsals**

598 4-56. At any point in TLP, units may rehearse their support for an operation.  
599 For small units, this typically involves coordination and procedure drills for  
600 aviation, fire, combat service, or engineer support. Support rehearsals and  
601 combined arms rehearsals complement preparations for the operation. They  
602 may be conducted separately and then combined into full dress rehearsals.

### 603 **Battle Drills or SOP Rehearsal**

604 4-57. A *battle drill* is a collective action rapidly executed without applying a  
605 deliberate decision making process (see FM 7-1, *Battle Focused Training*).  
606 Throughout preparation, units rehearse battle drills and SOP actions. These  
607 rehearsals do not need a completed order from higher headquarters. Army  
608 leaders place priority on those drills or actions they anticipate occurring  
609 during the operation. For example, a transportation platoon may rehearse a  
610 battle drill on reacting to an ambush while awaiting the movement order.

611 4-58. Army leaders refine their plan based on continuing analysis of their  
612 mission and updated intelligence. Most important, Army leaders know that

613 they create plans to ensure all their subordinates focus on accomplishing the  
614 same mission within the commander's intent. If required, they can deviate  
615 from the plan and execute changes based on battlefield conditions and the  
616 enemy. Army leaders oversee preparations for operations. These include in-  
617 spections, coordination, reorganization, fire support and engineer activities,  
618 maintenance, resupply, and movement. The requirement to supervise is con-  
619 tinuous; it is as important as issuing orders. Supervision allows Army leaders  
620 to assess their subordinates' understanding of their orders and determine  
621 where additional guidance is needed. It is crucial to effective preparation.

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<sup>1</sup>*Infantry In Battle*, Reprinted by the US Army Center for Military History (Washington, DC, 1997)  
p.139.

1 **Appendix A**

2 **Staff Studies and Decision Papers**

3 Staff studies and decision papers are means to present recommendations  
4 for solving problems. Both are complete, coordinated staff actions that  
5 include the documents needed to implement their recommendations. This  
6 appendix discusses how to prepare them. It includes formats for both. The  
7 staff study and decision paper formats parallel the Army problem solving  
8 steps discussed in Chapter 2.

9 **STAFF STUDIES**

10 A-1. A staff study is a formal report of the methodology and information used  
11 to solve a problem or answer a question. It requests the decision maker to act  
12 on its recommendation and provides the required implementing documents  
13 for signature. It is coordinated with all affected organizations and includes  
14 any statements of nonconcurrence and the corresponding considerations of  
15 nonconcurrence. A staff study is comprehensive: it includes all relevant  
16 information gathered while solving the problem and a complete description of  
17 the methodology used to arrive at the recommended solution.

18 A-2. The body of a completed staff study is a stand-alone document. While  
19 annexes are a part of most staff studies, readers should not need to refer to  
20 them to understand the recommendation and the basis for it. Annexes  
21 contain details and supporting information. They are used to keep the body of  
22 the study concise.

23 **THE STAFF STUDY FORMAT**

24 A-3. Prepare staff studies as informal memorandums (see AR 25-50) in the  
25 format at Figure A-1 (page A-2). This format parallels the first five steps of  
26 Army problem solving. Commands and other agencies often establish format  
27 standards to meet local requirements.

28 **Memorandum For**

29 A-4. Address the staff study to the decision maker. Include thru addressees  
30 here or on the routing slip, as specified by command policy.

<b>CONTENTS</b>	
<b>Staff Studies .....</b>	<b>A-1</b>
<b>The Staff Study Format.....</b>	<b>A-1</b>
<b>Coordinating Staff Studies.....</b>	<b>A-6</b>
<b>Common Problems of Staff Studies.....</b>	<b>A-7</b>
<b>Decision Papers .....</b>	<b>A-7</b>

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Office Symbol (Marks Number)	Date												
<b>MEMORANDUM FOR</b>													
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<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. <b>PROBLEM.</b></li> <li>2. <b>RECOMMENDATION.</b> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a. That the [state the approving authority and recommended solution].</li> </ol> </li> </ol>													
<p style="margin-left: 40px;"> <b>APPROVED</b> _____ <b>DISAPPROVED</b> _____ <b>SEE ME</b> _____         </p>													
<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li value="2">b. That the [approving authority] sign the implementing directive(s) at TAB A.</li> </ol>													
<p style="margin-left: 40px;"> <b>APPROVED</b> _____ <b>DISAPPROVED</b> _____ <b>SEE ME</b> _____         </p>													
<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>3. <b>BACKGROUND.</b></li> <li>4. <b>FACTS.</b></li> <li>5. <b>ASSUMPTIONS.</b></li> <li>6. <b>COURSES OF ACTION.</b></li> <li>7. <b>CRITERIA.</b> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a. <b>Screening Criteria.</b></li> <li>b. <b>Evaluation Criteria.</b></li> <li>c. <b>Weighting of Criteria.</b></li> </ol> </li> <li>8. <b>ANALYSIS.</b> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a. <b>COAs Screened Out.</b></li> <li>b. <b>COA 1.</b> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>(1) <b>Advantages.</b> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>(a)</li> <li>(b)</li> </ol> </li> <li>(2) <b>Disadvantage.</b></li> </ol> </li> <li>c. <b>COA 2.</b> [Use the same sub-subparagraphs as for COA 1.]</li> </ol> </li> <li>9. <b>COMPARISON.</b></li> <li>10. <b>CONCLUSION.</b></li> <li>11. <b>COORDINATION.</b></li> </ol>													
<table style="width: 100%; border: none;"> <tr> <td style="width: 25%; border: none;">ACofS, G1</td> <td style="width: 25%; border: none;">CONCUR/NONCONCUR _____</td> <td style="width: 25%; border: none;">CMT _____</td> <td style="width: 25%; border: none;">DATE: _____</td> </tr> <tr> <td style="border: none;">DPTM</td> <td style="border: none;">CONCUR/NONCONCUR _____</td> <td style="border: none;">CMT _____</td> <td style="border: none;">DATE: _____</td> </tr> </table>		ACofS, G1	CONCUR/NONCONCUR _____	CMT _____	DATE: _____	DPTM	CONCUR/NONCONCUR _____	CMT _____	DATE: _____				
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DPTM	CONCUR/NONCONCUR _____	CMT _____	DATE: _____										
12. <b>POINT OF CONTACT.</b>													
<table style="width: 100%; border: none;"> <tr> <td style="width: 50%; border: none;">[#] Annexes</td> <td style="width: 50%; border: none;">[Signature Block]</td> </tr> <tr> <td style="border: none;">A. Implementing document</td> <td></td> </tr> <tr> <td style="border: none;">B. Tasking document</td> <td></td> </tr> <tr> <td style="border: none;">C. Coordination list</td> <td></td> </tr> <tr> <td style="border: none;">D. Nonconcurrences</td> <td></td> </tr> <tr> <td style="border: none;">E-Z Other supporting documents, listed as separate annexes</td> <td></td> </tr> </table>		[#] Annexes	[Signature Block]	A. Implementing document		B. Tasking document		C. Coordination list		D. Nonconcurrences		E-Z Other supporting documents, listed as separate annexes	
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B. Tasking document													
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D. Nonconcurrences													
E-Z Other supporting documents, listed as separate annexes													

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**Figure A-1. Format for a Staff Study**

73 **Subject**

74 A-5. Briefly state the study’s subject. Be specific. “Staff Study” is not an  
75 acceptable subject.

76 **Problem**

77 A-6. In paragraph 1, concisely state the problem as an infinitive phrase or  
78 question; for example, To determine..., or, How to.... Include the who, what,  
79 when, and where, if pertinent.

80 **Recommendation**

81 A-7. In paragraph 2, recommend a solution or solutions based on the  
82 conclusion in paragraph 10. If there are several recommendations, state each  
83 one in a separate subparagraph. Follow each recommendation with the  
84 *approved-disapproved-see me* line shown in Figure A-1.

85 A-8. Most staff studies include at least two recommendations:

- 86
  - 87 • That the decision authority approve the recommended solution.
  - 88 • That the decision authority sign a document or documents to  
89 implement that solution.

The implementing document or documents are always placed at Annex A.

90 **Background**

91 A-9. In paragraph 3, briefly state why the problem exists. Provide enough  
92 information to place the problem in context. This discussion may include the  
93 origin of the action and a summary of events related to it. If a tasking doc-  
94 ument accompanies the staff study, place it at Annex B and refer to it here.

95 **Facts**

96 A-10. In paragraph 4, state all facts that influence the problem or its solution.  
97 List each fact as a separate subparagraph. Make sure the facts are stated  
98 and attributed correctly. Facts must stand alone: either something is clearly  
99 a fact or it is attributed to a source that asserts it to be true. There is no limit  
100 to the number of facts. Provide all facts relevant to the problem, not just facts  
101 used to support the study. State any guidance given by the decision maker.  
102 Refer to annexes as necessary for amplification, references, mathematical  
103 formulas, or tabular data.

104 **Assumptions**

105 A-11. In paragraph 5, identify assumptions necessary for a logical discussion  
106 of the problem. List each assumption as a separate subparagraph.

107 **Courses of Action**

108 A-12. In paragraph 6, list all courses of action (COAs) considered. Place each  
109 COA in a separate subparagraph. List each COA by number and name, or as  
110 a short sentence in the imperative mode (for example, Increase physical  
111 security measures at key assets). If a COA is not self-explanatory, include a  
112 brief description of it. Use annexes to describe complex COAs.

113 **Criteria**

114 A-13. In paragraph 7, list and define, in separate subparagraphs, the  
 115 screening and evaluation criteria. There should be a fact or an assumption in  
 116 paragraph 4 or 5 that supports each criterion. The number of facts and  
 117 assumptions should, at a minimum, be greater than the number of criteria.  
 118 In a third subparagraph, explain the rationale for how the evaluation criteria  
 119 are weighted.

120 A-14. **Screening Criteria.** In subparagraph 7a, list the screening criteria,  
 121 each in its own sub-subparagraph. Screening criteria define the minimum  
 122 and maximum characteristics of the solution to the problem. Define each  
 123 screening criterion in terms of the five characteristics in paragraph 2-31:  
 124 suitability, feasibility, acceptability, distinguishability, and completeness.  
 125 Screening criteria are not weighted. They are required, absolute standards.  
 126 COAs that do not meet them are rejected.

127 A-15. **Evaluation Criteria.** In subparagraph 7b, list the evaluation criteria,  
 128 each in its own sub-subparagraph. List them in order of their weight, from  
 129 most to least important. Define each evaluation criterion in terms of the five  
 130 required elements listed in paragraph 2-35: short title, definition, unit of  
 131 measure, benchmark, and formula.

132 A-16. **Weighting of Criteria.** In subparagraph 7c, state the relative  
 133 importance of each evaluation criterion with respect to the others. Explain  
 134 how each criterion compares to each of the other criteria (equal, favored,  
 135 slightly favored), or provide the values from the decision matrix and explain  
 136 why the criterion are measured as such. This subparagraph explains the  
 137 order in which the evaluation criteria are listed in subparagraph 7b.

138 **Analysis**

139 A-17. Paragraph 8 lists the COAs that do not meet the screening criteria and  
 140 the results of applying the evaluation criteria to the remaining COAs.

141 A-18. **COAs Screened Out.** In subparagraph 8a, list the COAs that did not  
 142 meet the screening criteria, each in its own subparagraph, and the criteria  
 143 each did not meet. This subparagraph is particularly important if a COA the  
 144 decision maker wanted considered does not meet the screening criteria.

145 A-19. **Evaluated COAs.** In subsequent subparagraphs, list the COAs  
 146 evaluated, each in its own subparagraph. Discuss the advantages and  
 147 disadvantages of each COA in sub-subparagraphs. For quantitative criteria,  
 148 include the payoff value. Advantages and disadvantages may be discussed in  
 149 narratives or listed. Use the form that best fits the information. Avoid using  
 150 bullets unless the advantage or disadvantage is self-evident.

151 **Comparison**

152 A-20. In paragraph 9, compare the COAs to each other, based on the analysis  
 153 outlined in paragraph 8. Develop in a logical, orderly manner the rationale  
 154 used to reach the conclusion in paragraph 10. If quantitative techniques are  
 155 used in the comparison, summarize the results clearly enough that the reader

156 does not have to refer to an annex. Include any explanations of quantitative  
157 techniques in annexes. State only the results in paragraph 9.

158 **Conclusion**

159 A-21. In paragraph 10, state the conclusion drawn based on the analysis  
160 (paragraph 8) and comparison (paragraph 9). The conclusion must answer  
161 the question or solve the problem. It must match the recommendation in  
162 paragraph 2.

163 **Coordination**

164 A-22. In paragraph 11, list all organizations with which the study was  
165 coordinated (“staffed”) in the format shown in Figure A-1. If the list is very  
166 long, or if space is a consideration, place this list in Annex C. If the staffing  
167 list is placed in Annex C, indicate the number of nonconcurrences with the  
168 cross-reference (for example, See Annex C; 3 nonconcurrences; or, See Annex  
169 C; no nonconcurrences).

170 A-23. A representative of each organization with which the study was staffed  
171 indicates whether the organization concurs with the study, nonconcurr, or  
172 concurs with comment. Representatives place their initials in the blank,  
173 followed by their rank, name, position, telephone number, and e-mail  
174 address. If separate copies were sent to each organization (rather than  
175 sending one copy to each organization in turn), this information may be typed  
176 into the final copy of the study and the actual replies placed in Annex D. This  
177 convention is recommended when using e-mail for staffing.

178 A-24. Place all statements of nonconcurrency and considerations of  
179 nonconcurrency in Annex D, or in separate annexes for each nonconcurrency.  
180 Concurrences with comment may be placed in Annex D or in a separate  
181 annex or annexes.

182 **Point of Contact**

183 A-25. Use paragraph 12 to record the point of contact or action officer, and  
184 contact information. As a minimum, contact information includes a military  
185 telephone number. Additional contact information may include the action  
186 officer’s organization, a civilian telephone number, a unit address, and an e-  
187 mail address.

188 **Signature Block**

189 A-26. Prepare the signature block as specified in AR 25-50.

190 **Annexes**

191 A-27. The first four annexes are standard for all staff studies:

- 192 • Annex A contains implementing memorandums, directives, or letters  
193 submitted for signature or approval. A staff study requests a decision.  
194 Annex A contains the documents required to implement the decision  
195 the staff study recommends.
- 196 • Annex B contains the document that directed the staff study. If the  
197 requirement was given verbally, include the memorandum for record

198 that documents the conversation. If no record exists, enter “Not used”  
199 in the annex list in the body.

200 • Annex C contains the staffing list, if the list is too long for paragraph  
201 11. If paragraph 11 contains the entire staffing list, enter “Not used” in  
202 the annex list in the body.

203 • Annex D contains statements of nonconcurrency and considerations of  
204 nonconcurrency. Statements of nonconcurrency and their  
205 corresponding considerations of nonconcurrency may be placed in  
206 separate annexes. Concurrences with comment may be placed in either  
207 Annex D or a separate annex or annexes. If there are no statements of  
208 nonconcurrency, enter “Not used” in the annex list in the body.

209 A-28. Other annexes contain detailed data, lengthy discussions, and  
210 bibliographies. Number the pages of each annex separately, except when an  
211 annex contains several distinct documents (such as, concurrences). Annexes  
212 are usually tabbed (see Figure A-3, page A-11). Use the convention in  
213 Appendix G to assign annex page numbers.

## 214 **COORDINATING STAFF STUDIES**

215 A-29. Preparing a staff study normally involves coordinating with other staff  
216 officers and organizations. At minimum, action officers obtain concurrences  
217 or nonconcurrences from agencies affected by the study’s recommendations.  
218 Other aspects of the study may require coordination as well. Coordination  
219 should be as broad as time permits, but should be limited to agencies that  
220 might be affected by possible recommendations or that have expertise in the  
221 subject of the study.

222 A-30. Action officers anticipate nonconcurrences and try to resolve as many  
223 as possible before staffing the final product. An action officer who cannot  
224 resolve a nonconcurrency has two options:

225 • Modify the staff study to satisfy the nonconcurrency, if the analysis and  
226 comparison support the change. If this is done after the final draft has  
227 been staffed, the study must be restaffed.

228 • Prepare a consideration of nonconcurrency and include it and the  
229 statement of nonconcurrency in Annex C to the staff study as discussed  
230 in paragraph A-24.

## 231 **Statements of Nonconcurrency**

232 A-31. A statement of nonconcurrency is a recommendation that the decision  
233 maker reject all or part of the staff study. Statements of nonconcurrency are  
234 prepared in the memorandum format; e-mail may be accepted at the  
235 commander’s discretion. They address specific points in the recommendations  
236 or the study, stating why they are wrong or unacceptable. When possible they  
237 offer an alternative or a constructive recommendation.

## 238 **Considerations of Nonconcurrency**

239 A-32. Prepare considerations of nonconcurrency as memoranda for record.  
240 Present the reasons for the nonconcurrency accurately and assess them  
241 objectively. Then state why the study is correct and why the decision maker  
242 should reject the nonconcurrency.

243 **COMMON PROBLEMS WITH STAFF STUDIES**

244 A-33. The following questions identify the most common problems found in  
245 staff studies. Review them before beginning a staff study and periodically  
246 thereafter:

- 247 • Is the subject too broad?
- 248 • Is the problem properly defined?
- 249 • Are facts or assumptions clear and valid?
- 250 • Are there any unnecessary facts or assumptions?
- 251 • Are there any facts that appear for the first time in the discussion?
- 252 • Are there a limited number of options or COAs?
- 253 • Are evaluation criteria invalid or too limiting?
- 254 • Is the discussion too long?
- 255 • Is the discussion incomplete? Must readers consult the annexes to  
256 understand it?
- 257 • Does the conclusion include a discussion?
- 258 • Is the logic incorrect or incomplete? Does the conclusion follow from the  
259 analysis?
- 260 • Can the solution be implemented within resource and time constraints?
- 261 • Do the conclusions and recommendations solve the problem?
- 262 • Is there an implementing directive?
- 263 • Have new criteria been introduced in the analysis or comparison?  
264

265 **DECISION PAPERS**

266 A-34. A decision paper is a piece of correspondence that requests the decision  
267 maker to act on its recommendation and provides the required implementing  
268 documents for signature. Use a decision paper when a formal report is not  
269 necessary or the decision maker does not require the details a staff study  
270 provides.

271 A-35. Decision papers are brief. Unlike staff studies, decision papers are not  
272 self-contained. For a decision paper, much of the material that would be  
273 included in a staff study is kept in the action officer's file. Decision papers  
274 contain the minimum information the decision maker needs to understand  
275 the action and make a decision. The action officer synthesizes the facts,  
276 summarizes the issues, presents feasible alternatives, and recommends one  
277 of them. Essential explanations and other information are attached as  
278 enclosures, which are always tabbed (see Figure A-3, page A-11).

279 A-36. Prepare decision papers as informal memorandums (see AR 25-50) in  
280 the format at Figure A-2 (page A-8). This format parallels the first five steps  
281 of Army problem solving. Commands and other agencies often establish  
282 format standards to meet local requirements. Decision papers should not  
283 exceed two pages, excluding the staffing list and supporting documentation.

284 A-37. The coordination requirements for a decision paper are the same as  
285 those for a staff study. Follow the procedures in paragraphs A-29–A-32.

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Office Symbol (Marks Number)	Date
<b>MEMORANDUM FOR</b>	
<b>SUBJECT:</b>	
1. For <b>DECISION</b> .	
2. <b>PURPOSE</b> .	
3. <b>RECOMMENDATION</b> .	
a. That the [state the approving authority and recommended solution].	
<b>APPROVED</b> _____ <b>DISAPPROVED</b> _____ <b>SEE ME</b> _____	
b. That the [approving authority] sign the implementing directive(s) at TAB A.	
<b>APPROVED</b> _____ <b>DISAPPROVED</b> _____ <b>SEE ME</b> _____	
4. <b>BACKGROUND AND DISCUSSION</b> .	
5. <b>IMPACTS</b> .	
6. <b>COORDINATION</b> .	
ACofS, G1	<b>CONCUR/NONCONCUR</b> _____ <b>CMT</b> _____ <b>DATE:</b> _____
DPTM	<b>CONCUR/NONCONCUR</b> _____ <b>CMT</b> _____ <b>DATE:</b> _____
7. <b>POINT OF CONTACT</b> .	
[#] Encls	(Signature Block)
1. Implementing document (TAB A)	
2. Tasking document (TAB B)	
3. Coordination list (TAB C)	
4. Nonconcurrences (TAB D)	
5-[#]. Other supporting documents, listed as separate enclosures (Tabs E through Z)	

**Figure A-2. Format for a Decision Paper**

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**MEMORANDUM FOR**

A-38. Address the decision paper to the decision maker. Include thru addressees here or on the routing slip, as specified by command policy.

**SUBJECT**

A-39. Briefly state the decision’s subject. Be specific. “Decision Paper” is not an acceptable subject.

**FOR DECISION**

A-40. Paragraph 1 states, “For DECISION.” (Paragraph headings may be either underlined or bolded, according to command policy.) Indicate if the decision is time-sensitive, tied to an event, or has a suspense to a higher headquarters. Show any internal suspenses on the routing slip, if necessary. Do not show internal suspenses in this paragraph.

322 **PURPOSE**

323 A-41. In paragraph 2, state clearly the decision required, as an infinitive  
324 phrase; for example, “To determine the...,” or, “To obtain.....” Include the who,  
325 what, when, and where, if pertinent.

326 **RECOMMENDATION**

327 A-42. In paragraph 3, recommend a solution or solutions to the problem. If  
328 there are several recommendations, state each one in a separate  
329 subparagraph. Follow each recommendation with the *approved-disapproved-*  
330 *see me* line shown in Figure A-2.

331 A-43. Most decision papers include at least two recommendations:

- 332 • That the decision maker approve the recommended solution.  
333 • That the decision maker sign a document or documents to implement  
334 that solution.

335 Place the implementing document or documents at Enclosure 1.

336 **BACKGROUND AND DISCUSSION**

337 A-44. Paragraph 4 explains the origin of the action, why the problem exists,  
338 and a summary of events in chronological form. It helps put the problem in  
339 perspective and provide an understanding of the alternatives and the  
340 recommendation. If the decision paper is the result of a tasking document,  
341 refer to that document here, and place it at Enclosure 2.

342 **IMPACT**

343 A-45. Paragraph 5 states the effects of the recommended decision. Address  
344 each affected area in a separate subparagraph; for example, personnel,  
345 equipment, funding, environment, and stationing. State who is affected by  
346 the recommendation and the extent to which they are affected.

347 **COORDINATION**

348 A-46. In paragraph 6, list all organizations with the decision paper was  
349 staffed in the format shown in Figure A-2. If the list is very long, or if space is  
350 a consideration, place this list in Enclosure 3. If the staffing list is placed in  
351 Enclosure 3, indicate the number of nonconcurrences with the cross-reference  
352 (for example, See Enclosure 3; 2 nonconcurrences; or, See Enclosure 3; no  
353 nonconcurrences).

354 A-47. A representative of each organization with which the decision paper  
355 was staffed indicates whether the organization concurs, nonconcurr, or  
356 concurs with comment. Representatives place their initials in the blank,  
357 followed by their rank, name, position, telephone number, and e-mail  
358 address. If separate copies were sent to each organization (rather than  
359 sending one copy to each organization in turn), this information may be typed  
360 into the final copy of the decision paper and the actual replies placed in  
361 Enclosure 3. This convention is recommended when using e-mail for staffing.

362 A-48. Place all statements of nonconcurrency and considerations of  
363 nonconcurrency in Enclosure 4, or in separate enclosures for each

364 nonconcurrency. Prepare them as specified in paragraphs A-31 and A-32.  
365 Concurrences with comment may be placed in Enclosure 4 or in a separate  
366 annex or annexes.

367 **POINT OF CONTACT**

368 A-49. Use paragraph 7 to record the point of contact or action officer, and  
369 contact information. As a minimum, contact information includes a military  
370 telephone number. Additional contact information may include the action  
371 officer's organization, a civilian telephone number, a unit address, and an e-  
372 mail address.

373 **SIGNATURE BLOCK**


374 A-50. Prepare the signature block as specified in AR 25-50.

375 **ENCLOSURES**

376 A-51. The first four enclosures are standard for all decision papers:

- 377 • Enclosure 1 contains implementing memorandums, directives, or  
378 letters submitted for signature or approval.
- 379 • Enclosure 2 contains the document that directed the decision paper. If  
380 the requirement was given verbally, include the memorandum for  
381 record that documents the conversation. If no record exists, enter "Not  
382 used" in the enclosure list.
- 383 • Enclosure 3 contains the staffing list, if the list is too long for  
384 paragraph 6. If paragraph 6 contains the entire staffing list, enter "Not  
385 used" in the enclosure list.
- 386 • Enclosure 4 contains statements of nonconcurrency and considerations  
387 of nonconcurrency. Statements of nonconcurrency and their  
388 corresponding considerations of nonconcurrency may be placed in  
389 separate enclosures. Concurrences with comment may be placed in  
390 either Enclosure 4 or a separate enclosure or enclosures. If there are no  
391 statements of nonconcurrency, enter "Not used" in the enclosure list.

392 A-52. Other enclosures contain detailed data, lengthy discussions, and  
393 bibliographies. Number the pages of each enclosure separately, except when  
394 an enclosure contains several distinct documents (such as, concurrences). Use  
395 the convention in Appendix G to assign enclosure page numbers.



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**Figure A-5. Assembling and Tabbing Staff Actions**

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## Appendix B

# Military Briefings

Briefings are a means of presenting information to commanders, staffs, or other audiences. The purpose of the briefing, the desired response, and the role of the briefer determine the techniques employed. This appendix describes the types of military briefings and gives a format for each type.

### TYPES OF BRIEFINGS

B-1. There are four types of military briefings:

- Information.
- Decision.
- Mission.
- Staff.

### INFORMATION

B-2. An information briefing provides information in a form the audience can understand. It does not include conclusions or recommendations. No decisions result. Information briefings deal primarily with facts.

B-3. Figure B-1 (page B-2) shows the format for an information briefing. The briefer begins by stating, “This is an information briefing” and its classification. The briefer then briefly introduces and defines the subject, orients the audience, and presents the information. Examples of information appropriate for an information briefing are—

- High priority information requiring immediate attention.
- Complex information—such as, complicated plans, systems, statistics, or charts—that require detailed explanation
- Controversial information requiring elaboration and explanation.

### DECISION

B-4. A decision briefing obtains an answer to a question or a decision on a course of action. It presents the recommended solution resulting from analysis or study of a problem or problem area. Decision briefings vary in formality and detail depending on the level of command and the

<b>CONTENTS</b>	
<b>Types of Briefings.....</b>	<b>B-1</b>
<b>Information .....</b>	<b>B-1</b>
<b>Decision .....</b>	<b>B-2</b>
<b>Mission.....</b>	<b>B-3</b>
<b>Staff .....</b>	<b>B-3</b>
<b>Briefing Steps.....</b>	<b>B-4</b>
<b>Analyze the Situation and Prepare a</b>	
<b>Briefing Outline .....</b>	<b>B-4</b>
<b>Construct the Briefing .....</b>	<b>B-5</b>
<b>Deliver the Briefing .....</b>	<b>B-5</b>
<b>Follow Up.....</b>	<b>B-6</b>

52 decision maker’s knowledge of the subject.

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**1. Introduction**

- a. Greeting.** Address the audience. Identify yourself and your organization.
- b. Type and classification of briefing.** For example, “This is an information briefing. It is classified SECRET.”
- c. Purpose and scope.** Describe complex subjects from general to specific.
- d. Outline or procedure.** Briefly summarize the key points and general approach. Explain any special procedures (such as, demonstrations, displays, or tours). For example, “During my briefing, I’ll discuss the six phases of our plan. I’ll refer to maps of our area of operations. Then my assistant will bring out a sand table to show you the expected flow of battle.” The key points may be place on a chart that remains visible throughout the briefing.

**2. Body**

- a. Arrange the main ideas in a logical sequence.
- b. Use visual aids to emphasize main ideas.
- c. Plan effective transitions from one main point to the next.
- d. Be prepared to answer questions at any time.

**3. Closing**

- a. Ask for questions.
- b. Briefly recap main ideas and make a concluding statement.
- c. Announce the next speaker.

77 **Figure B-1. Information Briefing Format**

78 B-5. In situations where the decision maker is familiar with the problem, the  
79 briefing format may resemble that of a decision paper: a problem statement,  
80 essential background information, impacts, and a recommended solution.  
81 However, briefers are prepared to present assumptions, facts, alternative solu-  
82 tions, reasons for adopting the recommendation, and the coordination involved.  
83

84 B-6. If the decision maker is unfamiliar with the problem, the briefing format  
85 resembles that of a staff study (see Figure B-2). The briefing should include facts  
86 bearing on the problem, assumptions, a discussion of alternatives, conclusions,  
87 and the coordination involved.

88 B-7. The briefer begins by stating, “This is a decision briefing.” At the  
89 conclusion, if the decision maker does not state a decision, the briefer asks for  
90 one. The briefer should be certain that he understands the decision. If uncertain,  
91 the briefer asks for clarification.

92 B-8. The recommendation the briefer asks the decision maker to approve should  
93 be precisely worded in a form that can be used as a decision statement.  
94 Presenting the recommendation this way helps eliminate ambiguities. If the

95 decision requires an implementing document, it should be prepared before the  
 96 briefing and given to the decision maker for signature if the recommendation is  
 97 approved. If the chief of staff (executive officer) is not present, the briefer  
 98 informs the secretary of the general staff or other appropriate authority of the  
 99 decision after the briefing.

<p>100 101 102 103 104 105 106 107 108 109 110 111 112 113 114 115 116 117 118 119 120 121 122 123</p>	<p><b>1. Introduction</b></p> <p><b>a. Greeting.</b> Address the decision maker. Identify yourself and your organization.</p> <p><b>b. Type and classification of briefing.</b> For example, “This is a decision briefing. It is UNCLASSIFIED.”</p> <p><b>c. Problem statement.</b></p> <p><b>d. Recommendation.</b></p> <p><b>2. Body</b></p> <p><b>a. Facts.</b> An objective presentation of both positive and negative facts bearing upon the problem.</p> <p><b>b. Assumptions.</b> Necessary assumptions made to bridge any gaps in factual data.</p> <p><b>c. Courses of action.</b> A discussion of the various options that can solve the problem.</p> <p><b>d. Analysis.</b> The criteria by which you will evaluate how to solve the problem (screening and evaluation). A discussion of each course of action’s relative advantages and disadvantages.</p> <p><b>e. Comparison.</b> Show how the courses of action rate against the evaluation criteria.</p> <p><b>f. Conclusion.</b> Describe why the selected solution is best.</p> <p><b>3. Closing</b></p> <p><b>a. Questions</b></p> <p><b>b. Restatement of the recommendation.</b></p> <p><b>c. Request a decision.</b></p>
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124 **Figure B-2. Decision Briefing Format**

125 **MISSION**

126 B-9. The mission briefing is an information briefing presented under tactical or  
 127 operational conditions. The briefer may be the commander, an assistant, a staff  
 128 officer, or a special representative.

129 B-10. The mission briefing is used during operations and training. It is  
 130 especially appropriate for critical missions or when it is necessary to give  
 131 individuals or smaller units information not in the order. The mission briefing  
 132 serves to—

- 133 • Issue or reinforce an order.
- 134 • Provide more detailed requirements or instructions.
- 135 • Instill a general appreciation for the mission.
- 136 • Review the key points of a forthcoming military operation.

- 137                   • Ensure participants know the mission’s objective, their place in the  
138                   operation, problems they may confront, and ways to overcome them.

139           B-11. The type of mission or the nature of the information to be presented  
140           determines the mission briefing format. The five-paragraph operation order is  
141           the most common format used. Others include the movement order, combat  
142           service support order, and reconnaissance order.

## 143   **STAFF**

144           B-12. The purpose of a staff briefing is to coordinate unit efforts by informing the  
145           commander and staff of the current situation. The person who convenes the staff  
146           briefing sets the agenda. Staff representatives each present relevant information  
147           from their functional areas. Staff briefings may involve exchange of information,  
148           announcement of decisions, issuance of directives, or presentation of guidance.  
149           They may have characteristics of information briefings, decision briefings, and  
150           mission briefings.

151           B-13. Attendance at staff briefings varies with the size of the headquarters, type  
152           of operation, and commander’s preferences. Generally, the commander, deputies  
153           or assistants, chief of staff (executive officer), and coordinating and special staff  
154           officers attend. Representatives from major subordinate commands may be  
155           present. The chief of staff (executive officer) usually presides. The commander  
156           usually concludes the briefing but may take an active part throughout it.

157           B-14. In garrison, staff briefings (sometimes called “staff calls”) are often  
158           regularly scheduled. In combat, staff briefings are held as needed. The  
159           presentation of staff estimates culminating in a commander’s decision to adopt  
160           a course of action is a form of staff briefing that incorporates aspects of a  
161           decision briefing. In this type of briefing, staff representatives use the staff  
162           estimate for their functional area as an outline.

## 163   **BRIEFING STEPS**

164           B-15. A briefing assignment has four steps that correspond to the four activities  
165           of the operations process:

- 166                   • Plan: Analyze the situation and prepare a briefing outline.  
167                   • Prepare: Construct the briefing.  
168                   • Execute: Deliver the briefing.  
169                   • Assess: Follow up.

## 170   **ANALYZE THE SITUATION AND PREPARE A BRIEFING OUTLINE**

171           B-16. Upon receiving the task to conduct a briefing, the briefer analyzes the  
172           situation to determine the —

- 173                   • Audience.  
174                   • Purpose and type of briefing.  
175                   • Subject of the briefing.  
176                   • Physical facilities and support needed.  
177                   • Preparation schedule.

178           B-17. Based on this information, the briefer prepares a briefing outline. The  
179           briefing outline is the briefer’s plan for preparing, executing, and following up

180 on the briefing. It is a tool the briefer uses to manage preparations for the  
181 briefing and refines as new information is received.

182 B-18. Figure B-3 (page B-7) lists factors briefers consider when planning a  
183 briefing and tasks they perform to prepare for it. In addition to those, briefers  
184 determine the following—

- 185 • Audience preferences—for a decision briefing, those of the decision maker.
- 186 • The purpose of the briefing—the purpose determines the type of briefing.
- 187
- 188 • The time allocated for the briefing—this dictates the style, physical
- 189 facilities, and the preparatory effort needed.
- 190 • The availability of physical facilities, visual aids, and visual information
- 191 specialists.

192 The briefer estimates deadlines for each task and carefully schedules the  
193 preparatory effort. This includes scheduling facilities for rehearsals and  
194 requesting critiques. The briefer alerts support personnel and any assistants as  
195 early as possible.

## 196 **CONSTRUCT THE BRIEFING**

197 B-19. The construction of the briefing will vary with its type and purpose. The  
198 analysis provides the basis for this determination. The following are the major  
199 steps in preparing a briefing:

- 200 • Collect material.
- 201 • Prepare first draft.
- 202 • Revise first draft and edit.
- 203 • Plan use of visual aids.
- 204 • Practice.

205 Figure B-3 lists components of these steps and factors to consider.

## 206 **DELIVER THE BRIEFING**

207 B-20. The success of a briefing often depends on how well it is presented. A  
208 confident, relaxed, and forceful delivery, clearly enunciated and obviously based  
209 on full knowledge of the subject, helps convince the audience. Briefers maintain  
210 a relaxed, but military bearing. They use natural gestures and movement, but  
211 avoid distracting mannerisms. Conciseness, objectivity, and accuracy  
212 characterize good delivery. He remain aware of the following:

- 213 • The basic purpose is to present the subject as directed and ensure that the
- 214 audience understands it.
- 215 • Brevity precludes a lengthy introduction or summary.
- 216 • Conclusions and recommendations must flow logically from facts and
- 217 assumptions.

218 B-21. Interruptions and questions may occur at any point. If and when they  
219 occur, briefers answer each question before continuing, or indicate that the  
220 question will be answered later in the briefing. At the same time, they do not  
221 permit questions to distract them from the planned briefing. If the question will  
222 be answered later in the briefing, briefers make specific reference to the earlier  
223 question when they introduce the material. Briefers are prepared to support any

224 part of the briefing. They anticipate possible questions and are prepared to  
225 answer them.

226 **FOLLOW UP**

227 B-22. When the briefing is over, the briefer prepares a memorandum for record  
228 (MFR). This MFR records the subject, date, time, and place of the briefing, and  
229 the ranks, names, and positions of audience members. The briefing's substance  
230 is concisely recorded. Recommendations and their approval, disapproval, or  
231 approval with modification are recorded, as well as any instruction or directed  
232 action. This includes who is to take action. When a decision is involved and  
233 doubt exists about the decision maker's intent, the briefer submits a draft of the  
234 MFR to him for correction before preparing it in final form. The MFR is  
235 distributed to staff sections or agencies that must act on the decisions or  
236 instructions, or whose operations or plans may be affected.

<p><b>1. Analyze the situation and prepare a briefing outline</b></p> <p><b>a. Audience</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Number?</li> <li>• Composition? Single service or joint? Civilians? Foreign nationals?</li> <li>• Who are the ranking members?</li> <li>• What are their official positions?</li> <li>• Where are they assigned?</li> <li>• How well do they know the subject?</li> <li>• Are they generalists or specialists?</li> <li>• What are their interests?</li> <li>• What are their personal preferences?</li> <li>• What is the anticipated reaction?</li> </ul> <p><b>b. Purpose and type</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Information briefing (to inform)?</li> <li>• Decision briefing (to obtain decision)?</li> <li>• Mission briefing (to review important details)?</li> <li>• Staff briefing (to exchange information)?</li> </ul> <p><b>c. Subject of the briefing</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• What is the specific subject?</li> <li>• What is the desired coverage?</li> <li>• How much time will be allocated?</li> </ul> <p><b>d. Physical facilities and support needed</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Where will the briefing be presented?</li> <li>• What arrangements will be required?</li> <li>• What are the visual aid facilities?</li> <li>• What are the deficiencies?</li> <li>• What actions are needed to overcome deficiencies?</li> </ul> <p><b>e. Prepare schedule</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Finish analysis of the situation.</li> <li>• Prepare preliminary outline.</li> <li>• Determine requirements for training aids, assistants, and recorders.</li> <li>• Edit or redraft.</li> <li>• Schedule rehearsals, facilities, and critiques.</li> <li>• Arrange for final review by responsible authority.</li> </ul>	<p><b>3. Construct the briefing</b></p> <p><b>a. Collect material</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Research.</li> <li>• Become familiar with the subject.</li> <li>• Collect authoritative opinions and facts.</li> </ul> <p><b>b. Prepare first draft</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• State problem (if necessary).</li> <li>• Isolate key points (facts).</li> <li>• Identify courses of action.</li> <li>• Analyze and compare courses of action. State advantages and disadvantages.</li> <li>• Determine conclusions and recommendations.</li> <li>• Prepare draft outline.</li> <li>• Include visual aids.</li> <li>• Fill in appropriate material.</li> <li>• Review with appropriate authority.</li> </ul> <p><b>c. Revise first draft and edit</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Make sure that facts are important and necessary.</li> <li>• Include all necessary facts.</li> <li>• Include answers to anticipated questions.</li> <li>• Polish material.</li> </ul> <p><b>d. Plan use of visual aids</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Check for simplicity and readability.</li> <li>• Develop method for use.</li> </ul> <p><b>e. Practice</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Rehearse (with assistants and visual aids).</li> <li>• Polish.</li> <li>• Isolate key points.</li> <li>• Memorize outline.</li> <li>• Develop transitions.</li> <li>• Use definitive words.</li> </ul> <p><b>3. Deliver the briefing</b></p> <p><b>4. Follow-up</b></p> <p><b>a. Ensure understanding</b></p> <p><b>b. Record decision</b></p> <p><b>c. Inform proper authorities</b></p>
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Figure E-3. Briefing Outline

1 **Appendix C**

2 **Mission Analysis Factors**

3 This appendix provides factors for staff members to consider when preparing  
4 for the mission analysis briefing. This list is not all-inclusive. It is generic  
5 and should be reviewed and revised to meet individual needs. Staff members  
6 not listed can use the following as examples.

7 C-1. The following paragraphs list factors staff members consider when  
8 preparing for the mission analysis briefing. Staff members bring to the mission  
9 analysis briefing technical knowledge, estimates, and historical data as required.

10 **ALL STAFF OFFICERS**

11 C-2. All staff officers consider—

- 12 • Mission and intent of higher headquarters one and two levels up.
- 13 • Specified, implied, and essential tasks.
- 14 • Area of operations.
- 15 • Area of interest.
- 16 • Enemy situation and capabilities.
- 17 • Critical facts and assumptions.
- 18 • Status of subordinate units.
- 19 • Weapon systems capabilities and limitations.
- 20 • Status of available assets within their functional area or battlefield  
21 operating system.
- 22 • Constraints.
- 23 • Risk considerations.
- 24 • Time considerations.
- 25 • Recommended commander's critical information requirements.
- 26 • Recommended intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) tasks.

27 **ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G1/S1, PERSONNEL**

28 C-3. The assistant chief of staff (ACofS), G1/S1 considers—

- 29 • Personnel services available to the force (current and projected).
- 30 • Personnel status of organic and attached units.
- 31 • Projected personnel gains.

32 **ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G2/S2, INTELLIGENCE**

33 C-4. The ACofS, G2/S2, considers—

- 34 • Initial intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB), including the  
35 following:

- 36                   ▪ Define battlefield environment.
- 37                   ▪ Define battlefield effects.
- 38                   ▪ Evaluate the threat: including, threat combat power, vulnerabilities,
- 39                   and courses of actions.
- 40                   • Initial intelligence collection recommendation.

41   **ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G3/S3, OPERATIONS**

- 42                   C-5. The ACofS, G3/S3, considers—
- 43                   • Current combat power.
  - 44                   • Current situation of subordinate units and activities.
  - 45                   • Status of the task organization.
  - 46                   • Initial ISR plan recommendation.

47   **ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G4/S4, LOGISTICS**

- 48                   C-6. The ACofS, G4/S4, considers—
- 49                   • Maintenance status.
  - 50                   • Forecasted combat vehicle and weapons status.
  - 51                   • Status of Classes I, II, III, IV, V, VII, and IX supplies.
  - 52                   • Availability of transportation assets.
  - 53                   • Availability and status of services.
  - 54                   • Host-nation and foreign-nation support.

55   **ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G5/S5, CIVIL-MILITARY OPERATIONS**

- 56                   C-7. The ACofS, G5/S5, considers—
- 57                   • Units/assets available (assigned, attached, or available from higher).
  - 58                   • Displaced civilian movement, routes, and assembly areas.
  - 59                   • Host-nation ability to care for civilians.
  - 60                   • Host-nation and foreign-nation support.
  - 61                   • Protected target list: including, cultural, religious, historical, and high-
  - 62                   density civilian population areas.
  - 63                   • Nongovernmental and other independent organizations operating in the
  - 64                   area of operations.

65   **ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G6/S6, COMMAND, CONTROL, COM-**  
66   **MUNICATIONS, AND COMPUTER OPERATIONS**

- 67                   C-8. The ACofS, G6/S6, considers—
- 68                   • Communication and information system maintenance status.
  - 69                   • Available communication assets, including higher and host-nation
  - 70                   support.
  - 71                   • Higher headquarters communications plan.

72 **ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G7/S7, INFORMATION OPERATIONS**

73 C-9. The ACoS, G7/S7 considers—

- 74 • Friendly information operations (IO) capabilities and vulnerabilities.
- 75 • Enemy IO capabilities and vulnerabilities.
- 76 • Status of IO assets: including, electronic attack and psychological
- 77 operations units.
- 78 • Higher headquarters deception plan.

79 **AIR AND MISSILE DEFENSE COORDINATOR**

80 C-10. The air and missile defense coordinator considers—

- 81 • Status of available air defense assets.
- 82 • Current airspace control measures (current, planned, and required).
- 83 • Current command and control measures for air defense assets (warning,
- 84 weapons-control status).
- 85 • Enemy air capabilities (most likely air avenues of approach, type and
- 86 number of sorties, HVT list).

87 **CHAPLAIN**

88 C-11. The chaplain considers—

- 89 • Status of available unit ministry teams.
- 90 • Effect of indigenous religions on military operations.

91 **FIRE SUPPORT COORDINATOR**

92 C-12. The fire support coordinator considers—

- 93 • Fire support capabilities and limitations.
- 94 • Recommended tasks for fire support.
- 95 • High-value targets.
- 96 • Impact of IPB, target value analysis, and battlefield geometry on fire
- 97 support.
- 98 • Protected target list, including cultural, religious, historical, and high-
- 99 density civilian population areas.

100 **ENGINEER COORDINATOR**

101 C-13. The engineer coordinator considers—

- 102 • Status of available engineer assets.
- 103 • Engineering capabilities with available assets (for example, number of
- 104 fighting positions; number, size, and density of minefields; meters of
- 105 antitank ditch; smoke assets; and nuclear demolition assets).
- 106 • Terrain visualization support through engineer battlefield assessment.

107 **NUCLEAR, BIOLOGICAL, AND CHEMICAL OFFICER**

108 C-14. The nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) officer considers—

- 109 • Assets available, including reconnaissance, decontamination, and smoke.
- 110 • NBC-related constraints.

- 111                   • Mission-oriented protective posture (MOPP) status.
- 112                   • NBC threat status.
- 113                   • Troop safety criteria.

114 **SURGEONS/MEDICAL OFFICERS**

- 115                   C-15. The surgeon/medical officer considers—
- 116                   • Civilian and military medical assets available.
  - 117                   • Class VIII supply status.

1 **Appendix D**

2 **Commander's Guidance Guidelines**

3 This appendix provides a tool to help commanders develop planning guidance. It addresses each battlefield operating system and information operations. The content of the commander's guidance varies, depending on the situation and the echelon of command. This list is not designed to meet the needs of all situations. It is a generic list of information commanders may consider as they develop their guidance. It is neither mandatory nor desired that commanders address every item. Commander's guidance is tailored to meet specific needs. Commanders issue guidance on only those items appropriate to a particular mission.

12 **COMMANDER'S GUIDANCE DURING PLANNING**

13 D-1. Commanders develop planning guidance from their visualization. Planning guidance may be broad or detailed, as circumstances require. Combined with the commander's intent, it conveys the essence of the commander's visualization. Commanders use their experience and judgment to add depth and clarity to their planning guidance. Effective planning guidance gives the staff a broad outline of the commander's visualization, while still allowing latitude to explore different options.

20 D-2. During planning, the commander's guidance focuses on course of action (COA) development, COA analysis, and COA comparison. Commanders identify an expected decisive operation and convey how they see shaping and sustaining operations contributing to it. This initial battlefield framework enables the staff to fully develop several COAs. Planning guidance states in broad terms when, where, and how the commander intends to mass the effects of combat power to accomplish the mission within the higher commander's intent. Commander's guidance also includes priorities for all combat, combat support, and combat service support elements, and how the commander envisions their contributions to the operation. Commanders also use the elements of operational design to articulate their guidance.

31 D-3. The amount of detail in the planning guidance depends on the time available, staff proficiency, and the latitude the next higher commander allows. Broad and general guidance lets a proficient staff to develop flexible and effective options. Time-constrained conditions require more specific and directive guidance. The more detailed the planning guidance, the more quickly the staff can complete the plan. However, detailed guidance incurs the risk of overlooking or insufficiently examining things that might affect mission execution.

## INTELLIGENCE

D-4. For intelligence, commanders consider—

- Enemy COAs to consider during COA development and COA analysis. These may be the enemy's most probable COA, most dangerous COA, or a combination of the two.
- Enemy's critical decision points and vulnerabilities.
- Priority intelligence requirements.
- Targeting guidance.
- High-value targets.
- Defining of the enemy commander's mission.
- Defining of the enemy commander's method.
- Desired enemy perception of friendly forces.
- Intelligence focus for the security effort.
- Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance guidance.
- Specific terrain and weather factors.
- Identification of key terrain.

## MANEUVER

D-5. For maneuver, commanders consider—

- Initial commander's intent:
  - Purpose of operation.
  - Key tasks.
  - Desired end state.
- COA development guidance:
  - Number of COAs to be developed.
  - COAs to consider or not consider
  - Critical events.
  - Elements of operational design.
  - Battlefield framework
  - The decisive operation.
  - Shaping operations.
  - Task organization.
  - Task/purpose of subordinate units.
  - Forms of maneuver.
  - Reserve guidance (composition, mission, priorities, and command and control measures).
  - Security and counterreconnaissance guidance.
  - Possible branches.
  - Positive and procedural control measures.
  - Commander's critical information requirements (CCIR).
  - Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance guidance and priorities.
- Risk.
  - Risk to friendly forces.

- 80                                   ▪ Risk to mission accomplishment.
- 81                                   ▪ Risk control measures.

## 82   **FIRE SUPPORT**

83                                   D-6. For fire support, commanders consider—

- 84                                   • High-payoff targets:
  - 85                                   ▪ Methods of engagement (maneuver, lethal, nonlethal).
  - 86                                   ▪ Desired effects.
- 87                                   • Guidance for fires.
- 88                                   • Observer plan.
- 89                                   • Employment of combat observation and lasing teams (COLTs).
- 90                                   • Requirements, restrictions, and priorities for special munitions.
- 91                                   • Task and purpose of fires.
- 92                                   • Counterfires and use of radars.
- 93                                   • Suppression of enemy air defenses.
- 94                                   • Critical zones.
- 95                                   • Critical friendly zones and call for fire zones (see FM 3-09.12 [6-121]).
- 96                                   • Fire support coordinating measures.
- 97                                   • Synchronization and focus of fires with maneuver.
- 98                                   • Attack guidance.
- 99                                   • Protected target list: including, cultural, religious, historical, and high-
- 100                                   density civilian population areas.

## 101   **AIR DEFENSE**

102                                   D-7. For air defense, commanders consider—

- 103                                   • Protection priorities.
- 104                                   • Positioning guidance.
- 105                                   • Weapon control status for specific events.

## 106   **MOBILITY, COUNTERMOBILITY, AND SURVIVABILITY**

107                                   D-8. For mobility and survivability, commanders consider—

- 108                                   • Priority of effort and support.
- 109                                   • Mobility:
  - 110                                   ▪ Breaching/bridging guidance.
  - 111                                   ▪ Employing assets guidance.
- 112                                   • Countermobility:
  - 113                                   ▪ Obstacle effects/emplacement guidance.
  - 114                                   ▪ Family of scatterable mines use and duration.
- 115                                   • Survivability: Assets available to dig survivability positions.
- 116                                   • Nuclear, biological, and chemical defense operations:
  - 117                                   ▪ Chemical reconnaissance assets.
  - 118                                   ▪ Mission-oriented protective posture (MOPP) guidance.
  - 119                                   ▪ Decontamination guidance.
  - 120                                   ▪ Masking and unmasking guidance.

- 121                   ▪ Employment of smoke.
- 122                   ▪ Detection, reporting, and marking.
- 123                 • Management of engineer supplies and materiel.
- 124                 • Environmental guidance.

## 125 **COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT**

- 126                 D-9. For combat service support (CSS), commanders consider—
- 127                 • CSS priorities in terms of tactical logistics functions (manning, fueling,
  - 128                 fixing, arming, moving the force, and sustaining soldiers and their
  - 129                 systems).
  - 130                 • Positioning of key CSS assets and bases.
  - 131                 • Medical evacuation treatment and evacuation guidance.
  - 132                 • Anticipated requirements and prestockage of Class III, IV, and V.
  - 133                 • Controlled supply rates.
  - 134                 • Guidance on construction and provision of facilities and installations.

## 135 **COMMAND AND CONTROL**

- 136                 D-10. For command and control, commanders consider—
- 137                 • Rules of engagement.
  - 138                 • Command post positioning.
  - 139                 • Position of the commander.
  - 140                 • Integration of retransmission assets or other communications equipment.
  - 141                 • Liaison officer guidance.
  - 142                 • Force protection measures.
  - 143                 • Time line guidance.
  - 144                 • Type of order and rehearsal.
  - 145                 • Specific communications guidance.

## 146 **INFORMATION OPERATIONS**

- 147                 D-11. For information operations, (IO) commanders consider—
- 148                 • Military deception guidance.
  - 149                 • OPSEC.
  - 150                 • Electronic warfare.
  - 151                 • Physical destruction to support IO.
  - 152                 • Psychological operations (PSYOP).
  - 153                 • Public affairs.
  - 154                 • Information assurance.
  - 155                 • Physical security.
  - 156                 • Counterdeception.
  - 157                 • Counterpropaganda.
  - 158                 • Counterintelligence.

1 **Appendix E**

2 **Staff Estimates**

3 This appendix discusses estimates and their essential qualities. It provides  
4 a generic staff estimate format.

5 E-1. Because assessment is continuous throughout the operations process, staff  
6 sections maintain continuous “running” estimates. However, because the focus  
7 of assessment is different during each operations process activity, the focus of  
8 staff estimates is likewise different (see FM 6-0, *Command and Control*). During  
9 planning, the most important decision the commander makes is selecting a  
10 course of action (COA) on which to base the plan. Thus, during planning, staff  
11 estimates focus on supporting that decision. During preparation, staff estimates  
12 focus on any command decisions that affect the ability of the unit to execute the  
13 upcoming operation. During execution, staff estimates focus on anticipated  
14 command decisions. These include, but are not limited to, decision points and  
15 decisions on whether to execute a branch or sequel.

16 E-2. Staff estimates may be written or oral. At the tactical level, especially  
17 during operations and exercises, estimates are usually delivered orally,  
18 supported by charts and other decision support tools. During contingency  
19 planning, especially at corps level and above, estimates are usually written.  
20 During deliberate planning at joint headquarters, estimates are always written  
21 (see JP 5-00.1).

22 E-3. The military decision making process (MDMP) is the mechanism that  
23 produces each staff section’s estimate. The staff estimate is the product of all  
24 actions a staff section performs during the MDMP. The commander is usually  
25 not briefed on the entire contents of every section’s estimate; however, those  
26 estimates form the basis for each staff section’s recommendation during COA  
27 approval. Complete estimates contain the information necessary to answer any  
28 question the commander poses. Any gaps in a staff estimate are identified as  
29 information requirements and submitted to the appropriate agency.

30 E-4. Staff estimates normally include the elements shown in Figure E-1 (page  
31 E-3). The details addressed depend on a staff section’s functional area. All staff  
32 sections except the intelligence section have a similar perspective: they focus on  
33 friendly COAs and their supportability. The intelligence section concentrates on  
34 the enemy: enemy situation, including strengths and weaknesses; enemy  
35 capabilities and an analysis of those capabilities; and conclusions drawn from  
36 that analysis. The analysis of enemy capabilities includes an analysis of the  
37 COAs available to the enemy. It provides the background the intelligence officer  
38 uses to portray enemy actions during COA analysis. The intelligence estimate’s  
39 conclusion identifies the enemy’s most likely COA and most dangerous COA.

40 E-5. Comprehensive estimates consider both the quantifiable and the intangible  
41 aspects of military operations. They translate friendly and enemy strengths,

42 weapon systems, training, morale, and leadership into combat capabilities.  
43 Preparing an estimate requires a clear understanding of weather and terrain  
44 effects and, more important, the ability to visualize the battlespace or crisis  
45 situations requiring military forces. Estimates provide a timely, accurate  
46 evaluation of the unit, the enemy, and the area of operations at a given time.

47 E-6. Estimates are as thorough as time and circumstances permit. The  
48 commander and staff constantly collect, process, and evaluate information. Staff  
49 members update their estimates as they receive new information, such as—

- 50 • When they recognize new facts.
- 51 • When they replace assumptions with facts or find their assumptions  
52 invalid.
- 53 • When they receive changes to the mission or when changes are indicated.

54 E-7. Estimates for the current operation can often provide a basis for estimates  
55 for future missions as well as changes to current operations. Technological  
56 advances and near real-time information allow estimates to be continuously  
57 updated.

58 E-8. Estimates analyze the implications for the future and support the  
59 commander's visualization. These estimates link the current operations with  
60 future plans. The commander's visualization directs the end state. Each  
61 subordinate unit commander must also possess the ability to visualize the  
62 organization's end state. Estimates contribute to this ability.

63 E-9. Figure E-1 shows a generic format for written staff estimates. Doctrine  
64 proponents for staff functional areas may establish formats for written staff  
65 estimates and graphic products for their functional areas.

1. **MISSION.** Show the restated mission resulting from mission analysis.
2. **SITUATION AND CONSIDERATIONS.**
  - a. **Characteristics of the area of operations.**
    - (1) **Weather.** State how the military aspects of weather affect the staff section's functional area.
    - (2) **Terrain.** State how aspects of the terrain affect the staff section's functional area.

**Civil Considerations.** State how political, economic, sociological, and psychological factors and infrastructure affect the staff section's functional area.

**Other pertinent facts.** State any other pertinent facts and how they affect the staff section's functional area.
  - b. **Enemy Forces.** Discuss enemy dispositions, composition, strength, capabilities, and COAs as they affect the staff section's functional area.
  - c. **Friendly Forces.**
    - (1) List the current status of resources within the staff section's functional area.
    - (2) List the current status of other resources that affect the staff section's functional area.
    - (3) Compare requirements with capabilities. Recommended solutions for discrepancies.
  - d. **Assumptions.** List any assumptions that affect the staff section's functional area.
3. **COURSES OF ACTION**
  - a. List the friendly COAs that were war-gamed.
  - b. List evaluation criteria identified during COA analysis. All staff sections use the same evaluation criteria.
4. **ANALYSIS.** Analyze each COA using the evaluation criteria identified during COA analysis.
5. **COMPARISON.** Compare COAs. Rank order COAs for each key consideration. A decision matrix usually supports comparison.
6. **RECOMMENDATION AND CONCLUSIONS.**
  - a. Recommend a most supportable COA from the specific staff perspective.
  - b. List issues, deficiencies and risks with recommendations to reduce their impacts.

Figure C-1. Generic Staff Estimate Format

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## Appendix F

# Task Organization

*A temporary grouping of forces designed to accomplish a particular mission is a task organization.*

FM 3-0, *Operations*

This appendix discusses the fundamentals of task organization, including command and support relationships. It establishes task organization formats. FM 3-0, *Operations*, discusses joint and multinational command relationships and their inherent responsibilities.

### FUNDAMENTAL CONSIDERATIONS

F-1. Military units are made up of organic components. Organic parts of a unit are those listed in its table of organization. Commanders can alter an organization’s organic and assigned unit relationships to better allocate assets to subordinate commanders. They also can establish temporary command and support relationships to facilitate command and control. This process of allocating available assets to subordinate commanders and establishing their command and support relationships is called *task organizing* (FM 3-0, *Operations*).

F-2. Establishing clear command and support relationships is fundamental to organizing for any operation. These relationships establish clear responsibilities and authorities among subordinate and supporting units. Some command and support relationships (for example, TACON [tactical control]) limit the commander’s authority to prescribe additional relationships. Knowing the inherent responsibilities of each command and support relationship allows commanders to effectively organize their forces.

F-3. Commanders designate command and support relationships to weight the decisive operation and support the concept of operations. Task organization also helps subordinate and supporting commanders understand their roles in the operation and support the commander’s intent. Command and support relationships carry with them varying responsibilities to the subordinate unit by the parent and the gaining units (see Figure F-1, page F-5). Commanders consider these responsibilities when establishing command and support

CONTENTS	
Fundamental Considerations .....	F-1
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Command Relationships.....	F-4
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Outline Format .....	F-7
Matrix Format .....	F-9
Unit Listing Sequence .....	F-10

33 relationships. Commanders consider two organizational principles when task  
 34 organizing forces:

- 35 • Maintain cohesive mission teams.
- 36 • Do not exceed subordinates' span of control capabilities.

37 F-4. When possible, commanders maintain cohesive mission teams. They  
 38 organize task forces based on standing headquarters, their assigned forces, and  
 39 habitually associated combat support (CS) and combat service support (CSS)  
 40 ("slice") elements. Where this is not feasible and ad hoc organizations are  
 41 formed, commanders allow time for training and establishing functional working  
 42 relationships and procedures. Once commanders have organized and committed  
 43 a force, they do not change its task organization unless the benefits of a change  
 44 clearly outweigh the disadvantages. Reorganizations may result in a loss of time,  
 45 effort, and tempo. Logistic considerations may also preclude quick  
 46 reorganization.

47 F-5. Commanders are careful not to exceed the span of control capabilities of  
 48 subordinates. Span of control refers to the number of subordinate units under  
 49 a single commander. Commanders should not be given more units than they can  
 50 effectively command and control. This number is situation-dependent. Although  
 51 span of control varies with the situation, commanders can effectively command  
 52 two to five subordinate units. Allocating subordinates more units gives them  
 53 greater flexibility and increases options and combinations. However, as the  
 54 number increases, commanders, at some point, lose the ability to consider each  
 55 unit individually and begin to think of units as a single, inflexible mass. In such  
 56 circumstances, the only way to reintroduce flexibility is to create another  
 57 echelon of command by grouping elements into a smaller number of parts.

58 F-6. Staff estimates and course of action (COA) analysis provide information  
 59 that helps commanders determine the best task organization. An effective task  
 60 organization—

- 61 • Facilitates the commander's intent and concept of operations.
- 62 • Retains flexibility within the concept of operations.
- 63 • Weights the decisive operation.
- 64 • Adapts to conditions imposed by the factors of METT-TC—mission,  
 65 enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available  
 66 and civil considerations.
- 67 • Creates effective combined arms teams.
- 68 • Provides mutual support among units.
- 69 • Ensures flexibility to meet unforeseen events and support future  
 70 operations.
- 71 • Allocates resources with minimum restrictions on their employment.
- 72 • Ensures unity of command and synchronization of effort through proper  
 73 use of command and support relationships.
- 74 • Offsets limitations and maximizes the potential of all forces available.
- 75 • Exploits enemy vulnerabilities.

76 F-7. Creating an appropriate task organization requires understanding—

- 77 • The mission, including the higher commander's intent and concept of  
 78 operations.

- 79 • The tenets of Army operations (see FM 3-0, *Operations*) and basic tactical
- 80 concepts (see FM 3-90, *Tactics*).
- 81 • The battlefield organization.
- 82 • The roles and interrelations of the battlefield operating systems.
- 83 • The status of available forces, including morale, training, and equipment
- 84 capabilities.
- 85 • Specific unit capabilities, limitations, strengths, and weaknesses.
- 86 • The risks inherent in the plan.
- 87 • Subordinate commanders' abilities, especially their ability to apply
- 88 combined arms doctrine.

89 F-8. During COA analysis, commanders identify what combat power they need,  
90 and where, when, and how frequently they will need it. They approve or modify  
91 the staff's recommended task organization based on their evaluation of the  
92 factors listed above and information from estimates and COA analysis.

93 F-9. Formal task organization and the change from generic to specific units  
94 begin after COA analysis, when commanders assign missions to subordinate  
95 commanders. Commanders assign tasks to subordinate headquarters and  
96 determine if subordinate headquarters have enough combat power, reallocating  
97 combat power as necessary. They then define command and support  
98 relationships for subordinate units and decide the priorities of support.  
99 Commanders allocate maneuver units two levels down to commanders one level  
100 down. There may be exceptions for CS units—for example, at corps level,  
101 engineer or military police companies may be allocated to divisions. The  
102 commander allocates CSS units as needed, regardless of size.

103 F-10. In allocating assets, the commander and staff consider the—  
104 • Task organization for the ongoing operation.  
105 • Potential adverse effect of breaking up cohesive teams by changing the  
106 task organization.  
107 • Time necessary to realign the organization after receipt of the task  
108 organization.  
109 • Limits on control over supporting units provided by higher headquarters.

110 F-11. Definitions of support or command relationships do not cover every  
111 situation. Some circumstances require commanders to establish nonstandard  
112 command relationships. When establishing such a relationship commanders  
113 assign responsibility for the necessary support tasks in the task organization.

## 114 **COMMAND AND SUPPORT RELATIONSHIPS**

115 F-12. Army commanders build combined arms organizations using command  
116 and support relationships. Command relationships define command  
117 responsibility and authority. Support relationships define the purpose, scope,  
118 and effect desired when one capability supports another.

119 F-13. A command or support relationship is not a mission assignment; mission  
120 assignments go in paragraph 3b or 3c of the basic OPORD or OPLAN. Operation  
121 plans and orders state specifically the command and support relationships that  
122 place the unit under a commanding headquarters. If possible, show all command  
123 and support relationships in the task organization.

124 **COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS**

125 F-14. Command relationships establish the degree of control and responsibility  
126 commanders have for forces operating under their control. Army command  
127 relationships include assigned, attached, operational control (OPCON), and  
128 tactical control (TACON). (FM 3-0, *Operations*, discusses joint command  
129 relationships.)

130 F-15. *Assign* is to place units or personnel in an organization where such  
131 placement is relatively permanent, and/or where such organization controls and  
132 administers the units or personnel for the primary function, or greater portion  
133 of the functions, of the unit or personnel (JP 1-02). Unless specifically stated,  
134 this relationship includes administrative control (ADCON).

135 F-16. *Attach* is the placement of units or personnel in an organization where  
136 such placement is relatively temporary (JP 1-02). A unit that is temporarily  
137 placed into an organization is attached.

138 F-17. *Operational control* (OPCON) is transferable command authority that may  
139 be exercised by commanders at any echelon at or below the level of combatant  
140 command. Operational control is inherent in combatant command (command  
141 authority). Operational control may be delegated and is the authority to perform  
142 those functions of command over subordinate forces involving organizing and  
143 employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and  
144 giving authoritative direction necessary to accomplish the mission. Operational  
145 control includes authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations  
146 and joint training necessary to accomplish missions assigned to the command.  
147 Operational control should be exercised through the commanders of subordinate  
148 organizations. Normally this authority is exercised through subordinate joint  
149 force commanders and service and/or functional component commanders.  
150 Operational control normally provides full authority to organize commands and  
151 forces, and to employ those forces as the commander in operational control  
152 considers necessary to accomplish assigned missions. Operational control does  
153 not, in and of itself, include authoritative direction for logistics or matters of  
154 administration, discipline, internal organization, or unit training (JP 1-02).

155 F-18. *Tactical control* (TACON) is command authority over assigned or attached  
156 forces or commands, or military capability or forces made available for tasking,  
157 that is limited to the detailed and, usually, local direction and control of  
158 movements or maneuvers necessary to accomplish missions or tasks assigned.  
159 Tactical control is inherent in operational control. Tactical control may be  
160 delegated to, and exercised at any level at or below the level of combatant  
161 command (JP 1-02). Tactical control allows commanders below combatant  
162 command level to apply force and direct the tactical use of logistic assets but  
163 does not provide authority to change organizational structure or direct  
164 administrative and logistic support.

165 F-19. Figure F-1 shows the inherent responsibilities of each command  
166 relationship. Command responsibilities, responsibilities for service support, and  
167 authority to organize or reassign component elements of a supporting force  
168 remain with the higher headquarters or parent unit unless the authorizing  
169 commander specifies otherwise.  
170

IF RELATIONSHIP IS:		INHERENT RESPONSIBILITIES ARE:							
		Has Command Relationship with:	May Be Task Organized by:	Receives CSS from:	Assigned Position or AO By:	Provides Liaison To:	Establishes/ Maintains Communications with:	Has Priorities Established by:	Gaining Unit Can Impose Further Command or Support Relationship of:
COMMAND	Attached	Gaining unit	Gaining unit	Gaining unit	Gaining unit	As required by gaining unit	Unit to which attached	Gaining unit	Attached; OPCON; TACON; GS; GSR; R; DS
	OPCON	Gaining unit	Parent unit and gaining unit; gaining unit may pass OPCON to lower HQ. Note 1	Parent unit	Gaining unit	As required by gaining unit	As required by gaining unit and parent unit	Gaining unit	OPCON; TACON; GS; GSR; R; DS
	TACON	Gaining unit	Parent unit	Parent unit	Gaining unit	As required by gaining unit	As required by gaining unit and parent unit	Gaining unit	GS; GSR; R; DS
	Assigned	Parent unit	Parent unit	Parent unit	Gaining unit	As required by parent unit	As required by parent unit	Parent unit	Not Applicable
SUPPORT	Direct Support (DS)	Parent unit	Parent unit	Parent unit	Supported unit	Supported unit	Parent unit; Supported unit	Supported unit	Note 2
	Reinforcing (R)	Parent unit	Parent unit	Parent unit	Reinforced unit	Reinforced unit	Parent unit; reinforced unit	Reinforced unit; then parent unit	Not Applicable
	General Support Reinforcing (GSR)	Parent unit	Parent unit	Parent unit	Parent unit	Reinforced unit and as required by parent unit	Reinforced unit and as required by parent unit	Parent unit; then reinforced unit	Not Applicable
	General Support (GS)	Parent unit	Parent unit	Parent unit	Parent unit	As required by parent unit	As required by parent unit	Parent unit	Not Applicable

NOTE 1. In NATO, the gaining unit may not task organize a multinational unit (see TACON).  
 NOTE 2. Commanders of units in DS may further assign support relationships between their subordinate units and elements of the supported unit after coordination with the supported commander.

171

Figure F-1. Command and Support Relationships

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 173  
 174  
 175  
 176

F-20. When commanders establish command relationships they determine if the command relationship includes ADCON. *Administrative control* is direction or exercise of authority over subordinate or other organizations in respect to administration and support, including organization of service forces, control of resources and equipment, personnel management, unit logistics, individual and

177 unit training, readiness, mobilization, demobilization, discipline, and other  
 178 matters not included in the operational missions of the subordinate or other  
 179 organizations (JP 1-02). ADCON includes personnel management, control of  
 180 resources and equipment, discipline, and other matters not included in  
 181 operational missions.

182 F-21. ADCON is synonymous with administration and support responsibilities  
 183 identified in Title 10 United States Code (USC). This is the authority necessary  
 184 to fulfill military department statutory responsibilities for administration and  
 185 support. ADCON of an Army unit must remain in Army channels. It cannot be  
 186 transferred to a unit of another service.

187 F-22. Attachment orders normally state whether the parent unit retains  
 188 ADCON of the unit. If it does not, the attachment order specifically states that  
 189 the gaining unit has ADCON. For OPCON and TACON, parent units retain  
 190 ADCON.

191 **SUPPORT RELATIONSHIPS**

192 F-23. Support relationships define the purpose, scope, and effect desired when  
 193 one capability supports another. Support relationships establish specific  
 194 responsibilities between supporting and supported units (see Figure 4-1, page  
 195 F-5). Army support relationships are direct support (DS), general support (GS),  
 196 general support-reinforcing (GSR), and reinforcing (R).

197 • **Direct support is a support relationship requiring a force to sup-**  
 198 **port another specific force and authorizing it to answer directly**  
 199 **to the supported force's request for assistance.** (Joint doctrine  
 200 considers DS to be a mission rather than a support relationship.  
 201 Otherwise, the joint and Army definitions are the same.) A unit assigned  
 202 a DS relationship retains its command relationship with its parent unit,  
 203 but is positioned by and has priorities of support established by the  
 204 supported unit.

205 • **Reinforcing is a support relationship in which the supporting unit**  
 206 **assists the supported unit to accomplish the supported unit's**  
 207 **mission. Only like units (e.g., artillery to artillery, intelligence to**  
 208 **intelligence, armor to armor, etc.) can be given a**  
 209 **reinforcing/reinforced mission.** (Joint doctrine considers reinforcing  
 210 to be a mission rather than a support relationship. Otherwise, the joint  
 211 and Army definitions are the same.) A unit assigned a reinforcing  
 212 relationship retains its command relationship with its parent unit, but is  
 213 positioned by the reinforced unit. A unit that is reinforcing has priorities  
 214 of support established by the reinforced unit, then the parent unit.

215 • **General support-reinforcing is a support relationship assigned to**  
 216 **a unit to support the force as a whole and to reinforce another**  
 217 **similar-type unit.** (The joint definition limits GSR to field artillery units.  
 218 The Army definition allows other types of units to receive GSR  
 219 relationships.) A unit assigned a GSR relationship is positioned by its  
 220 parent unit and has priorities established by its parent unit then the  
 221 reinforced unit.

222 • **General support is a support relationship assigned to a unit to**  
 223 **support the force as a whole and not to any particular subdivision**

224                               **thereof.** (Joint doctrine considers GS to be a mission rather than a  
225                               support relationship. Otherwise, the joint and Army definitions are the  
226                               same.) Units assigned a GS relationship are positioned and have priorities  
227                               established by their parent unit.

## 228   **TASK ORGANIZATION FORMATS**

229                               F-24. There are two task organization formats: outline and matrix. The sequence  
230                               in which units are listed is the same for both methods. The chief of staff or  
231                               executive officer selects the method for a given plan or order. The following  
232                               conventions apply to both formats.

### 233   **OUTLINE FORMAT**

234                               F-25. The outline format lists all units under the headquarters to which they are  
235                               allocated or that they support (see Figure F-2, page F-8). Place long or complex  
236                               task organizations in Annex A of the plan or order.

237                               F-26. List subordinate units under the command and control headquarters to  
238                               which they are assigned, attached, or in support. Place DS units below the units  
239                               they support. Indent subordinate and supporting units two spaces. Identify  
240                               relationships other than attached with parenthetical terms—for example,  
241                               (OPCON) or (DS).

<p><b>78 BDE</b>            1-81 IN (LT)            1-127 IN (M)            1-129 IN (M)            1-92 AR            E/208 CAV            1-123 FA (DS)                1/C/1-44 FA (TA, Q-36)            2-643 FA (155, SP)            (M109A6) (CORPS) (R: 1-123 FA)                G/212 ADA (SFV/S) (DS)                TM 3&amp;4/HHB/1-223 ADA (Sentinel)            112 EN BN                A/508 EN (C) (M)            430 MI CO (DS)            30 MP PLT            1/24 MP PLT (DS)            30 CML PLT            5/124 CML CO            TM A, B, &amp;D/2/A/24 SIG BN            DET A&amp;B/A/425 CA BN            BPSE/A/200 PSYOPS BN            230 FSB (DS)                1/1/849 MED CO (AIR AMB) (DS)                1/855 MED CO (GRD AMB) (DS)                1/2/205 QM COLL CO (MA)                842 FST (DS)</p> <p><b>148 BDE</b>            1-129 IN (M)            2-129 IN (M)            1-107 AR            E/104 CAV            1-128 FA (DS)                2/C/1-44 FA (TA, Q-36)            2-731 FA (155, SP)            (M109A6) (CORPS) (R: 1-128 FA)                E/179 ADA (SFV/S) (DS)                TM 1,2/HHB/1-213 ADA (Sentinel)            648 EN BN            48 CML PLT            248 MI CO (DS)</p>	<p><b>148 BDE (continued)</b>            48 MP PLT            TM A, B, D/1/A/24 SIG BN            DET C&amp;D/A/435 CA BN            BPSE/A/210 PSYOPS BN            148 SB (DS)                2/1/849 MED CO (AIR AMB) (DS)                2/855 MED CO (GRD AMB) (DS)                2/2/205 QM COLL CO (MA)                843 FST (DS)</p> <p><b>228 BDE</b>            1-128 IN (M) (-)            1-258 AR            B/292 CAV            E/263 ADA (SFV/S) (DS)                TM 3&amp;4/HHB/1-213 ADA            188 EN BN            228 CML PLT            228 MI CO (DS)            228 MP PLT            TM A, B &amp;D/2/A/24 SIG BN            173 SB (DS)                3/1/849 MED CO (AIR AMB) (DS)                3/855 MED CO (GRD AMB) (DS)                3/2/205 QM COLL CO (MA)                844 FST (DS)</p> <p><b>52 AVN BDE</b>            171 ATK HEL BN            172 ATK HEL BN            52 ASLT HEL BN            52 CMD AVN CO            TM D/1/C/24 SIG BN</p> <p><b>52 ID DIVARTY</b>            HHB            1-178 FA (GSR: 1-123 FA, O/O DS 228 BDE)                3/C/1-44 FA (TA, Q-36)                C/1-44 FA (TA) (-)</p>	<p><b>52 ID DIVARTY (continued)</b>            87 FA BDE (R)                2-368 FA (MLRS)                2-485 FA (155, SP) (M109A6)                5080 EN CO (CSE) (-)            (O/O attached to 501 EN BN (C) (M))                TM D/2/C/24 SIG BN</p> <p><b>DIV TROOPS</b>            52 ID RAOC                C/1-128 IN (M) (TCF)                MORT/1-128 IN (M)            1/22 CAV            52 ID (M) EN BDE (-)                901 EN BN (-) (C) (M)                3/5080 EN CO (CSE)            1-213 ADA (-)            402 CM BN                401 CM CO (Smoke) (-)                402 CM CO (Smoke)                403 CM CO (Decon) (Corps) (-)                404 CM CO (Decon) (Corps)                1/51 CM CO (Recon) (-)            624 MI BN (-)            52 MP CO (-)                52 BAND (OPCON)            107 MP CO (CORPS) (DS)              52 SIG BN (-)            485 CA BN (-)            A/200 PSYOPS BN (-)</p> <p><b>DISCOM</b>            D/52 SIG (-)            MMC            744 MSB            849 MED CO (AIR AMB) (-) (DS)            855 MED CO (GRD AMB) (-) (DS)            184 PSB            2/205 QM CO (MA) (-)            3 (SLCR)/201 FLD SVC CO (DS)            20 FIN BN</p>
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Figure F-2. The Outline Format for a Task Organization (Division)

243 **MATRIX FORMAT**

244 F-27. The matrix format displays a task organization in terms of unit type and  
245 relationship to subordinate headquarters. It is especially convenient at brigade  
246 and below (see Figure F-3, page F-10.) The matrix format has several  
247 advantages:

- 248 • It displays, at a glance, command and support relationships for  
249 subordinate units and the force as a whole.
- 250 • It shows the organization for combat of CS and CSS elements.
- 251 • It conserves time and eliminates redundancy by not listing organic units  
252 of a parent organization.
- 253 • It makes accounting for each unit easier.

254 F-28. Use the following conventions when preparing a corps or division task  
255 organization as a matrix:

- 256 • List major subordinate command headquarters along the top of the  
257 matrix. List corps troops or division troops in the last column on the right.
- 258 • List attached maneuver units in the maneuver space under the gaining  
259 headquarters. Do not list organic maneuver units.
- 260 • For corps orders, do not list divisional brigades in the maneuver space.  
261 However, for division orders, list attached maneuver battalions under  
262 gaining brigades.
- 263 • List the support “slice” that comes with an attached task force in the  
264 maneuver space under the gaining command.
- 265 • Array CS units in their respective spaces under the supported  
266 headquarters.
- 267 • Specify command or support relationships for units not attached.

268 F-29. Use the following conventions when preparing a brigade or battalion task  
269 organization as a matrix:

- 270 • List major subordinate maneuver commands or task force designations  
271 along the top of the matrix. List brigade control or battalion control in the  
272 last space on the right.
- 273 • For brigade orders, list maneuver battalions separately down the left  
274 column instead of using the normal maneuver label. On battalion orders,  
275 list maneuver companies.
- 276 • If no cross-attachment occurs, leave the space blank.
- 277 • If maneuver units or elements (companies or platoons) are cross-attached,  
278 list them under the appropriate headquarters.
- 279 • Array CS units along their respective space in columns of the appropriate  
280 headquarters.
- 281 • Specify a command or support relationship for units not attached.

282 F-30. Task organization matrices are not recognized by the other armed forces  
283 or by foreign armies. Do not use matrix formats during joint or multinational  
284 operations.

285

	1st Bde	2d Bde	3d Bde	201 ACR	DIVARTY	DIV TRP	DISCOM	TCF
<b>MVR</b>	TF 3-5 TF 3-8		C/3-3 Armor	D/3-23 Cav		1054 ROC		C/3-82 Mech
<b>Avn</b>				C/54 Avn (OPCON)				
<b>FA</b>	3-40 FA (DS) 3-43 FA (R)	3-41 FA (DS)	3-42 FA (DS)	61 FA Bde				
<b>ADA</b>				A/3-441 ADA				
<b>Cml</b>	1/54 Cml Co	2/54 Cml Co	3/54 Cml Co					
<b>ENGR</b>	A, 54 EN (DS)	B/54 EN (DS)	C/54 EN (DS)	D/54 EN		C, 550 EN Cbt Bn (Hv) (-)		
<b>MI</b>	1/A/54 MI (DS) 10 GSR Tms	2/A/54 MI (DS) 6 GSR Tms	3/A/54 MI (DS) 5 GSR Tms					
<b>MP</b>								
<b>SIG</b>								
<b>CSS</b>								
<b>SOF</b>	1 Plt, Co. C, 55th CA TAC Spt Bn	2/C/55 CA TAC Spt Bn	3/C/55 CA TAC Spt Bn			288th PSYOP Co. SOCCE 190	4/C/55 CA TAC Spt Bn	

286

**Figure F-3. The Matrix Format for a Task Organization (Division)**

287

**UNIT LISTING SEQUENCE**

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290

F-31. List major subordinate control headquarters in the sequence shown in Figure F-4, page F-12, regardless of the format used. If applicable, list task organization by phases of the operation.

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292  
293  
294  
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296  
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299

F-32. Group units by command and control headquarters. List major subordinate maneuver units (for example, 1st Bde; 2-30 IN; A, 1-77 AR) first. Place them in alphabetical or numerical order. List brigade task forces ahead of brigades, battalion task forces before battalions, and company teams before companies. Follow maneuver headquarters with the field artillery (for example, DIVARTY), division units controlled by the force headquarters (for example, division troops), and the echelon support command (for example, DISCOM), in that order. List all units directly under the command and control of the force headquarters under a single heading.

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F-33. Use a plus (+) symbol when attaching one or more subelements of a similar function to a headquarters. Use a minus symbol (-) when deleting one or more subelements of a similar function to a headquarters. Always show the symbols in parenthesis. Do not use a plus symbol when the receiving headquarters is a combined arms task force or company team. Do not use plus and minus symbols together (as when a headquarters detaches one element and receives attachment of another); use the symbol that portrays the element's combat power with respect to other similar elements. Do not use either symbol when two units swap subelements and their combat power is unchanged. Here are some examples:

- C Company loses one platoon to A Company: The battalion task organization shows A Co. (+) and C Co. (-).

- 311
- 312
- 313
- 314
- 315
- 316
- 317
- 3-16th Infantry receives a tank company from 4-63d Armor: The brigade task organization shows TF 3-16 IN and 4-63 AR (-).
  - B Company receives a tank platoon from the tank company OPCON to the battalion and detaches one infantry platoon to the tank company: The battalion task organization shows TM B and TM Tank.
  - The 53d Mechanized Division receives an enhanced separate brigade from corps. The corps task organization shows 53d ID (M) (+).
- 318
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- 324
- 325
- F-34. When the effective attachment time of a nonorganic unit to another unit differs from the effective time of the plan or order, add the effective attachment time in parentheses after the attached unit—for example, 1-82 AR (OPCON 2d Bde Ph II). List this information in either the task organization (preferred) or in paragraph 1c of the plan or order, but not both. For clarity, list subsequent command or support relationships under the task organization in parentheses following the affected unit—for example, “...on order, OPCON to 2d Brigade” is written (O/O OPCON 2d Bde).
- 326
- 327
- 328
- F-35. Give the numerical designations of units in Arabic numerals, even if they are shown as Roman numbers in graphics—for example, show X Corps as 10th Corps.
- 329
- 330
- 331
- F-36. During multinational operations, insert the country code between the numeric designation and the unit name—for example, 3d (GE) Corps. FM 1-02 contains authorized country codes.
- 332
- 333
- 334
- F-37. Use abbreviated designations for organic units. Use the full designation for nonorganic units—for example, 2-607 FA (155, SP) (Corps), rather than 2-607 FA.
- 335
- 336
- 337
- F-38. Designate task forces with the last name of the task force commander (for example, TF WILLIAMS), a code name (for example, TF WARRIOR), or a number (for example, TF 47 or TF 1-77 AR).

	<b>Corps</b>	<b>Division</b> (Note 1)	<b>Brigade</b> (Note 1)	<b>Battalion</b> (Note 1)	<b>Company</b>
<b>MANEUVER</b>	Divisions <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>•Infantry</li> <li>•Light Infantry</li> <li>•Mechanized</li> <li>•Motorized</li> <li>•Air Assault</li> <li>•Airborne</li> <li>•Armored</li> </ul> Separate ground maneuver brigades or battalions Aviation ACR SOF <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>•Ranger</li> <li>•Special Forces</li> </ul>	Brigade-size ground <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>•Maneuver TFs named TFs in alphabetical order</li> <li>•Numbered TFs in numerical order</li> <li>•Brigades in numerical order</li> </ul> Task Forces of battalion size <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>•Named TFs in alphabetical order</li> <li>•Numbered TFs in numerical order</li> </ul> Cavalry squadron (Note 2)	Battalion TFs Battalions <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>•Infantry</li> <li>•Light Infantry</li> <li>•Mechanized</li> <li>•Air Assault</li> <li>•Airborne</li> <li>•Armor</li> </ul> Company Teams Companies Aviation Cavalry or Reconnaissance	Company Teams <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Named teams in alphabetical order</li> <li>•Letter designated teams in alphabetical order</li> </ul> Companies <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>•Infantry</li> <li>•Light Infantry</li> <li>•Mechanized</li> <li>•Air Assault</li> <li>•Airborne</li> <li>•Armor</li> <li>•Antitank Scout Platoon</li> </ul>	Organic Platoons Attached Platoons
<b>CS</b>  (Notes 3 and 4)	Field Artillery Air Defense Chemical Engineers LRSC Military Intelligence Military Police Signal SOF <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>•Civil Affairs</li> <li>•Psychological Operations</li> </ul>	Field Artillery Air Defense Artillery Chemical Engineers (Note 5) Military Intelligence Military Police Signal	Field Artillery Air Defense Artillery Chemical Engineers (Note 6) Military Intelligence Military Police Signal	Mortar Platoon Air Defense Artillery Chemical Engineers Military Intelligence	
<b>CSS</b>  (Notes 7 and 8)	Corps support command	Division support command	Support battalion	Support platoon	
<b>HQ Control troops</b>		(Note 9)			
ACR – armored cavalry regiment      LRSC – long range surveillance company      SOF – special operations forces					
<b>NOTES:</b> 1. List separate ground maneuver brigades, battalions, and companies in the same order as divisions are listed in the corps structure. 2. List the cavalry squadron separately when it is operating under division control. 3. List CS units by the size of command echelon, then list them again numerically; and then alphabetically; for example, list larger units before smaller units of the same type. 4. List multiple CS units of the same type using the sequence of size, numerical designation, and alphabet. 5. List the engineer battalion under division troops for light divisions with only one engineer battalion. 6. List the engineer company under brigade troops when only one engineer company is task-organized to the brigade (as is done in light divisions). 7. List multiple CSS units of the same type using the sequence of size, numerical designation, and alphabet. 8. List CSS units by size of command echelon, then list them again numerically, and then alphabetically. 9. Attach the band to the military police or HHC for tactical operations center security (at the main CP).					

Figure F-4. Order of Listing Units in a Task Organization

## Appendix G

# Plans and Orders

This appendix explains how to construct plans and orders for Army units at corps level and below. General information on the content and how to construct plans and orders is followed by examples. For guidance on the preparation of joint plans and orders, refer to JP 5-0, *Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations*; JP 5-00.1, *Joint Doctrine For Campaign Planning*; JP 5-00.2, *Joint Task Force (JTF) Planning Guidance and Procedures*; and CJCSM 3122.03, *Joint Operation Planning and Execution System, Volume II, Planning Formats and Guidance*. Figure G-1, page G-19, provides a list of the figures in this appendix. The figures, beginning on page G-20 contain examples and procedures for completing plans, orders, and annexes.

### CHARACTERISTICS

G-1. Plans and orders are the means by which commanders express their visualization, commander’s intent, and decisions. They focus on results the commander expects to achieve. Plans and orders form the basis commanders use to synchronize military operations. They encourage initiative by providing the *what* rather than the *how* of mission accomplishment. They give subordinates the operational and tactical freedom to accomplish the mission by providing the minimum restrictions and details necessary for synchronization and coordination.

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## Plans and orders—

- Permit subordinate commanders to prepare supporting plans and orders.
- Implement instructions derived from a higher commander's plan or order.
- Focus subordinates' activities.
- Provide tasks and activities, constraints, and coordinating instructions necessary for mission accomplishment.
- Encourage agility, speed, and initiative during execution.
- Convey instructions in a standard, recognizable, clear, and simple format.

G-2. The amount of detail provided in a plan or order depends on several factors: among them, the experience and competence of subordinate commanders, cohesion and tactical experience of subordinate units, and complexity of the operation. Commanders balance these factors with their guidance and commander's intent, and determine the type of plan or order to issue. To maintain clarity and simplicity, plans and orders include annexes only when necessary and only when they pertain to the entire command. Annexes contain the details of support and synchronization necessary to accomplish the mission.

G-3. Characteristics of good operation plans and orders are listed below:

- **Contain critical facts and assumptions.** The commander and staff evaluate all facts and assumptions. They retain for future reassessment only those facts and assumptions that directly affect an operation's success or failure. Operation orders do not state assumptions.
- **Authoritative expression.** The plan or order reflects the commander's intention and will. Therefore, its language is direct. It unmistakably states what the commander wants subordinate commands to do.
- **Positive expression.** Instructions in plans and orders are stated in the affirmative: for example, "The trains will remain in the assembly area"; instead of, "The trains will not accompany the unit." As an exception, some constraints are stated in the negative: for example, "Do not cross Phase Line Blue before H+2."
- **Avoid qualified directives.** Do not use meaningless expressions, such as, "as soon as possible." Indecisive, vague, and ambiguous language leads to uncertainty and lack of confidence. For example, do not use "try to retain"; instead, say "retain until." Avoid using unnecessary modifiers and redundant expressions, such as "violently attack" or "delay while maintaining enemy contact." Use "attack" or "delay." Army doctrine already requires attacking violently and maintaining enemy contact during delays.
- **Balance.** Balance centralized and decentralized control. The commander determines the appropriate balance for a given operation based on METT-TC (mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, and civil

considerations). During the chaos of battle, it is essential to decentralize decision authority to the lowest practical level. Over-centralization slows action and inhibits initiative. However, decentralized control can cause loss of precision. The commander constantly balances competing risks while recognizing that loss of precision is usually preferable to inaction.

- **Simplicity.** Reduce all elements to their simplest form. Eliminate elements not essential to understanding. Simple plans are easier to understand.
- **Brevity.** Be clear and concise. Include only necessary details. Use short words, sentences, and paragraphs. Do not include material covered in SOPs (standing operating procedures). Refer to the SOPs instead.
- **Clarity.** Eliminate every opportunity for misunderstanding the commander's exact, intended meaning. Everyone using the plan or order must readily understand it. Do not use jargon. Use acronyms when they do not reduce clarity. Keep the plan or order simple. Use only doctrinal terms and graphics.
- **Completeness.** Provide all information required for execution. Use control measures that are doctrinally correct, complete, and understandable, and that allow subordinates to exercise initiative. Provide adequate control means (headquarters and communications). Clearly establish command and support relationships. Fix responsibilities for all tasks.
- **Coordination.** Provide for direct contact among subordinates. Fit together all battlefield operating systems (BOS) for synchronized, decisive action. Identify and provide for mutual support requirements while minimizing the chance of fratricide.
- **Flexibility.** Leave room for adjustments to counter the unexpected. The best plan provides for the most flexibility.
- **Timeliness.** Send plans and orders to subordinates in enough time to allow them to adequately plan and prepare their own actions. When time is short, accept less than optimum products in the interest of timeliness.

G-4. Figure G-30 (page G-73) is a verbatim transcript of an order issued by VII Corps in World War II. It represents a typical order in the European Theater of Operations. Its brevity and simplicity are remarkable, considering that the operation involved six divisions. Several factors made this simplicity and brevity possible: VII Corps and its subordinate divisions were well trained, with detailed and practiced SOPs. They were combat tested, with experienced and cohesive staffs. Finally, there was trust up and down the chain of command. Emulating these conditions allows commanders to issue simple and concise operation plans and orders.

## TYPES OF PLANS

G-5. A *plan* is a design for a future or an anticipated operation. Plans come in many forms and vary in scope, complexity, and length of

planning horizons. Strategic plans cover the overall conduct of a war. Operational or campaign plans cover a series of related military operations aimed at accomplishing a strategic or operational objective within a given time and space. Tactical plans cover the employment of units in operations, including the ordered arrangement and maneuver of units in relation to each other and to the enemy in order to use their full potential.

**G-6. An *operation plan* is any plan for the preparation, execution, and assessment of military operations.** (The Army definition eliminates details of the joint definition that apply only to joint operations. See JP 5-0.) An operation plan (OPLAN) becomes an operation order (OPORD) when the commander sets an execution time. Commanders may begin preparation for possible operations by issuing an OPLAN. (See Figure G-2, page 20, and Figure G-4, page G-22.)

**G-7. A *service support plan* is a plan that provides information and instructions covering service support for an operation.** Estimates of the command's operational requirements are the bases for a service support plan (SSPLAN). An SSPLAN becomes a service support order (SSORD) when the commander sets an execution time for the OPLAN the SSPLAN supports. (See Figure G-5, page G-29.)

**G-8. A *supporting plan*,** is an operation plan prepared by a supporting commander or a subordinate commander to satisfy the requests or requirements of the supported commander's plan (JP 5-0).

**G-9. A *contingency plan* is a plan that provides for accomplishing different, anticipated major events before, during, and after an operation. Contingency plans take the form of branches or sequels.** (The joint definition of contingency plans addresses only emergencies. Army forces prepare contingency plans as part of all operations.) Operations never proceed exactly as planned. Commanders prepare contingency plans to gain flexibility. Visualizing and planning branches and sequels are important because they involve transitions—changes in mission, type of operation, or forces required for execution. Unless conducted (planned, prepared, executed, and assessed) efficiently, transitions can reduce tempo, slow momentum, and cede the initiative.

**G-10. A *branch*** is a contingency plan or course of action (an option built into the basic plan or course of action) for changing the mission, disposition, orientation, or direction of movement of the force to aid success of the current operation, based on anticipated events, opportunities, or disruptions caused by enemy actions. Army forces prepare branches to exploit success and opportunities, or to counter disruptions caused by enemy actions (FM 3-0). Although commanders cannot anticipate every possible threat action, they prepare branches for the most likely ones. Commanders execute branches to rapidly respond to changing conditions.

**G-11. *Sequels*** are operations that follow the current operation. They are future operations that anticipate the possible outcomes—success, failure, or stalemate—of the current operation (FM 3-0). A

counteroffensive, for example, is a logical sequel to a defense; exploitation and pursuit follow successful attacks. Executing a sequel normally begins another phase of an operation, if not a new operation. Commanders consider sequels early and revisit them throughout an operation. Without such planning during current operations, forces may be poorly positioned for future opportunities, and leaders unprepared to retain the initiative. Branches and sequels have execution criteria. Commanders carefully review them before execution and update them based on assessment of current operations.

## COMBAT ORDERS

G-12. An *order* is a communication, written, oral, or by signal, which conveys instructions from a superior to a subordinate. In a broad sense, the terms “order” and “command” are synonymous. However, an order implies discretion as to the details of execution whereas a command does not (JP 1-02). There are two general categories of orders: administrative and combat. Administrative orders cover normal administrative operations in garrison or in the field (see AR 25-30 and AR 600-8-105). Combat orders pertain to operations and their service support. Combat orders include—

- Operation orders.
- Service support orders.
- Movement orders.
- Warning orders.
- Fragmentary orders.

## OPERATION ORDERS

G-13. An *operation order* is a directive issued by a commander to subordinate commanders for the purpose of effecting the coordinated execution of an operation (JP 1-02). Traditionally called the five paragraph field order, an OPORD contains, at minimum, descriptions of the following:

- Task organization.
- Situation.
- Mission.
- Execution.
- Administrative and logistic support.
- Command and signal for the specified operation.

OPORDs always specify an execution date and time (see Figures G-2, page 20 and G-4, page G-22).

## SERVICE SUPPORT ORDERS

G-14. A ***service support order*** is an order that directs the service support of operations, including administrative movements (see Figure G-5, page G-29). SSORDs form the basis for the orders of supporting commanders to their units. They also provide information on combat service support (CSS) to supported elements. SSORDs are issued

with an OPORD. They may be issued separately, when the commander expects the CSS situation to apply to more than one OPLAN/OPORD. At division and corps levels, an SSORD may replace an OPORD's service support annex. In those cases, paragraph 4 of the OPORD refers to the SSORD. Staffs at brigade and lower levels may cover all necessary CSS information in paragraph 4 of the OPORD. The SSORD follows the same format as the OPORD. It is usually in writing and may include overlays, traces, and other annexes.

G-15. The logistics officer has primary coordinating responsibility for preparing, publishing, and distributing the SSORD. Other staff officers, both coordinating and special, prepare parts of the order concerning their functional areas.

## MOVEMENT ORDERS

G-16. A *movement order* is an order issued by a commander covering the details for a move of the command (JP 1-02) (see Figure G-6, page G-35). Movement orders usually concern administrative moves (see FM 3-90, *Tactics*). Normally, these movements occur in the communications zone or rear area. The logistics officer has primary coordinating staff responsibility for planning and coordinating movements. This includes preparing, publishing, and distributing movement orders. Other coordinating and special staff officers assist the logistics officer. These may include the operations officer, provost marshal, transportation officers, and movement control personnel.

G-17. When conducting ground movements the rear area of the combat zone where enemy interference is expected, a movement order may become a highway regulation annex to an OPORD or SSORD. (In NATO, this annex is called the movement annex.) The operations officer plans and coordinates these tactical movements.

## WARNING ORDERS

G-18. The *warning order* is a preliminary notice of an order or action which is to follow (JP 1-02) (see Figure G-7, page G-36). Warning orders (WARNOs) help subordinate units and staffs prepare for new missions. They increase subordinates' planning time, provide details of the impending operation, and detail events that accompany preparation and execution. The amount of detail a WARNO includes depends on the information and time available when it is issued and the information subordinate commanders need for proper planning and preparation. The words "warning order" precede the message text. With the commander's (or chief of staff's or executive officer's) approval, a coordinating or special staff officer may issue a WARNO.

G-19. A WARNO informs recipients of tasks they must do now or notifies them of possible future tasks. However, a WARNO does not authorize execution other than planning unless specifically stated. A WARNO follows the OPORD format. It may include some or all of the following information:

- Series numbers, sheet numbers and names, editions, and scales of maps required (if changed from the current OPORD).
- The enemy situation and significant intelligence events.
- The higher headquarters' mission.
- Mission or tasks of the issuing headquarters.
- The commander's intent statement.
- Orders for preliminary actions, including intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) operations.
- Coordinating instructions (estimated time lines, orders group meetings, and the time to issue the OPORD).
- Service support instructions, any special equipment needed, regrouping of transport, or preliminary unit movements.

### FRAGMENTARY ORDERS

G-20. A *fragmentary order* is an abbreviated form of an operation order (verbal, written or digital) usually issued on a day-to-day basis that eliminates the need for restating information contained in a basic operation order. It may be issued in sections. It is issued after an operation order to change or modify that order or to execute a branch or sequel to that order (JP 10-2). Fragmentary orders (FRAGOs) include all five OPORD paragraph headings (see Figure G-8, page G-37). After each heading, state either new information or "no change." This ensures that recipients know they have received the entire FRAGO. Commanders may authorize members of their staff to issue FRAGOs in their name.

G-21. FRAGOs differ from OPORDs only in the degree of detail provided. They address only those parts of the original OPORD that have changed. FRAGOs refer to previous orders and provide brief and specific instructions. The higher headquarters issues a new OPORD when there is a complete change of the tactical situation or when many changes make the current order ineffective.

### TECHNIQUES FOR ISSUING ORDERS

G-22. There are several techniques for issuing orders: oral, written, or electronically produced using matrixes or overlays. The five-paragraph format is the standard for issuing combat orders. Orders may be generated and disseminated by electronic means to reduce the amount of time needed to gather and brief the orders group. When available preparation time or resources are constrained, commanders may use the matrix method of issuing orders.

### ORAL ORDERS

G-23. Oral orders are used when operating in an extremely time-constrained environment. They offer the advantage of being passed quickly but risk important information being overlooked or misunderstood. Oral orders are usually followed up by written FRAGOs.

## GRAPHICS

G-24. Plans and orders generally include both text and graphics. Graphics convey information and instructions through military symbols (see FM 1-02). They complement the written portion of a plan or an order and promote clarity, accuracy, and brevity. The Army prefers depicting information and instructions graphically when possible. However, the mission statement and the commander's intent are always in writing.

## OVERLAYS

G-25. An overlay graphically portrays the location, size, and activity (past, current, or planned) of depicted units more consistently and accurately than text alone. An overlay enhances a viewer's ability to analyze the relationships of units and terrain. A trained viewer can attain a vision of a situation as well as insight into the identification of implied tasks, relationships, and coordination requirements that the written plan or order may not list or readily explain. Overlay graphics may be used on stand-alone overlays or overprinted maps. The issuing headquarters is responsible for the accuracy of control measures and for transposing graphics to and from the map scale used by subordinate headquarters (see Figures G-10, page G-40 and G-29, page G-72).

## OVERLAY ORDERS

G-26. The overlay order is a technique used to issue an order (normally a fragmentary order) that has abbreviated instructions written on an overlay. Overlay orders combine a five-paragraph order with an operation overlay. Commanders may issue an overlay order when planning and preparation time is severely constrained and they must get the order to subordinate commanders as soon as possible. Commanders issue overlay orders by any suitable graphic method. An overlay order may consist of more than one overlay. A separate overlay or written annex can contain the service support coordination and organizations (see Figures G-9, page G-39, and G-10, page G-41).

## ADMINISTRATIVE INSTRUCTIONS FOR PREPARING PLANS AND ORDERS

G-27. The following information pertains to all plans and orders. Unless otherwise stated, the term order refers to both plans and orders.

## GENERAL INFORMATION

G-28. Show all paragraph headings on written orders. There is no need to place an entry under each heading except for Mission (paragraph 2) and Intent (paragraph 3). A paragraph heading with no text will state: "None," or "See [attachment type] [attachment letter or number]." (In this context, attachment is a collective term for annex, appendix, tab, and enclosure; see paragraph G-50.) Conventions such as the bold font and changes in the font size appearing in the headings of annotated formats are solely for emphasis within this manual.

## ABBREVIATIONS

G-29. Use abbreviations to save time and space if they do not cause confusion. Do not sacrifice clarity for brevity. Keep abbreviations consistent throughout any order and its attachments. Avoid using abbreviations other than those contained in international agreements in joint and multinational communications (see FM 1-02, *Operational Terms and Graphics*, and AR 310-50, *Authorized Abbreviations, Brevity Codes, and Acronyms*).

## PLACE AND DIRECTION DESIGNATIONS

G-30. Describe locations or points on the ground by—

- Referring to military grid reference system (MGRS) coordinates.
- Referring to longitude and latitude if the maps available do not have the MGRS.
- Giving the distance and direction from a simple reference point: for example, “crossroads 1,000 meters southwest of church tower of NAPIERVILLE, LB6448.”

G-31. Designate directions in one of three ways:

- By using two locations or places: for example, direction ECKENTAL PV6690–PEGNITZ PA6851.
- As a point of the compass: for example, north or northeast.
- As a magnetic, grid, or true bearing, stating the unit of measure: for example, 85 degrees (magnetic).

G-32. When a place or feature on a map is mentioned for the first time, print the name in capital letters exactly as spelled on the map, and show its grid coordinates in parenthesis after it. When a control measure, such as a contact point, is used for the first time, print the name or designation of the point followed by its grid coordinates in parenthesis. Use four-, six-, or eight-digit MGRS coordinates (as necessary to precisely locate the place, feature, or point) preceded by the 100-kilometer square designation (for example, LB6448). Thereafter, repeat the coordinates only for clarity; use names, planning names, or codes.

G-33. Describe areas by naming the northernmost (12 o'clock) point first and the remaining points in clockwise order. Describe positions from left to right and from front to rear, facing the enemy. To avoid confusion, identify flanks by compass points, rather than right or left of the friendly force.

G-34. If the possibility of confusion exists when describing a route, add compass points for clarity: for example, “The route is northwest along the road LAPRAIRIE–DELSON.” If a particular route already has a planning name, such as main supply route (MSR) LAME DOG, refer to the route using only that designator.

G-35. Designate trails, roads, and railroads by the names of places along them or with grid coordinates. Precede place names with *trail*, *road*, or *railroad*: for example, “road GRANT–CODY.” Designate the route for a movement by listing a sequence of grids from the start point to the

release point. Otherwise, list the sequence of points from left to right or front to rear, facing the enemy.

G-36. Identify riverbanks with cardinal compass points. In river crossing operations, identify riverbanks as either near or far.

G-37. Describe boundaries and phase lines by terrain features easily distinguishable from the ground or air, or on a map. When designating boundaries between units, state which unit has responsibility and authority for the place, feature, or location to which the description refers. State each location along a boundary as either inclusive or exclusive to a unit: for example, "1st Brigade, exclusive crossroad LB621352." List boundaries and phase lines from left to right or front to rear, facing the enemy.

## NAMING CONVENTIONS

G-38. Unit SOPs normally designate naming conventions for graphics. Otherwise, planners select them. For clarity, avoid multiword names, such as "Junction City." Simple names are better than complex ones. To ensure operations security, avoid assigning names that could reveal unit identities, such as the commander's name or the unit's home station. Do not name sequential phase lines and objectives in alphabetical order. For memory aids, use sets of names designated by the type of control measure or subordinate unit. For example, the division might use colors for objective names and minerals for phase line names.

## CLASSIFICATION MARKINGS

G-39. AR 380-5, *Department of the Army Information Security Program*, contains a detailed description of marking, transmitting procedures, and other classification instructions. Place classification markings at the top and bottom of each page. All paragraphs must have the appropriate classification marking immediately following the numbered designation of the paragraph (preceding the first word if the paragraph is not numbered). If the entire plan or order is unclassified, no classification markings are required. Mark unclassified instructional or training material representing orders, "[CLASSIFICATION LEVEL] FOR TRAINING—OTHERWISE UNCLASSIFIED." Handle material marked classified for training only as classified material until the end of the exercise (see AR 380-5, paragraphs 1-18 and 4-21).

G-40. When the issuing headquarters sends classified plans or annexes separately, it assigns copy numbers to each and keeps a record of the copies sent to each addressee.

## EXPRESSING UNNAMED DATES AND TIMES

G-41. Use the following letters to designate unnamed dates and times in plans and orders:

- **C-day.** The unnamed day on which a deployment operation commences or is to commence. The deployment may be movement of troops, cargo, weapon systems, or a combination of these elements using any or all types of transport. The letter "C"

will be the only one used to denote the above. The highest command or headquarters responsible for coordinating the planning will specify the exact meaning of C-day within the aforementioned definition. The command or headquarters directly responsible for the execution of the operation, if other than the one coordinating the planning, will do so in light of the meaning specified by the highest command or headquarters coordinating the planning (JP 1-02).

- **D-day.** The unnamed day on which a particular operation commences or is to commence (JP 1-02). The highest headquarters planning an operation specifies the exact meaning of D-day.
- **M-day.** The unnamed day on which full mobilization commences or is due to commence (JP 1-02).
- **N-day.** The unnamed day an active duty unit is notified for deployment or redeployment (JP 1-02).
- **R-day.** Redeployment day. The day on which redeployment of major combat, combat support, and combat service support forces begins in an operation (JP 1-02).
- **S-day.** The day the President authorized selective reserve callup (not more than 200,000) (JP 1-02).
- **T-day.** The effective day coincident with presidential declaration of national emergency and authorization of partial mobilization (not more than 1,000,000 personnel exclusive of the 2000,000 callup) (JP 1-02).
- **W-day.** Declared by the National Command Authorities [president or secretary of defense], W-day is associated with an adversary decision to prepare for war (unambiguous strategic warning) (JP 1-02).
- **H-hour.** The specific hour on D-day at which a particular operation commences (JP 1-02). H-hour may also be the hour at which an OPLAN/OPORD is executed or is to be executed (as distinguished from the hour the order is issued. The highest command or headquarters coordinating planning specifies the exact meaning of H-hour within the above definition. When several operations or phases of an operation are being executed in the same area on D-day and confusion may arise over the use of the same hour designation, the letters F, L, S, W, and Y may be used.
- **L-hour.** The specific hour on C-day at which a deployment operation commences or is to commence (JP 1-02). For amphibious operations, L-hour is the time at which the first helicopter of the helicopter-borne assault wave touches down in the landing zone

G-42. C-, D-, and M-days end at 2400 hours Universal Time (ZULU time). They are assumed to be 24 hours long for planning. Plans and orders state the letters used and their meanings. If a plan mentions more than one event, refer to the secondary event in terms of the time

of the primary event. Refer to days preceding or following C-, D, or M-day by using a plus or minus sign and an Arabic number after the letter: for example, D – 3 is three days before D-day; D + 7 is seven days after D-day. When using a time element other than days, spell it out: for example, D + 3 months.

G-43. Refer to hours preceding or following H- or L-hour by a plus or minus sign and an Arabic number after the letter: for example, H – 3 is three hours before H-hour; H + 7 is seven hours after H-hour. When using a time element other than hours, spell it out: for example, H + 30 minutes.

G-44. Where it is necessary to identify a particular operation or exercise, place a nickname or code words before the letter; for example, BALD EAGLE (D-day) or ANVIL EXPRESS (M-day).

## EXPRESSING TIME

G-45. The effective time for implementing the plan or order is the same as the date-time group of the order. If the effective time of any portion of the order differs from that of the order, identify those portions at the beginning of the coordinating instructions (in paragraph 3): for example, “Effective only for planning on receipt,” or “Task organization effective 261300Z May 20XX.”)

G-46. Express all times in a plan or order in terms of one time zone (ZULU or local). Include the appropriate time zone indicator in the heading data and mission statement. For example, the time zone indicator for Central Standard Time in the continental US is SIERRA. When daylight savings time is in effect, the time zone indicator for Central Time is ROMEO. The relationship of local time to ZULU time, not the geographic location, determines the time zone indicator to use.

G-47. Express dates in the sequence day, month, and year (6 August 20XX). When using inclusive dates, express them by stating both dates separated by a dash (6–9 August 20XX or 6 August–6 September 20XX). Express times in the 24-hour clock system by means of four-digit Arabic numbers. Include the time zone indicator.

G-48. Express the date and time as a six-digit date-time group. The first two digits indicate the day of the month; the last four digits indicate the time. Add the month or the month and year to the date-time group when necessary to avoid confusion. For example, a complete date-time group would appear as 060140Z August 20XX.

## IDENTIFYING PAGES

G-49. Identify pages following the first page of plans and orders with a short title identification heading. Include the number (or letter) designation of the plan or order, and the issuing headquarters: for example, OPLAN 00-7—23d AD or ANNEX B (INTELLIGENCE) to OPLAN 00-15—23d AD).

## NUMBERING PAGES

G-50. Use the following convention to indicate page numbers:

- Number the pages of the base order and each attachment separately, beginning on the first page of each attachment. Use a combination of alphanumerics to identify each attachment, as described below.
- Use Arabic numbers only to indicate page numbers. Place page numbers after the alphanumerics that identify the attachment. (Use Arabic numbers without any preceding alphanumerics for base order page numbers.)
- Assign each attachment either a letter or Roman number that corresponds to the letter or number in the attachment's short title. Assign letters to annexes, Roman numbers to appendixes, letters to tabs, and Roman numbers to enclosures. Use Roman numbers only as elements of page numbers; do not use Roman numbers in attachment short titles.
- Separate elements of the alphanumerics with hyphens.

For example, the designation of the third page of enclosure 7 to Tab B to Appendix 2 to Annex A is A-II-B-VII-3.

## ATTACHMENTS (ANNEXES, APPENDIXES, TABS, AND ENCLOSURES)

G-51. Attachments (annexes, appendixes, tabs, and enclosures) are an information management tool. They simplify orders by providing a structure for organizing information. The staff member with responsibility for the functional area addressed in the attachment prepares it.

G-52. Attachments contain details not readily incorporated into the base order or a higher level attachment: appendixes contain information necessary to expand annexes; tabs expand appendixes; enclosures expand tabs. Prepare attachments in a form that best portrays the information: for example, text, a matrix, a trace, an overlay, an overprinted map, a sketch, a plan, a graph, or a table. Prepare text in the format at Figure G-11, page G-41.

G-53. Attachments are part of an order. Using them increases the base order's clarity and usefulness by keeping it short. Attachments include combat support (CS), CSS, and administrative details and instructions that amplify the base order. They may also contain branches and sequels.

G-54. The number and type of attachments depend on the commander, level of command, needs of the particular operation, and complexity of the functional area addressed. Minimize their number, consistent with completeness and clarity. If the information relating to an attachment's subject is brief enough to be placed in the base order or the higher level attachment, place it there and omit use the attachment.

G-55. List attachments under an appropriate heading at the end of the document they expand: for example, list annexes at the end of the base order, appendixes at the end of annexes, and so forth. Figure G-3, page

G-21) shows the required sequence of attachments. When local commands require attachments not listed in Figure G-3, label them beginning with the alphanumeric following the last one listed under the appropriate higher level attachment: for example, using Figure G-3 as a reference—

- Additional annexes begin with the letter S.
- Additional appendixes to Annex P begin with Appendix 6.
- Additional tabs to Appendix 2 to Annex I begin with Tab D.

When an attachment required by doctrine or SOP is not necessary, indicate this by stating, “[Type of attachment and its alphanumeric identifier] omitted”; for example, “Annex E omitted.”

G-56. Refer to attachments by letter or number, and title. Use the following convention:

- **Annexes.** Designate annexes with capital letters: for example, Annex I (Service Support) to OPORD 02-06—52d ID (Mech).
- **Appendixes.** Designate appendixes with Arabic numbers: for example, Appendix 3 (Traffic Circulation and Control) to Annex I (Service Support) to OPORD 02-06—52d ID (Mech).
- **Tabs.** Designate tabs with capital letters: for example, Tab B (Road Movement Table) to Appendix 3 (Traffic Circulation and Control) to Annex I (Service Support) to OPORD 02-06—52d ID (Mech).
- **Enclosures.** Designate enclosures with Arabic numbers; for example, Enclosure 2 (Route RED Overlay) to Tab B (Road Movement Table) to Appendix 3 (Traffic Circulation and Control) to Annex I (Service Support) to OPORD 02-06—52d ID (Mech).

G-57. Avoid creating attachments below the level of enclosure. When these are necessary, identify them by repeating the procedures for tabs and enclosures. Use double letters (AA) for attachments to enclosures. Use hyphenated double numbers (1-1) for attachments two levels below enclosures: for example, Enclosure 2-1 ([title]) to Tab BB ([title]) to Enclosure 2 (Route RED Overlay) to Tab B (Road Movement Table) to Appendix 2 (Traffic Circulation and Control) to Annex I (Service Support) to OPORD 02-06—52d ID (Mech).

G-58. If an attachment has wider distribution than the base order, or is issued separately, the attachment requires a complete heading and acknowledgment instructions (see Figure G-11, page G-41). When attachments are distributed with the base order, these elements are not required.

## STANDING OPERATING PROCEDURES

G-59. To enhance effectiveness and flexibility, commanders standardize routine or recurring actions not needing their personal involvement. Standing operating procedures (SOPs) detail how forces execute these unit-specific techniques and procedures. Commanders develop SOPs from doctrinal sources, applicable portions of higher headquarters

procedures, the higher commander's guidance, and experience. SOPs are as complete as possible. Complete SOPs allow new arrivals or newly attached units to quickly become familiar with the unit's routine. SOPs apply until commanders change them. The benefits of SOPs include—

- Simplified, brief combat orders.
- Enhanced understanding and teamwork among commanders, staffs, and troops.
- Standard synchronized staff drills.
- Standard abbreviated or accelerated decision making techniques.

G-60. The operations officer holds staff responsibility for tactical and administrative SOPs. This includes preparing, coordinating, authenticating, publishing, and distributing them. Other staff sections provide input.

## MATRICES AND TEMPLATES

G-61. A number of tools exist to support the commander and staff in making decisions and developing plans and orders. Tools include the synchronization matrix, decision support template (DST), and execution matrix. Matrixes and templates are information management tools that portray information in a readily understandable form. However, while they may be attachments to orders, they are not orders themselves.

## MATRIX AND TEMPLATE GRAPHICS

G-62. Common graphics used on matrixes and templates include—

- Time phase lines (TPLs).
- Named areas of interest (NAIs).
- Targeted areas of interest (TAIs).
- Decision points (DPs).

### Time Phase Lines

G-63. *Time phase lines* are lines used to represent the movement of forces or the flow of an operation over time (FM 2-01.3), for example, in two-hour intervals. TPLs account for the effects of the battlefield environment and the anticipated effects of contact with other forces. For example, TPLs depicting threat movement through an area occupied by friendly forces use movement rates based on a force in contact with the enemy rather than convoy movement speeds.

G-64. TPLs help track enemy movements. They provide a graphic means of comparing the enemy's rate of movement along different avenues of approach and mobility corridors. TPLs can be computed for all types of enemy movement and operations; for example, air assault, deliberate attack, and dismounted infiltration. Both friendly and enemy movement rates are adjusted to compensate for the effects of weather, terrain, and obstacles. During operations, the intelligence officer adjusts TPLs to conform to the enemy's actual movement rates.

## Named Areas of Interest

G-65. A *named area of interest* is a geographical area where information that will satisfy a specific information requirement can be collected (FM 3-90). NAIs are usually selected to capture indications of enemy courses of action (COAs), but may also be related to battlefield and environment conditions. They can be points on the ground, a portion of a route, or a larger area. When possible, NAIs are placed in numbered sequences along an avenue of approach or a mobility corridor. This technique helps calculate movement times between NAIs. It also limits confusion about the avenue or corridor involved. An NAI may be designated a TAI when enemy activity is detected within it.

## Targeted Areas of Interest

G-66. A *targeted area of interest* is the geographical area or point along a mobility corridor where successful interdiction causes the enemy to abandon a particular course of action or requires him to use specialized engineer support to continue. It is where he can be acquired and engaged by friendly forces (FM 3-90). This engagement can be by through maneuver, fires, obstacles, and or electronic warfare. Commanders designate TAIs where they believe they can best attack high-payoff targets. The staff develops TAIs during the targeting process, based on the IPB (see Annex H). They refine TAIs during the war game. The commander approves TAIs during COA approval.

## Decision Points

G-67. A *decision point* is a point in space and time where the commander or staff anticipates making a decision concerning a specific friendly course of action. A decision point is usually associated with a specific targeted area of interest, and is located in time and space to permit the commander sufficient lead-time to engage the adversary in the targeted area of interest. Decision points may also be associated with the friendly force and the status of ongoing operations (JP 1-02).

G-68. Decision points (DPs) may be events, areas, lines, or points where the war game showed the commander might have to make a decision. They address projected situations and indicate when, where, and under what conditions a decision is most likely to be required. A decision may be to initiate a specific activity (such as a branch or sequel) or event (such as lifting or shifting of fires). DPs do not dictate decisions; they only indicate that a decision is anticipated, and when and where the decision should be made to have the maximum effect on friendly or enemy COAs. However, if the commander does not make a decision before the enemy force passes the DP, the force may not be able to take advantage of opportunities associated with that DP.

G-69. Factors affecting DP placement include the time required—

- For the intelligence officer to receive information from ISR assets focused on NAIs associated with the DP.
- To process or analyze information the commander requires to make the decision associated with the DP.

- To advise the commander of the activity.
- To disseminate orders or instructions to the proper maneuver, fire support, CS, or CSS unit or asset.
- For the unit or asset to execute the orders or instructions.

G-70. DPs are supported by one or more NAIs. NAIs associated with a DP are areas where ISR assets are focused to collect information the commander needs to make the decision associated with that DP.

G-71. DPs often trigger maneuver, fires, or electronic attack on a TAI. For some TAIs, the commander specifies one attack option, thus one DP. However, commanders may designate a group of DPs, called a DP cluster, to address several options for one TAI. Regardless of location, DPs and TAIs are kept under surveillance.

## SYNCHRONIZATION MATRICES

G-72. A **synchronization matrix** is a format for the staff to record the results of war-gaming and synchronize a course of action across time, space, and purpose in relation to an enemy course of action. The staff can readily translate a synchronization matrix into a graphic decision making product, such as a decision support template. Separate synchronization matrices may be prepared for each battlefield operating system. A synchronization matrix clearly shows the relationships between activities, units, support functions, and key events. It helps the staff adjust activities based on the commander's guidance, commander's intent, and the enemy's most likely COA. (See Figure 3-15, page 3-41.) The synchronization matrix is not a formal part of plans and orders. It is an internal staff product that serves as a planning tool. It is normally is not distributed.

## DECISION SUPPORT TEMPLATES

G-73. A *decision support template* is a graphic record of war-gaming. The decision support template depicts decision points, time lines associated with the movement of forces and the flow of the operation, and other key items of information required to execute a specific friendly course of action (JP 1-02). A decision support template (DST) graphically portrays DPs and projected situations. It indicates when, where, and under what conditions decisions by the commander are most likely to be required.

G-74. The staff uses the operation map as the base for the DST. Before the war game, the intelligence officer portrays possible enemy COAs on situation templates. During the war game, the staff tests options within each COA and determines the information the commander needs to make decisions concerning them. Afterwards, the staff combines this information into the DST. The DST is keyed to the synchronization matrix developed during the war game. It graphically integrates—

- TPLs and enemy events, activities, and targets.
- Friendly events, activities, concept of operations, and control measures from the synchronization matrix and operation overlay.
- Commander's critical information requirements (CCIR).

- Estimates of times required to implement decisions.

FM 2-0, *Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Operations*, and FM 2-01.3, *Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield*, discuss elements of the DST.

G-75. The DST supports decisions linked to other events. These decisions can involve targets or actions that support the concept of operations. For each decision, the DST lists options developed during the war game. For example, a DST can list options for friendly maneuver and fires to counter enemy counterattacks. Additionally, DSTs can support CS- and CSS-related decisions: for example—

- When the enemy arrives at a DP, the commander may decide to shift unit positions and displace the division support area.
- When a friendly unit reaches a DP, the commander may decide to move supporting artillery.

G-76. A DST associates time with points, areas, or lines in the area of operations. Time may be expressed as a sequence of events or activities, or in relationship to the start of the mission; for example, D + 2; H + 6; or H + 30 minutes. The time to accomplish certain actions for both friendly and enemy units is estimated based on planning factors.

G-77. A DST links TAIs, DPs, CCIR, and NAIs. TAIs are areas where the where interdiction of an enemy force will reduce or eliminate particular enemy capabilities or cause him to abandon, modify, or adopt another course of action. A DP is a point at which the commander must decide whether to act on opportunities offered by a TAI. Information the commander requires to make a decision at a DP comprise one or more CCIR. ISR assets target NAIs to collect this information.

## EXECUTION MATRICES

G-78. An *execution matrix* is a visual and sequential representation of the critical tasks and responsible organizations by phase for a tactical operation. The staff can write an annex to the OPLAN/OPORD as an execution matrix.

## EXAMPLES AND PROCEDURES FOR COMPLETING PLANS, ORDERS, AND ATTACHMENTS

G-79. All plans, orders, and attachments use the five-paragraph format. Use the annotated annex format (Figure G-4, page G-22) as a guide. Refer to individual annex examples for functional-area specifics.

G-80. The following figures portray and explain the formats of plans, orders, and attachments. (See Annex F for instructions and formats for Annex A (Task Organization) to OPLANs/OPORDs. Figure G-1 is a list of the figures.

G-81. Boldface paragraph numbers, letters, and titles denote normal paragraph headings. Bullet lists indicate suggestions of the kinds of items that may go in subparagraphs. These conventions are solely for emphasis within this manual.

G-82. Formats for joint plans and orders are described in CJCSM 3122.03A, Joint Operations Planning and Execution System (JOPEs) Volume II (Planning Formats and Guidance).

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**Figure G-1. List of Figures**

<b>[Classification]</b> [Change from oral orders, if any]	Copy ## of ## copies Issuing headquarters Place of issue Date-time group of signature Message reference number
<b>OPERATION PLAN/ORDER [number] [code name]</b>	
<b>References</b>	
<b>Time Zone Used Throughout the OPLAN/OPORD:</b>	
<b>Task Organization</b>	
<b>1. SITUATION.</b>	
a. Enemy forces.	
b. Friendly forces.	
c. Attachments and detachments.	
d. Assumptions.	
<b>2. MISSION.</b>	
<b>3. EXECUTION.</b>	
Intent:	
a. Concept of operations.	
(1) Maneuver.	
(2) Fires.	
(3) Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance.	
(4) Intelligence.	
(5) Engineer.	
(6) Air and Missile Defense.	
(7) Information Operations.	
b. Tasks to maneuver units.	
c. Tasks to other combat and combat support units.	
d. Coordinating instructions.	
(1) Time or condition when the plan/order becomes effective.	
(2) CCIR.	
(3) Risk reduction control measures.	
(4) Rules of engagement.	
(5) Environmental considerations.	
(6) Force protection.	
(7) As required.	
<b>4. SERVICE SUPPORT.</b>	
a. Support concept.	
b. Materiel and services.	
c. Medical evacuation and hospitalization.	
d. Personnel.	
e. Civil military.	
f. As required.	
<b>[Classification]</b>	

Figure G-2. OPLAN/OPORD Outline Format

<b>[Classification]</b>	
<b>OPLAN/OPORD [number] [code name]—[issuing headquarters]</b>	
<b>5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL.</b>	
a. Command.	
b. Signal.	
<b>ACKNOWLEDGE:</b>	<b>[Commander's last name]</b>
	<b>[Commander's rank]</b>
<b>OFFICIAL:</b>	
<b>[Authenticator's Name]</b>	
<b>[Authenticator's Position]</b>	
<b>ANNEXES:</b>	
<b>DISTRIBUTION:</b>	
<b>[Classification]</b>	

Figure G-2. OPLAN/OPORD Outline Format (continued)

<p><b>Annex A (Task Organization)</b></p> <p><b>Annex B (Intelligence)</b></p> <p>    Appendix 1 (Intelligence Estimate)</p> <p>    Appendix 2 (Intelligence Synchronization Plan)</p> <p>    Appendix 3 (Counterintelligence)</p> <p>    Appendix 4 (IPB Products)</p> <p><b>Annex C (Operations)</b></p> <p>    Appendix 1 (Operation Overlay)</p> <p>    Appendix 2 (As required—Air Assault, River Crossing, etc.)</p> <p><b>Annex D (Fire Support)</b></p> <p>    Appendix 1 (Air Support)</p> <p>    Appendix 2 (Field Artillery Support)</p> <p>    Appendix 3 (Naval Gunfire Support)</p> <p><b>Annex E (Rules of Engagement)</b></p> <p><b>Annex F (Engineer)</b></p> <p>    Appendix 1 (Engineer Overlay)</p> <p>    Appendix 2 (Environmental Considerations)</p> <p><b>Annex G (Air and Missile Defense)</b></p> <p><b>Annex H (Command, Control, Communication, and Computer Operations)</b></p> <p><b>Annex I (Service Support)</b></p> <p>    Appendix 1 (Service Support Matrix)</p> <p>    Appendix 2 (Service Support Overlay)</p> <p>    Appendix 3 (Traffic Circulation and Control)</p> <p>        Tab A (Traffic Circulation Overlay)</p>	<p>    Tab B (Road Movement Table)</p> <p>    Tab C (Highway Regulation)</p> <p>    Appendix 4 (Personnel)</p> <p>    Appendix 5 (Legal)</p> <p>    Appendix 6 (Religious Support)</p> <p>    Appendix 7 (Foreign and Host-Nation Support)</p> <p>    Appendix 8 (Reports)</p> <p><b>Annex J (Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Operations)</b></p> <p><b>Annex K (Provost Marshal)</b></p> <p><b>Annex L (Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Operations)</b></p> <p>    Appendix 1 (ISR Tasking Plan/Matrix.)</p> <p>    Appendix 2 (ISR Overlay)</p> <p><b>Annex M (Rear Area and Base Security)</b></p> <p><b>Annex N (Space)</b></p> <p><b>Annex O (Army Airspace Command and Control)</b></p> <p><b>Annex P (Information Operations)</b></p> <p>    Appendix 1 (OPSEC)</p> <p>    Appendix 2 (PSYOP)</p> <p>    Appendix 3 (Military Deception)</p> <p>    Appendix 4 (Electronic Warfare)</p> <p>    Appendix 5 (IO Execution Matrix)</p> <p><b>Annex Q (Civil-Military Operations)</b></p> <p><b>Annex R (Public Affairs)</b></p>
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Figure G-3. Sequence of Annexes and Appendixes to OPLANs/OPORDs

**[Classification]**

Place the classification at the top and bottom of every page of the OPLAN/OPORD.

**(Change from oral orders, if any)**

The phrases “No change from oral orders” or “No change from oral orders except paragraph #” are required. This statement is applicable only if an oral order is issued by the commander.

**Copy ## of ## copies  
Issuing headquarters**

Show location of issuing headquarters.

**Place of issue**

Show the name of the town or place in capital letters, coordinates in parentheses, and the country in capital letters. You may encode both.

**Date-time group of signature**

The effective time for implementing the plan or order is the same as the date-time group of signature unless the coordinating instructions state otherwise. Use time zone ZULU (Z) unless the order states otherwise. When orders apply to units in different time zones, use ZULU time. When an OPLAN/OPORD does not specify the actual time to begin an operation, state that time in terms of an event or in terms of one of the times listed I paragraph G-41 (for example, 0400 hours Z, D + 3).

**Message reference number**

Message reference numbers are internal control numbers that the unit signal officer issues and assigns to all plans and orders. The unit SOP normally describes their allocation and use. Using this number allows an addressee to acknowledge receiving the message in the clear.

**OPERATION PLAN/ORDER [number] [code name]**

Plans and orders normally receive a code name and are numbered consecutively within a calendar year.

**References**

List the maps, charts, datum, or other related documents the unit needs to understand the OPLAN/OPORD. Do not list SOPs. Refer to maps using the map series number (and country or geographic area, if required), sheet number and name, edition, and scale, if required. Datum is the mathematical model of the earth used to calculate the coordinate on any map. Different nations use different datums for printing coordinates on their maps. The datum is usually printed in the marginal information of each map. A common datum is essential for accurate targeting.

**Time Zone Used Throughout the OPLAN/OPORD:**

The time zone used throughout the OPLAN/OPORD (including attachments) is the time zone applicable to the operation. Operations across several time zones use ZULU time.

**[Classification]**

**Figure G-4. Annotated OPLAN/OPORD Format**

<p><b>[Classification]</b></p> <p><b>OPLAN/OPORD [number] [code name]—[issuing headquarters]</b></p> <p>Place the classification and short title of the OPLAN/OPORD at the top of the second and any subsequent pages of the base OPLAN/OPORD.</p> <p><b>Task Organization:</b></p> <p>Describe the allocation of forces to support the concept of operations (see Appendix F). Task organization may be placed in Annex A if it is long or complicated.</p> <p><b>1. SITUATION.</b></p> <p><b>a. Enemy forces.</b> Express this information in terms of two enemy echelons below yours (for instance, corps address brigades; battalions address platoons). Describe the enemy's most likely and most dangerous COAs. When possible, provide a sketch of the enemy COA instead of a written description. These sketches are appendixes to Annex B (Intelligence). Include an assessment of terrorist activities directed against US government interests in the AO. Refer to Annex B (Intelligence), the current intelligence estimate, the intelligence summary, and other sources, if appropriate.</p> <p><b>b. Friendly forces.</b> List the mission, commander's intent, and concept of operations for headquarters one and two levels up. Subparagraphs state the missions of flank units and other units whose actions have a significant effect on the issuing headquarters.</p> <p><b>c. Attachments and detachments.</b> Do not repeat information already listed under Task Organization or in Annex A (Task Organization). Try to put all information in the task organization and state, "See Task Organization" or "See Annex A" here. Otherwise, list units that are attached or detached to the headquarters that issues the order. State when attachment or detachment is effective, if different from the effective time of the OPLAN/OPORD (such as, on-order, or on commitment of the reserve). Use the term "remains attached" when units will be or have been attached for some time.</p> <p><b>d. Assumptions (OPLAN only).</b> List all assumptions.</p> <p><b>2. MISSION.</b> Enter the restated mission (see Chapter 3). A mission statement contains no subparagraphs. The mission statement covers on-order missions.</p> <p><b>3. EXECUTION.</b></p> <p><b>Intent:</b> State the commander's intent (see Chapter 3).</p> <p><b>a. Concept of operations.</b> The concept of operations describes how the commander sees the actions of subordinate units fitting together to accomplish the mission. As a minimum, the concept of operations includes the scheme of maneuver and concept of fires. The concept of operations expands the commander's selected COA and expresses how each element of the force will cooperate to accomplish the mission. Where the commander's intent focuses on the end state, the concept of operations focuses on the method by which the operation uses and synchronizes the</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><b>[Classification]</b></p>
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Figure G-4. Annotated OPLAN/OPORD Format (continued)

**[Classification]****OPLAN/OPORD [number] [code name]—[issuing headquarters]**

battlefield operating systems to translate vision and end state into action. Commanders ensure that their concept of operations is consistent with their intent and that of the next two higher commanders.

The concept of operations may be a single paragraph, divided into two or more subparagraphs or, if unusually lengthy, prepared as a separate annex (Annex C, Operations). The concept of operations addresses the decisive and shaping operations. It describes the overall form of maneuver, designates the main effort for each phase of the operation (if phases are used), and includes any be-prepared missions. The concept of operations is concise and understandable.

The concept of operations describes—

- The employment of major maneuver elements in a scheme of maneuver.
- A plan of fire support or “scheme of fires” supporting the maneuver with fires.
- The integration of other major elements or systems within the operation. These include ISR, intelligence, engineer, and air defense assets.
- Any other details the commander considers appropriate to clarify the concept of operations and to ensure unity of effort. If the integration and coordination are too lengthy for this paragraph, they are addressed in the appropriate annexes, which are referenced here.

When an operation involves two or more clearly distinct and separate phases, the concept of operations may be prepared in subparagraphs describing each phase. Designate phases as “Phase” followed by the appropriate Roman numeral, for example, Phase I.

If the operation overlay is the only annex referenced, show it after “a. Concept of Operations.” Place the commander’s intent and concept of operations statement on the overlay if the overlay does not accompany the OPLAN/OPORD.

**NOTE:** The number of subparagraphs, if any, depend on what the commander considers appropriate, the level of command, and the complexity of the operation. The following subparagraphs are examples of what may be required within the concept of operations.

**(1) Maneuver.** State the scheme of maneuver. Be sure this paragraph is consistent with the operation overlay. It must address the decisive and shaping operations, including security operations and the use of reserves. This paragraph and the operation overlay are complementary, each adding clarity to, rather than duplicating, the other. Do not duplicate information in unit subparagraphs and the coordinating instructions.

**(2) Fires.** Describe the scheme of fires. State which unit has priority of fires. Include the purpose of, priorities for, allocation of, and restrictions for fire support. Refer to Annex D (Fire Support) and other annexes as required. If Annex D is not used, include the following subparagraphs:

**[Classification]**

**Figure G-4. Annotated OPLAN/OPORD Format (continued)**

**[Classification]****OPLAN/OPORD [number] [code name]—[issuing headquarters]**

**(a) Air support.** State allocation of close air support (CAS) sorties, air interdiction sorties (corps), and nominations (division). Show tactical air reconnaissance sorties here or in Annex B (Intelligence). Corps and echelons above corps include nuclear weapons target nominations.

**(b) Field artillery support.** Cover priorities such as counterfires or interdiction. State organization for combat. Include command and support relationships only if they are not clear in the task organization. Ensure that allocation of fires supports the concept of operations.

**(c) Naval gunfire support.**

**(d) Fire support coordinating measures.**

**(3) Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance.** State the overall reconnaissance objective. Outline the ISR concept and how it ties in with the scheme of maneuver. Address how ISR assets are operating in relation to the rest of the force. Do not list ISR tasks to units here. Assign ISR tasks to units in paragraphs 3b, 3c, or 4. Refer to Annex L (ISR) if required.

**(4) Intelligence.** Describe the intelligence system concept. State the priority of effort among situation development, targeting, and battle damage assessment. Describe the priority of support to units and the priority of counterintelligence effort. Refer to Annex B (Intelligence) and Annex L (ISR) as required.

**(5) Engineer.** State the scheme of engineer support. Describe the integration of engineer assets and obstacles. Establish priority of work if not addressed in SOPs. Provide priority of mobility and survivability aspects as appropriate. List environmental considerations. Delegate or withhold authority to emplace obstacles. Refer to Annex F (Engineer) and other annexes as required.

**(6) Air and Missile Defense.** State overall concept of air and missile defense. Include considerations of potential Air Force counterair support and the contribution of dedicated air defense units. Establish priority of air defense for general support units. Provide air defense weapons status and warning status. Refer to Annex G (Air Defense) and other annexes as required.

**(7) Information Operations.** State IO concept of support and list the IO objectives. Refer to Annex P (Information Operations) and other annexes as required. Do not list IO tasks. Assign IO tasks to units in paragraphs 3b, 3c, or 4.

**(8) NBC Operations.** State the overall concept of NBC operations. Assign priorities of effort and support. Address functions or support roles of organic or attached chemical and smoke units if not clear in task organization. Establish priorities of work if not addressed in unit SOPs. Refer to Annex J (NBC Operations) and other annexes as required.

**(9) Military Police Operations.** State the overall concept of military police

**[Classification]**

Figure G-4. Annotated OPLAN/OPORD Format (continued)

<p><b>[Classification]</b></p> <p><b>OPLAN/OPORD [number] [code name]—[issuing headquarters]</b></p> <p>operations in support of the scheme of maneuver. Assign priorities of effort and support. Address functions or support roles of organic or attached military police units if it is not clear in task organization. Establish priorities of support to EPW operations, circulation control plan, and rear area security if not addressed in unit SOPs. Refer to Annex K (Provost Marshal) and other annexes as required.</p> <p><b>(10) Civil-Military Operations.</b> State the overall CMO concept. Assign priorities of effort and support. Refer to Annex Q (CMO) and other annexes as required.</p> <p><b>b. Tasks to maneuver units.</b> State the missions or tasks assigned to each maneuver unit that reports directly to the headquarters issuing the order. Use a separate subparagraph for each unit. Cross-reference attachments that assign them tasks. List units in task organization sequence. Include reserves. State only tasks that are necessary for comprehension, clarity, and emphasis. Place tasks that affect two or more units in paragraph 3d, Coordinating Instructions.</p> <p><b>c. Tasks to other combat and combat support units.</b> State the missions or tasks assigned to nonmaneuver combat units and CS units. Cross-reference attachments that assign them tasks. Use a separate subparagraph for each unit. List units in task organization sequence. List only those tasks that are not specified or implied elsewhere.</p> <p><b>d. Coordinating instructions.</b> List only instructions applicable to two or more units and not covered in unit SOPs. This is always the last subparagraph in paragraph 3. Complex instructions should be placed in an annex. Paragraphs 3d(1)–d(5) below are mandatory.</p> <p><b>(1) Time or condition when a plan or an order becomes effective.</b></p> <p><b>(2) Commander’s critical information requirements.</b> List CCIR only here. Do not list in annexes.</p> <p><b>(3) Risk reduction control measures.</b> These are measures unique to this operation and not included in unit SOPs. They may include mission-oriented protective posture, operational exposure guidance, troop-safety criteria (corps only), vehicle recognition signals, and fratricide prevention measures.</p> <p><b>(4) Rules of engagement (ROE).</b> Refer to Annex E (ROE) if required.</p> <p><b>(5) Environmental considerations.</b></p> <p><b>(6) Force protection.</b></p> <p><b>(7) Any additional coordinating instructions.</b></p> <p><b>4. SERVICE SUPPORT.</b> Address service support in the areas shown below as needed to clarify the service support concept. Refer to annexes, if required. An SSPLAN/SSORD may replace this paragraph in division and corps orders (see Figure G-5, page G-29)</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><b>[Classification]</b></p>
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Figure G-4. Annotated OPLAN/OPORD Format (continued)

[Classification]

**OPLAN/OPORD [number] [code name]—[issuing headquarters]**

Subparagraphs can include the following:

**a. Support concept.** State the concept of logistics support to provide non-CSS commanders and their staffs a visualization of how the operation will be logistically supported. This could include—

- A brief synopsis of the support command mission.
- Support command headquarters or support area locations, including locations of the next higher logistic bases if not clearly conveyed in the CSS overlay.
- The next higher level's support priorities and where the unit fits into those priorities.
- The commander's priorities of support.
- Units in the next higher CSS organization supporting the unit.
- The use of host-nation support.
- Significant or unusual CSS issues that might impact the overall operation.
- Any significant sustainment risks.
- Unique support requirements in the functional areas of manning, arming, fueling, fixing, moving, and sustaining soldiers and their systems.
- The support concept organized into a framework based on operational phasing, or presented in the before-during-after-operations format.

**b. Materiel and services.**

**c. Medical evacuation and hospitalization.**

**d. Personnel service support.**

**5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL**

**a. Command.** State the map coordinates for command post locations and at least one future location for each command post. Identify the chain of command if not addressed in unit SOPs.

**b. Signal.** List signal instructions not specified in unit SOPs. Identify the specific signal operating instructions edition in effect, required reports and formats, and times the reports are submitted.

**ACKNOWLEDGE:** Include instructions for the acknowledgement of the plan or order by addressees. The word "acknowledge" may suffice or you may refer to the message reference number. Acknowledgement of a plan or order means that it has been received and understood.

[Commander's last name]

[Commander's rank]

The commander or authorized representative signs the original copy. If the representative signs the original, add the phrase "For the Commander." The signed copy is the historical copy and remains in headquarters files.

[Classification]

Figure G-4. Annotated OPLAN/OPORD Format (continued)

<b>[Classification]</b>
<b>OPLAN/OPORD [number] [code name]—[issuing headquarters]</b>
<b>OFFICIAL:</b> <b>[Authenticator's Name]</b> <b>[Authenticator's Position]</b>
Use only if the commander does not sign the original order. If the commander signs the original, no further authentication is required. If the commander does not sign, authentication is required by the signature of the preparing staff officer and only the last name and rank of the commander appear in the signature block.
<b>ANNEXES:</b> List annexes by letter and title in the sequence shown in Figure G-3 (page G-21). If a particular annex is not used, place a "not used" beside that annex letter.
<b>DISTRIBUTION:</b> Furnish distribution copies either for action or for information. List in detail those who are to receive the plan or order. If necessary, also refer to an annex containing the distribution list or to a standard distribution list or SOP. When referring to a standard distribution list, also show distribution to reinforcing, supporting, and adjacent units, since that list does not normally include these units. When distribution includes a unit from another nation or from a NATO command, cite the distribution list in full.
<b>[Classification]</b>

Figure G-4. Annotated OPLAN/OPORD Format (continued)

<p><b>[Classification]</b></p> <p>Place the classification at the top and bottom of every page of the SSPLAN/ SSORD.</p> <p><b>(Change from oral orders, if any)</b></p> <p>The phrases “No change from oral orders” or “No change from oral orders except paragraph #” are required. This statement is applicable only if an oral order is issued by the commander.</p> <p style="text-align: right;"><b>Copy ## of ## copies Issuing headquarters</b></p> <p>Show location of issuing headquarters.</p> <p style="text-align: right;"><b>Place of issue</b></p> <p>Show the name of the town or place in capital letters, coordinates in parentheses, and the country in capital letters. You may encode both.</p> <p style="text-align: right;"><b>Date-time group of signature</b></p> <p>The effective time for implementing the plan or order is the same as the date-time group of signature unless the coordinating instructions state otherwise. Use time zone ZULU (Z) unless the order states otherwise. When orders apply to units in different time zones, use ZULU time. When an OPLAN/OPORD does not specify the actual time to begin an operation, state that time in terms of an event or in terms of one of the times listed I paragraph G-41 (for example, 0400 hours Z, D + 3).</p> <p style="text-align: right;"><b>Message reference number</b></p> <p>Message reference numbers are internal control numbers that the unit signal officer issues and assigns to all plans and orders. The unit SOP normally describes their allocation and use. Using this number allows an addressee to acknowledge receiving the message in the clear.</p> <p><b>SERVICE SUPPORT PLAN/ORDER [number] [code name]</b></p> <p>Plans and orders normally contain a code name and are numbered consecutively within a calendar year.</p> <p><b>Related OPLAN/OPORD [number] [code name]</b> (when applicable).</p> <p><b>References</b></p> <p>List the maps, charts, datum, or other related documents the unit needs to understand the OPLAN/OPORD. Do not list SOPs. Refer to maps using the map series number (and country or geographic area, if required), sheet number and name, edition, and scale, if required. Datum is the mathematical model of the earth used to calculate the coordinate on any map. Different nations use different datums for printing coordinates on their maps. The datum is usually printed in the marginal information of each map. A common datum is essential for accurate targeting.</p> <p><b>Time Zone Used Throughout the OPLAN/OPORD:</b></p> <p>The time zone used throughout the OPLAN/OPORD (including attachments) is the time zone applicable to the operation. Operations across several time zones use ZULU time.</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><b>[Classification]</b></p>
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Figure G-5. Annotated SSPLAN/SSORD Format

**[Classification]**

**SSPLAN or SSORD [number] [code name]—[issuing headquarters]**

Place the classification and short title of the OPLAN/OPORD at the top of the second and any subsequent pages of the base OPLAN/OPORD.

**Task Organization:** List the number and coordinates of CSS units here or in a trace or overlay. If you do not list units here, omit this heading.

1. **SITUATION.** State the general CSS factors affecting support of the operation. Include any information essential to understanding the current situation as it influences CSS. This information comes from paragraph 1 of the related OPLAN/OPORD.

**a. Enemy forces.** Refer to an OPLAN/OPORD or its intelligence annex if it has been published or is to be published. List information about the composition, disposition, location, movements, estimated strengths, and identifications of enemy forces. List enemy capabilities that could influence the CSS mission.

**b. Friendly forces.** List pertinent information on own forces (other than those a referenced OPLAN/OPORD covers or that subsequent paragraphs of this PLAN/order include) that might directly influence the CSS mission.

**c. Attachments and detachments.** See related OPLAN/OPORD.

**d. Assumptions (SSPLAN only).** Same as the related OPLAN/OPORD.

2. **MISSION.** State the CSS tasks and their purpose.

3. **EXECUTION.**

**NOTE: There is no commander’s intent statement for a SSPLAN/SSORD.**

**Concept of support operations.** Outline the general plan for CSS and any instructions that succeeding paragraphs do not suitably cover (for example, location of the division support area, location of coordinating agencies, general instructions for movement of bases).

4. **SERVICE SUPPORT.**

**a. Materiel and services.**

**(1) Supply.** This paragraph contains a subparagraph for each class of supply, maps, water, special supplies, excess materiel, salvage materiel, and captured enemy materiel. Each subparagraph contains the location of the installations that handle supplies and materiel for supported units, the time of opening or closing, operating units, supported units, levels of supply, methods and schedules of distribution, and other instructions or information supported units need. Instructions or information for two or more classes of supply may be listed under one paragraph. However, do not sacrifice clarity. For Class V, include the designation and location of the approving agency for ammunition requisitions and the controlled supply rate, as appropriate.

**(2) Transportation.** Include location of terminals and installations (rail stations, airfields, and ports); operating units; schedules (march tables, timetables, and rail movement tables); area responsibilities of the transportation movement officers and highway regulating teams; traffic control and regulation measures, such as, regulations, restrictions, allocation priorities, and regulating and control points; and designation of the main supply routes. Modes may include ocean, inland waterway, coastal,

**[Classification]**

Figure G-5. Annotated SSPLAN/SSORD Format (continued)

**[Classification]****SSPLAN or SSORD [number] [code name] —[issuing headquarters]**

highway, air, and rail. Include procedures to request transportation support.

**(3) Services.** Include information or instructions for support units that prescribe the type of service available, designation and location of the unit or installation providing the service, assignments to support units, and schedules for service, if applicable. Include specific missions for service units supporting operations. For example, include priority of effort for general engineering missions. Under each subparagraph, list pertinent service installations, stating location, operating units, and assignments to supported units. Assign any special missions not covered in other orders to service units. Divide this information into subparagraphs if necessary. The following are examples of Services subparagraphs:

**(a) Field services.** Include food preparation, water purification, aerial delivery, showers, laundry, clothing repair, light textile repair, and mortuary affairs. For mortuary affairs, establish locations of collection points, evacuation procedures, and handling of personal effects. Include procedures for emergency and temporary burials, mass burials, or contaminated remains.

**(b) Installation service.** List real estate, repair and utilities, fire protection, sewage and trash disposal, hazardous material and waste disposal, and water supply. Establish base camps to house soldiers.

**(c) Other.** Include any CSS requirements for EOD and contingency contracting.

**(4) Labor.** Include policies, with any restrictions, on using civilian and EPW and civilian internees or detainees in labor units. Allocate and prioritize available labor. Include designation and location of available labor units.

**(5) Maintenance.** Include priority of maintenance, location of facilities, collection points, maintenance time lines, and evacuation procedures.

**b. Medical evacuation and hospitalization.** Include information and instructions for supported units. Prescribe the plan for collection, triage, medical evacuation, and medical treatment of sick, injured, and wounded soldiers, including EPW. List procedures to be used for chemical casualties.

**(1) Evacuation.** List ambulance exchange points. Establish ambulance shuttles, routes, means, and schedules of evacuation; evacuation and en route treatment policies for the use of nonmedical transportation assets; policies for evacuation by air or ground; and evacuation of NBC-contaminated patients. Include information about MEDEVAC request procedures and channels, and evacuation or holding policies.

**(2) Treatment.** List of all appropriate treatment facilities (for example, dispensaries, aid stations, clearing stations, hospitals) belonging to or supporting the force. Include the location and operational time of supporting hospitals, medical regulating matters, and evacuation policy. Establish patient decontamination facilities.

**(3) Other services.** Include pertinent information on any other CHS matters (for example, dental, preventive medicine, health service logistics, combat stress

**[Classification]**

**Figure G-5. Annotated SSPLAN/SSORD Format (continued)**

<b>[Classification]</b>
<p><b>SSPLAN or SSORD [number] [code name]—[issuing headquarters]</b></p> <p>control, veterinary services). Include unit locations, support information, policies, requirements for nonmedical augmentation to accomplish patient decontamination, support requirements for providing nonmedical guards for EPW evacuated within CHS channels, and any other appropriate information.</p> <p><b>c. Personnel.</b></p> <p><b>(1) Personnel matters.</b> Include information and instructions on personnel matters, including foreign civilian labor used in direct military support functions. List information under each of the following subparagraphs, when necessary.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Installations. Location and time of opening or closing.</li> <li>• Operating units. The units or areas served.</li> <li>• Rotation criteria.</li> <li>• Unit responsibility for personnel movement and administration.</li> <li>• Requisitions or plans concerning personnel activities.</li> <li>• Necessary references to previous orders, instructions, or SOPs.</li> </ul> <p><b>(2) Strength maintenance.</b></p> <p><b>(a) Strength reports.</b> Include instructions for submitting strength reports. Include requirements for routine reports and the special reports required after WMD attacks, natural disasters, and serious incidents.</p> <p><b>(b) Replacements.</b> Include a statement establishing the validity of existing personnel requisitions, instructions for submitting requisitions, instructions for processing and moving replacements, the location of replacement units and the units each supports, and the type and location of unit replacements under control of the issuing headquarters.</p> <p><b>(3) Casualty operations.</b> Include instructions for recording, reporting, verifying, and processing casualty information.</p> <p><b>(4) Personnel management.</b></p> <p><b>(a) Military personnel.</b> Include information or instructions concerning classification, assignment, promotion, transfer, reclassification, reduction, elimination, retirement, separation, training, rotation, and personnel economies.</p> <p><b>(b) Civilian personnel.</b> List sources of civilian labor; locations of civilian personnel offices or other labor administration centers and labor pools; procurement policies and procedures; restrictions on use of civilian labor; administrative and control procedures; pay schedules, allowances, and CSS to be provided; and responsibilities of subordinate commanders for administration. Provide specific pay scales and other conditions of employment in an annex.</p> <p><b>(c) Enemy prisoners of war and civilian internees or detainees.</b> Include instructions for collecting, safeguarding, processing, evacuating, using, treating, and</p>
<b>[Classification]</b>

Figure G-5. Annotated SSPLAN/SSORD Format (continued)

<p><b>[Classification]</b></p> <p><b>SSPLAN or SSORD [number] [code name]—[issuing headquarters]</b></p> <p>disciplining EPWs, civilian internees, detainees, and all other personnel arrested or captured but not immediately identifiable as EPWs. Include the location of EPW and civilian internee and detainee facilities.</p> <p><b>(5) Personnel service support.</b> Include information or instructions concerning leaves; rest and recreation facilities, including criteria and unit quotas; decorations and awards; postal and finance services; chaplain activities and religious coverage; field services; morale support activities; post exchange; and legal assistance.</p> <p><b>(6) Discipline, law, and order.</b> Include information and instructions about troop conduct and appearance. Address control and disposition of stragglers, locations of straggler-collecting points, and special instructions for straggler-control augmentation. Include instructions for administering military justice and information or instructions concerning relations between military and civilian personnel: such as, fraternization, black-marketing, selling of government property, and respect for local laws.</p> <p><b>(7) Headquarters management.</b> Include instructions concerning movement, internal arrangement, organization, and operation of headquarters. Allocate shelter in the headquarters area for troops and headquarters personnel.</p> <p><b>(8) Miscellaneous.</b> Include personnel administrative matters not assigned to another coordinating staff section or included in the preceding subparagraphs.</p> <p><b>d. Third-nation support and host-nation support.</b> Outline the concept for third-nation support and host-nation support. Include forecasted and unforecasted support.</p> <p><b>e. Coordinating instructions.</b> List instructions applicable to two or more units and not routinely covered in unit SOPs. This is always the last subparagraph in paragraph 4. Place complex instructions in an annex. Paragraphs 4e(1)–4e(4) are mandatory.</p> <p><b>(1) Time or condition when a plan or an order becomes effective.</b> Include the time or the conditions under which the plan is to be placed in effect.</p> <p><b>(2) Commander’s critical information requirements.</b> List only here. Do not list in annexes.</p> <p><b>(3) Risk reduction control measures.</b> These are measures unique to this operation and not included in unit SOPs. They may include mission-oriented protective posture, operational exposure guidance, troop-safety criteria (corps only), vehicle recognition signals, and fratricide prevention measures.</p> <p><b>(4) Rules of engagement.</b> Refer to Annex E (ROE) if required.</p> <p><b>(5) Boundaries.</b> Location of the rear boundary and any other boundary needed for CSS purposes.</p> <p><b>(6) Force protection.</b> Address measures established to protect CSS units or installations. Specify which tactical units are to provide protection, which CSS units or installations will receive protection, and any conditioning factors to that protection. This paragraph provides information for CSS units; it is not an order to tactical units.</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><b>[Classification]</b></p>
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Figure G-5. Annotated SSPLAN/SSORD Format (continued)

<p><b>[Classification]</b></p> <p><b>SSPLAN or SSORD [number]—[issuing headquarters]</b></p> <p><b>(7) Special reports.</b> List reports requiring special emphasis that are not addressed elsewhere.</p> <p><b>(8) Other CSS matters.</b> Include information or instructions not addressed elsewhere.</p> <p><b>5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL</b></p> <p><b>a. Command.</b> State the map coordinates for command post CP locations and at least one future location for each command post. Identify the chain of command if not addressed in unit SOPs.</p> <p><b>b. Signal.</b> Refer to appropriate OPLAN/OPORD. When not included in the basic OPLAN/OPORD, include the headquarters location and movements, liaison arrangements, recognition and identification instructions, and general rules concerning the use of communications and other electronic equipment, if necessary. Use an annex when appropriate.</p> <p><b>ACKNOWLEDGE:</b> Include instructions for the acknowledgement of the plan or order by addressees. The word “acknowledge” may suffice or you may refer to the message reference number. Acknowledgement of a plan or order means that it has been received and understood.</p> <p style="text-align: right;"><b>[Commander’s last name]</b> <b>[Commander’s rank]</b></p> <p>The commander or authorized representative signs the original copy. If the representative signs the original, add the phrase “For the Commander.” The signed copy is the historical copy and remains in headquarters files.</p> <p><b>OFFICIAL:</b> <b>[Authenticator’s Name]</b> <b>[Authenticator’s Position]</b></p> <p>Use only if the commander does not sign the original order. If the commander signs the original, no further authentication is required. If the commander does not sign, authentication is required by the signature of the preparing staff officer and only the last name and rank of the commander appear in the signature block.</p> <p><b>ANNEXES:</b> List annexes by letter and title in the sequence shown in Figure G-3 (page G-21). If a particular annex is not used, place a “not used” beside that annex letter.</p> <p><b>DISTRIBUTION:</b> Furnish distribution copies either for action or for information. List in detail those who are to receive the plan or order. If necessary, also refer to an annex containing the distribution list or to a standard distribution list or SOP. When referring to a standard distribution list, also show distribution to reinforcing, supporting, and adjacent units, since that list does not normally include these units. When distribution includes a unit from another nation or from a NATO command, cite the distribution list in full.</p>
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Figure G-5. Annotated SSPLAN/SSORD Format (continued)

<b>[Classification]</b> (Change from oral orders, if any)	<b>[Heading data is the same as for OPLAN/OPORD]</b>
<b>MOVEMENT ORDER [number]</b>	
<b>References:</b>	
<b>Time Zone Used Throughout the Order:</b>	
<b>Task Organization:</b>	
<b>1. SITUATION.</b>	
a. Enemy forces.	
b. Friendly forces.	
c. Attachments and detachments.	
<b>2. MISSION.</b>	
<b>3. EXECUTION.</b>	
a. Concept of movement.	
b. Tasks to subordinate units.	
c. Detailed timings.	
d. Coordinating instructions.	
(1) Order of March.	
(2) Routes.	
(3) Density.	
(4) Speed. (Include catch-up speed.)	
(5) Method of movement.	
(6) Defense on move.	
(7) Start, release, or other critical points.	
(8) Convoy control.	
(9) Harbor areas.	
(10) Instructions for halts.	
(11) Lighting.	
(12) Air support.	
<b>4. SERVICE SUPPORT.</b>	
a. Traffic control (performed by MPs).	
b. Recovery.	
c. Medical.	
d. Petroleum, oils, and lubricants.	
e. Water.	
<b>5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL.</b>	
a. Command.	
(1) Location of commander and chain of command.	
(2) Locations of key individuals or particular vehicles.	
b. Signal.	
<b>ACKNOWLEDGE:</b>	
	<b>[Authentication data is the same as for OPLAN/OPORD]</b>
<b>ANNEXES:</b>	
<b>DISTRIBUTION:</b>	
<b>[Classification]</b>	

Figure G-6. Movement Order Format

<p><b>[Classification]</b>                  (Change from oral orders, if any) (Optional)  <b>[Heading data is the same as for OPLAN/OPORD]</b></p>	
<p><b>WARNING ORDER [number]</b></p> <p><b>References:</b> Refer to higher headquarters OPLAN/OPORD, and identify map sheets for operation (Optional).</p> <p><b>Time Zone Used Throughout the Order:</b> (Optional)</p> <p><b>Task Organization:</b> (Optional) (See paragraph 1c.)</p>	
<p><b>1. SITUATION.</b></p> <p style="padding-left: 20px;"><b>a. Enemy forces.</b> Include significant changes in enemy composition, dispositions, and COAs. Information not available can be included in subsequent WARNOs.</p> <p style="padding-left: 20px;"><b>b. Friendly forces.</b> (Optional) Address only if essential to the WARNO.</p> <p style="padding-left: 40px;">(1) Higher commander's mission.</p> <p style="padding-left: 40px;">(2) Higher commander's intent.</p> <p style="padding-left: 20px;"><b>c. Attachments and detachments.</b> Initial task organization. Address only major unit changes.</p> <p><b>2. MISSION.</b> Issuing headquarters' mission. This may be the higher headquarters' restated mission or commander's decisions during the MDMP.</p> <p><b>3. EXECUTION.</b></p> <p style="padding-left: 20px;"><b>Intent:</b></p> <p style="padding-left: 40px;"><b>a. Concept of operations.</b> This may be "to be determined" for the initial WARNO.</p> <p style="padding-left: 40px;"><b>b. Tasks to maneuver units.</b> Any information on tasks to units for execution, movement to initiate, reconnaissance to initiate, or security to emplace.</p> <p style="padding-left: 40px;"><b>c. Tasks to other combat and combat support units.</b> See paragraph 3b.</p> <p style="padding-left: 40px;"><b>d. Coordinating instructions.</b> Include any information available at the time of the issuance of the WARNO. It may include the following:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• CCIR.</li> <li>• Risk guidance.</li> <li>• Time line.</li> <li>• Deception guidance</li> <li>• Orders group meeting information.</li> <li>• Specific priorities, in order of completion.</li> <li>• Earliest movement time and degree of notice</li> <li>• Guidance on orders and rehearsals</li> </ul> <p><b>4. SERVICE SUPPORT.</b> (Optional) Include any known logistics preparations.</p> <p style="padding-left: 20px;"><b>a. Special equipment.</b> Identify requirements and coordinate transfer to using units.</p> <p style="padding-left: 20px;"><b>b. Transportation.</b> Identify requirements, and coordinate for pre-position of assets.</p> <p><b>5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL.</b> (Optional)</p> <p style="padding-left: 20px;"><b>a. Command.</b> State the chain of command if different from unit SOP.</p> <p style="padding-left: 20px;"><b>b. Signal.</b> Identify the current SOI. Pre-position signal assets to support operation.</p> <p><b>ACKNOWLEDGE:</b></p> <p><b>ANNEXES:</b></p> <p><b>DISTRIBUTION:</b></p>	<p style="text-align: center;"><b>A warning order does not authorize execution unless specifically stated.</b></p>
<p style="text-align: right;"><b>[Authentication data is the same as for OPLAN/OPORD]</b></p>	

Figure G-7. Warning Order Format

**[Classification]**

**[Classification]**  
(Change from oral orders, if any)

**Copy ## of ## copies**  
**Issuing headquarters**  
**Place of issue**  
**Date-time group of signature**  
**Message reference number**

**FRAGMENTARY ORDER [number]**

**References:** Refer to the order being modified.

**Time Zone Used Throughout the Order:**

- 1. SITUATION.** Include any changes to the existing order or state, "No change"; for example, "No change to OPORD 02-XX."
- 2. MISSION.** List the new mission or state, "No change."
- 3. EXECUTION.** Include any changes or state, "No change."  
**Intent:**
  - a. Concept of operations.**
  - b. Tasks to subordinate units.**
  - c. Coordinating instructions.** Include statement, "Current overlay remains in effect" or "See change 1 to Annex C, Operations Overlay." Mark changes to control measures on the overlay or issue a new overlay.
- 4. SERVICE SUPPORT.** Include any changes to existing order or state, "No change."
- 5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL.** Include any changes to existing order or state, "No change."

**ACKNOWLEDGE:**

**[Commander's last name]**  
**[Commander's rank]**

**OFFICIAL:**  
**[Authenticator's Name]**  
**[Authenticator's Position]**

**ANNEXES:**  
**DISTRIBUTION:**

**[Classification]**

Figure G-8. Fragmentary Order Format

<p><b>[Classification]</b>                  (Change from oral orders, if any)</p>	<p><b>Copy ## of ## copies</b>  <b>Issuing headquarters</b>  <b>Place of issue</b>  <b>Date-time group of signature</b>  <b>Message reference number</b></p>
<p><b>OVERLAY ORDER [number] [code name]</b></p>	
<p><b>References:</b></p>	
<p><b>Time Zone Used Throughout the Order:</b></p>	
<p><b>Task Organization:</b> List only changes on the overlay.</p>	
<p><b>1. SITUATION.</b> List any changes to enemy or friendly situation.</p>	
<p style="padding-left: 40px;"><b>a. Enemy forces.</b> Verbal brief, referring to enemy unit locations (known or suspected) on the overlay.</p>	
<p style="padding-left: 40px;"><b>b. Friendly forces.</b> Verbal brief, referring to friendly unit locations on the overlay.</p>	
<p style="padding-left: 40px;"><b>c. Attachments and detachments.</b> Verbal brief, confirming changes to the task organization.</p>	
<p style="padding-left: 40px;"><b>d. Commander's evaluation.</b> Verbal brief.</p>	
<p><b>2. MISSION.</b> Written on the overlay.</p>	
<p><b>3. EXECUTION.</b></p>	
<p style="padding-left: 40px;"><b>Intent:</b></p>	
<p style="padding-left: 40px;"><b>a. Concept of operations.</b> Verbal brief, referring to the overlay. Focus on key event. Identify the main effort, priorities of fires, and trigger points to execute engagements.</p>	
<p style="padding-left: 40px;"><b>b. Tasks to maneuver units.</b> Written, for each subordinate unit, on the overlay. Specified tasks for each unit only.</p>	
<p style="padding-left: 40px;"><b>c. Tasks to other combat and combat support units.</b> Verbal brief, identifies priority of support.</p>	
<p style="padding-left: 40px;"><b>d. Coordinating instructions.</b> Verbal brief, covers only items not covered in unit SOPs. Focus on control measures and graphics.</p>	
<p><b>4. SERVICE SUPPORT.</b> Verbal brief, referring to the overlay for locations of support. Any changes to sustainment.</p>	
<p><b>5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL.</b></p>	
<p style="padding-left: 40px;"><b>a. Command.</b> Verbal brief; refer to the overlay for location of key personnel, and identify the succession of command.</p>	
<p style="padding-left: 40px;"><b>b. Signal.</b> Verbal brief, including any code words that key events.</p>	
<p><b>ACKNOWLEDGE:</b></p>	
	<p><b>[Commander's last name]</b>  <b>[Commander's rank]</b></p>
<p><b>OFFICIAL:</b></p>	
<p><b>[Authenticator's Name]</b></p>	
<p><b>[Authenticator's Position]</b></p>	
<p>[Annexes are not used with overlay orders]</p>	
<p><b>DISTRIBUTION:</b></p>	
<p><b>[Classification]</b></p>	

Figure G-9. Overlay Order Format

**TASK ORGANIZATION:**

A/4-78 MECH  
 1/A/4-78 MECH  
 2/A/4-78 MECH  
 3/C/4-5 AR  
 SCT PLT/4-78 MECH  
 1/1/B/4-441 ADA(DS)  
 1/2/B/52 MI (GSR)(DS)

O/O 1/A/4-78 MECH  
 2/A/4-78 MECH

B/4-78 MECH  
 1/B/4-78 MECH  
 2/B/4-78 MECH  
 3/D/4-5 AR

C/4-5 AR  
 1/C/4-5 AR  
 2/C/4-5 AR  
 3/A/4-78 MECH

D/4-5 AR  
 1/D/4-5 AR  
 2/D/4-5 AR  
 3/B/4-78 MECH

TF Control  
 A/32 EN(DS)  
 1/B/4-441 ADA(-)(DS)

O/O 3/C/4-5 AR (Reserve)  
 A/32 EN(DS)  
 1/B/4-441 ADA(DS)  
 1/2/B/52 MI (GSR)(DS)  
 SCT/4-78 MECH  
 MTR/4-78 MECH

Mission: NLT H+48, TF 4-78 MECH defends in sector to contain elements of the 3rd and 9th MRDs in order to protect the flank of TF 4-5 AR and deny enemy penetration of PL MUSKET.

**EXECUTION - TASKS TO SUBORDINATE UNITS:**

a. A/4-78 MECH: 1. Screen north of PL YELLOW to deny enemy reconnaissance observation of MBA preparations.  
 2. Prepare and Occupy O/O BP3 orienting fires into EA2 to deny enemy penetration of PL MUSKET to protect the right flank of B/4-78 MECH, the TF Main Effort.

b. B/4-78 MECH: TF Main Effort - Prepare and Occupy BP2 orienting fires into EA 1 and 2 in order to deny penetration of PL MUSKET.

c. C/4-5 AR: Prepare and Occupy BP1 orienting fires into EA 1 and 2 to deny penetration of PL MUSKET and to protect the left flank of B/4-78 MECH, the TF Main Effort.

d. D/4-5 AR: Prepare and Occupy BP4 to deny enemy access to high mobility corridors along Stranger Creek and force the enemy into EA2.

e. 3/C/4-5 AR: Occupy AA READY as TF Reserve. Priority of commitment is to occupy BP's 55, 66, or 77 in order to deny penetration of PL MUSKET by a company size element.

f. SCT/4-78 MECH: 1. Screen North along PL GRAY to deny enemy reconnaissance observation of MBA preparations by vectoring in the killing systems of A/4-78 MECH to destroy enemy reconnaissance elements.  
 2. O/O screen along the TF western boundary from PL BLUE to PL BAYONET to protect the TF right flank.

g. 1/B/4-441 ADA: Provide area coverage with priority of protection to B/4-78 MECH, TF Main Effort, C2, CSS, and Combat Systems.

h. 1/2/B/52 MI (GSR): 1. Attached to A/4-78 MECH.  
 2. O/O occupy under TF Control position on the western boundary oriented into EA4 to provide early warning.

Acknowledge: A/4-78 MECH, B/4-78 MECH, C/4-5 AR, D/4-5 AR, 1/B/4-441 ADA, SCT/4-78 MECH, MTR/4-78 MECH

Figure G-10. Overlay Order Example




Figure G-10. Overlay Order Example (continued)

<p><b>[Classification]</b>  <b>(Change from oral orders, if any)</b></p> <p style="text-align: right;"> <b>Copy ## of ## copies</b>  <b>Issuing headquarters</b>  <b>Place of issue</b>  <b>Date-time group of signature</b>  <b>Message reference number</b></p> <p>Include heading if attachment is distributed separately from the base order or higher-level attachment. Otherwise, omit.</p> <p><b>[Attachment type and number/letter] ([Attachment Title]) TO [higher-level attachment type and number/letter, if applicable] ([Higher-level attachment title, if applicable]) TO OPERATION PLAN/ORDER [number] [code name]—[issuing headquarters]</b></p> <p>For example, TAB C (Highway Regulation) to APPENDIX 3 (Traffic Circulation and Control) to Annex I (Service Support) to OPLAN 02-05 (First Impression)—52d ID</p> <p><b>References:</b></p> <p><b>Time Zone Used Throughout the Order:</b></p> <p><b>1. SITUATION.</b> Include information affecting the functional area that paragraph 1 of the OPLAN/OPORD does not cover or that needs to be expanded.</p> <p style="padding-left: 20px;"><b>a. Enemy forces.</b> See Annex B (Intelligence) or intelligence estimate, and analysis of area of operations if available.</p> <p style="padding-left: 40px;"><b>(1) Terrain.</b> List all critical terrain aspects that would impact functional area's operations.</p> <p style="padding-left: 40px;"><b>(2) Weather.</b> List all critical weather aspects that would impact functional area's operations.</p> <p style="padding-left: 40px;"><b>(3) Enemy functional area capability and/or activity:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• List known and templated locations and activities of enemy functional area units. Information is normally gathered one level up and two levels down.</li> <li>• List significant enemy maneuver and functional area capabilities that impact friendly functional area operations.</li> <li>• State the expected employment of enemy functional area assets based on the most probable enemy COA.</li> </ul> <p style="padding-left: 20px;"><b>b. Friendly forces.</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Outline the plan of the higher headquarters as it pertains to the functional area.</li> <li>• List designation, location, and outline of the plan of higher, adjacent, and other functional area assets that support or would otherwise impact the issuing headquarters or would require coordination, and any other functional area supporting the unit.</li> <li>• List nonfunctional-area units capable of assisting in functional area operations (such as nonengineer units capable of emplacing scatterable mines).</li> </ul> <p style="text-align: center;"><b>[Classification]</b></p>
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Figure G-11. Attachment Format (General)

[Classification]
<p><b>[Attachment type and number/letter] ([Attachment Title]) TO [higher-level attachment type and number/letter, if applicable] ([Higher-level attachment title, if applicable]) TO OPERATION PLAN/ORDER [number] [code name]—[issuing headquarters]</b></p>
<p><b>c. Attachments and detachments.</b></p> <p>(1) List units attached or detached only as necessary to clarify task organization.</p> <p>(2) Highlight changes in functional area task organization that occur during the operation, including effective times or events.</p> <p><b>2. MISSION.</b> State the mission of the functional area in support of the basic OPORD/OPLAN.</p> <p><b>3. EXECUTION.</b></p> <p><b>a. Scheme of support.</b> May be titled “Scheme of (functional area) operations.”</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Describe the concept of functional area operations to support the commander’s intent and the maneuver plan. Tie in critical functional area tasks or the functional area’s main effort by mission.</li> <li>• Establish the main functional area effort by mission and unit for each phase of the operation.</li> <li>• State functional area priorities.</li> </ul> <p><b>b. Tasks to subordinate units.</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• List functional area tasks that specific maneuver elements are to accomplish that the base OPORD does not contain.</li> <li>• List functional area tasks the functional area units supporting maneuver elements are to accomplish only as necessary to ensure unity of effort.</li> </ul> <p><b>c. Coordinating instructions.</b> Include only instructions common to two or more units not already covered in the base OPORD.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• State specific rules of engagement that apply to the functional area.</li> <li>• Refer to supporting appendixes not referenced elsewhere.</li> <li>• Do not include SOP information.</li> </ul> <p><b>4. SERVICE SUPPORT.</b></p> <p><b>a. Command-regulated classes of supply.</b> Highlight subordinate allocations of command-regulated classes of supply that impact functional area operations (such as the controlled supply rate). Summarize in a matrix or table if necessary.</p> <p><b>b. Supply distribution plan.</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• State the method of supply (supply point or unit distribution) to be used for appropriate classes of supply for each subordinate or supporting unit.</li> <li>• Give tentative locations for supply points or locations for linkup of push packages direct to units.</li> <li>• Give allocation of classes of supply by subordinate unit, control measure, or combination. Summarize in a matrix or table, if necessary.</li> </ul> <p><b>c. Transportation.</b> State the allocation and priority of support of haul or airlift assets dedicated for hauling of classes of supply</p>
[Classification]

Figure G-11. Attachment Format (General) (continued)

<p><b>[Classification]</b></p> <p><b>[Attachment type and number/letter] ([Attachment Title]) TO [higher-level attachment type and number/letter, if applicable] ([Higher-level attachment title, if applicable]) TO OPERATION PLAN/ORDER [number] [code name]—[issuing headquarters]</b></p> <p><b>d. Combat health support.</b> Address arrangements made for health support of functional area units operating in forward maneuver unit areas.</p> <p><b>e. Maintenance.</b> State priority of support, locations of maintenance facilities, and any relevant policies.</p> <p><b>f. Field services.</b> State priority of support, locations of facilities, and command policies.</p> <p><b>g. Host nation.</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• List type and location of HN functional area facilities, assets, or support.</li> <li>• List procedures for requesting and acquiring HN functional area support.</li> <li>• Highlight any limitations or restrictions on HN support.</li> </ul> <p><b>5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL.</b></p> <p><b>a. Command.</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• State the location of key functional area leaders.</li> <li>• Designate a functional area chain of command and succession of command.</li> <li>• Designate a headquarters to control the effort within functional area work lines on an area basis.</li> <li>• List command posts and other C2 facilities and their locations.</li> </ul> <p><b>b. Signal.</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• State edition number of SOI in effect. Do not write “current SOI.”</li> <li>• Describe the nets to monitor for reports.</li> <li>• Designate critical functional area reporting requirements.</li> <li>• Address any functional-area-specific communications or digitization connectivity requirements or coordination necessary to meet functional responsibilities.</li> </ul> <p><b>ACKNOWLEDGE:</b></p> <p>Include only when annex is distributed separately from the base order.</p> <p style="text-align: right;"> <b>[Commander’s/coordinating staff officer’s last name]</b>  <b>[Commander’s/coordinating staff officer’s rank]</b> </p> <p>Either the commander or the coordinating staff officer responsible for the functional area may sign attachments.</p> <p><b>[TYPE OF ATTACHMENT]:</b></p> <p>List lower level attachments, if any.</p> <p><b>DISTRIBUTION:</b></p> <p>Show only if distributed separately from the base order or higher-level attachment.</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><b>[Classification]</b></p>
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Figure G-11. Attachment Format (General) (continued)

**[Classification]**

Include heading if annex distributed separately from base OPLAN/OPORD.

**ANNEX B (INTELLIGENCE) TO OPERATION ORDER NO ## [code name]—[issuing headquarters]**

**1. SITUATION.**

**a. Enemy Situation.** Refer to Appendix 1 (Intelligence Estimate).

**b. Friendly Situation.** Refer to base order and Annex C (Operations).

**2. MISSION.** State the intelligence mission for the operation.

**3. EXECUTION.**

**a. Scheme of intelligence.** Describe the concept of intelligence operations to support the commander's intent and the maneuver plan. Tie in critical intelligence tasks to the focus of intelligence by phase.

**b. Tasks to subordinate units.** Refer to Annex L (ISR) for intelligence collection tasks. List intelligence tasks that specific maneuver elements are to accomplish that the base OPOD does not contain. List intelligence tasks that MI units supporting maneuver elements are to accomplish only as necessary to ensure unity of effort.

**c. Counterintelligence.** Refer to Appendix 3 (Counterintelligence) to Annex B.

**d. Coordinating instructions.**

**(1) Intelligence requirements.** List each intelligence requirement in priority in a separate subparagraph. Assign each intelligence requirement a latest time intelligence of value. Tie each to an operational decision or action.

**(a) Priority intelligence requirements.**

**(b) Intelligence Requirements.**

**(2) Intelligence acquisition.** List requests for information to higher, adjacent, and cooperating units in separate, lettered subparagraphs.

**(3) Measures for handling personnel, documents, and materiel.**

**(a) Prisoners of war, deserters, repatriates, inhabitants, and other persons.** State special handling, segregation instructions, and locations of the command's and next higher headquarters' EPW collection point.

**(b) Captured documents.** List instructions for handling and processing captured documents from time of capture to receipt by specified intelligence personnel.

**(c) Captured materiel.** Designate items or categories of enemy materiel required for examination. Include any specific instructions for their processing and disposition. Give locations of the command's and next higher headquarters' captured materiel collection point.

**(4) Documents or equipment required.** List in each category the conditions under which units can obtain or request certain documents or equipment. Items may include air photographs and maps, charts, and geodesy products.

**(5) Distribution of intelligence products.** State the conditions (for example, dates, number of copies, or issue) regulating the issue of intelligence reports and

**See Figure G-11, page G-41, for general instructions on completing annexes. This figure discusses intelligence-specific items.**

**[Classification]**

**Figure G-12. Annex B (Intelligence) Instructions and Format**

<p><b>[Classification]</b></p> <p><b>ANNEX B (INTELLIGENCE) TO OPERATION ORDER NO ## [code name]—[issuing headquarters]</b></p> <p>products to the originating command for the operation’s duration. This paragraph may cover any or all of the following:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Periods that routine reports and distribution address.</li> <li>• Updates to the threat and environment portions of the COP.</li> <li>• Formats and methods for push and pull intelligence support.</li> <li>• Periodic or special intelligence meetings and conferences.</li> <li>• Distribution of special intelligence studies: such as, defense overprints, photo intelligence reports, and order of battle overlays.</li> <li>• Special intelligence liaison, when indicated.</li> </ul> <p>List in each category the conditions under which units can obtain or request certain documents or equipment.</p> <p><b>(6) Other instructions.</b></p> <p><b>4. SERVICE SUPPORT.</b> List any unique intelligence service support (for example, contractor support) not addressed in either the base order or Annex I (Service Support).</p> <p><b>5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL.</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a. Identify command intelligence handover line.</li> <li>b. Identify intelligence liaison requirements.</li> <li>c. Identify special security office arrangements and coordination.</li> </ul> <p><b>ACKNOWLEDGE:</b> (if distributed separately from base order)</p> <p style="text-align: right;"><b>[Authenticator’s last name]</b> <b>[Authenticator’s rank]</b></p> <p><b>APPENDIXES:</b></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Intelligence Estimate</li> <li>2. Intelligence Synchronization Plan</li> <li>3. Counterintelligence Plan</li> <li>4. IPB Products</li> </ol> <p><b>DISTRIBUTION:</b> (if distributed separately from base order)</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><b>[Classification]</b></p>
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Figure G-12. Annex B (Intelligence) Instructions and Format (continued)

1. Center the security classification at the top and bottom of the overlay. Use the largest and widest letters possible.
  2. Place the title in the upper left margin (below the security classification). Use the following format: ANNEX C (OPERATION OVERLAY) TO OPERATION ORDER NO ## [code name]—[issuing headquarters].
  3. Place the map reference in the upper left margin immediately below the title.
  4. Place at least two overlay and map reference points (double crosshair reference marks on map grid lines) on opposite corners of the overlay (see Figure G-10, page G-40).
- NOTE:** An overlay must always contain the first four items listed here.
5. Prepare the overlay to the scale of the maps subordinate units will use.
  6. Correctly transfer control measures onto the overlay from the higher headquarters' OPLAN/ OPORD.
  7. Provide a list of coordinates for major C2 points, unit locations, coordinating points, and so on as an attachment to the overlay.
  8. Make the overlay consistent with the applicable text from the OPLAN/OPORD.
  9. Place symbols at doctrinally correct locations. (Before placing symbols on an overlay, always consider the effect of terrain and weather.)
  10. Keep the overlay simple, but give enough detail for others to understand the operation and its essential tasks.
  11. Limit control measures to the minimum needed to synchronize the operation and limit possible fratricide.
  12. Make sure control measures give the commander flexibility to react to changing situations or conditions
  13. When transmitting or storing overlays, roll up or fold the overlay with the classification, title, and map reference visible on the outside.

**Figure G-13. Annex C (Operation Overlay) Instructions**

<b>[Classification]</b>	
<p>Include heading if annex distributed separately from base OPLAN/OPORD.  <b>ANNEX D (FIRE SUPPORT) TO OPERATION ORDER NO## [code name]—</b>  <b>[issuing headquarters]</b></p>	
<p><b>1. SITUATION.</b></p> <p><b>a. Enemy forces.</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Include a detailed description of enemy fire support and AD assets.</li> <li>• List enemy rocket, cannon, and missile artillery units. Include those organic to maneuver units. List all artillery units that can be identified as being committed or reinforcing. Consider all identified artillery units within supporting range as being in support of the committed force. Include the number of possible enemy air sorties by day, if known. Estimate the number, type, yield, and delivery means of enemy NBC weapons available to the committed force.</li> </ul> <p><b>b. Friendly forces.</b></p> <p>(1) State the higher headquarters' concept of fires.</p> <p>(2) Provide adjacent units' concept of fires.</p> <p>(3) Include supporting air power and naval forces.</p> <p><b>c. Attachments and detachments.</b> List fire support resources attached or under the operational control of the unit. List any units detached or under the operational control of other headquarters.</p>	<p><b>See Figure G-11, page G-41, for general instructions on completing annexes. This figure discusses fire support-specific items.</b></p>
<p><b>2. MISSION.</b></p> <p><b>3. EXECUTION.</b></p> <p><b>a. Concept of fires.</b> Describe how fires will be used to support the concept of operations. State the priority of fire support.</p> <p><b>b. Air support.</b></p> <p>(1) <b>General.</b> Briefly describe the maneuver commander's concept for the use of air power.</p> <p>(2) <b>Air interdiction.</b></p> <p>(3) <b>Close air support.</b></p> <p>(4) <b>Electronic warfare.</b></p> <p>(5) <b>Reconnaissance and surveillance operations.</b></p> <p>(6) <b>Miscellaneous.</b> State the following:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The air tasking order's effective time period.</li> <li>• Deadlines for submission of AI, CAS, search and rescue, and EW requests.</li> <li>• The mission request numbering system as it relates to the target numbering system.</li> <li>• Joint suppression of enemy air defenses taskings from the joint force land component commander.</li> <li>• Essential A2C2 measures—such as coordinating altitude, target areas, low-level transit route requirements—identified in the A2C2 annex.</li> </ul>	
<b>[Classification]</b>	

Figure G-14. Annex D (Fire Support) Instructions and Format

<b>[Classification]</b>
<b>ANNEX D (FIRE SUPPORT) TO OPERATION ORDER NO ## [code name]—[issuing headquarters]</b>
<p><b>c. Field artillery support.</b></p> <p>(1) <b>General.</b> Include the concept for use of cannon, rocket, and missile artillery in support of decisive and shaping operations.</p> <p>(2) <b>Artillery organization for combat.</b></p> <p>(3) <b>Allocation of ammunition.</b></p> <p>(4) <b>Miscellaneous.</b> Include the following:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Changes to the targeting numbering system.</li> <li>• The use of pulse repetition frequency codes.</li> <li>• Positioning restrictions.</li> </ul> <p><b>d. Naval gunfire support.</b></p> <p>(1) <b>General.</b> Include the concept for use of naval gunfire support.</p> <p>(2) <b>Naval gunfire organization.</b></p> <p>(3) <b>Miscellaneous.</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Trajectory limitations or minimum safe distances.</li> <li>• Frequency allocations.</li> <li>• Reference to a naval gunfire support annex.</li> </ul> <p><b>e. Nuclear operations</b> (corps and EAC only).</p> <p><b>f. Smoke operations.</b></p> <p><b>g. Target acquisition.</b> Include information pertaining to the employment and allocation of FA target acquisition systems and EW assets. Refer to the FA support plan for specific target acquisition tasks, if needed.</p> <p><b>h. Coordinating instructions.</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• List the targeting products (target selection standards matrix, high-payoff target list, and attack guidance matrix).</li> <li>• List fire support coordination measures.</li> <li>• Refer to time of execution of program of fires relative to H-hour.</li> <li>• Include rules of engagement.</li> <li>• List fire support rehearsal times and requirements.</li> <li>• List target allocations.</li> <li>• List FASCAM allocations and requirements.</li> </ul> <p><b>4. SERVICE SUPPORT.</b> Identify the location of ammunition transfer points and ammunition supply points, or refer to the logistics annex. List the controlled supply rate.</p> <p><b>5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL.</b></p> <p><b>ACKNOWLEDGE:</b> (if distributed separately from base order)</p> <p style="text-align: right; padding-right: 50px;"><b>[Authenticator's last name]</b></p> <p style="text-align: right; padding-right: 50px;"><b>[Authenticator's rank]</b></p> <p><b>APPENDIXES:</b></p> <p>1. Air Support. 2. Field Artillery. 3. Naval Gunfire Support.</p> <p><b>DISTRIBUTION:</b> (If distributed separately from base order)</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><b>[Classification]</b></p>

Figure G-14. Annex D (Fire Support) Instructions and Format (continued)

<b>[Classification]</b>	
Include heading if annex distributed separately from base OPLAN/OPORD.	
<b>ANNEX E (RULES OF ENGAGEMENT) TO OPERATION ORDER NO## [code name]—[issuing headquarters]</b>	
<b>1. SITUATION.</b>	
<p><b>a. General.</b> Describe the general situation anticipated when the operation is executed. Provide all information needed for insight concerning the ROE.</p> <p><b>b. Enemy forces.</b> Refer to Annex B (Intelligence). Describe enemy capabilities, tactics, techniques, and probable COAs that may affect existing or proposed ROE.</p> <p><b>c. Friendly forces.</b> State in separate subparagraphs the friendly forces that require individual ROE; for example, army aviation. State the ROE for them.</p> <p><b>d. Assumptions.</b> List all assumptions on which ROE are based.</p>	<p><b>See Figure G-11, page G-41, for general instructions on completing annexes. This figure discusses ROE-specific items.</b></p> <p><b>This annex may not follow the five-paragraph format. A matrix format is often used.</b></p>
<b>2. MISSION.</b>	
<b>3. EXECUTION.</b>	
<p><b>a. Concept of operations.</b> Summarize the concept of the operations and state the general application of ROE in support of it. Indicate the times (hours, days, or events) ROE are in effect.</p> <p><b>b. Tasks.</b> Provide guidance for ROE development and approval by subordinate units.</p> <p><b>c. Coordinating Instructions.</b> Include the following, as a minimum:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Coordination of ROE. Include requirements for ROE coordination with adjacent commands, friendly forces, appropriate foreign forces, third countries, appropriate civilian agencies, and Department of State elements.</li> <li>• Dissemination of ROE.</li> <li>• Provision of ROE to augmentation forces of other commanders.</li> <li>• Procedures for requesting and processing changes to ROE.</li> <li>• Special reports requirements.</li> </ul>	
<b>4. SERVICE SUPPORT.</b>	
<b>5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL.</b> Refer to the appropriate section of Annex H (C4). Provide pertinent extracts of information required to support the basic plan, including—	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Identification, friend or foe, or neutral ROE policy.</li> <li>• Relation of ROE to use of code words.</li> <li>• Geographic boundaries or control measures within which ROE apply.</li> <li>• Special systems and procedures applicable to ROE.</li> </ul>	
<b>ACKNOWLEDGE:</b> (if distributed separately from base order)	
	<b>[Authenticator's last name]</b>
	<b>[Authenticator's rank]</b>
<b>APPENDIXES:</b>	
1. ROE Card	
<b>DISTRIBUTION:</b> (if distributed separately from base order)	

Figure G-15. Annex E (Rules of Engagement) Instructions and Format (continued)

**[Classification]**

Include heading if annex distributed separately from base OPLAN/OPORD.

**ANNEX F (ENGINEER) TO OPERATION ORDER NO## [code name]—[issuing headquarters]**

**1. SITUATION.**

**a. Enemy forces.**

**b. Friendly forces.**

**c. Attachments and detachments.** List engineer support resources, attached or under the operational control of the unit by higher headquarters, and any units detached or under the operational control of other headquarters.

**See Figure G-11, page G-41, for general instructions on completing annexes. This figure discusses engineer-specific items.**

**2. MISSION.**

**3. EXECUTION.**

**a. Scheme of Engineer Operations.** Same scheme as in basic OPLAN/OPORD.

- Provide narrative of mobility and survivability tasks regardless of what unit performs the task. For example, address FA-delivered FASCAM.
- List essential mobility and survivability tasks. Explain how they support the scheme of maneuver.
- Ensure the scheme of engineer operations corresponds to the maneuver unit concept of operations, which provides the foundation and structure for engineer operations. If the operation is phased, the scheme of engineer operations is also phased, using the same phases. If not, the scheme of engineer operations uses the same format as supported unit's concept of operations.
- Address four areas under each phase: general comments, mobility, countermobility, and survivability. Address each in order of priority by phase. If there is no support provided in an area during a phase, do not mention that area. The support addressed under each phase applies to the mobility and survivability effort that supports a maneuver unit during that phase, no matter when the effort was completed. Address each area as follows:
  - **General comments:** a brief, one-sentence comment about mobility and survivability support for the phase.
  - **Countermobility:** each obstacle belt, in order of its priority, its intent, and which maneuver unit it supports. Provide execution criteria for reserve targets and situational obstacles.
  - **Survivability:** each survivability task and relative location; for example, battle position, and maneuver unit supported.
  - **Mobility:** each mobility task (breaching, marking lanes, providing guides, and maintaining a route), relative location (route or objective), priority of reduction asset used (use plows first, then mine-clearing line charge), and maneuver unit supported.

**b. Tasks to subordinate units.** List engineer tasks to be accomplished by engineers supporting maneuver elements only as necessary to ensure unity of effort. Ensure that the unit level tasks assigned to the engineer organization are included. This

**[Classification]**

**Figure G-16. Annex F (Engineer) Instructions and Format**

**[Classification]**

**ANNEX F (ENGINEER) TO OPERATION ORDER NO## [code name] —[issuing headquarters]**

paragraph is used to inform subordinate unit commanders of tasks under unit control being done by unit-level forces.

**c. Coordinating instructions.**

- Include times or events in which obstacle control measures become effective if they differ from the effective time of the order.
- List supported unit PIR that must be considered by subordinate engineer staff officers or that the supported unit requires. List mission reports that the supported unit requires if not covered in the signal paragraph or unit SOP.
- Include explanation of countermobility and survivability time lines, if used.

**4. SERVICE SUPPORT.**

**a. Command-regulated classes of supply.** Identify command-regulated classes of supply. Highlight supported unit allocations that affect engineer CSR.

**b. Supply distribution plan.** Establish a Class IV and V (obstacle) supply distribution plan. State method of supply for each class, for each supported unit subordinate element.

- List supply points of linkup points.
- List allocations of Class IV and V (obstacle) by support unit element by obstacle control measure or combination. May summarize in a matrix or table.

**c. Transportation.**

**d. Combat health support.**

**e. Host nation.**

- Include HN coordination.
- List type and location of HN engineer facilities, assets, or support.
- List procedures for requesting and acquiring HN engineer support.
- Identify any limitations or restrictions on HN support.

**5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL.**

**a. Command.** Designate the headquarters that controls the effort within work lines on an area basis.

**b. Signal.**

- Identify communication networks monitored by the unit engineer, if different than SOP.
- Identify critical engineer reporting requirements of subordinates if not covered in SOP.

**ACKNOWLEDGE:** (if distributed separately from base order)

**[Authenticator's last name]**  
**[Authenticator's rank]**

**APPENDICES:** 1. Engineer Overlay. 2. Environmental Considerations.

**DISTRIBUTION:** (if distributed separately from base order)

**[Classification]**

Figure G-16. Annex F (Engineer) Instructions and Format (continued)

**[Classification]**

Include heading if annex distributed separately from base OPLAN/OPORD.  
**ANNEX G (AIR AND MISSILE DEFENSE) TO OPERATION ORDER ## [code name]**  
**—[issuing headquarters]**

**1. SITUATION.**

**a. Enemy forces.** See Annex B (Intelligence).

(1) **Terrain.** Identify most likely enemy ingress and egress routes.

(2) **Weather.** Identify enemy aircraft all-weather capabilities and limitations.

(3) **Enemy air capability and or activity.**

(a) **Air threat data.** Air-capable organizations, including air platforms, by number and type.

(b) **Additional air threat information.**

Include air threat information pertinent to the operation but not covered in Annex B (Intelligence). Highlight specific air threat considerations: such as, sortie rates, subordination of air elements to **ground** units, ordnance peculiarities, target preferences, tactics, recent significant activities, and tactical ballistic missile threats.

(c) **Air avenues of approach.** List all expected air avenues of approach. Identify their potential users by air platform. List all known beginning points and describe avenue of approach as it goes through **the** area of interest.

**b. Friendly forces.** List ADA missions at all applicable levels. Describe how the air defense plan integrates with higher-echelon plans.

(1) **Higher units.** Outline **higher** air defense unit concept and plans.

(2) **Adjacent units.** Outline adjacent air defense unit concept and plans.

(3) **Supporting elements.** Note **supporting** units and support relationship.

**c. Attachments and detachments.** Identify air defense resources attached from other commands. Identify air defense resources detached.

**2. MISSION.**

**3. EXECUTION.**

**a. Scheme of air and missile defense support.** Commander's overall air and missile defense plan, including the concept, objectives, and priorities.

**b. Tasks to subordinate ADA units.** Briefly discuss the ADA plan, command and support relationships, and priority of protection.

**c. Coordinating instructions.** Include references to other applicable attachments.

- Weapons control status and weapons control status authority. Include any plans to change weapons control status.
- Hostile criteria. Basic rules the commander has established to assist in the identification of friendly or hostile air vehicles. Include preplanned changes.
- ROE. Address ROE unique to the operation or points in the operation where changes are intended. Include use of supplemental fire control measures.
- Passive air defense. Specific passive air defense measures that all units should take to protect themselves from air and missile attack or surveillance

**See Figure G-11, page G-41, for general instructions on completing annexes. This figure discusses air and missile defense-specific items.**

**[Classification]**

**Figure G-17. Annex G (Air and Missile Defense) Instructions and Format**

[Classification]

**ANNEX G (AIR AND MISSILE DEFENSE) TO OPERATION ORDER NO ## [code name]—[issuing headquarters]**

during this operation.

- ~~Combined arms for air defense. Specific techniques units should use to defend themselves against an or a missile attack or surveillance.~~
- Early warning. Method and format for passing early warning to the force.

**4. SERVICE SUPPORT.**

**5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL.**

**a. Command.**

**b. Signal.**

- Identification, friend or foe code edition and book number.
- Communications links for early warning equipment.

**ACKNOWLEDGE:** (if distributed separately from base order)

name] **[Authenticator's last**

**[Authenticator's rank]**

**APPENDIXES:**

**DISTRIBUTION:** (if distributed separately from base order)

**[Classification]**

**Figure G-17. Annex G (Air and Missile Defense) Instructions and Format (continued)**

**[Classification]**

Include heading if annex distributed separately from base OPLAN/OPORD.

**ANNEX H (COMMAND, CONTROL, COMMUNICATION, and COMPUTER OPERATIONS) TO OPERATION ORDER NO ## [code name]—[issuing headquarters]**

**1. SITUATION.**

**a. Enemy forces.**

(1) **Terrain.** Critical terrain aspects that impact C2 systems deployment.

(2) **Enemy capability and or activity.** Significant enemy EW capabilities that impact communications systems.

**b. Friendly forces.**

- Primary communications gateways providing connectivity to higher, lower, and adjacent units.
- Critical communications security measures required to counter expected enemy EW capabilities and protect C2 systems.
- External communications assets that augment signal support unit capabilities.

**See Figure G-11, page G41, for general instructions on completing annexes. This figure discusses C4-specific items.**

**2. MISSION.**

**3. EXECUTION.**

**a. Scheme of signal support operations.**

(1) Describe the concept of signal operations, including primary and back-up systems supporting critical C2 networks.

(2) Outline the plan for extending C2 systems by each phase of the operation.

(3) List critical links between tactical and strategic communications systems.

(4) Identify critical limitations of organic signal support assets. Define limitations of assets from higher headquarters.

(5) State signal support tasks that all nonsignal units must perform to accomplish missions and tasks beyond normal requirements.

(6) State signal support priorities.

**b. Tasks to subordinate units.**

- Signal support tasks that maneuver elements must accomplish that the base OPLAN/OPORD does not contain.
- Signal support tasks that signal units supporting maneuver elements are to accomplish only as necessary to ensure unity of effort.

**c. Coordinating instructions.**

- Critical signal support instructions not already covered in the base OPLAN/OPORD.
- Key times or events critical to INFOSYS and network control procedures.
- Army Battle Command System (ABCS) control procedures.

**4. SERVICE SUPPORT.**

**[Classification]**

**Figure G-18. Annex H (Command, Control, Communication, and Computer Operations) Instructions and Format**

<b>[Classification]</b>	
<b>ANNEX H (COMMAND, CONTROL, COMMUNICATION, and COMPUTER OPERATIONS) TO OPERATION ORDER NO ## [code name]—[issuing headquarters]</b>	
<b>5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL.</b>	
a. Identify C2 systems control hierarchy for the common user network.	
b. Identify local area network control procedures for network administration and management.	
c. Use appendixes to diagram any changes to standard communications networks.	
<b>ACKNOWLEDGE:</b> (if distributed separately from base order)	
<b>name]</b>	<b>[Authenticator's last</b>
	<b>[Authenticator's rank]</b>
<b>APPENDIXES:</b>	
<b>DISTRIBUTION:</b> (if distributed separately from base order)	
<b>[Classification]</b>	

Figure G-18. Annex H (Command, Control, Communication, and Computer Operations) Instructions and Format (continued)

**[Classification]**

Include heading if annex distributed separately from base OPLAN/OPORD.

**ANNEX I (SERVICE SUPPORT) TO OPERATION ORDER NO ## [code name]—  
[issuing headquarters]**

- 1. SITUATION.**
- 2. MISSION.**
- 3. EXECUTION.**
- 4. SERVICE SUPPORT.**
  - a. Materiel and services.**
    - (1) Supply.** For each class of supply, list supply point locations and state supply plan and procedures. Post supply point locations to service support matrix and overlay.
      - (a) Class I (Rations).** List ration cycle.
      - (b) Class II (Organizational clothing and individual equipment and maps).** Classified map requests are submitted through S2/G2 channels.
      - (c) Class III (Bulk fuel; package petroleum, oils, and lubricants).**
      - (d) Class IV (Construction and fortification material).** List command-controlled items.
      - (e) Class V (Munitions).** List CSRs and procedures to request EOD support.
      - (f) Class VI (Personal demand items).** Health and comfort packs and items normally sold through the exchange service.
      - (g) Class VII (Major end items).** List command-controlled items.
      - (h) Class VIII (Medical material).**
      - (i) Class IX (Repair parts).** State the approving authority for controlled exchange of parts. List critical shortages and command-controlled items.
      - (j) Class X (Material for nonmilitary or civil affairs operations).**
      - (k) Miscellaneous.** Items which are not one of the 10 supply classes. List maps, water, special supplies, and excess and salvage materiel, as applicable.
    - (2) Transportation.** For each subparagraph, identify facility locations, traffic control, regulation measures, MSRs, ASRs, transportation critical shortages, and essential data not provided elsewhere. Post MSRs, ASRs, and transportation nodes to service support overlay. List transportation request procedures.
      - (a) Land.**
      - (b) Sea.**
      - (c) Air.**
    - (3) Services.** Identify services available, the designation and location of units providing them, and the time they are available. List procedures for requesting services by type. Post services information to service support matrix and overlay.
      - (a) Construction.**
      - (b) Showers, laundry, and clothing repair and light textile repair.**
      - (c) Mortuary affairs.**

**See Figure G-11, page G-41, for general instructions on completing annexes. This figure discusses service support-specific items.**

**[Classification]**

Figure G-19. Annex I (Service Support) Instructions and Format

[Classification]

**ANNEX I (SERVICE SUPPORT) TO OPERATION ORDER NO ## [code name]—[issuing headquarters]**

- (d) Food preparation.
- (e) Water purification.
- (f) Aerial delivery.
- (g) Installation service.
- (4) Labor.

(5) **Maintenance.** For each subparagraph, include maintenance priority, location of facilities and collection points, repair time limits at each maintenance level, and evacuation procedures. Post maintenance points to service support matrix and overlay.

- (a) Air.
- (b) Ground.
- (c) Watercraft.

**b. Medical evacuation and treatment.** State plan for collection and medical treatment of sick, injured, or wounded US and multinational soldiers, EPW, and civilians. Discuss support requirements for CHS logistics (including blood management), combat stress control, preventive medicine, dental services, and veterinary services. Post hospital locations and information to service support matrix and overlay.

(1) **Evacuation.** Medical evacuation policy, including contaminated casualty treatment.

(2) **Hospitalization.**

**c. Personnel.** Outline plans for unit strength maintenance; personnel management; morale development and maintenance; discipline, law and order; headquarters management; force provider; religious support, and so on. Post locations and information to service support matrix and overlay.

- (1) **Unit strength maintenance.**
- (2) **Morale.**

**d. Foreign nation and host nation support.**

**e. Miscellaneous.** Logistic and personnel reports format usually as per SOP or included in an appendix. List any allocation rules in effect.

**5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL.**

**ACKNOWLEDGE:** (if distributed separately from base order)

[Authenticator's last name]

[Authenticator's rank]

**APPENDIXES:**

- |                                      |                                    |
|--------------------------------------|------------------------------------|
| 1. Service Support Matrix            | 4. Personnel                       |
| 2. Service Support Overlay           | 5. Legal                           |
| 3. Traffic Circulation and Control   | 6. Religious Support               |
| Tab A. Traffic Circulation (Overlay) | 7. Foreign and Host-Nation Support |
| Tab B. Road Movement Table           | 8. Reports                         |
| Tab C. Highway Regulations           |                                    |

**DISTRIBUTION:** (if distributed separately from base order)

**Figure G-19. Annex I (Service Support) Instructions and Format (continued)**

**[Classification]**

Include heading if annex distributed separately from base OPLAN/OPORD.

**ANNEX J (Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Operations) TO OPERATION ORDER NO ## [code name]—[issuing headquarters]**

**1. SITUATION.** Address NBC threat, including smoke, flame, and riot-control agents.

**2. MISSION**

**3. EXECUTION**

**a. Scheme of NBC operations.** Briefly state the NBC defense operation to be carried out. State smoke synchronization plan.

**b. Tasks to subordinate units.** Include subordinate and supporting chemical unit tasks, missions, and priorities for NBC reconnaissance, surveillance, & decontamination operations.

**c. Coordinating instructions.** Address—

- MOPP-level guidance.
- Automatic masking criteria.
- Troop safety criteria.
- Linkup points for decontamination sites.
- Locations of medical facilities for treating chemical casualties.
- Turn-in points and procedures for handling chemical and biological samples.
- Civilian and military facilities whose destruction could create militarily significant NBC hazards.
- Operational exposure guidance (if applicable).
- Procedures for limiting electromagnetic pulse effects.
- Identification of designated observer units.
- Identification of procedures for providing support to local populations.

**See Figure G-11, page G-41, for general instructions on completing annexes. This figure discusses NBC-specific items.**

**4. SERVICE SUPPORT.** Address—

- Procedures for handling contaminated casualties and processing remains, if not in SOP. State the battlefield interment authority.
- Information on the availability and location of field expedient decontamination supplies, materials, and decontaminants.
- Information about the availability, procedures for distributing, prestock points, and transportation of NBC equipment and chemical defense equipment.
- Procedures for chemical defense equipment push-package concept.

**5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL.**

**a. Command.** Locations of chemical staffs and subordinate and supporting chemical unit headquarters.

**b. Signal.**

- Special signal instructions to subordinate and supporting chemical units.
- Information concerning the NBC warning and reporting system.
- Information concerning dissemination of strike warning messages.

**ACKNOWLEDGE:** (if distributed separately from base order)

**[Authenticator's last name]**

**[Authenticator's rank]**

**APPENDIXES:**

**DISTRIBUTION:** (if distributed separately from base order)

**[Classification]**

**Figure G-20. Annex J (Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Operations) Instructions and Format**

<b>[Classification]</b>	
<p>Include heading if annex distributed separately from base OPLAN/OPORD.</p> <p><b>ANNEX K (PROVOST MARSHAL) TO OPERATION ORDER NO ## [code name]—</b>  <b>[issuing headquarters]</b></p>	
<p><b>1. SITUATION.</b></p> <p><b>2. MISSION.</b></p> <p><b>3. EXECUTION.</b></p> <p style="padding-left: 20px;"><b>a. Scheme of provost marshal operations.</b> State the provost marshal concept to employ military police assets. Focus on the mission, commander’s intent, and guidance; how provost marshal operations support to the fight; and how they are nested.</p> <p style="padding-left: 40px;"><b>(1) Maneuver and mobility support.</b> Outline the circulation control plan. Focus on maneuver unit mobility to minimize interference with movement within and through the rear area. Include the following:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Route reconnaissance and surveillance.</li> <li>• MSR regulation enforcement.</li> <li>• Contamination avoidance.</li> <li>• Straggler control.</li> <li>• Dislocated civilian control.</li> <li>• Tactical and criminal intelligence collecting and reporting.</li> </ul> <p style="padding-left: 40px;"><b>(2) Force protection.</b> Develop rear area protection plan, including levels II and III response actions (base and base cluster defense); synchronize with the ISR plan. Include the following:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Security of critical assets.</li> <li>• Base response force (levels I, II, III).</li> <li>• Counterreconnaissance and response force activities.</li> <li>• Air base defense.</li> <li>• Counterterrorism and antiterrorism activities.</li> <li>• Area damage control.</li> <li>• NBC detection and reporting.</li> <li>• C2 protection activities.</li> </ul> <p style="padding-left: 40px;"><b>(3) Internment and resettlement operations.</b> List locations of EPW, detainee, or internee holding areas. Coordinate with appropriate rear command post or staff element on population data (such as number and location). Plan and direct operations (collection, detention, internment, protection measures, sustainment, and evacuation). Coordinate with G4/S4 and host nation as necessary.</p> <p style="padding-left: 40px;"><b>(4) Law and order operations.</b> Outline plan to maintain law and order from the rear area forward to maneuver units. Determine investigative assets, develop MP patrol routes. Establish criteria for apprehension and detention of US military prisoners.</p> <p style="padding-left: 40px;"><b>(5) Police intelligence operations.</b> Outline coordination with criminal investigation division, military police, and MI relative to the collection, integration, and dissemination of police intelligence and information.</p>	<div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 5px; margin: 10px auto; width: 80%;"> <p><b>See Figure G-11, page G-41, for general instructions on completing annexes. This figure discusses provost marshal-specific items.</b></p> </div>
<b>[Classification]</b>	

**Figure G-21. Annex K Provost Marshal) Instructions and Format**

**[Classification]**

**ANNEX K (PROVOST MARSHAL) TO OPERATION ORDER NO ## [code name]—  
[issuing headquarters]**

**b. Tasks to subordinate units.** List tasks to be accomplished by general support and direct support units.

**c. Coordinating instructions.** Include instructions on military police general support missions that apply to two or more subordinate units. Refer to other appendixes or annexes as necessary.

- State required coordination and cooperation among adjacent and other units, and civilian HN agencies, for example, with engineers concerning building and hardening EPW holding area.
- State actions pertaining to rear area force protection that may expand or differ from the SOP.

**4. SERVICE SUPPORT.**

**5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL.**

**ACKNOWLEDGE:** (if distributed separately from base order)

**[Authenticator's last name]  
[Authenticator's rank]**

**APPENDIXES:**

**DISTRIBUTION:** (if distributed separately from base order)

**[Classification]**

**Figure G-21. Annex K (Provost Marshal) Instructions and Format (continued)**

**[Classification]**

Include heading if annex distributed separately from base OPLAN/OPORD.

**ANNEX L (INTELLIGENCE, SURVEILLANCE, AND RECONNAISSANCE) TO OPERATION ORDER NO## [code name]—[issuing headquarters]**

**1. SITUATION.**

**a. Enemy Situation.** Refer to Annex B (Intelligence).

**b. Friendly Situation.** Refer to base order, Annex A (Task Organization), and Annex C (Operations).

**2. MISSION.** State the ISR mission.

**3. EXECUTION.**

**a. Concept of ISR Operations.** State the overall reconnaissance objective. Describe the concept of ISR operations to support the commander's intent and the maneuver plan. The concept of ISR operations expresses how each element of the force will cooperate to accomplish the ISR mission and how it is tied to supporting the unit's overall operation. Describe how actions of subordinate units and assets fit together by task and purpose. At minimum, the concept of ISR operations addresses the ISR scheme of maneuver and concept of fires. Refer to Appendix 2 (ISR Overlay) to Annex L (ISR). Discuss details of the concept of ISR operations in subparagraphs as necessary, based on what the commander considers appropriate, the level of command, and the complexity of ISR operations. If a subparagraph is unnecessary, omit it. The following subparagraphs are examples of what may be required within the concept of ISR operations.

**See Figure G-11, page G-41, for general instructions on completing annexes. This figure discusses ISR-specific items.**

**(1) Maneuver.** State the scheme of maneuver for ISR units. This paragraph must be consistent with force concept of operations (base order, paragraph 3a) and Annex C (Operations). Detail how reconnaissance and surveillance units and assets operate in relation to the rest of the force. State the method reconnaissance forces will use to get to the AO (infiltration, penetration of enemy security zone, passage of lines, and so on). Refer to Appendix 1 (ISR Overlay) to Annex L ; Annex C, (Operations), or the base OPLAN/OPORD if required.

**(2) Fires.** State the concept of fires in support of ISR operations. This subparagraph states which ISR elements have priority of fires. It states the purpose of, priorities for, allocation of, and restrictions for fire support and fire support coordinating measures. Refer to Annex D (Fire Support) if required.

**(3) Intelligence.** State the intelligence system concept for supporting ISR operations. Refer to Annex B (Intelligence) if required.

**(4) Engineer.** Clarify the scheme of engineer support for ISR operations. Indicate priority of effort. Provide priority of mobility and survivability assets as appropriate. Delegate or withhold authority to emplace obstacles. Refer to Annex F (Engineer) and other annexes as required.

**(6) Air and Missile Defense.** State the overall concept of air and missile defense in support of ISR operations. Establish priority of air defense support and provide air defense weapons status and warning status. Ensure airspace coordination measures are published. Include UAV considerations. Refer to Annex G (Air and Missile Defense) as required.

**[Classification]**

**Figure G-22. Annex L (Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance) Instructions and Format**

<p><b>[Classification]</b></p> <p><b>ANNEX L (INTELLIGENCE, SURVEILLANCE, AND RECONNAISSANCE) TO OPERATION ORDER NO## [code name]—[issuing headquarters]</b></p> <p><b>(7) Information Operations.</b> State overall concept of information operations in support of ISR operations. Establish priority of support. Refer to Annex P (Information Operations) and other annexes as required.</p> <p><b>b. Tasks to maneuver units.</b> List by unit ISR tasks not contained in the base order. Refer to Appendix 1 (ISR Tasking Plan/Matrix). Tasks may contain collection tasks.</p> <p><b>c. Tasks to other combat and combat support units.</b> List by unit ISR tasks not contained in the base order. Refer to Appendix 1 (ISR Tasking Plan/Matrix). Tasks may contain collection tasks.</p> <p><b>d. Coordinating instructions.</b></p> <p><b>4. SERVICE SUPPORT.</b></p> <p><b>5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL.</b></p> <p><b>a. Command.</b></p> <p><b>b. Signal.</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• State to whom to report collected information and on what nets.</li> <li>• Outline the retransmission plan to support the operation.</li> </ul> <p><b>ACKNOWLEDGE:</b> (if distributed separately from base order)</p> <p style="text-align: right;"><b>[Authenticator's last name]</b> <b>[Authenticator's rank]</b></p> <p><b>APPENDIXES:</b></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. ISR Tasking Plan/Matrix.</li> <li>2. ISR overlay.</li> </ol> <p><b>DISTRIBUTION:</b> (if distributed separately from base order)</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><b>[Classification]</b></p>
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**Figure G-22. Annex L (Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance) Instructions and Format (continued)**

<b>[Classification]</b>	
<p>Include heading if annex distributed separately from base OPLAN/OPORD.</p> <p><b>ANNEX M (REAR AREA AND BASE SECURITY) TO OPERATION ORDER NO##</b>  <b>[code name]—[issuing headquarters]</b></p>	
<p><b>1. SITUATION.</b></p> <p><b>2. MISSION.</b></p> <p><b>3. EXECUTION.</b></p> <p style="padding-left: 20px;"><b>a. Scheme of rear area and base security operations.</b> Describe how the rear area and base security operations will support the overall operation.</p> <p style="padding-left: 40px;"><b>(1) Terrain management.</b> Identify areas to be used for reconstitution. State when the rear boundaries will be moved forward.</p> <p style="padding-left: 40px;"><b>(2) Security.</b> Identify the tactical combat force, response force, and reaction forces. Describe the counterreconnaissance plan. State how aviation overflights (routine in support of sustaining operations) will be used to provide additional reconnaissance. Identify CI tasks that support threat reduction, location, and identification. Plan for integrating any HN, multinational, or joint force support.</p> <p style="padding-left: 40px;"><b>(3) Sustainment.</b> Monitor status of sustaining operations. Position support assets. Identify critical CSS facilities and movements that require priority protection. Plan establishment of forward supply points.</p> <p style="padding-left: 40px;"><b>(4) Movements.</b> Monitor administrative and tactical movements in the rear area. Identify choke points that require sustained engineer support. Plan for rerouting sustainment on MSRs to ensure no interference with tactical unit movements. Plan for tracking of all units—including HN, multinational, and joint—moving through the rear area.</p> <p style="padding-left: 20px;"><b>b. Tasks to subordinate units.</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Include tasks for tactical combat forces, military police, and base cluster reaction forces.</li> <li>• Designate responsibilities for specific units to conduct rear area security.</li> <li>• Specify tasks to units for intelligence gathering, liaison, response operations, base and base cluster self-defense, and rear area fire support.</li> <li>• Specify rear CP coordinating tasks for rear area and base security operations.</li> </ul> <p style="padding-left: 20px;"><b>c. Coordinating instructions.</b></p> <p><b>4. SERVICE SUPPORT.</b></p> <p><b>5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL.</b></p> <p style="padding-left: 20px;"><b>a. Command.</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Establish the chain of command for the rear CP. Identify base and base cluster commanders and their chains of command.</li> <li>• Designate the location of the alternate rear CP.</li> </ul> <p style="padding-left: 20px;"><b>b. Signal.</b></p>	<p style="text-align: center;"><b>See Figure G-11, page G-41, for general instructions on completing annexes. This figure discusses rear area and base security-specific items.</b></p>
<p style="text-align: right;"><b>[Authenticator's last name]</b> <b>[Authenticator's rank]</b></p>	
<p><b>APPENDIXES:</b></p> <p><b>DISTRIBUTION:</b> (if distributed separately from base order)</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><b>[Classification]</b></p>	

**Figure G-23. Annex M (Rear Area and Base Security) Instructions and Format**

<b>[Classification]</b>	
Include heading if annex distributed separately from base OPLAN/OPORD.	
<b>ANNEX N (SPACE) TO OPERATION ORDER NO## [code name]—[issuing headquarters]</b>	
<b>1. SITUATION.</b>	
<p><b>a. General.</b> Provide enough information about the overall situation to give subordinate and supporting units a clear understanding of the operations contemplated that require space operations support.</p> <p><b>b. Enemy.</b> Estimate what the enemy is capable of doing and probably will do with space, air, surface, or subsurface assets to interfere with space operations.</p> <p style="padding-left: 40px;">envisioned in this plan. Refer to Annex B (Intelligence) for amplifying information.</p> <p><b>c. Friendly.</b> Identify all available friendly space forces and assets.</p> <p><b>d. Assumptions.</b> State assumptions not included in the base plan relating to friendly, enemy, or third-party capabilities that may affect, negate, or compromise space capabilities. If any assumptions are critical to success, indicate alternative COAs.</p>	<p><b>See Figure G-11, page G-42, for general instructions on completing annexes. This figure discusses space-specific items.</b></p>
<b>2. MISSION.</b> State, clearly and concisely, the major space tasks.	
<b>3. EXECUTION.</b>	
<p><b>a. Concept of Operations.</b> State the general concept of space operations. Briefly describe how they fit into the overall operation, or refer to the base plan. Emphasize aspects of the base plan that require space support and that may affect space capabilities. State OPSEC planning guidance for tasks assigned in this annex. Cross-reference other OPSEC planning guidance for functional areas addressed in other annexes.</p> <p><b>(1) Space Activities.</b> Identify space activities required to support the operation, including the following areas as applicable:</p> <p style="padding-left: 40px;"><b>(a) Communications.</b> Space operations needed to support communications plans as described in Annex H (C4 Operations).</p> <p style="padding-left: 40px;"><b>(b) Environmental.</b> Meteorological, oceanographic, geodetic, and other environmental support information provided by space assets that affect space, air, surface, and subsurface activities and assets.</p> <p style="padding-left: 40px;"><b>(c) Navigation.</b> Navigational capabilities that aid transit of ships, aircraft, personnel, or spacecraft and help determine courses and distances traveled and position locations.</p> <p style="padding-left: 40px;"><b>(d) Surveillance.</b> Information about friendly and enemy forces within or outside the AO that would aid in operations and force positioning. Refer to Annex B (Intelligence) and Annex L (ISR).</p> <p style="padding-left: 40px;"><b>(e) Tactical Warning.</b> Notification of enemy ballistic missile or space-weapon attacks that can be evaluated from available sensor and intelligence sources and could affect the AO. Refer to Annex B (Intelligence).</p> <p style="padding-left: 40px;"><b>(f) Space Control.</b> Space-related activities—whether performed by space, air, or surface assets—that assure friendly forces of unrestricted use of space and space assets, and deny it to enemy forces.</p>	
<b>[Classification]</b>	

Figure G-24. Annex N (Space) Instructions and Format

<p><b>[Classification]</b></p> <p><b>ANNEX N (SPACE) TO OPERATION ORDER NO## [code name]—[issuing head-quarters]</b></p> <p><b>(g) Nuclear Detonation.</b> Address notification of detected nuclear detonations that might affect the operation and require evaluation as to yield and location. Refer to Annex B (Intelligence).</p> <p><b>(h) Friendly Missile Impact.</b> Address notification of friendly ballistic missile launches that might affect the AO and that would require early warning of affected friendly forces and estimated points of impact. Establish provisions to provide expeditious dissemination of this information throughout the AO.</p> <p><b>(i) Enemy Space Activity.</b> Address notification of space-related activities undertaken by the enemy that would affect friendly operations. Include notice of enemy space assets observing friendly forces. Include notice of other hostile space activities that deny unrestricted friendly access to space, deny the full capabilities of friendly space assets, or restrict friendly surface resources required by those space assets. Refer to Annex B (Intelligence).</p> <p><b>(j) Electronic Warfare.</b> Identify space activities that support EW. Clearly state the contributions that space systems make to EW. Reference to Appendix 4 (EW) to Annex P (IO) may be sufficient.</p> <p><b>b. Tasks and Responsibilities.</b> In separate numbered subparagraphs, assign individual tasks and responsibilities to each subordinate unit, supporting command, or agency that supports the operation. For each task, provide enough detail to assure all essential elements are described properly.</p> <p><b>c. Coordinating Instructions.</b> Provide guidance common to two or more components, subdivisions, or agencies.</p> <p><b>4. SERVICE SUPPORT.</b> Provide broad guidance concerning administrative and logistic support for space operations. Address support of mobile and fixed space assets within the theater, or refer to the appropriate annex. Reference to Annex I (Service Support) may suffice.</p> <p><b>5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL.</b></p> <p><b>a. Command.</b> Indicate any difference between command channels for space operations and command relationships established in Annex A (Task Organization). If applicable, state requirements for headquarters augmentation with space operations personnel. Refer to the appropriate sections of Annex H (C4) or the base plan for general C2 support of space activities.</p> <p><b>b. Signal.</b> Summarize requirements for general C4 support of space activities. Refer to appropriate sections of Annex H (C4 Operations).</p> <p><b>ACKNOWLEDGE:</b> (if distributed separately from base order)</p> <p style="text-align: right;"><b>[Authenticator's last name]</b> <b>[Authenticator's rank]</b></p> <p><b>APPENDIXES:</b></p> <p><b>DISTRIBUTION:</b> (if distributed separately from base order)</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><b>[Classification]</b></p>
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Figure G-24. Annex N (Space) Instructions and Format (continued)

<b>[Classification]</b>	
<p>Include heading if annex distributed separately from base OPLAN/OPORD.</p> <p><b>ANNEX O (ARMY AIRSPACE COMMAND AND CONTROL) TO OPERATION ORDER NO## [code name]—[issuing headquarters]</b></p> <p><b>1. SITUATION.</b> Include information-affecting A2C2 that is not included in paragraph 1 of the base order and Annex G (Air Defense), or that requires expansion.</p> <p><b>a. Enemy forces.</b></p> <p style="margin-left: 40px;">(1) List known and templated ADA locations and enemy air corridors.</p> <p style="margin-left: 40px;">(2) List significant enemy maneuver capabilities that affect A2C2 operations.</p> <p><b>b. Friendly forces.</b> Note additional airspace users—including Air Force, Navy, Marine, coalition ADA, FA, and UAV—that affect the scheme of maneuver.</p> <p><b>2. MISSION.</b></p> <p><b>3. EXECUTION.</b></p> <p style="margin-left: 40px;"><b>a.</b> None.</p> <p style="margin-left: 40px;"><b>b.</b> None.</p> <p style="margin-left: 40px;"><b>c. Coordinating instructions.</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Identify routes and corridors (such as minimum-risk routes, low-level transit routes, standard-use routes, UAV operating areas, restricted operations zones, Air Force routes, and coordination requirements).</li> <li>• Identify fire support coordinating measures that affect airspace users.</li> <li>• List areas of large area smoke operations.</li> </ul> <p><b>4. SERVICE SUPPORT.</b></p> <p><b>5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL.</b></p> <p><b>ACKNOWLEDGE:</b> (if distributed separately from base order)</p> <p style="text-align: right; margin-right: 100px;"><b>[Authenticator's last name]</b> <b>[Authenticator's rank]</b></p> <p><b>APPENDIXES:</b></p> <p><b>DISTRIBUTION:</b> (if distributed separately from base order)</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><b>[Classification]</b></p>	
	<p><b>See Figure G-11, page G-41, for general instructions on completing annexes. This figure discusses A2C2-specific items.</b></p>

**Figure G-25. Annex O (Army Airspace Command and Control) Instructions and Format**

**[Classification]**

Include heading if annex distributed separately from base OPLAN/OPORD.

**ANNEX P (INFORMATION OPERATIONS) TO OPERATIONS ORDER NO## [code name]—[issuing headquarters]**

**1. Situation**

**a. Enemy.** Identify enemy IO C2 nodes and their vulnerabilities.

**(1) Terrain.** List terrain aspects that affect each IO element.

**(2) Weather.** List weather aspects that affect each IO element.

**(3) Enemy IO capabilities.** Identify enemy IO elements, C2 vulnerabilities, and capabilities to degrade friendly C2. Identify the enemy situation, force disposition, intelligence elements, and possible actions. Identify specific information that bears directly on planned IO.

**b. Friendly IO capabilities.** Identify IO elements and their vulnerability to enemy actions. Identify IO capabilities to degrade enemy C2. Identify IO assets needed to attack enemy targets and friendly forces that will directly affect IO. Identify limitations of planned IO. Identify potential conflicts within the friendly electromagnetic spectrum, especially if conducting joint or multinational operations. Identify deconfliction methods and priority of spectrum distribution.

**c. Civil Considerations.** Identify other key people and groups in the AO.

**d. Attachments and detachments.** List IO assets that are attached or detached. List IO resources available from higher headquarters.

**2. MISSION.** State the IO mission statement.

**3. EXECUTION.**

**a. Concept of support.** Describe the IO concept of support, including IO objectives and IO tasks. A complex IO concepts of support may require a schematic to show IO objective–IO task relationships. Include a discussion of the overall IO concept of support. Place details in element subparagraphs. Use appendixes if necessary. Refer to Appendix 5 (IO Execution Matrix) to Annex P to clarify the timing relationships among IO tasks. This annex should contain the information to synchronize timing relationships of each IO element/related activity. Include IO-related constraints if appropriate. Address each IO element in a separate subparagraph. Use appendixes as necessary.

**b. Tasks to Subordinate Units.** List units assigned IO tasks and the IO tasks they are assigned.

**c. IO Cell.** List instructions for the IO cell not included in the SOP.

**d. Coordinating Instructions.** Include only IO instructions not already covered in the base OPLAN/OPORD common to two or more units. State ROE for each IO element. Do not include SOP information. List constraints not contained in the concept of support.

**4. SERVICE SUPPORT.** Identify requirements for supply distribution, transportation, and host nation support pertaining to IO as a whole. Identify service support to individual IO elements their respective appendixes or annexes.

**See Figure G-11, page G-41, for general instructions on completing annexes. This figure discusses IO-specific items.**

**[Classification]**

**Figure G-24. Annex P (Information Operations) Instructions and Format**

[Classification]

**ANNEX P (INFORMATION OPERATIONS) TO OPERATION ORDER NO## [code name]—[issuing headquarters]**

**5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL.** Significant command and signal information related to IO is normally covered in the body of the order. This paragraph covers arrangements needed to exchange information among IO elements.

**ACKNOWLEDGE:** (if distributed separately from base order)

[Authenticator's last name]

[Authenticator's rank]

**APPENDIXES:**

1. Operations Security
2. Psychological Operations
3. Military Deception Plan
4. Electronic Warfare
5. IO Execution Matrix

**DISTRIBUTION:** (if distributed separately from base order)

[Classification]

**Figure G-26. Annex P (Information Operations) Instructions and Format (continued)**

<b>[Classification]</b>	
Include heading if annex distributed separately from base OPLAN/OPORD.	
<b>ANNEX Q (CIVIL-MILITARY OPERATIONS) TO OPERATION ORDER NO## [code name]—[issuing headquarters]</b>	
<b>1. SITUATION.</b> Include information affecting CMO not included in the OPLAN/OPORD. Identify the impact of civilians on unit ability to complete its mission. Identify higher and adjacent unit CMO plans. Identify CA resources attached and detached with effective times.	
<b>2. MISSION.</b>	
<b>3. EXECUTION.</b> State proposed CMO. Establish priorities. Define requirements for liaison, particularly with agencies outside the Army (for example, Department of Defense, Department of State, and nongovernmental organizations).	
<b>See Figure G-11, page G-41, for general instructions on completing annexes. This figure discusses CMO-specific items.</b>	
<b>4. SERVICE SUPPORT.</b>	
<b>5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL.</b>	
<b>a. Command.</b>	
<b>b. Signal.</b> Designate reporting functions for units assigned CMO tasks and CA units.	
<b>ACKNOWLEDGE:</b> (if distributed separately from base order)	
<b>[Authenticator's last name]</b> <b>[Authenticator's rank]</b>	
<b>APPENDIXES:</b>	
<b>DISTRIBUTION:</b> (if distributed separately from base order)	
<b>[Classification]</b>	

Figure G-27. Annex Q (Civil-Military Operations) Instructions and Format

<b>[Classification]</b>	
Include heading if annex distributed separately from base OPLAN/OPORD.	
<b>ANNEX R (PUBLIC AFFAIRS) TO OPERATION ORDER NO## [code name]—[issuing headquarters]</b>	
<b>1. SITUATION.</b> Include information affecting public affairs operations not included in the OPLAN/OPORD. Identify the impact of media and news technology on unit ability to complete its mission. Identify any higher and adjacent unit PA plans. Identify PA resources and news media attached and detached with effective times.	
<b>2. MISSION.</b>	<b>See Figure G-11, page G-41, for general instructions on completing annexes. This figure discusses PA-specific items.</b>
<b>3. EXECUTION.</b> State the proposed PA operations. Establish priorities. Define requirements for media liaison, particularly with any foreign news agencies.	
<b>4. SERVICE SUPPORT.</b>	
<b>5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL.</b> Designate the reporting functions for PA activities.	
<b>ACKNOWLEDGE:</b> (if distributed separately from base order)	
	<b>[Authenticator's last name]</b> <b>[Authenticator's rank]</b>
<b>APPENDIXES:</b>	
<b>DISTRIBUTION:</b> (if distributed separately from base order)	
<b>[Classification]</b>	

Figure G-28. Annex R (Public Affairs) Instructions and Format

## VII Corps Operation Order Vignette

Figures G-29 and G-30 show Field Order 18, a typical order prepared by Army forces during World War II. Field Order 18 was completed in a time-constrained environment and relied on proven SOPs. It uses the overlay order technique. The commanding general provided additional mission orders personally.

The VII Corps, commanded by MG (later GEN) J. Lawton “Lightning Joe” Collins, had to expand the Remagen Bridgehead as well as plan for the breakout and exploitation into the German industrial heartland. VII Corps prepared, and the commanding general gave, the order orally on 22 March 1945. A written order—including overlay, intelligence annex, and fire support annex—followed on 23 March. The order, both the oral and written, was flexible enough to be adapted between its time of issue and execution.

Especially notable is the brevity and simplicity of the base order. Such simplicity and brevity reflect the combat-tested experience and SOPs of VII Corps and the divisions within First US Army. Field Order 18 contains the minimum essential information required in an OPOD today:

- Five basic paragraphs (slightly different from now, but nevertheless similar in name and order).
- Task organization (contained in subparagraphs of paragraph 3 rather than above paragraph 1).
- Mission statement (paragraph 2).
- Operations overlay.

MG Collins used oral orders and an overlay to issue his order. The written order confirmed those directives. Today a commander’s intent and concept of operations are mandatory. In Field Order 18, a concept is outlined in the subparagraphs of paragraph 3. Presumably, the corps commander issued his concept in the oral orders. It is apparent from the execution of the operation that the subordinates understood MG Collins’ concept.

D-day and H-hour for Field Order 18 were 0400 hours, 25 March 1945. The corps accomplished its initial objectives on 26 March, seized its objective on 27 March, and exploited to Marburg on 28 March. The corps issued a subsequent field order (Field Order 19) on 28 March for follow-on operations. These eventually involved closing the Ruhr Pocket with XIX Corps from Ninth Army to the north on 1 April 1945, after covering 300 kilometer in seven days. Over 300,000 German soldiers were captured in the pocket. During the European campaign, VII Corps issued only 20 field orders, an average of two per month, to control operations; many of these “confirmed oral orders CG, VII Corps.”




Figure G-29. Overlay to VII Corps Field Order 18, 23 March 1945

<p><b>HQ, VII CORPS</b> <b>APO 307</b> <b>23 MARCH 1945</b></p>	
<p><b>FO 18 (Confirming oral orders CG VII Corps issued 22 March 1945)</b></p>	
<p>Maps: GSGS 4416 CENTRAL EUROPE 1/100,000</p>	
<p>1. a. See Annex 2, Intelligence.</p>	
<p>b. (1) NINTH US ARMY, with XIX Corps on its right, continues its defense of the RHINE River from WORRINGEN (F3874) (excl) to the NORTH.</p>	
<p>(2) FIRST US ARMY will attack on D-day from present bridgehead area to drive EAST between the SIEG River on the NORTH and the LAHN River on the SOUTH to capture the road center at LIMBURG (M2398), and the high ground extending generally NORTH thereof.</p>	
<p>2. a. VII Corps will (1) attack at H-hour, D-day within zone of action EAST of the RHINE and SOUTH of the SIEG River to capture the high ground generally WEST of the DILL River between WURGENDORF (G2740) and NENDEROTH (G3220); (2) be prepared to resume the attack to the NORTHEAST; (3) maintain defense of the WEST bank of the RHINE in the Corps zone and NORTH of BONN (F5537); and (4) protect the left flank of the FIRST ARMY EAST of the RHINE.</p>	
<p>b. For Corps and Division boundaries and initial objectives, see Annex 1, Operations Overlay.</p>	
<p>c. H-hour and D-day to be announced.</p>	
	<p>NOTES:</p> <p>MG Collins used oral and overlay techniques for delivering the order.</p> <p>1. Annex 2 not included; consisted of main body (3 pp) and 2 appendixes: App 1, Counterintelligence (2 pp); App 2, Tactical Study of the Terrain (2 pp)</p> <p>2. MISSION Operation commenced 250400 MAR 1945 following crossing of Rhine to north by 21 Army Group. Technically this is an OPLAN IAW current doctrine (see Operations Overlay.)</p> <p>Doctrinal location (1944) for task organization (between paras 2 and 3) In this case, task organizations are included in par 3 for subordinate units.</p>

Figure G-30. VII Corps Field Order 18, 23 March 1945

<p>3. a. 3d Armored Division, Major General Maurice Rose, Commanding.</p> <p>(1) Attachments:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>414th Inf (104th Inf Div)</li><li>183d FA Bn (155 How)</li><li>83d Armd FA Bn (105 How SP)</li><li>486th AAA AW Bn (SP)</li><li>703d TD Bn (SP)</li></ul> <p>(2) Will attack H-hour D-day through elements of the 104th Division and 1st Inf Div and advance rapidly to seize initially the high ground and road center in the vicinity of ALTENKIR-CHEN (F9332) and successive objectives thereafter to include crossings of the DILL River between DILLENBURG (G3837) and HERBORN (G3931). Will by-pass [sic] pockets of resistance in order to seize objectives quickly. Will be prepared to exploit in the direction of MARBURG (G7347) - FRANKENBERG (G7473).</p> <p>b. 104th Infantry Division, Major General Terry Allen, Commanding.</p> <p>(1) Attachments:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>555 AAA AW Bn (M)</li><li>750th Tk Bn</li><li>Co. C, 644th TD Bn (SP)</li></ul> <p>(2) With its principal effort on the left, will attack at H-hour on D-day to eliminate all enemy resistance within its zone of action.</p> <p>(3) Will assist the advance of 3d Armd Div.</p> <p>c. 1st Infantry Division, Brigadier General Clifton Andrus, Commanding.</p> <p>(1) Attachments:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>957th FA Bn (155 How)</li><li>193d FA Bn (25 Pdr)</li><li>103d AAA AW Bn (M)</li><li>634th TD Bn (SP)</li><li>745th Tk Bn</li><li>Co A, 86th Cml Bn</li></ul> <p>(2) With its principal effort on the right, will attack at H-hour on D-day to eliminate all enemy resistance within its zone of action.</p>	<p>3. TACTICAL MISSIONS FOR SUBORDINATE UNITS.</p> <p>Implied concept: 3AD pass through IDs; seize Corps objectives in order. Initial objectives taken 2d day, DILL River crossed on 3d day.</p> <p>See next two subparas: Infantry divisions following to clear enemy forces.</p> <p>VII Corps/3 AD exploited to MARBURG on 4th day.</p>
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Figure G-30. VII Corps Field Order 18, 23 March 1945 (continued)

(3) Will assist the advance of 3d Armd Div.

(4) Will protect the NORTH flank of the Corps within its zone.

(5) Will be progressively relieved of responsibility for protecting the NORTH flank of the Corps by elements of 78th Inf Div and the 4th Cav Gp per par 3d(3) and par 3g below. d. 78th Infantry Division, Major General Edwin P. Parker, Jr., Commanding.

(1) Attachments:

76th FA Bn (25 Pdr)  
893d TD Bn (SP)  
774th Tk Bn  
552d AAA AW Bn (M)  
Co B, 86th Cml Bn

(2) Will protect the left flank of the Corps along the SIEG from the RHINE River to the EAST, relieving elements of the 1st Inf Div along the SIEG River initially as far as MERTEN (F7640) as the attack of the 1st Inf Div progresses.

e. 8th Infantry Division, Brigadier General Bryant E. Moore, Commanding.

(1) Attachments:

69th Div Arty (-879th FA Bn (105 How))  
445th AAA AW Bn (M)  
644th TD Bn (SP) (-Co C)

(2) Will continue to secure the WEST bank of the RHINE River between F383754 and F535410, preventing the passage of any enemy across the river and maintaining observation over the entire sector.

(3) Will be relieved by 86th Inf Div and assemble in Corps reserve on order CG VII Corps.

f. 86th Infantry Division, Major General Harris M. Melasky, Commanding.

Will relieve 8th Inf Div in its zone and take over the mission of securing the WEST bank of the RHINE River in its zone, preventing the passage of any enemy across the river and maintaining observation over the entire sector.

g. 4th Cavalry Group, Colonel John C. McDonald, Commanding.

Figure G-30. VII Corps Field Order 18, 23 March 1945 (continued)

- (1) Attachments:
  - 4th Cav Sq
  - 24th Cav Sq
  - 759th Lt Tk Bn (-Co B)
  - Co A, 298th Engr C Bn

(2) Will assemble by 25 March in vicinity of BONN (F5537) in corps reserve. (3) Will be prepared to defend the NORTH flank of the Corps along the SIEG River EAST of MERTEN (F7640) on order CG VII Corps, progressively relieving elements of 1st Inf Div as the attack advances.

h. VII Corps Artillery.

VII Corps Artillery will support the attack as per Annex 3, Artillery.

i. VII Corps Engineers.

Corps Engineer troops support the operation; 1120th Engr C Gp in the zone of 104th Inf Div with one battalion in support of the Div; 1106th Engr C Gp in the zone of 1st Inf Div with one battalion in support of 1st Inf Div and one battalion in support of 3d Armd Div.

j. Air Support will be provided for the operation by fighter-bombers and medium bombers of IX TAC and IX Bomb Div of NINTH AIR FORCE.

(1) No vehicles will be parked on main roads at any time.

(2) Commanders will insure that main traffic routes are cleared of road blocks and rubble and that important traffic is not impeded by halted columns.

4. Administrative Orders 114, 115, and 116.

5. a. (1) Current SOI.

b. Initial Command Posts:

- VII Corps KONIGSWINTER (F617310)
- 1st Inf Div F658307
- 8th Inf Div WEIDEN (F362606)
- 78th Inf Div NDR HOLTORF (F610375)
- 86th Inf Div to be reported.
- 104th Inf Div HONNEF (F649272)
- 3d Armd Div HONNEF (F649272)
- 4th Cav Gp BONN (F553372)

/s/ J. Lawton Collins

/t/ J. LAWTON COLLINS

Major General, U.S. Army,  
Commanding

4. ADMINISTRATIVE  
Orders included  
Supply, Evacuation,  
Traffic, Service Troops  
and Trains, Personnel,  
and miscellaneous  
paras.

Figure G-30. VII Corps Field Order 18, 23 March 1945 (continued)

1 **Appendix H**

2 **Integrating Targeting into the Operations Process**

3 This appendix discusses integrating the targeting process into the  
4 operations process with emphasis on planning. It is organized around the  
5 four targeting functions: decide, detect, deliver, assess. It discusses the  
6 decide function in terms of military decision making process tasks. Refer  
7 to FM 3-60 for targeting process details and examples of targeting  
8 products. Refer to FM 3-13 for integrating information operations  
9 targeting into both processes.

10 **THE TARGETING PROCESS AND TARGETING TEAM**

11 H-1. Targeting is a logical process that synchronizes lethal and nonlethal fires  
12 with the effects of other battlefield operating systems. It is an integral part of  
13 Army operations. Based on the commander's targeting guidance and  
14 targeting objectives, the targeting team determines what targets to attack  
15 and how, where, and when to attack them. It then assigns targets to systems  
16 best suited to achieve the desired effects. The chief of staff/executive officer  
17 leads the targeting team. Fire support, G2, G3, and Air Force representatives  
18 form its core. Other coordinating and special staffs participate as their  
19 functional areas require.

20 H-2. The Army targeting methodology is based on four functions: decide,  
21 detect, deliver, and assess (see Figure H-1, page H-2). The *decide* function  
22 occurs concurrently with planning. The *detect* function occurs during  
23 preparation and execution. The *deliver* function occurs primarily during  
24 execution, although some targets may be engaged while the command is  
25 preparing for the overall operation. The *assess* function occurs throughout the  
26 operations process but is most intense during execution.

28 H-3. The targeting pro-  
30 cess is cyclical. The com-  
32 mand's battle rhythm  
34 determines the frequen-  
36 cy of targeting team  
38 meetings. Figure H-2  
40 shows an example of a  
42 targeting team schedule  
44 that meets a command's  
46 battle rhythm.

<b>CONTENTS</b>	
<b>The Targeting Process and Targeting</b>	
Team.....	H-1
<b>Decide</b> .....	<b>H-2</b>
<b>Mission Analysis</b> .....	<b>H-3</b>
<b>Course of Action Development</b> .....	<b>H-4</b>
<b>Course of Action Analysis</b> .....	<b>H-5</b>
<b>COA Comparison and Approval and</b>	
<b>Orders Production</b> .....	<b>H-6</b>
<b>Detect</b> .....	<b>H-6</b>
<b>Deliver</b> .....	<b>H-7</b>
<b>Assess</b> .....	<b>H-7</b>

	Operations Process Activity	Targeting Process Activity	Targeting Task
<b>ASSESSMENT</b>	<b>PLANNING</b>	<b>DECIDE</b>	<p><b>Mission Analysis</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Perform TVA to develop HVTs</li> <li>• Develop targeting guidance and targeting objectives</li> </ul> <p><b>COA Development</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Designate potential HPTs</li> <li>• Deconflict and coordinate potential HPTs</li> </ul> <p><b>COA Analysis</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Develop HPTL</li> <li>• Establish TSS</li> <li>• Develop AGM</li> <li>• Determine criteria of success BDA requirements</li> </ul> <p><b>Orders Production</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Finalize HPTL</li> <li>• Finalize TSS</li> <li>• Finalize AGM</li> <li>• Submit IRs/RFIs to G2</li> </ul>
			<b>PREPARATION EXECUTION</b>
	<b>DELIVER</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Execute attacks in accordance with the AGM</li> </ul>	
			<b>ASSESS</b>

Figure H-1. Targeting Process Activities and Tasks

50 **DECIDE**

51 H-4. The *decide* function is part of the planning activity of the operations  
 52 process. It occurs concurrently with the military decision making process  
 53 (MDMP). During the decide function, the targeting team focuses and sets  
 54 priorities for intelligence collection and attack planning. Based on the  
 55 commander’s intent and concept of operations, the targeting team establishes  
 56 targeting priorities for each phase or critical event of an operation. The  
 57 following products reflect these priorities:

- 58 • **High-payoff target list.** The high-payoff target list (HPTL) is a  
 59 prioritized list of targets whose loss to the threat will contribute to the  
 60 success of the friendly course of action (COA).
- 61 • **Intelligence collection plan.** The intelligence collection plan,  
 62 prepared by the G2 and coordinated with the G3, synchronizes the  
 63 intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) effort to answer

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the priority intelligence requirements (PIR) (see FM 2-33.3). It is a major contributor to the detect and assess functions.

- **Target selection standards.** Target selection standards (TSS) establish criteria for deciding when targets are located accurately enough to attack.
- **Attack guidance matrix.** The attack guidance matrix (AGM) lists which targets or target sets to attack, how and when to attack them, and the desired effects.
- **Target synchronization matrix.** The target synchronization matrix (TSM) combines data from the HPTL, intelligence collection plan and AGM. It lists HPTs by category and the agencies responsible for detecting them, attacking them, and assessing the effects of the attacks.

The targeting team develops or contributes to these products throughout the MDMP. The commander approves them during COA approval.

79 **MISSION ANALYSIS**

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H-5. The major targeting-related products of mission analysis are high-value targets and the commander’s targeting guidance. High-value targets are identified during IPB.




Figure H-2. Targeting and Battle Rhythm

83 **Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield**

84 H-6. IPB includes preparing doctrinal templates that portray adversary forces  
85 and assets unconstrained by the environment. The G2 adjusts doctrinal  
86 templates based on terrain and weather to create situational templates that  
87 portray possible adversary COAs. These situational templates allow the  
88 targeting team to identify *high-value targets* (HVTs), assets that the threat  
89 commander requires for the successful completion of a specific course of  
90 action. The process that identifies HVTs is target value analysis (TVA).

91 **Target Value Analysis**

92 H-7. TVA yields HVTs for each enemy COA. The targeting team performs  
93 TVA for each enemy COA the G2 develops. The initial TVA sources are target  
94 spread sheets and target sheets.

95 H-8. **Target spread sheets.** Target spreadsheets identify target sets  
96 associated with adversary functions that could interfere with each friendly  
97 COA or that are key to adversary success. The fire support element usually  
98 prepares them.

99 H-9. **Target sheets.** A target sheet contains the information required to  
100 engage a target. It is a locally produced product. Target sheets state how  
101 attacking the target would affect the adversary operation.

102 **Targeting Guidance**

103 H-10. The commander's guidance, issued at the end of mission analysis,  
104 includes targeting guidance. Targeting guidance describes the desired effects  
105 of lethal and nonlethal fires. It is expressed in terms of targeting objectives  
106 (limit, disrupt, delay, divert, or destroy) or IO effects (destroy, degrade,  
107 disrupt, deny, deceive, exploit, or influence). Targeting focuses on essential  
108 adversary capabilities and functions, such as, the ability to exercise C2 of  
109 forward units, mass artillery fires, or (in stability operations) form a hostile  
110 crowd.

111 **COURSE OF ACTION DEVELOPMENT**

112 H-11. During COA development, the staff prepares feasible COAs that  
113 integrate the effects of all elements of combat power to accomplish the  
114 mission. The targeting team identifies which HVTs are potential high-payoff  
115 targets for each COA. It coordinates and deconflicts targets and establishes  
116 assessment criteria.

117 H-12. Generally, the effects of lethal attacks can be evaluated using objective,  
118 quantifiable criteria, such as the percentage of the target that is destroyed.  
119 However, evaluating nonlethal attacks may require subjective criteria and  
120 monitoring the target over time. Establishing meaningful criteria of success  
121 requires understanding the desired end state. Evaluating effects in terms of  
122 subjective criteria requires interpreting information that portrays qualitative  
123 effects and determining how these effects change over time.

124 **COURSE OF ACTION ANALYSIS**

125 H-13. COA analysis (war-gaming) is a disciplined process that staffs use to  
126 visualize the flow of a battle. During the war game, the staff decides or  
127 determines—

- 128 • Which HVTs are HPTs for each COA. When listed in priority the HPTs  
129 for the approved COA compose the HPTL.
- 130 • When to engage each HPT.
- 131 • Which system to use against each HPT.
- 132 • The desired effects of each attack, expressed in terms of the targeting  
133 objectives.
- 134 • Which HPTs require BDA.
- 135 • Which HPTs require special instructions or require coordination.

136 H-14. Based on the war game, the targeting team produces the following draft  
137 targeting products for each COA:

- 138 • High-payoff target list.
- 139 • Target selection standards.
- 140 • Attack guidance matrix.

141 **High-Payoff Target List**

142 H-15. During the war game, the staff determines which HVTs are HPTs for  
143 each COA. A *high-payoff target* is a target whose loss to the threat will  
144 contribute to the success of the friendly course of action (FM 3-60). HPTs are  
145 critical to both the adversary's needs and the friendly concept of operations.  
146 They support achieving the commander's intent and executing the concept of  
147 operations. They are determined based on the commander's targeting  
148 guidance. The HPTL is a prioritized list of HPTs.

149 **Target Selection Standards**

150 H-16. TSS are criteria applied to adversary activity (acquisitions or combat  
151 information) to decide whether the activity can be engaged as a target. TSS  
152 are usually disseminated as a matrix. Military intelligence analysts use TSS  
153 to determine targets from combat information and pass them to fire support  
154 elements for attack. Attack systems managers, such as fire control elements  
155 and fire direction centers, use TSS to determine whether to attack a potential  
156 target. The G2 and fire support coordinator determine TSS.

157 **Attack Guidance Matrix**

158 H-17. The targeting team recommends attack guidance based on the results  
159 of the war game. Attack guidance is normally disseminated as a matrix (the  
160 AGM). An AGM includes the following information, listed by target set or  
161 HPT:

- 162 • Timing of attacks (expressed as immediate, planned, or as acquired).
- 163 • Attack system assigned.
- 164 • Attack criteria (expressed as neutralize, suppress, harass, or destroy).
- 165 • Restrictions or special instructions.

166 H-18. Only one AGM is produced for execution at any point in the operation;  
 167 however, each phase of the operation may have its own matrix. To  
 168 synchronize lethal and nonlethal fires, all lethal and nonlethal attack  
 169 systems, including psychological operations and electronic attack, are placed  
 170 on the AGM. The AGM is a synchronization and integration tool. It is  
 171 normally included as part of the fire support annex. However, it is not a  
 172 tasking document. Attack tasks for unit assets are identified as taskings to  
 173 subordinate units and agencies in the body or appropriate annexes or  
 174 appendixes of the plan or order.

175 **Target Synchronization Matrix**

176 H-19. The TSM lists HPTs by category and the agencies responsible for  
 177 detecting them, attacking them, and assessing the effects of the attacks. It  
 178 combines data from the HPTL, intelligence collection plan, and AGM. A  
 179 completed TSM allows the targeting team to verify that assets have been  
 180 assigned to each targeting process task for each target. The targeting team  
 181 may prepare a TSM for each COA, or may use the HPTL, TSS, and AGM for  
 182 the war game and prepare a TSM for only the approved COA.

183 **COA COMPARISON AND APPROVAL AND ORDERS PRODUCTION**

184 H-20. After war-gaming all COAs, the staff compares them and recommends  
 185 one to the commander for approval. When the commander approves a COA,  
 186 the targeting products for that COA become the basis for targeting for the  
 187 operation. The targeting team meets to finalize the HPTL, TSS, AGM, and  
 188 input to the intelligence collection plan. The team also performs any  
 189 additional coordination required. After accomplishing these tasks, targeting  
 190 team members ensure that targeting factors that fall within their functional  
 191 areas are placed in the appropriate part of the plan or order.

192 **DETECT**

193 H-21. The *detect* function involves locating HPTs accurately enough to engage  
 194 them. It primarily entails execution of the intelligence collection plan.  
 195 Although the G2 oversees the execution of intelligence collection plan, the  
 196 collection assets themselves do not all belong to the G2. All staff agencies are  
 197 responsible for passing to the G2 information answering information  
 198 requirements that their assets collect. Conversely, the G2 is responsible for  
 199 passing combat information and intelligence to the agencies that identified  
 200 the information requirements. Sharing information allow timely evaluation of  
 201 attacks and development of new targets. Effective information management  
 202 is essential.

203 H-22. The intelligence collection plan focuses on identifying HPTs and  
 204 answering PIR. These are prioritized based on the importance of the target or  
 205 information to the concept of operations and commander's intent. Thus, there  
 206 is some overlap between the *detect* and *assess* functions. Detecting targets for  
 207 nonlethal attacks may require ISR support from higher headquarters. The  
 208 targeting team adjusts the HPTL and AGM to meet changes as the situation  
 209 develops.

210 **DELIVER**

211 H-23. The *deliver* function involves engaging targets located within the TSS  
212 according to the guidance in the AGM. HPT that are located within the TSS  
213 are tracked and engaged at the time designated in the order/AGM. Other  
214 collection assets look at HPTs that are not located accurately enough or for  
215 targets within priority target sets. When one of these is located within the  
216 TSS, its location is sent to the system that the AGM assigns to attack it. Not  
217 all HPT will be identified accurately enough to be attacked before execution.  
218 Some target sets may not have very many targets identified. Collection assets  
219 and the intelligence system develop information that locates or describes  
220 potential targets accurately enough to engage them. The HPTL sets the  
221 priority in which they accomplish this task.

222 **ASSESS**

223 H-24. Assessment occurs throughout the operations process. Targets are  
224 reattacked until the effects outlined in the AGM are achieved or until the  
225 target is no longer within the TSS. (FM 3-60 discusses assessment of the  
226 effects of lethal engagements.)

## Glossary

<b>A2C2</b>	Army airspace command and control
<b>AA</b>	assembly area
<b>AAA</b>	antiaircraft artillery (graphic only)
<b>abb</b>	abbreviated (graphic only)
<b>ABCS</b>	Army Battle Command System
<b>ACofS</b>	assistant chief of staff
<b>AD</b>	armored division
<b>ADA</b>	air defense artillery
<b>ADCON</b>	administrative control
<b>administrative control</b>	direction or exercise of authority over subordinate or other organizations in respect to administration and support, including organization of Service forces, control of resources and equipment, personnel management, unit logistics, individual and unit training, readiness, mobilization, demobilization, discipline, and other matters not included in the operational missions of the subordinate or other organizations (JP 1-02)
<b>AF</b>	Air Force
<b>AG</b>	Adjutant General
<b>AI</b>	air interdiction
<b>air interdiction</b>	air operations conducted to destroy, neutralize, or delay the enemy's military potential before it can be brought to bear effectively against friendly forces at such distance from friendly forces that detailed integration of each air mission with the fire and movement of friendly forces is not required (JP 1-02)
<b>alternate supply route</b>	A route or routes designated within an area of operations to provide for the movement of traffic when main supply routes become disabled or congested
<b>AO</b>	area of operations
<b>APO</b>	Army Post Office (graphic only)
<b>AR</b>	Army Regulation; armor
<b>area of interest</b>	that area of concern to the commander, including the area of influence, areas adjacent thereto, and extending into enemy territory to the objectives of current or planned operations. This area also includes areas occupied by enemy forces who could jeopardize the accomplishment of the mission. (JP 1-02)

<b>area of operations</b>	An operational area defined by the joint force commander for land and naval forces. Areas of operation do not typically encompass the entire operational area of the joint force commander, but should be large enough for component commanders to accomplish their missions and protect their forces. (JP 1-02)
<b>ARFOR</b>	the senior Army headquarters and all Army forces assigned or attached to a combatant command, subordinate joint force command, joint functional command, or multinational command (FM 3-0)
<b>armd</b>	armored (graphic only)
<b>Army airspace command and control</b>	those actions that ensure the synchronized use of airspace and enhance the command and control of forces using airspace (FM 3-52)
<b>arty</b>	artillery (graphic only)
<b>ASCC</b>	Army service component commands
<b>ASR</b>	alternate supply route
<b>assumption</b>	a supposition on the current situation or a presupposition on the future course of events, either or both assumed to be true in the absence of positive proof, necessary to enable the commander in the process of planning to complete an estimate of the situation and make a decision on the course of action (JP 1-02)
<b>attachment</b>	a collective term for annex, appendix, tab, and enclosure
<b>AUTL</b>	Army universal task list
<b>AW</b>	automatic weapons (graphic only)
<b>battle drill</b>	a collective action rapidly executed without applying a deliberate decision making process (FM 7-1)
<b>battlefield organization</b>	the allocation of forces in the AO by purpose. It consists of three all-encompassing categories of operations: decisive, shaping, and sustaining. (FM 3-0)
<b>battlespace</b>	the environment, factors, and conditions that must be understood to successfully apply combat power, protect the force, or complete the mission. This includes the air, land, sea, space, and the included enemy and friendly forces; facilities; weather; terrain; the electromagnetic spectrum; and the information environment within the operational areas and areas of interest. (JP 1-02)
<b>BC</b>	before Christ
<b>bde</b>	brigade (graphic only)
<b>bearing</b>	the horizontal angle at a given point, measured clockwise from a specific datum point to a second point (JP 1-02)
<b>bn</b>	battalion
<b>BOS</b>	battlefield operating systems

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<b>branch</b>	a contingency plan or course of action (an option built into the basic plan or course of action) for changing the mission, disposition, orientation, or direction of movement of the force to aid success of the current operation, based on anticipated events, opportunities, or disruptions caused by enemy actions. Army forces prepare branches to exploit success and opportunities, or to counter disruptions caused by enemy actions. (FM 3-0)
<b>C2</b>	command and control
<b>CAS</b>	close air support
<b>cav</b>	cavalry (graphic only)
<b>CCIR</b>	commander's critical information requirements
<b>cdr</b>	commander (graphic only)
<b>CHS</b>	combat health support
<b>CI</b>	counterintelligence
<b>civil affairs</b>	(Army) 1. Matters concerning the relationship between military forces located in a country or area and the civil authorities and people of that country or area, usually occurring in time of hostilities or other emergency, and normally covered by a treaty or other agreement expressed or implied. 2. Military government; the form of administration by which occupying power exercises executive, legislative, and judicial authority over occupied territory.
<b>civil-military operations</b>	the complex of activities in support of military operations embracing the interaction between the military force and civilian authorities fostering the development of favorable emotions, attitudes, and behavior in neutral, friendly, or hostile groups (JP 1-02)
<b>CJCSM</b>	chairman, joint chiefs of staff manual
<b>close air support</b>	air action by fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft against hostile targets which are in close proximity to friendly forces and which require detailed integration of each air mission with the fire and movement of those forces (JP 1-02)
<b>Cml</b>	chemical (graphic only)
<b>CMO</b>	civil-military operations
<b>co.</b>	company (graphic only)
<b>COA</b>	course of action
<b>CofS</b>	chief of staff
<b>COL</b>	colonel
<b>*collaborative planning</b>	is the real-time interaction among commanders and staffs at two or more echelons developing plans for a particular operation
<b>COLT</b>	combat observation and lasing team

- combat observation and lasing team** (Army) A fire support team controlled at the brigade level that is capable of target acquisition under reduced visibility conditions and has both laser-rangefinding and laser-designating capabilities
- combat power** the total means of destructive and/or disruptive force that a military unit/formation can apply against the opponent at a given time (JP 1-02).
- combat service support** The essential capabilities, functions, activities, and tasks necessary to sustain all elements of operating forces in theater at all levels of war. Within the national and theater logistic systems, it includes but is not limited to that support rendered by service forces in ensuring the aspects of supply, maintenance, transportation, health services, and other services required by aviation and ground combat troops to permit those units to accomplish their missions in combat. Combat service support encompasses those activities at all levels of war that produce sustainment to all operating forces on the battlefield. (Army) CSS also include those activities in stability operations and support operations that sustain all operating forces.
- combat support** (Army) critical combat functions provided by units and soldiers in conjunction with combat arms units and soldiers to secure victory (FM 3-90)
- command and control** (Army) the exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated commander over assigned and attached forces in the accomplishment of the mission (FM 6-0)
- commander's critical information requirements** elements of information required by commanders that directly affect decision making and dictate the successful execution of military operations (FM 3-0)
- commander's intent** a clear, concise statement of what the force must do and the conditions the force must meet to succeed with respect to the enemy, terrain, and the desired end state (FM 3-0)
- commander's visualization** the process of developing a clear understanding of the current state with relation to the enemy and environment, envisioning a desired end state which represents mission accomplishment, and then subsequently visualizing the sequence of activity that moves the force from its current state to the end state (FM 6-0)
- common operational picture** an operational picture tailored to the user's requirements, based on common data and information shared by more than one command (FM 3-0)
- \*constraint** a restriction placed on the command by a higher command. A constraint dictates an action or inaction, thus restricting the freedom of action a subordinate commander has for planning.
- \*contingency plan** (Army) a plan that provides for accomplishing different, anticipated major events before, during, and after an operation. Contingency plans take the form of branches or sequels.

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<b>controlled supply rate</b>	(Army) The rate of ammunition consumption that can be supported, considering availability, facilities, and transportation. It is expressed in rounds per unit, individual, or vehicle per day. The Army service component commander announces the CSR for each item of ammunition, and, in turn, the commander of each subordinate tactical unit announces a CSR to his commanders at the next lower levels. A unit may not draw ammunition in excess of its CSR without authority from its next higher headquarters.
<b>COP</b>	common operational picture
<b>counterintelligence</b>	information gathered and activities conducted to protect against espionage, other intelligence activities, sabotage, or assassinations conducted by or on behalf of foreign governments or elements thereof, foreign organizations, or foreign persons, or international terrorist activities (JP 1-02)
<b>course of action</b>	(Army) <b>1.</b> Any sequence of acts that an individual or a unit may follow. <b>2.</b> A possible plan open to an individual or a commander that would accomplish or is related to accomplishment of the mission. <b>3.</b> A feasible way to accomplish a task or mission that follows the guidance given, will not result in undue damage or risk to the command, and is noticeably different from other actions being considered.
<b>CP</b>	command post
<b>CS</b>	combat support
<b>CSR</b>	controlled supply rate
<b>CSS</b>	combat service support
<b>date-time group</b>	the date and time, expressed in digits and time zone suffix, at which the message was prepared for transmission. (Expressed as six digits followed by the time zone suffix; first pair of digits denotes the date, second pair the hours, third pair the minutes, followed by a three-letter month abbreviation and two-digit year abbreviation.) (JP 1-02)
<b>decision making</b>	selecting a course of action as the one most favorable to accomplish the mission (FM 6-0)
<b>decision point</b>	the point in space and time where the commander or staff anticipates making a decision concerning a specific friendly course of action. A decision point is usually associated with a specific target area of interest, and is located in time and space to permit the commander sufficient lead time to engage the adversary in the targeted area of interest. Decision points may also be associated with the friendly force and the status of ongoing operations (JP 1-02)
<b>decision support template</b>	a graphic record of wargaming. The decision support template depicts decision points, timelines associated with the movement of forces and the flow of the operation, and other key items of

	information required to execute a specific friendly course of action (JP 1-02).
<b>DEH</b>	director of engineering and housing
<b>deliberate operation</b>	an operation in which a commander's detailed intelligence concerning the situation allows him to develop and coordinate detailed plans, including multiple branches and sequels. He task organizes his forces specifically for the operation to provide a fully synchronized combined arms team. He conducts extensive rehearsals while conducting shaping operations to set the conditions for the conduct of his decisive operation. (FM 3-90)
<b>direct support</b>	a support relationship requiring a force to support another specific force and authorizing it to answer directly to the supported force's request for assistance (JP 1-02)
<b>div</b>	division
<b>divarty</b>	division artillery
<b>DOL</b>	director of logistics
<b>DP</b>	decision point
<b>DPTM</b>	director of plans, training, and mobilization
<b>DRM</b>	director of resource management
<b>DS</b>	direct support
<b>DSA</b>	division support area
<b>DST</b>	decision support template
<b>DTG</b>	date-time group
<b>EAC</b>	echelons above corps
<b>echelons above corps</b>	(Army) Army headquarters and organizations that provide the interface between the theater commander (joint or multinational) and the corps for operational matters
<b>electronic warfare</b>	Any military action involving the use of electromagnetic and directed energy to control the electromagnetic spectrum or to attack the enemy. The three major subdivisions within electronic warfare are: electronic attack, electronic protection, and electronic warfare support. (JP 3-51) See JP 1-02 for the subdivisions.
<b>encl</b>	enclosure
<b>end state</b>	(Army) at the operational and tactical levels, the conditions that, when achieved, accomplish the mission. At the operational level, these conditions attain the aims set for the campaign or major operation. (FM 3-0, <i>Operations</i> )
<b>enemy prisoner of war</b>	Enemy personnel captured during operations conducted in war or combat, or stability and support operations
<b>enr</b>	engineer (graphic only)

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<b>EPW</b>	enemy prisoner of war
<b>*essential task</b>	a task that must be executed to accomplish the mission
<b>EW</b>	electronic warfare
<b>excl</b>	exclusive (graphic only)
<b>*execution matrix</b>	a visual and sequential representation of the critical tasks and responsible organizations by phase for a tactical operation
<b>FA</b>	field artillery
<b>family of scatterable mines</b>	A grouping of munitions that dispense scatterable mines (scatmines) by artillery, helicopter, fixed wing, or ground launchers. There are antipersonnel and antitank mines. All US scatmines self-destruct at preset times. The self-destruct times depend on the type of munition.
<b>FASCAM</b>	family of scatterable mines
<b>FEBA</b>	forward edge of the battle area
<b>FFIR</b>	friendly force information requirements
<b>FLOT</b>	forward line of own troops
<b>FM</b>	field manual
<b>forward edge of the battle area</b>	the foremost limits of a series of areas in which ground combat units are deployed, excluding the areas in which the covering or screening forces are operating, designated to coordinate fire support, the positioning of forces, or the maneuver of units (JP 1-02)
<b>forward line of own troops</b>	(Army) A line which indicates the most forward positions of friendly forces in any kind of military operation at a specific time. The forward line of own troops normally identifies the forward location of covering and screening forces. (FM 3-90)
<b>fragmentary order</b>	an abbreviated form of an operation order (verbal, written or digital) usually issued on a day-to-day basis that eliminates the need for restating information contained in a basic operation order. It may be issued in sections. It is issued after an operation order to change or modify that order or to execute a branch or sequel to that order (JP 1-02).
<b>FRAGO</b>	fragmentary order
<b>friendly force information requirements</b>	information that the commander and staff need about the forces available for the operation (FM 6-0)
<b>FSCL</b>	fire support coordination line
<b>G1</b>	assistant chief of staff, personnel
<b>G2</b>	assistant chief of staff, intelligence
<b>G3</b>	assistant chief of staff, operations
<b>G4</b>	assistant chief of staff, logistics

<b>G5</b>	assistant chief of staff, civil-military operations
<b>G6</b>	assistant chief of staff, communications
<b>G7</b>	assistant chief of staff, information operations
<b>GE</b>	Germany
<b>GEN</b>	general
<b>*general support</b>	a support relationship assigned to a unit to support the force as a whole and not to any particular subdivision thereof
<b>*general support-reinforcing</b>	a support relationship assigned to a unit to support the force as a whole and to reinforce another similar-type unit
<b>Gp</b>	group (graphic only)
<b>GS</b>	general support
<b>GSR</b>	general support-reinforcing
<b>hasty operation</b>	an operation in which a commander directs his immediately available forces, using fragmentary orders, to perform activities with minimal preparation, trading planning and preparation time for speed of execution (FM 3-90)
<b>high-value target</b>	Assets that the threat commander requires for the successful completion of a specific course of action
<b>HN</b>	host nation
<b>host nation</b>	a nation which receives the forces and/or supplies of allied or coalition nations and/or organizations to be located on, to operate in, or to transit through its territory
<b>how</b>	howitzer (graphic only)
<b>HQ</b>	headquarters
<b>HVT</b>	high-value target
<b>IAW</b>	in accordance with
<b>ID</b>	infantry division
<b>IEW</b>	intelligence and electronic warfare
<b>*implied task</b>	a task that must be performed to accomplish the mission, but is not stated in the higher headquarters order
<b>IN</b>	infantry
<b>inf</b>	infantry (graphic only)
<b>information operations</b>	(Army) actions taken to affect adversary, and influence others', decision making processes, information and information systems while protecting one's own information and information systems
<b>information requirements</b>	(Army) all of the information elements required by the commander and his staff for the successful execution of operations, that is, all elements necessary to address the factors of METT-TC (FM 6-0)

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<b>INFOSYS</b>	information systems
<b>intel</b>	intelligence (graphic only)
<b>intelligence preparation of the battlefield</b>	a systematic approach to analyzing the enemy and environment (for example, weather, terrain and civil considerations) in a specific geographic area. It integrates enemy doctrine with the weather, terrain, and civil considerations as they relate to the mission and the specific environment. This is done to determine and evaluate enemy capabilities, vulnerabilities, and probable courses of action. (FM 2-01.3)
<b>IO</b>	information operations
<b>IPB</b>	intelligence preparation of the battlefield
<b>IR</b>	information requirements
<b>ISR</b>	intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
<b>JOPES</b>	Joint Operation Planning and Execution System
<b>JP</b>	joint publication
<b>JTF</b>	<b>joint task force</b>
<b>key tasks</b>	tasks that the force must perform or conditions the force must meet to achieve the stated purpose of the operation (FM 6-0)
<b>LC</b>	line of contact
<b>LD</b>	line of departure
<b>line of contact</b>	a general trace delineating the location where friendly and enemy forces are engaged (FM 3-90)
<b>line of departure</b>	a phase line crossed at a prescribed time by troops initiating an offensive operation (FM 3-90)
<b>LLTR</b>	low-level transit route
<b>LNO</b>	liaison officer
<b>low-level transit route</b>	a temporary corridor of defined dimensions established in the forward area to minimize the risk to friendly aircraft from friendly air defenses or surface forces (JP 1-02)
<b>lt</b>	light (graphic only)
<b>LTC</b>	lieutenant colonel
<b>LTIOV</b>	last time information is of value
<b>M</b>	mechanized (graphic only)
<b>MACOM</b>	major Army command
<b>MCOO</b>	modified combined obstacle overlay
<b>MDMP</b>	military decision making process
<b>mech</b>	mechanized (graphic only)
<b>MEDEVAC</b>	medical evaluation

<b>medical evaluation</b>	the timely and efficient movement of patients while providing <i>en route</i> medical care to and between medical treatment facilities (FM 4-02)
<b>METT-TC</b>	the major subject categories into which relevant information is grouped for military operations: mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, and civil considerations (in tactics, the major factors considered during mission analysis) (FM 6-0)
<b>MFR</b>	memorandum for record
<b>MG</b>	major general
<b>MGRS</b>	Military Grid Reference System
<b>*military decision making process</b>	a planning tool that establishes techniques for analyzing a mission, developing, analyzing, and comparing courses of action against criteria of success and each other, selecting the optimum course of action, and producing a plan or order
<b>mission command</b>	the conduct of military operations through decentralized execution based upon mission orders for effective mission accomplishment (FM 6-0)
<b>mission orders</b>	a technique for completing combat orders that allows subordinates maximum freedom of planning and action to accomplish missions and leaves the “how” of mission accomplishment to the subordinates (FM 6-0)
<b>mission-oriented protective posture</b>	A flexible system for protection against a chemical or biological attack devised to maximize the unit’s ability to accomplish its mission in a toxic environment. This posture permits maximum protection from chemical or biological attack without unacceptable reduction in efficiency.
<b>MOPP</b>	mission-oriented protective posture
<b>movement order</b>	an order issued by a commander covering the details for a move of the command (JP 1-02)
<b>MP</b>	military police
<b>MSR</b>	main supply route
<b>mtns</b>	mountains
<b>NA</b>	not applicable
<b>NAI</b>	named area of interest
<b>named area of interest</b>	the geographical area where information that will satisfy a specific information requirement can be collected (FM 3-90)
<b>NATO</b>	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
<b>NBC</b>	nuclear, biological, and chemical
<b>o/o</b>	on order
<b>OBJ</b>	objective (graphic only)

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<b>OPCON</b>	operational control
<b>operational control</b>	Transferable command authority that may be exercised by commanders at any echelon at or below the level of combatant command. Operational control is inherent in combatant command (command authority). Operational control may be delegated and is the authority to perform those functions of command over subordinate forces involving organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction necessary to accomplish the mission. Operational control includes authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations and joint training necessary to accomplish missions assigned to the command. Operational control should be exercised through the commanders of subordinate organizations. Normally this authority is exercised through subordinate joint force commanders and Service and/or functional component commanders. Operational control normally provides full authority to organize commands and forces and to employ those forces as the commander in operational control considers necessary to accomplish assigned missions. Operational control does not, in and of itself, include authoritative direction for logistics or matters of administration, discipline, internal organization, or unit training. (JP 1-02)
<b>operational picture</b>	a single display of relevant information within a commander's area of interest (FM 3-0)
<b>operation order</b>	a directive issued by a commander to subordinate commanders for the purpose of effecting the coordinated execution of an operation. (JP 1-02)
<b>*operation plan</b>	(Army) any plan for the preparation, execution, and assessment of military operations (The Army definition eliminates details of the joint definition that apply only to joint operations. See JP 5-0.)
<b>operations security</b>	A process of identifying critical information and subsequently analyzing friendly actions attendant to military operations and other activities to: <b>a.</b> Identify those actions that can be observed by adversary intelligence systems. <b>b.</b> Determine indicators hostile intelligence systems might obtain that could be interpreted or pieced together to derive critical information in time to be useful to adversaries. <b>c.</b> Select and execute measures that eliminate or reduce to an acceptable level the vulnerabilities of friendly actions to adversary exploitation. (JP 1-02)
<b>OPLAN</b>	operation plan
<b>OPORD</b>	operation order
<b>OPSEC</b>	operations security
<b>order</b>	a communication, written, oral, or by signal, which conveys instructions from a superior to a subordinate. In a broad sense, the terms "order" and "command" are synonymous. However, an

	order implies discretion as to the details of execution whereas a command does not. (JP 1-02)
<b>*overlay order</b>	a technique used to issue an order (normally a fragmentary order) that has abbreviated instructions written on an overlay
<b>p.</b>	page
<b>PA</b>	public affairs
<b>par</b>	paragraph (graphic only)
<b>*parallel planning</b>	two or more echelons planning for an operation nearly simultaneously
<b>paras</b>	paragraphs (graphic only)
<b>pdr</b>	pounder (graphic only) refers to British artillery units identified by weight of rounds
<b>ph</b>	phase
<b>phase line</b>	a line utilized for control and coordination of military operations, usually a terrain feature extending across the operational area [JP 1-02 uses <i>zone of action</i> ] (JP 1-02)
<b>PIR</b>	priority intelligence requirements
<b>PL</b>	phase line
<b>*plan</b>	a design for a future or an anticipated operation
<b>planning</b>	the means by which the commander envisions a desired outcome, lays out effective ways of achieving it, and communicates to his subordinates his vision, intent, and decisions, focusing on the results he expects to achieve (FM 3-0, <i>Operations</i> )
<b>*planning horizons</b>	points in time the commander uses to focus the organization's planning efforts to shape future events
<b>PM</b>	provost marshal
<b>POTF</b>	psychological operations task force
<b>pp</b>	pages (graphic only)
<b>priority intelligence requirements</b>	those intelligence requirements for which a commander has an anticipated and stated priority in his task of planning and decision-making (JP 1-02)
<b>psychological operations</b>	Planned operations to convey selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups, and individuals. The purpose of psychological operations is to induce or reinforce foreign attitudes and behavior favorable to the originator's objectives. (JP 1-02)
<b>PSYOP</b>	psychological operations
<b>R</b>	reinforcing

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<b>*reinforcing</b>	a support relationship in which one unit augments the capability of another similar-type unit
<b>relevant information</b>	all information of importance to commanders and staffs in the exercise of command and control (FM 3-0)
<b>risk management</b>	the process of identifying, assessing, and controlling risks arising from operational factors, and making decisions that balance risk cost with mission benefits (FM 5-19)
<b>ROE</b>	rules of engagement
<b>rules of engagement</b>	directives issued by competent military authority which delineate the circumstances and limitations under which US forces will initiate and/or continue combat engagement with other forces encountered (JP 1-02)
<b>S1</b>	battalion or brigade personnel staff officer
<b>S2</b>	battalion or brigade intelligence staff officer
<b>S3</b>	battalion or brigade operations staff officer
<b>S4</b>	battalion or brigade logistics staff officer
<b>S5</b>	battalion or brigade civil-military operations staff officer
<b>S6</b>	battalion or brigade communications staff officer
<b>S7</b>	battalion or brigade information operations staff officer
<b>sequel</b>	an operation that follows the current operation. Sequels are future operations that anticipate the possible outcomes—success, failure, or stalemate—of the current operation. (FM 3-0)
<b>*service support order</b>	an order that directs the service support of operations, including administrative movements
<b>*service support plan</b>	plan that provides information and instructions covering service support for an operation
<b>SITEMP</b>	situation template
<b>SOI</b>	signal operating instructions
<b>SOP</b>	standing operating procedure
<b>SP</b>	self propelled (graphic only)
<b>*specified task</b>	a task specifically assigned to a unit by its higher headquarters
<b>SSORD</b>	service support order
<b>SSPLAN</b>	service support plan
<b>*staff estimate</b>	an assessment of a course of action by a staff element that assists the commander in visualization and decision making. It is an evaluation of how factors in a staff section's functional area will influence the course of action the commander is considering.
<b>standing operating procedure</b>	A set of instructions covering those features of operations which lend themselves to a definite or standardized procedure

	without loss of effectiveness. The procedure is applicable unless ordered otherwise. (JP 1-02)
<b>subparas</b>	subparagraphs (graphic only)
<b>supply point</b>	(Army) a location where supplies, services, and materiel are located and issued. These locations are temporary and mobile, normally being occupied for up to 72 hours.
<b>supporting plan</b>	an operation plan prepared by a supporting commander or a subordinate commander to satisfy the requests or requirements of the supported commander's plan (JP 5-0)
<b>SUPPT</b>	supply point
<b>*synchronization matrix</b>	a format for the staff to record the results of wargaming and synchronize a course of action across time, space, and purpose in relation to an enemy course of action.
<b>tac</b>	tactical (refers to the tactical command post)
<b>TAC</b>	Tactical Air Command (graphic only) obsolete term
<b>TACON</b>	tactical control
<b>tactical combat force</b>	(Army) A dedicated force controlled by the rear area commander.
<b>tactical control</b>	Command authority over assigned or attached forces or commands, or military capability or forces made available for tasking, that is limited to the detailed and, usually, local direction and control of movements or maneuvers necessary to accomplish missions or tasks assigned. Tactical control is inherent in operational control. Tactical control may be delegated to, and exercised at any level at or below the level of combatant command. (JP 1-02)
<b>TAI</b>	targeted area of interest
<b>targeted area of interest</b>	(Army) the geographical area or point along a mobility corridor where successful interdiction causes the enemy to abandon a particular course of action or requires him to use specialized engineer support to continue. It is where he can be acquired and engaged by friendly forces (FM 3-90)
<b>task</b>	a clearly defined and measurable activity accomplished by individuals and organizations. Tasks are specific activities that contribute to the accomplishment of encompassing missions or other requirements (FM 7-0)
<b>task force</b>	(Army) A battalion-sized unit of the combat arms consisting of a battalion control headquarters, with at least one of its major organic subordinate elements (a company), and the attachment of at least one company-sized element of another combat or combat support arm. (See also task organization.) A component of a fleet organized by the commander of a task fleet or higher authority for the accomplishment of a specific task or tasks.

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<b>task organizing</b>	the process of allocating available assets to subordinate commanders and establishing their command and support relationships (FM 3-0)
<b>TCF</b>	tactical combat force
<b>TD</b>	tank destroyer (graphic only)
<b>tempo</b>	the rate of military action (FM 3-0)
<b>TF</b>	task force
<b>time phase line</b>	a line used to represent the movement of forces or the flow of an operation over time. It usually represents the location of forces at various increments of time, such as lines that show unit locations at two-hour intervals. Time phase lines should account for the effects of the battlefield environment and the anticipated effects of contact with other forces. For example, time phase lines depicting threat movement through an area occupied by friendly forces should use movement rates based on a force in contact with the enemy rather than convoy movement speeds. (FM 2-01.3)
<b>Tk</b>	tank (graphic only)
<b>TLP</b>	troop leading procedures
<b>TPL</b>	time phase line
<b>*troop leading procedures</b>	a sequence of activities used by small unit leaders to plan and prepare for operations
<b>UAV</b>	unmanned aerial vehicle
<b>USC</b>	United States Code
<b>visualization</b>	<i>see</i> commander's visualization
<b>Vol.</b>	volume
<b>warning order</b>	a preliminary notice of an order or action which is to follow (JP 1-02)
<b>WARNO</b>	warning order
<b>WMD</b>	weapons of mass destruction
<b>XO</b>	executive officer

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